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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of science and public participation in
environmental policy-making processes in Australia. To this end, I analyse the Western
Australian Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process, a recent Australian Federal
Government initiative designed to resolve a longstanding dispute over native forest use
and management.

Theoretically underpinned by an open systems approach, the thesis employs a case study
method for the analysis of the RFA process, using data from three distinct sources;
interviews, RFA-related literature, and media content. The analysis of the RFA occurs
against the historical background to this policy process and in context of contemporary
discussions on science and public participation in natural resource conflicts. Interview
data is used for the construction of a meta-narrative of the RFA from multiple
stakeholder perspectives as a means of learning about the inclusiveness of, and the
treatment of science during, the RFA process. The interview data is analysed using an
adaptation of discourse analysis, the findings of which are integrated with information
derived from the other data sources. This combined data set is then used to inform a
systems critique of the Western Australian RFA process in view of gauging its perceived
strengths and weaknesses.

The analysis reveals a sense of systemic failure in the management of the Western
Australian RFA, pointing towards a process and governing structures which constrained
opportunities for stakeholder input and deliberation-based decision-making. A range of
cultural, socio-political, and personality-based issues are seen to have given rise to
constraints, underlying which is found to be an economic rationality subtly driving a
systemic closure of political structures and processes.

The resultant degree of

closedness is shown to have caused an insensitivity of the political apparatus towards
community opposition to, and scientific concerns about, commercial forestry, which is
understood to have contributed to the social and political rejection of the process and
its outcomes.

In this thesis I unearth a paradox arising out of the political need to reduce and simplify
the complexity inherent in messy socio-ecological affairs but in doing so adding

complexity due to political over-simplification. The findings suggest that the political
process depends on the trimming of complexity for pragmatic reasons but that, at the
same time, the politicality of such closure demands deliberative approaches to negotiate
the terms of closing so as to attain sustainable process outcomes.

This thesis echoes calls from the literature in support of political and scientific
pluralism. An opening of political structures and processes is suggested to enable and
facilitate active stakeholder participation and decision-making. Similarly, it is argued that
science also needs to become more open towards alternative, yet equally valid, modes of
knowing and understanding so as to avert threats to its relevance and trustworthiness in
political processes dealing with complex socio-ecological problems. Complex problems
demand problem solving with.requisite complexity. An openness of politics and science
and the processes they engage in invites variety of perspective, which in tum increases
capacity to deal effectively with socio-ecological messes.

Finally, this thesis understands the dominance of economic rationality as a constraint for
environmental policy-making, working against notions of openness and plurality and
thus precluding trans-formational change in the structure, mode, and outcomes, of
political decision-making. For its implicitness this constraint has so far defied needed
societal reflection on its implications for science, society, politics, and nature, which is
why this thesis stresses the need for explication and for searching pathways towards
more balanced rationalities in policy making processes.
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Chapter One
Introduction and Thesis Background
Introduction

When I arrived in Western Australia (WA) in 1995, a national debate about native
forests captured my attention as it gained renewed momentum. I soon learned that this
rapidly intensifying debate was triggered by a new approach to forest policy taken by the
Commonwealth Government of Australia\ an approach purported to bring an end to a
long-standing dispute over the use and management of the country's native forests.
Back then, however, it was not foreseeable that this government initiative was going to
be the catalyst for Western Australia's yet largest wave of environmental protests and a
trigger for civil disobedience, violence, political upheaval, and electoral defeat of the
ruling State Government in response to an environmental policy process.

The events in Western Australia, which I will describe shortly, have directed my
attention to the area of environmental policy-making in Australia.

With a personal

interest in ecologically sustainable development (ESD), I regard research in the area of
environmental policy-making as complementary to ESD and its operationalisation
because I view policy processes as potential drivers for sustainability. ESD, which is
centred around notions of ecology, equity, futurity, and democracy (United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, 1992; Palmer et al., 1997), explicitly
incorporates science and public participation (see United Nations Division for
Sustainable Development, 1992; Beder, 1996). Operationally, the advancement of the
sustainability agenda is, to a large degree, dependent on environmental policy-making,
which also draws on science and public input.

In that sense, science and public

participation form a link between sustainability and environmental policy. Against this
background, the Western Australian experience made me wonder how an acceptance of
political processes, and lasting policy outcomes, could be realised and what the role of

1

Based on its Constitution of 1901 Australia has a federal system of government. Under this system,

powers are distributed between a federal government (the Commonwealth) and six states (New South
Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South Australia, Tasmania (Tas), Victoria (Vic), and Western Australia
(WA) and three Territories (Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the Northern Territory (NT), and
Norfolk Island) which have self-government arrangements (see Parliament of Australia, 2003).
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both science and the public within processes of environmental policy formulation could,
or should, be. It is these issues that are going to be the main preoccupation of this
thesis, the focus of which I clarify and refine below.

I consider the politics of the environment topical because it is a policy area which is
becoming increasingly complex and critical. While it is true that science is improving
our understanding of economy-ecology relations and ecological processes per se (see for
instance Perrings et al., 1995; Lenton, 1998), we are faced with problems when
attempting the inculcation of these newly gained insights in political decision-making
processes.

Problems arise because not only do demands for extended planning

horizons, precaution in the face of uncertainty, and still poorly understood notions of
carrying capacity, connectivity, and inter-dependence lead to high degrees of complexity
but they also collide with increasingly market-driven, short-term focused demands
placed on natural systems by a globalised world economy.

The concomitant

intensification of natural resource exploitation sharply raises the environmental stakes
for political decision makers as environmental impacts reach ever more critical levels.
In other words, there is progressively less room for error regarding humanity's approach
towards the biophysical environment (on this point see World Resources Institute, 2000;
Flavin et al., 2002), and therefore, vigilant environmental policy-making and
management are imperative.

The ill-effects of rapid economic expansion have given rise to the notion of
environmental crisis, which in turn has triggered the emergence of sustainability as a
new development paradigm. ESD, although it can be traced back to the 1960s (e.g.
Carson, 1962), was popularised by the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on
Environment and Development, 1987) in the late 1980s. Since then, sustainability has
registered on the political compasses of environmental policy makers world-wide. Yet,
despite more than 15 years of theoretical (e.g. Basagio, 1995; Palmer et al., 1997;
Buchdahl & Raper, 1998) and empirical (e.g. Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 2000; O'Riordan
& Stoll-Kleemann, 2002b) work in the area, the implementation efforts by the

international community hitherto have been disappointing (see foreword of Kofi Annan
in Flavin et al., 2002; O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002b). The reasons behind the
slow progress towards implementing ESD are manifold; they relate to a range of factors
which are in part systemic (i.e., linked to economic and political apparatuses), and in part

2

cultural. The cultural dominance of economic rationalism (Gare, 2002) or marketisation
(Davers, 2002), the prevalence of a consumer ethic (Saul, 1997; Theobald, 1997), an
acculturated growth fetish (Hamilton, 2003), as well as commercial and political shorttermism (Brown, 2001) may serve here as examples. All these factors act as constraints
on sustainability efforts.

In recent years, a number of trends, working against these cultural and systemic
constraints, have become discernible.

The literature speaks of a "backlash against

perceived economic, social and political domination" (Cuthill, 2002, p.82) and a growing
disquiet about resultant community disempowerment.

The renewed interest in

participative democracies (see for instance Saul, 1997; Theobald, 1997; Owens, 2000)
and the resurgence of the literature on public participation in environmental and natural
resource conflicts (see for instance Tuler & Webler, 1999; Overdevest, 2000; Buchy &
Race, 2001) may also be indicative of the trend articulated by Cuthill (2002).

The

growing demand for public input in political decision-making processes has profound
implications for environmental policy makers because these changes in public attitude
are likely to lead to challenges to existing decision-making processes and structures.
Furthermore, they can lead to community disputes about underlying assumptions in
environmental decision making and to questions about the validity of scientific advice.
Changes in public sentiment ultimately increase the complexity of the environmental
policy-making process.

Changes in public attitude also increase the potential for conflict as evidenced by the
intensification of conflicts over natural resource use and management over the last 30
years.

This intensification, while perhaps predominantly an indication of growing

resource scarcity, may also attest to a public reaction towards economic and/ or political
domination. The North-Atlantic fisheries, forestry in Canada and the USA, and mining
in the UK are prominent examples of such disputes. Australia has not been immune to
environmental conflicts (e.g., Fraser Island, Franklin River, Jabiluka Mine) (Scholes et
al., 1983; Wilderness Society, 1983; Henkel & Canin, 1999). In fact, being a resourcebased economy, Australia is particularly prone to disagreements over the allocation and
utilisation of its natural assets.

In this context, the forest debate mentioned in the

opening paragraph of this chapter has been a dispute of particular endurance and
intensity. This well documented debate (see for instance Routley & Routley, 1975;

3

Nicholson & Pople, 1977; Cullen, 1986; Dargavel, 1995; Mercer, 1995) is one of the
most long-standing and dates back to the 1960s. It is largely seen to be the product of
ideological differences fuelled by perceived economic imperatives, the absence of
scientific certainty in forestry practices, fractious Federal-State relations, and the
electoral significance of forest policy in general (Chindarsi, 1997; Lane, 1999; Slee,
2001). In the past, various government initiatives at the state and federal level, which
intended to resolve or at least dampen these controversies, largely failed and even, at
times, increased the polarisation between the various protagonists (Dargavel, 1998). Ad
hoc crisis-management by successive governments ostensibly lacked an understanding
of the symbolic and ideological factors involved in forest disputes (Syme, 1992; Lane,
1999) and tended to ignore public/ stakeholder views to the extent that these attempts at
crisis resolution were dubbed participatory rituals (Mercer, 1995).

The forest debate I witnessed during the 1990s promised to be different and to resolve
the enduring conflict. In 1992, a national forest policy was announced by the Federal
Government, heralding a new approach to forest use, conservation, and management.
The National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) spoke of conflict resolution and certainty
for all stakeholders via the establishment of comprehensive, adequate, representative
(CAR) forest reserve systems, the development of an internationally competitive and
sustainable native timber ind1,1stry, and the implementation of ecologically sustainable
forest management practices (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a). The vehicle for the
realisation of this national forest policy became known as the Regional Forest
Agreement (RFA). RFAs represented individual, 20 year long, agreements entered into
by the Commonwealth and all State and Territory Governments, which - based on
science and intensive community consultation (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a) sought to regulate native forest use, conservation, and management in delineated forest
areas.

In Western Australia, a considerable amount of time and public money was spent,
involving many scientists and the public in the RFA process. Nonetheless, the process
and the resulting agreement attracted widespread public and scientific condemnation.
Indeed, the public outcry triggered by the WA RFA led to the amendment of the
original agreement by the WA State Government only eight weeks after it was first
signed. To me it was bewildering that the WA RFA - going by appearances - did not
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deliver widely acceptable outcomes despite its much emphasised scientific and
consultative thrust. This is why in this thesis I will interrogate the WA RFA process and
its outcomes, concentrating in particular on the scientific and participatory nature of the
process.

Research Problem
This thesis is based on the proposition that the science of the WA RFA and the kind of
public participation enabled during the process were at the heart of the public's negative
response to the process and the outcomes it delivered.

In light of this working

hypothesis, this study seeks to identify:

•

the degree to which public participation was enabled in the WA RFA process;

•

the level of community input desired by WA RFA process participants; and

•

the role of science/ scientists played in the WA RFA process.

In general terms, I wish to determine:

•

the factors that determine an adequate level of public input in political processes;

•

the role science could/ should play in an environmental policy-making context; and

•

the kind of science that is required for effective environmental policy-making.

With regard to earlier references to a perceived public backlash against a range of social,
economic, and political constraints affecting environmental policy-making, I will
attempt an assessment of the public reaction towards the WA RFA, looking for
discernible signs of process constraints. Therefore, an additional aim is to determine
the:

•

factors constraining environmental policy-making and assess their implications
for policy processes.

The assumptions implicit in the research proposition from which this thesis evolves are
a starting position only. A final analysis of the data presented throughout this thesis will
help determine the validity of the assumptions made.
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Nature of Thesis
At this point, I wish to make explicit that this thesis is trans-disciplinary in nature,
meaning that it does not fall into a discrete disciplinary area. In contrast to traditional
approaches, this work does not necessarily seek to embed this thesis within an existing
school of thought nor does it seek to erect new academic boundaries. Instead, this
study seeks to integrate traditionally disparate modes of knowing and to employ
different

forms

of knowledge

construction

for

the

purpose

of identifying

complementarities and room for cross-fertilisation among established disciplines.
Therefore, this work should not be seen in light of established norms for disciplinebound work but viewed as an attempt of working against barriers of holistic, academic
inquiry.

The structure of this thesis is intended to reflect the exploratory nature of this project.
In light of the amount of contextual information and wide range of literature covered in
this work, a number of theme-specific literature reviews will be presented throughout
the thesis. These will be synthesised in Chapter Seven. For the sake of clarity and
manageability, this thesis deviates from the conventional scientific report writing format
as such a design would have proven impractical. More detail on thesis format can be
found in the methods section in Chapter Two.

Finally, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Two, this thesis employs a relativistic approach
for the exploration of perceptions, world views, and perspectives. This exploration is
not aimed at the establishment of objective truths but - via a dialogical approach - at the
construction of synthesised realities reflective of their originators' perceptions. In other
words, this study intends to give a voice to its research participants and to integrate their
views in an attempt to make sense of an opaque, highly complex and politicised social
issue. Again, these and other methodological issues will be addressed in more detail in
Chapter Two.

Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this introductory chapter.
Additional information is included in ten printed appendices, and a further 26
appendices are provided in electronic form (see CD-ROM), the purpose of which I will
explain later on.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Methods
In this chapter I introduce the commons problematique as a means of framing the WA
RFA. Attention will be directed to a socio-ecological commons perspective which is
derived from open systems theory and will serve as this study's theoretical framework. I
provide detail on the theory's conceptual evolution and argue for its applicability to the
case of the WA RFA. Subsequently, I introduce my research design and methods of
choice for the purposes of this study. In particular, I provide detail on my case study
design and the use of discourse analysis for the treatment of the case study data. Finally,
I elaborate on my approach to data collection and analysis and present a rationale for its
appropriateness.

Chapter Three: The Contexts of the Western Australian Regional Forest
Agreement
This chapter is contextual in nature providing the necessary background information to
the WA RFA. I commence by describing the WA RFA area in terms of its ecology,
demographics, and socio-economic significance. Subsequently, as a means of exploring
the history of resource use and management in WA, I review the evolution of the state's
timber industry, its forest management agencies, and the emergence of the conflict over
the governance of timber resources. Finally, I sketch, both regionally and nationally, the
evolution of the RFAs and lay out the progress and conclusion of the Western
Australian process.

Chapter Four: The RFA Discourse Community and Stakeholder Expectations
In this part of the thesis - against the historical background presented in Chapter Three
- I introduce my research participants, chosen from the large group of actors in the WA
RFA debate, and present a rationale for this study's treatment of this discourse
community. Furthermore, as a contextual adjunct to Chapter Three, analysis is made of
the expectations of members of the selected RFA discourse community on the process
and its outcomes. This analysis is designed to provide an informed understanding of
the public reactions towards the WA RFA and to aid subsequent analyses.

Chapter Five: The Participatory Nature of the Western Australian RFA
In this chapter I investigate RFA stakeholders' perceptions of the participatory nature of
the RFA process against the backdrop of a broader debate on public participation in
7
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resource conflicts. Analysis is made of stakeholders' perceptions of their role in the
process, their views on the process outcomes, and their notions on ideal modes of
participation within political processes. This analysis is followed by a general discussion
on the participatory nature of the WA RFA.

Chapter Six: Science and the Science of the Western Australian RFA
Here I examine the role and function(s) of scientists during the RFA process in context
of a review of the literature on science and democracy. Stakeholders' perceptions are
analysed with attention given to the perceived treatment of scientists throughout the
RFA process and the impacts that scientists made upon the process and its outcomes.
Finally, the key issues pertaining to the science of the WA RFA will be summarised and
discussed.

Chapter Seven: Contextual Analyses, Syntheses, and Conclusions
In this final chapter, I present three discrete analyses, which focus on the role of
individuals, the issue of homogeneity of discourse groupings, and media reporting of the
RFA respectively. Following this, I present a summary of the WA RFA as seen from
multiple stakeholder perspectives. I then integrate the issues of public participation,
science, and democracy that emerged from the preceding analyses of the WA RFA
experience.

This synthesis ·is conducted from an open systems perspective, the

conceptual strengths and weaknesses of which are also assessed. Based on arguments
and analyses made throughout the thesis, I critically reflect on the issue of openness in
the face of constraints as it relates to science, public participation, and environmental
policy processes and present a case for structural and procedural openings with a view
to negotiate new (temporary) points of closure.

8

Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework and Methods
Introduction
Australia's enduring forest dispute may best be characterised as a community conflict
over the use and management of forest resources. Australian communities embody a
heterogeneous assemblage of forest users, who hold in common the forest areas under
contention albeit with competing and conflicting aspirations regarding forest use. It is
for that reason that I consider these forests common properry resources (CPRs) and adopt a
commons approach for the purposes of this thesis. More specifically, a socio-ecological
commons perspective derived from open systems theory (OS1) will be introduced as
this thesis' theoretical framework, the guiding principles of which are explored in some
detail. I then move on to justify my case study method and design and present the
rationale underpinning my means of investigating the case study data.

The Framing of the Western Australian Regional Forest Agreement

Westem Australia's South-West Forests -A Common Property Resource?
A common property resource (common pool resource or a commons) is generally
defined

as

a natural or human-made resource

"in which

one user's

use

[subtraction/appropriation] of this resource diminishes the ability of others to use it ...
and in which use is limited to a definable community of users ... " (Selsky & Memon,
1995, p.260). In other words, subtractability and non-trivial excludability are CPR key
characteristics (Ostrom et al., 1994). CPRs are usually subject to multiple, overlapping,
and often uncoordinated uses by a diverse range of stakeholders. These stakeholders
are thought to be acting in an economically rational fashion. This is to say that at every
opportunity they act to increase or indeed maximise individual resource appropriation.
This individual pursuit of maximum appropriation can lead to CPRs being caught in a
vicious trap of overexploitation, a tendency exacerbated
economic settings.

within today's globalised

Current social, cultural, and institutional arrangements in many

countries are responsible for an ever increasing commodification of natural resources
and in their spiralling trade within the world's exchange economies (Selsky & Creahan,
1996).

As a result, today's melange of common property resources and utility
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maximising behaviour of an increasing number of economic agents is rapidly increasing
the likelihood of what Hardin (1968) coined the tragec!J of the commons. This tragedy is
essentially an economic paradox caused by the "apparent conflict between individual
rationality and group rationality" (Deadman, 1999, p.160), a situation in which resource
overuse occurs due to an individual economic rationality, which proves irrational at the
group level.

Are the forest areas in Western Australia's south-west a CPR? At first glance, these
forest areas do not fall within the above CPR definition because, in a strict sense, many
forest uses (e.g., apiary, tourism) are not subtractable uses. In fact, one could argue that
merely asymmetric subtraction (Selsky, 1999) occurs by users of the timber industry
while groups like apiarists and seed collectors engage in what one could consider passive
uses. Also, other users such as tourists and local residents often exercise what Selsky
and Memon (1997) call amenity rights. Amenity rights and values represent in many cases
a social resource not only for recreation purposes and aesthetic reasons but also for
ethical considerations such as the protection of existence value and bequest value.
Amenity use can nevertheless be seen as a form of resource consumption even though
subtraction may not be measurable or does not necessarily apply. Thus, shared amenity
values can give rise to an amenity commons in that conflict arising over dis-amenities
may be indicative of the existence of perceived de facto rights that have been violated
(Selsky & Memon, 1997). . In terms of subtraction it can be argued that the
active/ subtractive use of the forest resource (i.e., logging) by the timber industry is
mutually exclusive to the passive/ amenity use of other user groups. I would therefore
make the case for quasi-symmetric subtraction by all users, as timber harvesting
prevents alternative uses and vice versa and for these reasons consider the WA forest
areas to fall within the CPR definition.

There is also a worthwhile distinction to be made between simple, single-use CPRs and
messy or complex CPRs (CCPRs) (after Selsky & Memon, 1995; Selsky & Memon,
2000), for the WA RFA forests appear to fall into the latter category.

CCPRs, as

opposed to simple, single-use CPRs, exhibit features of multiple, overlapping, and
potentially conflicting uses and user groups, volatility in uses and institutional
arrangements, and variances between de jure and de facto property rights (Selsky &
Memon, 1995). The CCPR framework is useful because it allows accounting for the de
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facto status of CPRs notwithstanding official property rights regimes and other legal and
institutional arrangements governing the resource. The CCPR concept extends beyond
conventional commons theory which treats the commons itself as the unit of analysis
(Selsky & Memon, 2000), being constrained by its focus on internal processes and
therefore often lacking external context (see Goldman, 1997).

In contrast, CCPRs are

addressed as part of a wider unit of analysis (a resource system) (see Selsky & Memon,
2000)) and with a wider focus on outside dynamics and interactions affecting the
commons. The CCPR framework therefore lends itself to commons issues that are rich
in context and feature complex stakeholder dynamics (e.g., patterns of action and
decision-making, recognition of users rights etc.). At this point, I venture to suggest
that the forest areas specified under the WA RFA exhibit discernible CCPR features.
This assertion will be supported in the following chapters, which will produce ample
evidence of the complex and rich context(s) surrounding the dispute over the WA's
forest resources. Beforehand, however, I shall describe the commons framework and
its theoretical evolution.

The Commons Framework
The contemporary commons framework is based on Hardin (1968). Although Hardin's
focus was placed on open access resources, his observations are equally applicable to the
study on common property resources, which today represents a growing body of
interdisciplinary research. Many forms of CPR management, ranging from complete
state control to privatisation, have been called for by academics and politicians alike (see
Ostrom, 1990). To this day, however, no one system has been found to be universally
appropriate (Deadman, 1999).

More recently, studies have extended the original

framework acknowledging the limitations of Hardin's theoretical and ethical proposals
(for instance see Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Feeny et al., 1990). This new literature
advocates that more emphasis be placed on collaboration and co-management
arrangements in the context of CCPRs. Within the field of social ecology - akin to, yet
distinct from the Bookchin tradition - similar calls have been made, advocating a more
holistic commons approach for the sustainable management of resources in
communities (Selsky, 1999). The term holistic is understood here as the treatment of
resource issues based on a whole social system perspective as opposed to traditionally
segmental views (Selsky & Creahan, 1996), which implies the need to consider the
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contextual richness of CPR settings. 2

The inter-system orientation of the socio-

ecological perspective allows for attention to be directed to the entire "network of
relations" (Selsky, 1999, p.4) among CPR stakeholder groups and individual social actors
whose geography and interests overlap. Thus, this school of thought lends itself to the
analysis of complex human systems such as organisations, government, or society at
large.

A more holistic or more complete approach towards CPR management and governance
is of general interest to political decision makers dealing with resource conflicts. For
instance, a more complete social system perspective may enable authorities to widen and
enlighten entrenched views, help overcome polarised positions and gridlocks, and be a
driving force in a more deliberative political process that pays attention to the "voices
and values of non-dominant actors in public policy forums" (Selsky & Memon, 1997,
p.260). These qualities render the socio-ecological perspective applicable to the issue of
resource governance and environmental policy-making and thus germane to this thesis.

Another contribution from social ecology to this thesis lies in its focus on behavioural
responses of human systems to environmental change.

Environmental change has

become a key characteristic of modern life, marked by increasing levels of
environmental turbulence in the form of interdependence, complexity, and uncertainty
(Trist et al., 1997).

CCPRs. are thought to emerge in response to environmental

turbulence (Barton & Selsky, 1998), which is of significance to the case of the WA RFA.
The fate of WA's forests was decided upon within turbulent settings with turbulence
increasing in response to the decisions that had been made. In that sense, the forest
areas in WA could be considered a CCPR, a proposition to be tested in this thesis. In
what follows, I shall expand further on the socio-ecological perspective for its relevance
to the WA RFA and elaborate on the concept's theoretical heritage.

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Socio-Ecological Commons Framework
Social ecology represents a branch of open systems theory (Emery & Trist, 1973; Trist,
1977; Emery, 1997b).

2

In general terms, systems theory serves as a conceptual

It will be shown at a later stage that this definition may need further broadening to account for socio-

ecological complexities.
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foundation for the practice of systems thinking, providing a coherent set of explanations
of how systems operate. Systems thinking complements rational-analytical thinking, by
aiding the understanding of the causal relationships between the parts of a system,
which are based on a fundamental set of notions which determine that system's
behaviour (Ackoff, 1991). The term .rystem represents a grouping of component parts
that individually establish relationships with each other and that interact with their
environment both as individuals and as a collective (unitas multiplex) (Emery & Purser,
1996). Systems have the capacity to change over time, either by slow evolution or rapid
transition.

System behaviour, or system principle (after Angyal, 1941/1981), is

determined by both the system and its environment. The system principle expresses the
unique relation between the entity and the environment (Emery, 1997b).

Systems theory is branched into various fields including hard systems theory (HS1), soft
systems theory (SS1), and cybernetic approaches. HST and cybernetics were largely
employed for the further development of classical theories in behavioural sciences and
social structure. Both approaches, however, are thought to fall short when relating
systems to their environments (Rowe, 1989; McCall & Kaplan, 1990). In contrast, SST
treats system environment relations explicitly, focusing on system regulation and the
promotion of change within systems operating within changing environments. System
change occurs through processes of environmental learning, leading to self-renewal or
autopiesis (Churchman, 1971). This can be understood as a learning-based resilience.

The system-environment relationship, or more specifically, the importance of system
openness/ closedness to the environment was first highlighted by van Bertalanffy (1940;
1950), whose work gave rise to open systems thinking, a soft systems approach. Von
Bertalanffy observed that organisms operate as thermodynamically open systems with
their environments for the selective exchange of energy and matter in order to
maintain/attain stability (negentropy).

This concept of a system-environment

relationship was used by Emery and Trist (1965) to describe purposeful human systems,
emphasising the interconnectedness within, as well as between, systems and their
environment.

This concept, also known as the Emery-Trist Systems Paradigm

(Babiiroglu, 1992), forms the foundation of open systems theory (OS1).
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Within OST human systems are seen as living and purposeful systems, which are
described as having the following characteristics: (a) being concrete, (b) interacting with
the environment, (c) possessing key attributes of life in general, and (d) being defined
primarily in terms of the human element (Ackoff & Emery, 1981). The functions of
human systems revolve around:

•
•
•
•
•

adaptation (dynamic adjustment to environmental changes);
regulation (establishment of mechanisms to control behaviour);
communication (parts must network to transmit information);
transformation (adaptation process requires system response); and
renewal (entropy can only be escaped through renewal).
(Ackoff & Emery, 1981)

When these functions work effectively, human systems can be purposeful (Miller, 1978)
and regulate their behaviour based on a set of core values (Ackoff & Emery, 1981).
People are considered to be active agents and to be displaying will, capable of changing
both their own behaviour and their environment. However, there are obvious limits to
this notion due to the social embeddedness of human actors.

The term environment (understood here as both social and physical) 3 is defined as
extended social fields, affecting the behaviour of all systems within it. These social
fields are ascribed a causal texture, which represents the complex dynamic nature of the
environment (Emery & Trist," 1965). Originally, four types of environmental textures
were identified by Emery & Trist (1965) as shown in Table 2.1.

The range of

environmental textures was subsequently widened to include the temporary state of
hyperturbulence (McCann & Selsky, 1984) and vortical environments (Babiiroglu, 1988)
in an attempt to describe the emergence of environmental complexity and turbulence in
the second half of the twentieth century.

3

In this thesis, the term environment is used in a holistic, contextual sense. To clarify, systems comprise

sub-systems, which again can comprise sub-systems, and so on. Thus, system-environment relations
ought to be seen in the context of the system in focus, as systems form a part of the environment of their
sub-systems. Also, social environments are seen from within an ecological perspective, meaning in terms
of inter-relationships between various social spheres.

Depending on context, an environment can

therefore be socio-political, socio-cultural, socio-economic, etc. They all form a part of a larger socioecological environment.
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Type I environments rarely exist given that random access to resources may only be
found in nomadic (e.g., Aboriginal) and traditional farming cultures.

Type II

environments are perceived as ideal for system stability because they represent the
"most long lasting and adaptive option yet tried by the human race" (Emery, 1995, p.4).
However, the birth of industrialisation and the recent development of the global
economy have caused the destruction of the Type II environment. Hence today, Type
III, and in the Western world Type IV environments, are most prevalent (Trist et al.,
1997).

These environments are characterised by high degrees of interconnectivity,

complexity, and competition, which are all characteristics of globalised economies.

Table 2.1: Environmental Textures and Corresponding System Responses
(based on Selsky, 1999, pers. com.)
Environment Type

Features

System Response
(reactive)

Type I: Placid, random

Stable
Low interconnection

Tactics

Type II: Placid, clustered

Stable
Some legitimate connections

Strategies

Type III: Disturbed,
reactive

Action causes reactions
Environmental change

Competition

Type IV: Turbulent

Action causes multiple reactions
Highly dynamic environment

Collaboration

H yperturbulence

Partially overloaded (sub-) systems

Partitioning
(social enclave/vortex)

Type V: Vortex

Beyond management

Surrender?

Within OST, system-environment interrelations are regarded as mutually determining
and governed by laws. These laws are described as potentially lawful connections (L),
which - when known - aid the understanding of system behaviour. It is recognised,
however, that there are limits to our empirical understanding of these laws as their
complexity defies reductionist measurement (Trist, 1997), implying a larger reality
beyond the measurable. Figure 2.1 below illustrates how the functions of systems act
upon the environment.
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Figure 2.1: An Open System and the Connections to Its Environment
(based on Emery, 1997b, p.9) - This diagram illustrates system-environment relations, depicting
learning and planning as the transactional connections between open systems and their environments.

Here, subscript

1

refers to the system, and subscript

2

refers to the environment. The

notation L 11 represents internal system processes and interdependencies and as such
refers to the intrinsic nature of the system. L22 represents the intrinsic nature of the
environment, which is defined by "processes through which parts of the environment
become related to each other'' (Emery & Trist, 1965, p.22).

It is these

interdependencies between parts of the environment that give the environment its
causal texture.

L12 and Lz 1 refer to the exchange between the system and its

environmertt - or the area of transactional dependencies - and represent system
planning and learning respectively.

System learning occurs as the environment acts

upon the system, which in turn has impacts on the system's planning processes (Emery
& Trist, 1965). The relation between a system and its environment can be described as
an interplay between system autonomy, internally governed action, and homonomous
integration, a sense of belonging and interconnectedness (Angyal, 1965).

A balance

between autonomy and integration is important as life occurs between systems and their
environment (Emery, 1997b), which highlights the need for human systems to be both
inward (L11) as well as outward (Lzi) looking and to adapt to change within and outside.
Indeed, contextual learning and planning, the centrality of which will be highlighted in
Chapter Seven, are integral to system survival.

Human system-environment relations are complex, compounded by the non-linear or
non-probabilistic, and at times even chaotic, behaviour of human systems.

Human

behaviour is difficult to predict and thus difficult to manage within environments of
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high connectivity and high rates of change. In these environments discernible patterns
in human systems' behaviour can rarely be found. As illustrated in Table 2.1, human
systems respond to certain environmental textures, yet at the risk of responding
inappropriately and/ or leading to unintentional consequences, again
environmental textures (see Cavaleri & Obloj, 1993).

affecting

This phenomenon can be

considered natural, as shown in Figure 2.2, since "[t]he radius of the effects of human
actions intervening in a system's design or performance is often greater than the radius
of human predictions of possible effects" (Cavaleri & Obloj, 1993, p.68). Nonetheless,
despite their naturalness, unintended consequences create problems for those
responsible for the management of complex human systems.

Unintended consequences can be problematic, especially in light of a human tendency
to respond inappropriately to environmental changes. A sufficiently large sequence of
inappropriate responses can lead to turbulence or even more chaotic textures (in a
natural resource context this may mean unforeseen changes, for instance, in regional
micro-climates due to land-clearing, salinity, and erosion). Such changes in turn impact
on the functioning of the system. For instance, in the extreme case of emerging Type V
environments learning (L21 ) and planning (L12) are likely to slow down and ultimately
freeze while the environmental processes (L2i) may gain more and more in complexity.
This can trigger so-called inappropriate first order responses like superficiality,
segmentation, and dissociation which are considered typical for Type IV environments
(for a detailed description of active responses see Crombie (1997), on passive responses
see Emery (1997a)). However, this merely exacerbates the nature and effects of these
Type V environments, which in turn causes second order responses such as polarisation
and freezing of the system (cocoon). Consequently, system planning (L1i) and learning

(L21 ) become intra-dependent, aiding the polarisation process and ultimately causing the
system to lose all influence over the environment (stalemate) or leading to a stance of
totally ignoring environmental (outside) information (dogmatism). Both responses are
mutually re-enforcing. The problem often lies in the mental models employed, which if
widely shared with others can lead to systemic blind spots within that group. These can
render a system ineffective in thinking (metanoia) for dealing with environmental
changes (Emery & Trist, 1965; Emery, 1997b; Trist et al., 1997).
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Figure 2.2: The Origins of Unintended Consequences
(adopted from Cavaleri & Obloj, 1993, p.69)
As a means of overcoming maladaptive system responses OST promotes synthetic,
ecological learning. The term ecological includes the whole environment, both social and
physical, thus, the socio-ecological perspective. Ecological learning applies to human
behaviour and the environment and relates back to the earlier cited need to look inward
and outward so as to create a capacity for the active adaptation of changing systems
within changing environments. Underlying this approach is the world hypothesis of

contextualism (see Pepper, 1942), which assumes a whole changing over time within a
changing context of the whole (Emery, 1995). This perspective is in contrast to static
worldviews employing root metaphors such as mechanism or organicism (Emery, 1997b).

OST focuses on organisational structures, which are understood as environments
(econiches) in their own right determining system and sub-system behaviour as well as
system-environment relations. Two types of organisational structures for human
systems are identified, termed design principle 1 (DP1) and design principle 2 (DP2).
These design principles have originally been developed for organisational settings, yet
are equally applicable to larger human systems. DP1 is based on the redundanry ofparts,
meaning that there are generally more people (parts) than are required. Typical for this
design principle are the separation of the levels of responsibility and control from the
levels of planning and work (e.g., Fordism). The DP1 structure is thus supervisory in
nature, relying on dominant hierarchies and bureaucracies which regard people as
redundant or expendable parts of the system (Emery, 1967). DP1 is the most common
organisational structure within Type III and Type IV environments and are, due to their
structure, prone to environmental shocks and maladaptive responses, often lacking
18
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required response capabilities.

In contrast, DP2 structures, which are based on the

redundanry offunctions, equip an individual with the maximum possible amount of skills
and functions so as to locate the level of responsibility at the same level where work or
planning are being done (Emery, 1967). DP2 structures are collaborative arrangements,
which encourage cooperation and learning towards shared goals and are essentially
democratic in structure and governance. Systems such as these are typical for Type II
environments but outperform DP1 structures in more turbulent Type III and Type IV
conditions for they possess greater environmental sensitivity and are therefore more
adaptive. Adaptability results from intrinsically motivated learning, which allows systems
to gain intimate knowledge about their environment and its textures (Emery, 1997b).

It was the aim of this section to demonstrate how system behaviour and systemenvironment relations are conceptualised within OST.

For this study focuses on

stakeholder relations within a defined natural resource setting, the WA RFA will be
investigated in light of this systems perspective. In Chapter Seven I will expand on a
number of aspects pertaining to OST informing an ensuing systems analysis of the RFA
process and its governing structures. The question now is, however, how the socioecological insights derived from OST can be applied to the CPR problematique of the
WA RFA. This question I will turn to in the following section.

The Application ofSocial Ecology to the Westem Australian Regional Forest
Agreement
For the purposes of this study I have adopted the behavioural model for complex CPR
systems developed by Selsky and Memon (1995) (see Figure 2.3). This model focuses
on "whole-system behaviour" which allows for the analysis of both "the natural
resource system itself and the multiple sources and consequences of impacts on it over
time" (Selsky & Memon, 1995, p.263).

I have used this model as a tool for the

investigation of the WA RFA, directing attention to the CPR's environment and the
behaviours of, and dynamics between, CPR stakeholder groups (sub-systems).

The Selsky and Memon model helps identify stakeholders and their interactions with a
CCPR system. The model, as argued by Selsky and Memon (1995), is an extension of
previous conceptual behaviour models such as those by Ostrom (1990) and Oakerson
(1992). It describes management arrangements that govern a natural resource within a
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broader societal context. The resource itself is subject to a sub-system of institutional
arrangements, which are both structural and functional in nature. For the purposes of
this study these arrangements include (a) users and uses, (b) values and attitudes, and (c)
economic, political, and legal arrangements.
added.

However, other components could be

Emergent use and emergent management patterns are the intervening

(mediating) variables within the behavioural model. These patterns are said to arise out
of policy-making and planning as well as differing degrees of policy compliance. In the
Western Australian case, there. is a plurality of forest stakeholder groups and forest uses,
which, consistent with the paradigm of CPR theory, have an aggregate impact on the
forest resource. This means that the composition of institutional arrangements in this
complex CPR system have not only defined the state of that system but have also
produced emergent patterns of resource use and management (here, these could be the
changes in forest use and management brought about by the RFA process). Emergent
patterns produce outcomes with a blend of intended and unintended consequences
(both detectable and undetectable), which necessitate monitoring and evaluation (where
possible) against benchmarks for sustainability (e.g., ecologically sustainable forest
management principles, CAR reserve systems, and other RFA outcomes which - as will
be explored later on - were promised in the National Forest Policy Statement).
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Figure 2.3: Behavioural Model for a CCPR System
(based on Selsky & Memon, 1995, p.265)
The Selsky & Memon (1995) model allows recognition of potential divergence between
policy intent and actual outcome (i.e., impact on the resource) and analysis of "aggregate
patterns ... that characterize complex CPR systems" (Selsky & Memon, 1995, p.266).
Outcomes within the CPR system can be biophysical (e.g., ecological change), sociocultural (e.g., economic, human health, ethics), and socio-political (e.g., policy
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acceptance).

They represent the result of emergent patterns as opposed to that of

institutional arrangements (especially when considered from a systemic perspective)
(Selsky & Memon, 1995). To illustrate this point, the clearfelling of native forest or old
growth logging in general may be legal in Western Australia and may even be considered
economically efficient

by

some

analysts

but

could

prove

unacceptable

to

conservationists and local residents.

The socio-ecological perspective is applied to the case of the
WA RFA via the adoption of the Selsky and Memon (1995)
model, serving conceptual purposes but also as a structural tool
used for the composition of this thesis. Accordingly and as
foreshadowed in Chapter One, Chapter Three commences with
the description of the biophysical and socio-economic aspects of the natural resource in
focus (i.e., the forest areas covered under the WA RFA), perceived here as both a
natural and social commons.

This is followed by a review of the history of the timber industry, forest management,
forest policy, and the evolution of the conflict over forest use. This review outlines the
grown institutional arrangements that governed the State's forest resources prior to the
WA RFA, (a) providing a historical perspective on the forest users and their respective
Institutional
Arrangements
• Users/Uses

forest uses, (b) affording insights into changes in values and
attitudes pertaining to forests, (c) illustrating changes in
technology relevant to forest management and forest logging,

• Values/ Attitudes

and (d) describing changes to economic, political, and legal

• Economic/Political

arrangements. This is followed by an analysis of the WA RFA

Arrangements

in Chapters Five and Six.

In these chapters I investigate

stakeholders' perceptions of the participatory and scientific
nature of WA RFA.

This policy process is considered a part of the institutional

arrangements governing the forest resource as it affected the commons (a) through the
introduction of changes to the institutional arrangements (e.g., new forest policy and
management) but also (b) by being affected through changes occurring outside the WA
RFA (e.g., value shifts).
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Finally, in Chapter Seven
•

Use

•

Mu»gan,nt

•

Biopiysial

•

SoaH:ultural

-+ • Soa>tJdilial

the emergent patterns and
outcomes of the WA RFA

will be evaluated, and their
social

and

sustainability

political

will

be

assessed. Both description and analysis of the RF A will occur concurrently, and more
detail on how I will proceed is provided below.

Methods
This thesis is primarily integrative in orientation. I investigate stakeholders' perceptions
of the RF A process and its outcomes, aiming at synthesising the gathered information
to develop a detailed understanding of the issues central to this environmental policy
process. As this study deals with perceptions, values, and attitudes I decided to employ
the case study research method, which I perceive as a qualitative research design that
lends itself to an investigation such as this. The case study method has proved useful
within social sciences in the assessment of experiences and attitudes (Miles &
Huberman, 1984).

This thesis, as I shall explain shortly, relies predominantly on

interview data. Therefore, the treatment of the WA RF A as a case study is deemed
appropriate because of the project's exploratory nature (see Yin, 1984; Tsoukas, 1989;
Parkhe, 1993; Yin, 1993; Easton, 1994), examining stakeholders' recollections
(interviews relying on participants' memories), attitudes, and values (Yin, 1994) in the
context of government decision-making processes with little or no control over events
and outcomes. Also, due to a plurality of views held among RFA stakeholders only little
could be known about what particular research participants would think about the RFA
process and its outcomes. Finally, the events studied were contemporary in the sense
that they took place fairly recently, and their effects are still being felt politically as well
as operationally by the various RF A stakeholder groups. However, events subsequent
to the WA RFA have overtaken the agreement in 2001 for they shifted the focus of
debate to the 2004 Forest Management Plan.

The research design chosen for this study is based on grounded theory, a method of
comparative analysis (Glaser, 1998) used predominantly for qualitative research. Briefly
stated, grounded theory is a problem-oriented endeavour and refers to the systematic
22

Ins

generation of data that itself is systematically obtained from social research (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990; Glaser, 1998).

The generation of robust data can then be used to

generate theories, which can be elaborated through the construction of plausible models
and justified in terms of their explanatory coherence.

An iterative process was

employed for the purpose of data generation, data assessment, and synthesis; iteration
referring here to a process of constant refinement of methods of inquiry and problem
definition.

In agreement with Haig (1999) I would readily admit to the fact that this project probably in common with many scientific inquiries - began with an ill-structured
problem, and that this ill-structured problem became more clearly defined throughout
the inquiry. Haig (1999) contends that a problem is ill-structured to the extent that it
lacks the constraints required for its solution and suggests that the basic task of
scientific inquiry is to better structure research problems by building in the various
required constraints as the research proceeds. My acknowledgement of the need for
structural betterment has been a driving force during this research project.

The data used for the purposes of this thesis originated from three discrete data sources;
namely RFA-related literature, interviews with RFA stakeholders, and RFA-related
media content.

The data sources and the respective data collection methods are

described below.

Data Sources and Data Collection
Literature Review
The literature review was focused on RFA-related material, covermg specific
information on the forest areas in the south-west, the science surrounding their
management as well as historical and other contextual data pertaining to the RFA. The
literature was used in conjunction with interview data and media content to compare the
data sets as well as to fill existing information gaps.

In most cases, the literature was readily available from university libraries, government
departments, research institutions, and on-line databases.

The electronic databases I

used for data collection included Expanded Academic ASAP International, APAIS, ISI,
ELIXIR, Heritage and Environment, and STREAMLINE. The literature search was
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also facilitated through co-operation and resource sharing among a network of scholars,
which proved to be of great help.

RFA related material from Australian government sources was obtained via the State
and Federal HANSARD search engines, the then official RFA website (www.rfa.gov.au)
or directly from the respective government departments.

Database searches were

carried out using a wide range of keywords that were characteristic for the (Western
Australian) RFA debate; these included:

•

Regional Forest Agreement

•

Deferred Forest Agreement
(DFA);
native forests;
old growth;
comprehensive, adequate and
representative (CAR) reserve
system;
Western Australia;

•
•
•
•

(RFA);

•
•
•
•
•

timber industry;
public participation;
National Forest Policy
Statement (NFPS);
comprehensive regional
assessment (CRA); and
Joint ANZECC/MCFFA
National Forest Policy
Statement Implementation SubCommittee GANIS

The higher the level of intersection between keywords the more relevant the sources
were to this thesis.

The literature review covered a variety of data sources including government
publications, parliamentary proceedings, scholarly and research publications, working
and discussion papers, conference proceedings, legal documents, legislative bills, theses,
andgrry literature (i.e., non-re~ewed and often not readily available). This diverse range
of information sources helped prevent biased use, and collection, of data as
inconsistencies were identifiable. The literature review was ongoing for the entirety of
the research project to (a) monitor changes within the area of research and (b) maintain
the relevance of this study.

Interviews
Interview data formed the most crucial information component gathered for this thesis.
This is because it was the interview data that allowed insights into RFA stakeholders'
perceptions, attitudes, and values, and their analysis was my principal objective. The
interview data also proved the most difficult to obtain. Constrained by time, finances,
and physical distances I carried out a total of 59 face-to-face interviews and two
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telephone interviews, and 58 of which I tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Once
transcripts were completed they were returned to the interviewees, offering the
opportunity for comment and editorial feedback.

The return and finalisation of

transcripts was often delayed due to research participants changing jobs, re-locating,
high workloads, or simply forgetting about the transcripts. Overall, the interview period
stretched from December 1999 to October 2002 and involved travels within Western
Australia as well as to Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, and the Australian Capital
Territory (AC1).

The interviews comprised of two parts, one being structured the other open-ended. 4
Structured interview questions were focused on participants' involvement in the process
and to specific events relating to the RFA process. Some questions were specifically
tailored to the roles and functions assumed by participants in the process (e.g., scientists
were queried about scientific aspects of the process whereas timber workers were asked
questions relating to industry-relevant issues). Open-ended questions were used to gain
insights into participants' views on, and perceptions of, procedural aspects of the RFA
and process outcomes. On average, interview durations were between 40 minutes and
one hour, but occasionally interviews lasted up to two hours.

I employed what is known as snowball sampling as my sampling method, a technique
described in detail by Goodman (1961) and Babbie (1992).

Essentially, snowball

sampling uses a set of initial interview participants to suggest additional names to be
interviewed for the project in question. This is how a snowball of participants emerges.
Adequacy of sampling size can be determined by a perceivable closure of the participant
network. In other words, a saturation point is reached at which fewer and fewer new
names are being suggested.

In this study the snowballing process commenced via the identification of five potential
research participants.

This form of purposive sampling involved judgements

concerning the suitability of individual research participants. Suitability was dependent
on the participant's willingness 5 and ability to participate and the role an individual

4

The interview schedule is listed in Appendix 1.

s Participants' availability depended here on their willingness to co-operate, work commitments, and
permission to partake in a research exercise such as this. It should also be noted that I approached two
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played within the RFA process. The latter criterion required individuals to have been

recognised actors in the literature, newspapers, or on-line news groups in connection with
the WA RFA. All members of that initial group, which comprised members from
government departments, science, and the conservation movement, agreed to
participate.

These opening interviews provided the basis for further interviews as

research participants suggested names of potential candidates. Consequently, the circle
of research participants to be considered for this study was successively widened,
leading to further inquiries and the pursuit of a wider spectrum of people (main and
peripheral actors) and issues, which is characteristic for the iterative nature of a study
such as this.

The research participants of this study were not intended to reflect W A's forest
stakeholder community statistically. Instead, the idea was to capture a wide range of
views on, and perceptions of, the WA RFA process that would be reflective of the
multiplicity of discourses during the RFA process. Snowballing enabled me to attain a
large selection of discourses as research participants made frequent reference to their

discursive opponents in the forest debate. This in turn gave me the opportunity to pursue
individuals with alternative perspectives. In the end, this study was able to draw on
input from 59 research participants.

This group of people comprised of one

representative from the tourism industry, 12 scientists, 13 non-scientific employees of
government departments, six politicians, one apiary representative, three timber mill
owners/managers, one timber worker union representative, one softwood plantation
owner, one Indigenous N oongar community spokesperson, three local council
members, one local timber company manager, three timber industry representatives, ten
environmental/heritage non-government organisation (NGO) members, one forest
protester, and two members of the general public who were actively involved during the
RFA's public consultation process. Interview data represents the only primary source of
this study and thus features most prominently in this thesis.

Print, Radio, and Television Media Content
I decided to include media content for a variety of reasons. Firstly, international media
research (Parlour & Schatzow, 1978; Kepplinger & Roth, 1979; Hoffman, 1996;

senior public servants (State and Federal) who were central to the RFA process. However, they did not
participate in the project.
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Ranthum, 1996) indicates that the media in recent years "have played an important role
in influencing public opinion about various environmental issues" (Bengston et al.,
1999, p.183) and have had an impact on political agenda setting (Downs, 1973;
Solesbury, 1976; Schoenfeld et al., 1979; Protess et al., 1987). In fact, the mass media
have become an important source for many people about many issues including the
environment (Fortner et al., 1991; Wilson, 1995). Figure 2.4 illustrates the role the
media serves in the forum of public debate.

The Courts

Legislatures

The Media

Protests and
Confrontations

Meetings and
Hearings

Figure 2.4: Forums for Public Debates About Natural Resource Policy and
Management
(adopted from Bengston & Fan, 1999, p.79)

Secondly - based on personal observation and a preliminary analysis of the WA RFA the media seemed to play a pivotal role throughout the WA RFA process, providing
information on various aspects of the debate. This included information about protests
and confrontations, meetings and hearings, court proceedings, and parliamentary
debates but also personal views from members of the Western Australian public.

Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, I included media content for the sake of completeness,
using the media as an information source. However, the media also played a contested
role during the RFA process. A number of interviewees commented on the selective
and biased media coverage of events during the WA RFA process and the way in which
the media raised the public profile of the WA RFA and accentuated the involvement of

27

Western Australian celebrities in the forest debate. These issues I will cover in more
detail in Chapter Seven.

Data Analysis and Sense-Making
I utilised the method of discourse analysis for the treatment of the case study data. My
decision to employ an approach such as this was in response to two aspects. Firstly, I
was searching for a technique that would not only fit my case study design but also
mesh with the theoretical approach chosen for this thesis (i.e., social ecology), which
places emphasis, following the OST tradition, on adaptive learning. Secondly, I was
inspired by the work done by Butteriss, Wolfenden, and Goodridge (2001) who
advocate the use of discourse analysis as a means of improving the understanding of
plural perspectives in natural resource disputes, and their approach will provide the basis
for the method of discourse analysis employed for the purposes of this study.

The brief summation of Australia's forest debate provided in Chapter One hinted at a
plurality of conflicting views and attitudes towards forest matters, which were generally
poorly understood by political decision makers.

Butteriss et al. (2001) promote

discourse analysis as an effective tool for the unearthing of views, prejudices, and
assumptions held by people, which is what I hoped to achieve through the study of
RFA stakeholder discourses. Butteriss et al. (2001) recognise the potential for problems
relating to biases and filtering arising out of their exclusive use of secondary data (i.e.,
media content) in their work and encouraged the empirical testing of the significance of
such problems. 6 I was able to follow this call in this study through the use of primary
(interviews) and secondary data (RFA-related literature, media content).

In the following section I provide an overview of definitions for discourse and discourse
analysis and survey a range of literature on discourse analysis theory relevant to this field
of research. I then move on to describe the discourse analysis method chosen for this
study and provide detail on its application to this project.

6'fhis relates to issue of objectivity/reliability of media content mentioned earlier.
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Discourse Analysis
Men [people] are the producers of their conceptions
(Marx and Engels cited in Arthur, 1974, p.47)

The term discourse ana!Jsis is very ambiguous, and its study represents a hybrid field of
enquiry (Burr, 1995) rich in history and esoteric jargon. 7 The roots of discourse analysis
are with linguistics dating back to the scholars of ancient Greece and Rome (Cook,
1989).

More recently, discourse analysis has been undertaken in a vast field of

disciplines such as anthropology, philosophy, semiotics, poetics, psychology, sociology,
literary criticism, and mass communication research (van Dijk, 1985e). Therefore, many
definitions exist for discourse and discourse analysis. In a linguistic sense, discourse can
simply be described as any sustained stretch of speech or sequence of individual
sentences (Carlson, 1952), the totality of things written and read, spoken and heard
,

(Myerson & Rydin, 1996), or as a collection of stories, myths, scripts, narratives,
legends, and sagas (Putnam et al., 1996). To many authors, however, discourse is more
than just language.

For language to be recognised it must involve an appropriate way of thinking, valuing,
acting, and interacting at the right times, with the right objects, at the right places (Gee,
1999). Discourse, therefore, not only comprises of language in the written or spoken
form (languages in use) but also other steff (Gee, 1999), or Discourse with a capital D
(Foucault, 1985). Gee (1999, p.18) explains it this way:

If you

put language, action, interaction, valued beliefs,
.rymbols, ol?Jects, tools, and places together in such a wqy
that others recognize you as a particular type of who
(identity) engaged in a particular type of what (activity) here
and now, then you have pulled effa Discourse ...
(emphasis added)

7

Detailed accounts of the theoretical evolution, epistemological heritage, and broader applications of

discourse analysis can be found in van Dijk's (1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1985d) four volume review of
approaches to discourse analysis; Mills' (1997) introduction to discourse, focusing on feminist,
poststructuralist, and postmodern work; Ortony's (1993) work on metaphors; the general introduction to
discourse analysis theory and method by Gee (1999); and the work by Myerson and Rydin (1996) and
Dryzek (1997) on environmental discourse.
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Of importance to this thesis is the other stuff, as I sought RFA stakeholders'
perceptions, mind-sets, paradigms, silent assumptions, and beliefs as expressed within
the many RFA discourses. For these reasons I have adopted Dryzek's (1997, p.8) more
constructionist designation of discourse who describes it as a "shared way of
apprehending the world." Within social constructionism discourse is seen as a product
of a shared version of reality (subjectivity) between interlocutors. Here, non-overlapping
discourses render communication ineffectual, as people would quite literally find the
utterances of others to be incomprehensible (Demeritt, 1994; Dryzek, 1997) and
perceive them as a foreign language, if a language at all. Even more, without discourse
knowledge could not exist (Lacan, 1977; cited in Burton & Carlen, 1979) nor could it be
shared in the absence of external validation, as it cannot be self-referential (Burton &
Carlen, 1979), and without discourse learning and problem solving would be very
difficult to imagine (Dryzek, 1997). As is detectable in Dryzek's (1997) interpretation of
discourse, it is relativism that characterises the constructionist approach towards
discourse analysis, for speech and expressions are not regarded as fact but merely as
reflections of subjective impressions of external facts. This is why discourse analysis is
said to have "displaced epistemology" (Burton & Carlen, 1979, p.15) as it is more
concerned about modes of knowing than the origins of knowledge, moving away from
concepts of absoluteness and fact towards subjectivity and perception. This means that
normative and positivistic notions that reality can be described with great precision in an
unambiguous and testable fashion are being rejected (for a list on assumptions of
positivism see Lakoff, 1993). It is due to this non-normative character of discourse
analysis (Foucault, 1972) that the so-called privilege to conventionality is being denied
(Burton & Carlen, 1979). Language is viewed as "a reality-creating social practice"
(Fowler, 1985, p.62), being reflexive or reciprocal (Durnati & Goodwin, 1992; Gumperz
& Levinson, 1996), simultaneously reflecting and construing reality (Gee, 1999).

Indeed, reality is seen as a social construct and, therefore, it is argued that "there is no
single correct reading of the external world within discourse analysis" (Manning, 1979,
p.660). However, truth and reality are not only socially constructed or created but also
contextual (Agar, 1994; Clark, 1996), a product oflanguage (see Fowler, 1985), as well as
political (see Saussure, 197 4; Lacan, 1975; Foucault, 1978; Dryzek, 1997).

This

essentially means that what is perceived to be true or real can vary just as meaning and
content of discourse can change in response to contextual changes (e.g., temporal,
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cultural, geographical) and that discourse itself can be determined by motives to specific
ends (i.e., discourses far courses).

The discourse analysis method is described in the literature as a useful tool, inter alia, for
critical reflection (Luks, 1998), the detection of norms and ideologies (Manning, 1979),
the exposure and analysis of power relations (Foucault, 1978; Putnam et al., 1996), the
improvement of communication (Luks, 1998) and organisational effectiveness (Morgan,
1986), the sense-making of unfamiliar environments (Ortony, 1993), and the
formulation of new ideas and concepts reflective of newly gained knowledge and values
(Butteriss, 2002). I concur with these characterisations of discourse analysis, which, to
my mind, describe this method as a tool used for the search of contextual meaning(s)
beyond the boundaries of the written and spoken word. For that reason, I adopted
Stubbs' (1983) interpretation of discourse analysis for the purposes of this study who
defines this approach as an attempt to examine the use of language in wider social
contexts, the interrelationships between language and society, and the interactive or
dialogic properties of everyday communication.

Discourse Analysis Method

The use of discourse analysis in this study aligns this research to other work done in the
area of public policy development (see for instance Fischer & Forester, 1993; Dryzek,
1997; Meppem, 2000). The approach chosen here was designed to investigate WA RFA
stakeholders' perceptions of (a) the participative nature of the RFA and (b) the
treatment of science, scientists, and scientific data throughout that process. The insights
gained into the plurality of stakeholder perspectives were then used for the construction
of a [Jnfhesised reality of the WA RFA, creating a meta-narrative from plural perspectives.
This means that the data derived from this study was used to develop a coherent,
stakeholder-informed account of this environmental policy process as a means of
identifying perceived strengths and weaknesses of the process and its outcomes.

It is important to note that many discourse analysis methods exist; yet, none of them
can be considered uniquely right. Gee (1999) asserts that discourse analysts, to suit
specific research problems, have devised various approaches to discourse analysis. In
essence, there is no one-best-way of doing discourse analysis. Methods are flexible, and
in fact it is considered normal and acceptable for them to be adapted, changed, and
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altered to specific issues and contexts (Gee, 1999). In Chapter One, I stated this thesis'
objectives and made it explicit that this study seeks to identify the lessons that can be
learned from the RFA proce~s. Thus, this research is not an objective truth seeking
exercise but an exploratory and integrative approach based on arguability and relativism
(subjectivism) because the question is not whether what I would find is true or not but
rather what could be learned from the analysis of the data. Yet, as will be shown below
this research does not rely purely on the plausibility of its findings.

This research project was methodologically constrained by the issue of confidentiality.
Confidentiality was a study condition imposed by the Committee for the Conduct of
Ethical Research at Edith Cowan University because of perceived sensitivities
surrounding the topic of this thesis. Not just data but also the identity of research
participants was in itself regarded as sensitive information. As a consequence, good
housekeeping and physical security measures needed to be introduced to prevent the
leakage of confidential information and to legitimate the research process (Kelman,
1972). Also, my research methods needed to contain certain safeguards (dejeopardising
techniques (after Lee, 1993)) ~o prevent the identification of research participants. The
employment of particular safeguards, which are described in this section, had
implications for the analysis and presentation of the research data in this thesis.
Therefore, the procedural steps outlined below need to be seen in light of this study
condition.

As mentioned previously, a total of 59 interviews was conducted, and 58 interviews
were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim.

The transcribed interviews formed a

database of approximately 27 4 000 words, which was imported into QSR NVivo 1.3
(1999), a qualitative data analysis computer software programme that I used to organise
and code the interview data. From the interview data selections were made of phrases
and entire sentences, although occasionally speech elements such as adjectives, adverbs,
past participles, and nouns were also considered.

Term selection was focused on

evaluative statements, personal observations, expressions of feelings and emotions,
historical accounts, quantifications, hopes, and predictions. Overall, my aim was to
analyse the interview data on the sentence level (provided sentences did not contain
identifying information) to leave intact as much of research participants' statements as
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possible8• This in turn enabled me to (a) minimise author intervention and the risk of
selectiveness, (b) enable participants to tell their story, and (c) allow for the transfer of
openness and transparency to the reader. In contrast, an analysis solely focused on
metaphors, for example, would have meant the possible loss of valuable context and
harboured the risk of simply putting my story over.

Over a period of 19 months I analysed the interview data via visual coding and analytic
deduction, searching for discursive themes and patterns. This involved the repeated
reading of the interview transcripts, a process which offered much opportunity for
reflection on the data and ultimately helped with the identification of information gaps
and cases of data overrepresentation. This led to additional interviews being conducted
and necessitated the adjustment of the coding system I had employed and the themes I
had developed. Emerging thematic groups were organised and structured with the help
of the computer software. I used the software for the development of a coding system
employing so-called nodes. Each node represented a thematic group, which selected
sections from the imported transcripts were assigned to.

The interview schedule, presenting the structured part of each interview (see Appendix
1), provided the initial coding structure for the interview data. Each interview question
was given a node, and quotations of all respective interviewee responses were listed
under these nodes.

The semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that

unstructured questions, follow-up questions, tangents, or interjections were leading to
the development of additional nodes and at times to the adjustment of the interview
schedule to incorporate newly gained information. Node searches were then carried out
with the use of the software, which produced lists of quotations taken from the
interview data for all nodes that were developed. For example, the interview question
''What are your views on the RFA process in terms of community involvement?" was
assigned the node name Participatory Nature of RFA - General Comments.

Then, all

statements made by research participants pertaining to the participatory nature of the
WA RFA were coded using that particular node.

8

Afterwards, a node search for

It needs to be recognised that the fonn of discourse analysis employed for the purposes of this study is

not a linguistic exercise. In other words, an in-depth analysis of interview material at the semiotic and
semantic levels is neither intended nor to be expected.

t
~.··

L
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quotations for RFA Participatory Nature of RFA - General Comments produced a data set
similar to that shown in Textbox 2.1.
Node Search Results for Node 'Participatory Nature ofRFA- General Comments'
Document 'Interviewee 1', 2 passages, 123 characters.
Section 0, Paragraph 60, 50 characters.
strong participatory role played by that local community

Document 'Interviewee 2', 2 passages, 123 characters
Section 0, Paragraph 60, 73 characters.
it was not a participatory process ·

Document 'Interviewee 3', 8 passages, 1511 characters.
Section 0, Paragraph 80, 25 characters.
very much a top-down process

Textbox 2.1: Example of a Node Search Result in QSR NVivo

The node search results shown below demonstrate the wide range of issues raised by
RFA stakeholders in response to the interview question on community involvement in
the WA RFA. In this example some individuals focused on structural aspects of the
RFA process whereas others made more general comments and observations. Varied
responses were characteristic for most of the interviews conducted.

The variety of stakeholder responses required the subdivision and refinement of the
thematic groups. However, on occasion categories needed to be kept sufficiently broad
in order to minimise privacy risks.

Through a process of iteration broad thematic

groups were divided into more refined subcategories. For instance, node category RFA

Public participation was subdivided into categories such as:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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participatory nature of RFA- general comments;
access to process;
power to influence process and outcomes;
structural characteristics to promote constructive interactions;
access to information;
facilitation of constructive personal behaviours;
adequate analysis; and
enabling of social conditions necessary for future processes.

New nodes were then assigned to the established subcategories and additional node
searches were carried out. The then refined search results were compiled into collages
(see Textbox 2.2), a device Butteriss et al. (2001) refer to as rhetorical landscapes or what
Myerson and Rydin (1996) call environets.

The industry very much felt that they were given token acknowledgement in the whole RFA process.
They did not have ownership of it. They were not consulted as much or as often or as in depth as
they should have been or could have been.

So when you came to drawing the lines on the map you said: Hang on, this group here, not only are
they prepared to have that area protected, they are prepared to maintain it and work on it.
Therefore, there was a strong participatory role played by that local community.

It's very much a top-down process with timelincs that look like they seek to meet their political
objcctiYcs in terms of elections rather than delivering things to people that arc meaningful on the
ground.

Textbox 2.2: Example of Collage for Node "Participatory Nature of RFA General Comments"

Each collage represented a thematic group, depicting randomly placed quotations taken
from that specific interview data subset. Randomisation was used to allow the scanning
of stakeholder information without superimposed structures and hierarchies.

The

technique also helped forestall the possibility of deductive disclosure (Lee, 1993). The
collage shown in Textbox 2.2 depicts node search results for a thematic group with
node name Participatory Nature

ef RFA

- General Comments. The collages were used as

information pools for the in-text presentation9 of the interview data via parentheses and
direct speech throughout the thesis complimented with, and compared to, data derived
from RFA-related literature and media content. Text fragments shown in bold type
represent text selections made for in-text use. The paragraphs (or parts of) from which

9

The text shown in square brackets [ ) denote editorial changes, which either represent the removal of

identifiers or alterations of grammatical, but not contextual, nature.

Text shown in parentheses are

additional quotes used to either signify the strength of data categories, to i;ndicate the variety of
stakeholder responses, or to simply allow for the inclusion of larger interview data segments. The use of
blanks " ... " denotes minor text omissions for grammatical/ structural reasons. Colour-coding (as shown
in Textbox 2.2 was used for in-text direct speech and parentheses, a technique described later on in
Chapter Four.
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text sections were lifted are also shown in the collages as a means of providing context
and transparency to the reader. All collages used for the purposes of this thesis can be
found in a series of electronic appendices (see CD-ROM), reference to which is made in
the relevant sections throughout.

A complete overview on the four-step process from interview transcription to the intext use of selected and categorised interview data fragments is provided in Figure 2.5.

Other Sub~Categotiea

Excerpts of an Interview Transcript with
Scientist

In-Text Use of Selected Quotation
lnterviewees pointed towards 2. general le,•d of
fear or w1cert:1inry within the scientific community
~ lthatJ would lhave] inhibit[ed) good, fruitful, and
honest debate on some of the issues at the heart
of rhe RFA.

l would not so much think public misperceptions but
2 ge neral recognition amo ng some scientists with
expertise and interest in the :l!Ca that to speak critically
of current management pr2ctices risked atttck from
some of the government departments working in the
are:a. 1 think that geocr.tl level of fear or uncertainty
within the scientific community would inhibit good,
fruitful, and honest debate on some of the issues at
the hem- of the RPA.

In-Text Use of Selected Quotation
These comments were congruent with stltements
expressing a general sense that mighty haste and
~ errors were charnctcristic of wh:n happened in the
l:uger process, primarily because of the pace in
which everybody was moving.

I guess what I was crying co illustrate via those
commencs that my involvement was euher quite small
in a formal sense but I guess the aspecrs of th.at formal
involvement were mighty hute, errors; thii would
seem to be, in my perception, chan.cteristic of what
happened in the larger p rocess, primarily because of
the pace in which everybody was moving.

In-Text Use of Selected Quotation
For instance, o n the question of impact of the
CRA studies on the final CRA report and the RP A
~ documen t the interview s revealed that some
scientists felt that the process ... was limited and
controlled and that certain scientific views that
ha,·e been expressed about the ecology of the
south -west forests .. . did not find their way into
any of the RFA documentation.

On that particular question l would :also suggest that
the coven,ge was inad eq uat e. There are certain
scientific views that have been expressed about the
ecology of the south-west fo rests that did not find
their way into any of the RFA documenration.

Other Sub-Categories

Data Transcription

Data Categorie8
Data Coding

In-Text Quotations
Data Sub-Categories
(Data Complied in Collages)
Category Refinement
Quote Selection From Collages

Figure 2.5: A Depiction of the Data Analysis Process

The illustration depicts three excerpts taken from an interview transcript. The data were
selected from an interview with a member of the scientific community who was
commenting on the science of the WA RFA. The interview data excerpts - via the data
coding process - were selected for inclusion into the category RFA Science. Through
category refinement, the RFA Science node was then broken down into numerous
thematic subcategories (shown here are Atmosphere, Time Horizon, and Data Use) . The
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content of these categories was then listed within node-specific collages, which provided
the data sources for verbatim in-text quotations throughout the thesis.

Citations taken from the interview transcripts appear in colour-coding, the various
colours denoting the different affiliations of research participants (e.g., government,
science, etc.) but primarily serving as a means of maintaining anonymity in the interview
data. Colour-coding permitted the use of direct quotes taken from the interview data,
providing a general indication of the participant's personal/professional context but
with no specific reference to the information source. Interview data could therefore be
used verbatim and did not need to be paraphrased. This way I hoped to preserve the
originality of the interview data to construct a meta-narrative of the WA RFA.

The coding system I employed involved RFA-specific informant groupings. However, a
description of these groupings will only become meaningful to the reader once I have
provided the necessary background to, and context(s) of, the WA RFA.

This

background information I will present in Chapter Three, and a full description of the
coding system will therefore need to wait until Chapter Four.

Rigour and Validity Issues
At this point I shall comment on the rigour of the methods outlined above. Many
criteria have been developed for the assessment of the trustworthiness and value of
qualitative research (see for instance Marshall, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1993);
however, all largely cover very similar ground. For the ensuing discussion I will address
three distinct but related inquiry elements, which, according to Patton (1990), the
credibility issue for qualitative research depends on. These inquiry elements are:

•

rigorous techniques;

•

researcher credibility; and

•

philosophical belief in the phenomenological paradigm.

Rigorous Techniques
The issue of rigour relates to the establishment of a study's truth value, meaning the
applicability, consistency, and neutrality of a research project (Llncoln & Guba, 1985).
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The tools I employed to strengthen the credibility of this study were clustering,
categorisation, triangulation, and checks for representativeness, which Miles and
Huberman (1993) refer to as means of verification of conclusions.

Clustering was employed, as will be described in more detail in Chapter Four, for the
partitioning of the group of informants and used primarily as a means of
depersonalising the interview data. Clustering was based on the question of who goes

together with whom? and thus involved a search for commonalities and points of overlap
among the individuals within that group of informants. Clustering also helped to give
contextual meaning to the interview transcripts, a point clarified by Platt (1981, p.53):
"A document's meaning cannot be understood unless one knows what genre it belongs
to, and what this implies for its interpretation."

The clusters I devised expressed

professional/philosophical allegiances of stakeholders, visually to be differentiated via
colour-codes for each cluster. The use of clusters was based on assumptions about the
homogeneity of RFA stakeholders' expectations of, and sentiments towards, the WA
RFA. The validity of these assumptions was tested throughout this thesis via constant
reference to the interview data, the literature, and media content and as part of an
analysis of group homogeneity /heterogeneity in Chapter Seven. In other words, the
clusters were tentative in nature, working hypotheses to be tested against the case study
data.

Data categorisations I used in response to a severe data overload (see Miles &
Huberman, 1984), which was a product of the large number of interviews conducted as
well as the richness of RFA-related literature and media content. Essentially, the use of
categories made the data more manageable. Emerging themes were subject to continual
scepticism (Ross & Lepper, 1980) to minimise the possibility of employing
superimposed structures.

Here, scepticism refers to the search for both data

corroboration and disconfirming evidence to either substantiate themes or devise new
themes reflective of data plurality. The parenthetical presentation of the case study data
and the use of direct speech provided a means through which the presentation of a total
discursive field image became possible; by this I mean the conveying of participants'
realities in either strong thematic groups in cases of data corroboration or weak thematic
groups where data was disconfirming (data outliers). The use of parentheses and direct
speech thus permitted both the comprehensive display of plural and conflicting
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perspectives and methodological transparency to the reader.

I made the conscious

attempt to treat all stakeholder discourses as equally valid and their selection as value
free and non-political despite the political nature of the topic. No single discourse was
to be seen as better, more worthwhile, valid or true and each discourse to be considered
justified and valid within its context. While some discourses may have dominated and
attained what Butteriss (2002) calls hegemonic status, this was not to make this discourse a
good or better discourse. The aim was to accurately define and describe events and
accounts of the WA RFA, and I was wanting to attain research findings that would "be
credible to the constructors of the original multiple realities" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985,
p.296).

Constant reference to other information sources also helped maintain a

balanced perspective.

I employed data triangulation as a means of supporting the rigour of this study. Three
different data sources, namely interview data, RFA-related literature, and media content,
were used to describe the same process or aspects of it. This technique, which has been
fruitfully applied to social science inquiries for many years (1farshall & Rossman, 1995),
helped corroborate, elaborate, and illuminate the case of the WA RFA. The method
helped me check for internal data consistency via the validation of interview
information with publicly available data sources (Patton, 1990). For instance, it could be
tested whether evidence given at parliamentary inquiries could corroborate interviewee
responses, providing insights which enabled me to monitor the quality of the interview
data. In addition, the conducting of interviews permitted within-data-triangulation. The
tapping into a heterogeneous group of philosophically opposed stakeholders afforded
me access to multiple accounts of the same policy process, in turn enabling a more
balanced data analysis and thus contributing to the credibility of the findings. The issue
of informant representativeness (Miles & Huberman, 1984) I did not address
statistically. Instead, with the use of snowball sampling I intended to achieve discursive
saturation, meaning the inclusion of additional interview data to a point where no new
data could be obtained. In other words, I intended to exhaust the discourse variety and
that way hoped to achieve a fair and balanced representation of the RFA discourse
community. The representativeness of events and activities (Miles & Huberman, 1984)
studied was to be ascertained through the detailed description of the historically grown
forest conflict and of other contextual information pertinent to the WA RFA. In so
doing, strong sentiments expressed during interviews could be put into context due to
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external data richness, which in turn helped minimise the risk of overweighing dramatic
events.

Researcher Credibility
Under this heading I intend to address the issue of how I, the researcher, may have
affected the credibility of the research findings and explain the steps taken to prevent
undue influence. My own institutional affiliation with Edith Cowan University I viewed
as being potentially problematic in light of the topic of this thesis. This is because a
number of university staff were actively involved in the WA RFA and played a part in
the developments leading up to this process. Some of these involvements were rather
adversarial in nature, aspects of which were well covered in the local media and thus
public knowledge. Therefore, I needed to be prepared to overcome both potential inhouse biases towards the WA RFA, which might have affected my own judgement, and
possible/ probable biases of RFA stakeholders towards the institution and staff
members, based on which research participants might have declined to participate or
limited their degree of cooperation (e.g., strongly filtered interview responses).

External biases I intended to overcome by clearly stating the aims of my research
project and methods involved to potential research participants as shown on the
consent form signed by all research participants (see Appendices 2 and 3). This was to
ensure that my mandate was unambiguous for informants (Miles & Huberman, 1984)
and to attain a sense of trust, which Lincoln and Guba (1986) describe as an important
dimension of methodological rigour. I also provided full disclosure of my supervisory
arrangements and personal focus on the research topic - as stated in Chapter One with the aim to work against doubt over ulterior motives and bias. Copies of the thesis
proposal were made available to potential participants on request.

Potential in-house biases I attempted to overcome by seeking both internal and external
views to challenge and critically question my analyses. This thesis' Chapters Five and
Six were presented respectively at two international conferences (Brueckner, 2002a,
2002b) and at a number of seminars at Perth-based universities. The feedback collected
helped me remain theory-minded (Patton, 1990) and aided critical reflection on
assumptions and inferences made.
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During the data analysis I frequently sought

feedback from experienced scholars, who I asked to play devils' advocate (Marshall &
Rossman, 1995) to critically question my approach and findings.

The inclusion of key stakeholders, peripheral stakeholders, and former stakeholders into
the group of research participants helped avoid elite biases (Miles & Huberman, 1984)
and allowed for consideration to be given to dissidents with alternative perspectives.
Informant cooption (Miles & Huberman, 1984), referring here to the provision of
historical and background information by research participants, was a means through
which I also hoped to achieve bias avoidance. I remained neutral throughout the course
of the WA RFA from 1997 to 1999, neither becoming actively involved in the process
nor liaising with any of the RFA stakeholder groups.

However, I did not distance

myself from the process and its aftermath as I attended rallies, seminars, lectures, and
public meetings as an observer, yet without fuming native (Marshall & Rossman, 1995), to
gain a feeling for, and understanding of, the players and the various paradigms, views,
and ambitions at work.

Philosophical Beliefin the Phenomenological Paradigm
In this section I shall explain and defend the value and appropriateness of the qualitative
approach chosen for this study. I stated earlier that this research does not aim at the
generation of unassailable certainties and truths. This thesis is about perspectives and
the development of perspectives. I employed a qualitative approach for I meant to
produce credible, balanced, and useful information applicable to debates

on

environmental policy making via an investigation of emotionally charged and contextrich data of a recently completed environmental policy process. The issue here was
learning and context-bound extrapolation (Patton, 1990), which is why I did not think
that quantitative techniques were suitable for the analysis of the case in hand.
Qualitative research is established and recognised across many scientific disciplines
(Miles & Huberman, 1993; Marshall & Rossman, 199 5). Yet, I am aware of the, albeit
diminishing, intensity of the debate between (some of) the so-called hard and soft
sciences (see for instance Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1986). 10 At issue in these debates are
usually concerns about objectivity, generalisability, and replicablility, and it is these
concerns I now wish to turn to.

to

This issue is addressed in more detail in Chapter Six.
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Objectivity is the cornerstone of positivistic (hard) science.

It has been recognised,

however, that the objectivity mandate in quantitative research cannot easily be
transferred to qualitative inquiries (Guba, 1981 ). In fact, there is a recognition within
the qualitative research community that subjectivity is inevitable (Peshkin, 1988). This is
why calls have been made to have this positivistic mandate replaced "with a mandate to
be balanced, fair and conscientious in taking account of multiple perspectives, multiple
interests, and multiple realities" (Patton, 1990, p.481). This is what gave rise to a new
(different) scientific protocol for qualitative research, which demands full disclosure of
the research methods employed, well documented research processes, transparency of
possible biases, and an open description of limitations (Patton, 1990; Miles &
Huberman, 1993).

I hope to have demonstrated in earlier sections that with the

techniques I employed throughout this study and the research details provided I have
fulfilled these requirements. The issue of detailed documentation I shall address below.

Generalisability is also problematic within qualitative research (Patton, 1990), some say
impossible (Marshall & Rossman, 1995) for contextual variation of social phenomena
over time does not allow for significant empirical generalisations. Certainly, qualitative
research findings are context-bound, but full and detailed descriptions of studies'
richness allow for the identification of other cases with similar contextual settings to
which research findings may apply.

In other words, the transferability of research

findings can be achieved when sufficient detail can assist the reader in seeing that
potential for transfer (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). This thesis deals in depth with the
case of the WA RFA, providing a full description of the RFA process, its participants,
their underlying beliefs and values, the historical development of the forest conflict, and
the resource system under contention.

Based on that information context-bound

extrapolations can be made from the findings of this study and transferred to resource
conflict settings and environmental policy-making processes of similar contextual
complexity.

The scientific hallmark of replicablility, as would have been detectable in the above
section on generalisability, is one of the most difficult to master within qualitative
research (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Marshall & Rossman, 199 5) largely due to reasons
of social complexity and dynamism. This is why a new technology of reporting has
come of age within qualitative research aiming at the verification of qualitative methods
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and research findings.

This new methodological canon is generally referred to as

research documentation or auditing (Miles & Huberman, 1984, 1993), an approach
which requires authors to lay open the logic and chosen approach of the research they
are reporting on.

Auditing usually involves the compilation of a diary, a research

companion containing field notes, observations, comments, hunches, procedures,
methodological decisions, and underlying rationales, which should enable "another
researcher ... [to] follow that audit trial and [to] verify the accuracy and legitimacy of
[those] procedures" (Miles & Huberman, 1984, p.244). Throughout the three and a half
years of this study I have compiled handwritten notes on this research project,
documented key aspects of weekly discussions had with members of my supervisory
panel and conversations with colleagues and external advisors, noted experiences had in
interview situations, relevant lectures, and conferences; all representing information
typical of that contained in a research diary.

Due to the confidentiality condition

imposed on this study, however, this information cannot be used for auditing purposes
because it cannot be made publicly available. The same is true for this research's raw
data (i.e., interview transcripts) which are stored electronically and in hardcopy in an
undisclosed appendix. Both research notes and interview transcripts contain identifiers,
which if made publicly available, would enable deductive disclosure by third parties.
Moreover, the anonymisation of this study's large datasets I considered for technical
reasons unpractical as data manipulation during software-based coding operations
cannot not be carried out and would have required time-intensive data exports and reimports. I am aware that my inability to divulge research-related information might
weaken the methodological strength of this research project but primary consideration
needed to be given to the protection of the identity of research informants. Yet, I
believe I have given sufficient detail on the procedural aspects of this study and
provided for adequate methodological transparency to offset any confidentiality-related
data concealments.

Also, in relation to the treatment of the interview data I am

confident that the use of appended collages and extensive in-text quotations will
compensate the reader for the barred access to this study's raw data.

Finally, I would like to comment on the issue of ethical conduct, especially as it relates
to data and informant confidentiality. This study has been approved by the Committee
for the Conduct of Ethical Research at Edith Cowan University.

Based on the

conditions imposed on this research project all interviewees were briefed in detail about
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the aims and purposes of this research project, possible ramifications stemming from
their involvement in the research were discussed, and all forms of data use were fully
disclosed. Informed (written) consent was sought from all research participants for the
conducting of both face-to-face and telephone interviews (see Appendices 2 and 3).
Informants were given the op.portunity to review and edit the interview transcripts and
provided with the option to either bar or authorise the release of the data for
research/publication purposes (Appendix 4). The interview data was not made available
to any third parties. The exceptions were instances where written consent could be
obtained from informants for the data disclosure to the members of my supervisory
panel (see Appendices 2 and 3). All interview data was kept securely under lock and key
for the entirety of the research project, and all electronic databases were password
protected and encrypted. All data will be stored that way for another five years until
2008. Then a decision will be made whether to continue with secure storage or to
choose the destruction of all files, audio-tapes, and other data carriers. Public access to
the interview data is not going to be granted at any future stage.

Conclusion
In this chapter I provided a rationale for the adoption of the socio-ecological commons
framework and presented details on the workings of open systems theory from which
social ecology is derived. Moreover, I demonstrated the applicability of this systems
approach to the case of the WA RFA and provided arguments in support of the
adoption of the Selsky & Memon (1995) model for CCPRs as a sense-making and
structural tool for the purposes of this thesis.

I introduced my research design and defended my decision to employ a case study
format and the adoption of grounded theory. I elaborated on the study's three distinct
data sources chosen, namely interviews, RFA-related literature, and media content and
provided details about the data collection process.

Subsequently, I presented my

rationale for choosing a constructionist adaptation of discourse analysis and described
the method I devised and its application. Finally, I discussed validity issues and ethical
concerns surrounding this research and the methods employed.
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Chapter Three
The Historical Contexts of the Western Australian
Regional Forest Agreement
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to put this study of the WA RFA into perspective. Based on
primary and secondary literature, I will provide a general overview of the ecological,
historical, social, political, and economic contexts of the RFA against which the process
ought to be seen regionally and nationally.

I will provide the reader with a brief

description of the WA RFA forest areas, sketching the region's geography and
commenting on its ecological, social, and economic make-up.

This review is kept

general, however, and does not contain any detailed analyses.

Subsequently, I will

present a historical review of the rise of the WA timber industry and forestry in the State
to afford the reader insights into the established patterns of forest utilisation and
management and to offer a background of understanding of the issues surrounding the
RFA debate.

In addition, I will elaborate on the rise of environmentalism and the

evolution of conflict over forest utilisation, particularly in relation to forest
management, clearfelling, old growth, and woodchipping and their influence on the
history of the RFA.

Description of the RFA Forest Area

A Glance at the Making ofa Continent
Hot, dry andflat, Australia is not aforested land
(Recher, 1981)
Australia today is a single-country continent which forms a part of Oceania between the
Indian Ocean and the South Pacific Ocean. The world's smallest and driest continent
originally formed a part of the Gondwana landmass, which during the Cretaceous
period approximately 135 million years ago started to break apart (White, 1994b). Since
the separation from Antarctica some 100 million years ago, Australia developed a
distinctive ecology over a considerable geological timeframe (McLaughlin, 2001). The
evolution of the country's flora and fauna is attributed to changes in climate and rising
then falling sea levels which caused the eventual separation of Tasmania and New
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Guinea from the mainland 10 000 to 15 000 years ago (Breidahl, 1987; Vickers-Rich &
Rich, 1993; State of the Environment Advisory Council, 1996).

More recently -

geologically speaking - evolutionary changes occurred, which coincided with the arrival
of humans 40 000 to 100 000 years ago and the increase in the incidence of fire, which
is also thought to be related to the drying of the land (White, 1994b). The Australian
continent has been described as geologically stable since the Cretaceous period - some
65 million years - but to have been subject to persistent weathering and erosion
(National Forest Inventory, 1998). These changes coincided with the decline of the
Gondwanan forests, which have largely been replaced by sclerophyllous forests (White,
1994a). Australia has a total land area of 7 617 930 km2 of which no more than 13 per
cent are covered by trees. Only a quarter of that area is classified as forested area, which
represents five per cent of Australia's land mass (Mercer, 199 5)11, which explains why
Australia is considered the least forested continent (State of the Environment Advisory
Council, 1996).

Western Australia - a State of 3 million km2 in size - has about 2.4 million ha of forest
(Resource Assessment Commission, 1992), which represents less than one per cent of
the State's landmass. Forest occurrence in WA can be viewed as being restricted to two
botanical districts (after Beard, 1981a), the Gardner in the Kimberley and the Darling in
the State's south-west; the latter essentially represents the WA RFA area, as shown in
Figure 3.1.

The Darling botanical district is made up of the Swan Coastal Plain

(Drummond sub-district), the northern jarrah forest (Dale sub-district), the southern
jarrah forest (Menzies sub-district), and the karri forest (Warren sub-district) (Beard,
1981a, 1982).

This region features, in contrast to the tropical Gardner district, a

Mediterranean climate with warm dry summers and mild wet winters with occasional
frost (for more detail on climate refer to Gentilli, 1989). The original forest extent in
the southern forest region prior to European settlement in the late 1820s is believed to

11

Forests - according to the National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, p. 47)

- are defined as "an area, incorporating all living and non-living components, that is dominated by trees
having usually a single stem and a mature or potentially mature stand height exceeding two metres and
with existing or potential crown cover of overstorey strata about equal to or greater than 20 per cent."
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have been in the vicinity of 4 million ha, of which 2.6 million ha remain today
(Government of Western Australia, 1998). 12

0
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Figure 3.1: Locality Map- South-Western Botanical Province
(after Beard, 1981b; adapted from Hopper, 1992; Environment Australia, 1999)
The WARFARegion

The Geography and Ecology of the WA RFA Region
The WA RFA region (see Figure 3.2) covers about 4.25 million ha of public and private
land. The region's eastern boundary roughly follows Albany highway (a direct route
between the city of Perth and the town of Albany) while the western boundary runs
along the Darling Range 13 turning coastward towards Cape Naturaliste. In the North,
the region starts near Gingin and stretches down to the South Coast near Denmark
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2000a) The coastal plain is excluded from the WA RFA
region. The private land - 1.87 million ha (44 per cent) - is largely cleared and used for

12

As is detectable in the discrepancy between the figures cited in this paragraph for existing forest extent

(i.e., 2.4 and 2.6 million ha), the accuracy of these figures is contested. This will be subject of further
discussion in Chapter Six.
13

The Darling Range (scarp) is at the edge of the Western Plateau, extending 322 km parallel with the

southwest coast and rising to 582 m.
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agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, grazing, dairy, and other uses (Commonwealth of
Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a).
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SOUTHERN OCEAN

Figure 3.2: Western Australian RFA Region
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998c, p. 57)
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The remaining 2.38 million ha (56 per cent) is public land and is predominantly covered
by native forest and some tree plantations. In 1998, the public land in the south-west
region featured 745 000 ha of formal nature reserves and 314 900 ha of informal nature
reserves (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a).
The reserve estate has been extended following the completion of the RFA.

The region's tall forest formations are found in the south-west corner of the State where
annual rainfall exceeds 600 mm (Department of Conservation and Land Management,
1992a). Jarrah (Eucafyptus marginata), karri (E. diversicolor), and marri (red gum) (Corymbia

calopf?ylla) 14 are the dominant tree species in the region. All are endemic to Western
Australia. The most extensive forest in the region, however, signifies what is sometimes
referred to as the Jarrah Forest. The Jarrah Forest (see Plate 3.1) is classified as open
forest in the north of the region and tall forest in the south (Dell & Havel, 1989). The
main jarrah belt is approximately 80 km wide and stretches 550 km from north to south.
It is situated to the west of the 600 mm isohyet with its largest formations in the high
rainfall zone along the plateau and scarp of the Darling Range (Calder, 1980; Dell &
Havel, 1989). Height and density of the jarrah forest decrease from the south to the
north and west to the east due to diminishing rainfall and edaphic effects (for more
information on jarrah distribution in relation to climate and soils refer to Smith, 1974;
Beard, 1979, 1981a, 1982; Gentilli, 1989); logging also explains some of the changes in
the density of the jarrah forest (Recher, 2003, pers. com.).

While jarrah has a distribution over a wide range of soil, topographic, and climatic
conditions (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1992a), the
occurrence of karri is restricted to the moister and more fertile (younger) soils in the
extreme south-west corner of the State within the 1100 mm isohyet (Bradshaw & Lush,
1981).

The karri area (see Plate 3.2) stretches along the Warren, Blackwood, and

Donnelly rivers, from Karridale through Nannup to Pemberton, Walpole, and Denmark
with isolated stands in the Porongorups near Albany (Department of Conservation and
Land Management, 1992a). With its occurrence being related to the presence of moist
soils karri is largely found in incised valleys, on red earths, and along valleys and rivers.
On slopes karri grows in mixture with marri, on ridges it is replaced by jarrah
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a).
14

Formerly Euca!Jptus calophylla.
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Plate 3.1: Jarrah Old Growth Forest North-East of Collie (Preston)
(Photo: Simon Judd)
·

Plate 3.2: Karri Forest Near Pemberton (Hawke Block)
(Photo: Simon Judd)

so

Marti grows in association with both jarrah and karri, predominantly, however, on fertile
and lighter, sandy soils. While found mainly to the west of the 600 mm isohyet, the
specie has a wide distribution across the south-west of WA, stretching from the
Murchison River in the north to Bremer Bay on the south coast (Wardell-Johnson,
2000). In the past, marri was commonly regarded a weed for it grew in competition
with jarrah and karri, which were (and still are) favoured over marri for sawn timber
production. With the introduction of woodchipping in WA in the late 1960s, marri
became recognised as a merchantable tree species (Schuster, 1980). In recent years,
marri also gained recognition in the context of furniture production.

Three species of tingle (a) red tingle (E.jacksoniz), (b) yellow tingle (E. gui!foylez), and (c)
Rates tingle (E. brevistylis) form sub-formations of the southern karri forest. On the
eastern edge of the jarrah forest, woodlands are largely made up of wandoo (E. wandoo)
and powderbark wandoo (E. accedens), and to the north and west of the jarrah forest,
tuarts (E. gomphocephalus) form woodlands especially on the western coastal plain. Yarri
(blackbutt) (E. patens), bullich (E. megaca,pa), and flooded gum (E. rudis) represent some
of the several other eucalypt species that grow in association with the principal forest
species (see Bradshaw & Lush, 1981; Dell et al., 1989; Abbott & Loneragan, 1996).
Most softwood and hardwood plantations in the region consist of exotic species such as
Pinus radiata, Pinus pinaster, and Tasmanian blue gum (Eucajyptus globulus) respectively
(Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1992a).

Finally, the southern forest region is also a significant water catchment area with 22 river
systems as well as substantial groundwater resources and high-yielding aquifers, which
together form the bulk of the water supply for the Perth metropolitan area (Department
of Conservation and Land Management, 1987a).

Scientific Knowledge ofthe WA RFA Region
There is much controversy about the scientific knowledge and thus the management of
the south-western forest region. In terms of biodiversity, the Darling district is regarded
species rich with numerous centres of endemism (largely local small-scale endemism)
(e.g. Hopkins et al., 1983) In fact, the south-western Mediterranean climate regions are
estimated to contain 8000 species, with three quarters endemic (Hopper et al., 1996).
Occurrences of relictual flora and fauna like the tingles, the sunset frog (Spicospina
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flammocaerulea) and the honey possum (Tarsipes rostratus) are considered common (see
Dell et al., 1989). Development, commercial forest uses, mining, climate change, fire,
the spread of pathogens, and inappropriate management regimes are some of the
potential threats to the biodiversity in this region.

Overall, however, there is scientific dispute over the ecological vulnerability of the
region. It is held among members of the Western Australian science community that
substantial knowledge gaps exist about species occurrence and the ecological processes
governing the region's forest ecosystems (e.g. Wardell-Johnson et al., 1989b; WardellJohnson & Nichols, 1991; Calver et al., 1996).

The extent of existing scientific

knowledge about the forest region is questioned, and concerns are raised about poorly
understood ecosystem interconnections, processes, and vulnerabilities in the face of
diminishing rainfall in WA's south-west (CSIRO, 1996) and other perceived threats to
flora and fauna.

Perceived knowledge deficits are attributed, inter alia, to customarily tree-centric
research programmes and forest management regimes in the State. In expounding, the
southern forest area has historically been seen as a homogenous landscape dominated
by merchantable tree species (i.e., jarrah and karri).

Yet, in recent years more

sophisticated research has led to an increased understanding of the richness, rarity, and
endemism of species within WA's forest estate (e.g. Wardell-Johnson et al., 1989a;
Hopper et al., 1992). Nonetheless, the State's forest areas, as is evident in Figure 3.3,
continue to be seen by the State's forest department as largely homogenous landscapes
and to be treated with broadscale management prescriptions, which are regarded by
some as insensitive to the heterogeneity of the forest landscape (Wardell-Johnson &
Horwitz, 1996). The scientific disagreements surrounding forest management will be
examined in more detail in Chapter Six.
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Figure 3.3: Forest Management Areas
(Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1992a, p.3)

Socio-Economic Data of the WA RFA Region

The south-west region has an estimated population of 188 000 15 people (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2000) with only a few population centres over 1000 people (e.g.,
Margaret River, Bridgetown, and Manjimup). Sources of employment within the region
are found in mining, timber cutting and milling, agriculture, tourism, apiary, floriculture,
native seed collection, and others. Viticulture has also become a significant industry in
the State's south-west.

In terms of economic significance, the region's overall

contribution to the State's employment was 19.2 per cent in 1998 with the timber
industry employing approximately 20 000 people either directly or indirectly, accounting
for flow-on employment such as fuel, transport, and engineering (Commonwealth of
Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a).

Industry data from 1996

indicates that forestry in conjunction with agriculture and fishing contributed 10.4 per
cent to the State's GDP of $55 billion16 (Treasury Department of Western Australia,

15

This figure includes the populations of the cities of Bunbury and Mandurah, which lie just outside the

RFA region.
16

Currency shown in Australian dollars.
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2003, pers. com.) and that export earnings from wood and wood-based products were
valued at $123 million per annum (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1998).

In summary, the RFA area features a wealth of unique and diverse flora and fauna and
contributes significantly to the State's economy. The region, which is governed by
complex ecological processes, is impacted upon to varying degrees by many overlapping
and at times conflicting anthropogenic demands such as mining, agriculture, tourism,
recreation, and timber production Timber production is of principal interest here as the
commercial use of timber is at the core of the RFA process, the focal point of this
thesis. In what follows, I will. draw attention to the history of timber usage and review
the rise of the timber industry and forestry in Western Australia.

History of Western Australian Timber Usage and Forestry

The Evolution ofan Industry
The cutting of native timber in the south-west of Western Australia immediately
followed British settlement in 1826 (Nunn, 1957; Heberle, 1997) and accelerated after
the establishment of the Swan River Colony in 1829 (Dargavel, 1995). In the early days
of the colony, land was being cleared for pastoral and agricultural purposes, and the
timber attained was being used for a variety of purposes including housing, fencing, and
furniture making, bridges, and boat building (Rule, 1967). Nevertheless, the quantities
of timber initially extracted are said to have been relatively low (Carron, 1985).

Very quickly hardwood timber (essentially jarrah) 17 was recognised as a potential export
commodity, especially because of the seemingly inexhaustible volumes available and its
superior quality (Calder, 1980; Mills, 1988; Cresswell, 1989). Exports of pit sawn timber
started in 1831 (Heberle, 1997), and sawmilling started in 1833 with the establishment of
the colony's first sawmill at Mount Eliza (Robertson, 1956), known today as Kings Park.

I:

Hardwood exports were seen as a means of stemming imports and reducing the ever
growing trade deficit of the young colony (Carron, 1985).

At that time, timber

extraction went largely unchecked. While licenses were required for timber cutting in
certain areas, regulations for forest conservation were few and difficult to enforce

17

Jarrah was then known as Swan River mahogany and not called by its native name ja,rah before the

mid-1840s (Carron, 1985).
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(Education and Lands and Surveys Departments of Western Australia, 1979). In fact,
measures by the colonial authorities rarely contemplated anything beyond the
registration of timber falling operators (Robertson, 1959).

Capital was required for the establishment of an export oriented timber industry,
particularly for the handling and transport of large logs, and for port facilities. Expertise
and skills for timber seasoning and kiln drying were also necessary (Carron, 1985; Mills,
1989).

In 1849, as a means to increase timber production among other reasons,

Governor Fitzgerald applied for the colony to become a penal colony, as it was hoped
that convict labour, adding to the labour force, would improve communications and
help realise the timber production potential of the colony's forests (Calder, 1980; Mills,
1988; Cresswell, 1989; Mills, 1989); this was acceded to by Britain. The convict system
lasted until 1868, and the expansion of the public-works programme afforded the
development of trade to England, India, and South Africa. Yet, the focal point of
timber production at the time remained local usage (Carron, 1985).

In the late 1860s, concession and license negotiations were being held between the
colony's government and its business entrepreneurs in an attempt to create a more
attractive environment for business and to stimulate much needed investment into the
industry (Bosworth & Brad, 1997). Following negotiations, the governor of the colony,
Governor Weld, decided to grant exclusive rights to cut timber and to exempt
enterprises from export duties in return for license and sawyer's fees (Robertson, 1959).
These and further agreements, known as the Canning, J arrahdale, and Lockeville or
Ballarat concessions (Robertson, 1959), fostered the establishment of large mills, first in
Canning, Jarrahdale and Lockeville, and later in Vasse, Denmark, Karridale, and Collie
(Education and Lands and Surveys Departments of Western Australia, 1979; Dargavel,
1995). The resulting generation of colonial capital allowed for greater mechanisation of
the forest industry and hence an increase in timber exports. The late 1870s and early
1880s saw a slow wave of infrastructure creation using native hardwoods in the form of
railway lines, tramways, and landing jetties (Calder, 1980; Carron, 1985; Mills, 1989;
Bosworth & Brad, 1997).

Towards the late 1880s, these developments attracted further British capital, which in
conjunction with initially reluctant increases in the government's public-works spending
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led to more sawmills and railway systems being built and more cutting concessions
being granted.

Between 1893 and 1902, the boom years, existing sawmills were

expanded and new timber towns were established along the newly built train lines.
These settlements included towns like Yarloop, Mornington, Waroona, Wellington, and
Greenbushes (Education and Lands and Surveys Departments of Western Australia,
1979). The expansion of infrastructure also gained pace with the discovery of gold at
Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie (Calder, 1980; Carron, 1985; Mills, 1989).

Following the boom period of the 1890s a drop in the paving wood trade caused a
slump in the then overcapitalised timber industry with falling export prices and profit
levels (Calder, 1980; Dargavel, 1995). This in turn led to fierce competition between
timber companies and a growth in unrestrained and wasteful cutting in an attempt to
maintain or improve market position. In 1902, one year after the proclamation of the
Australian Federation, the pressure resulting from the strong competition in the industry
led to the amalgamation of eight of the State's largest timber companies, which were to
form the Millars' Karri and Jarrah Forest Company, also known as the Combine,
accounting for over 70 per cent of the WA's timber exports (Cresswell, 1989). The
merger involved Millar's Karri and Jarrah Pty. Ltd., Jarrahdale Forests and Railways Ltd.,
M.C. Davies Karri and Jarrah Co. Ltd., Gill McDowell Jarrah Ltd., The Imperial Jarrah
Wood Corporation, The Jarrah Wood and Sawmilling Co. Ltd., and The Westralian
Jarrah Forests Ltd (Thomas, 1939).

Notably, two other large timber companies,

Whittaker Brothers and Bunnings Brothers, were not part of the merger, as they were
primarily focused on local markets for structural timber (Mills, 1989). However, these
two companies were to dominate timber milling in WA in the period leading up to the
WA RFA. In the ensuing years, partly due to the expansion of the railway system, the
timber industry recovered and expanded until World War I with a peak in production in
i

1913 (Forests Department, 1969).

I,

!i

The Dawn ofForest Management
During the 1870s and 1880s, ·concerns were raised about indiscriminate timber cutting
(Education and Lands and Surveys Departments of Western Australia, 1979). However,
authorities did little to ensure conservation (Carron, 1985). A Royal Commission in
1877 marked the first, but somewhat self-contradictory, inquiry into timber export
regulations and export encouragement, as well as the conservation of Western
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Australian forests (Robertson, 1959; Carron, 1985; Dargavel & Bourland, 1988;
Bosworth & Brad, 1997). The fact that no report was made by the Commission may be
indicative of the prevailing attitudes towards forest conservation at the time (on this
point refer to Robertson, 1959). In 1878, a Select Committee of the Legislative Council
recommended changes to license fees and hewing practices to reduce waste; these
changes were not welcomed by the industry (Robertson, 1956, 1959; Calder, 1980).
Subsequent reports by then Surveyor-General Malcolm Fraser (1882) and botanist
Baron Ferdinand von Miiller (1822 (possibly wrongly dated); 1879) 18 highlighted the
need for forest preservation. Both cautioned against the uncontrolled use and abuse of
forest resources and suggested conservancy measures and administrative control,
especially in relation to minimum tree size and fire damage. In 1883, J.S. Harris was
appointed to the position of Forest Ranger. However, the appointment could "scarcely
be held to signify an important innovation in forest protection policy" (Robertson,
1959, p.7). It was not until 1894/95 that, due to concerns raised by some members of
parliament, the WA government decided to employ a Forest Conservator, by the name
of J. Ednie-Brown, as head of the Woods and Forests Department (Calder, 1980), a
branch of the Department of Lands and Surveys (Carron, 1985).

Ednie-Brown's gravest mistake as Conservator, according to Robertson (1956), was his
miscalculation of the colony's forest extent, as it (a) made forest resources seem infinite
and (b) undermined his own forest conservation proposals. In his reports (1896; 1899;
cited in Robertson, 1959) Ednie-Brown stated that the principal forest surface equated
to over 8 million ha, a figure that was to be accepted for 20 years and to form the basis
for government policy. Not surprisingly, most of Ednie-Brown's attempts to curtail
destructive tree cutting and hewing practices were opposed by a hostile industry and
lacked support from a rather unsympathetic government (Mills, 1989).

His

recommendations rarely led to changes in existing regulations relating to forest
management as primacy was given to agriculture at the time (Education and Lands and
Surveys Departments of Western Australia, 1979).

Although Ednie-Brown was successful in pushing through the establishment of the
Woods and Forests Department in 1896, timber licenses were still granted by the Lands
18

As cited by Carron (1985) and Mills (1989). Judging from reports by Robertson (1959) and the era of

von Miiller (1883) is likely to be the correct date.
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Department, which also controlled the licenses (Robertson, 1959). The Conservator
also worked on the drafting of the Crown Lands Timber Bill, which meant to improve
working conditions, impose girth falling restrictions, and introduce the appraisement
principle. 19 However, when the Land Act was introduced by government in 189820 , it
did little more than limit lease areas to 30 000 ha, in order to prevent speculation on
timber concessions by timber companies (Carron, 1985). Robertson (1959) describes it
as an Act that led to a more ruthless exploitation of the forest resources and more
effective alienation of prime timber land to agriculturalists. Still, despite many setbacks,
when Ednie-Brown died in 1899 he had successfully started softwood plantings,
established a forests department, and laid the foundation for a legislative framework for
forestry, which in turn paved the way for the Forests Act in years to come.

The time following Ednie-Brown's death was marked by 17 years of diminutive interest
in forest management by successive governments. Despite a Royal Commission on
Forestry in 190321 and the appointment of a Forests Advisory Board in 1905, which
ceased in 1908, little change occurred in WA's forests and the regulative framework that
governed their use (Robertson, 1959; Carron, 1985).

In March 1916, C.E. Lane Poole

was appointed as Inspector-General (later Conservator) to professionally head the
Forests Department. His key role was in the drafting of legislation in relation to forest
protection measures and the raising of public awareness of the need for balanced forest
exploitation and conservation.

His work led to the passing of the Forests Act in

1918/19 by the State Parliament, signifying a "change from laissez-faire conditions to
organised forestry" (Carron, 1985, p.146).

The Act included the dedication of State forests, the limiting of the cutting of prime

i

timber for forest production, the introduction of the perpetual yield principle, the

E
I,

increase in softwood plantings for local demand, and a mandate for forest regeneration.

Ii

19

il

This meant that rent would be charged on timber leases based upon the quantity and value of the

timber available as well as the comparative advantages owing to conditions surrounding (Robertson,

Ii

1959).
20

21

Wrongly dated by Bosworth and Brad (1997).
The Commission's report

(Royal Commission on Forestry, 1903) led to the introduction of mill

permits and a royalty system (Education and Lands and Surveys Departments of Western Australia, 1979),
which were implemented under the Land Amendment Bill of 1904 (Mills, 1989; Bosworth & Brad, 1997)
(for more detail on WA legislation in relation to forests refer to Dargavel et al., 1987).
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Since 1919, steps were also taken to devote a portion of the State revenue from timber
to the maintenance of the forest estate (Government of Western Australia and Paterson
Brokensha Pty Ltd, 1956); and it was from the 1920s that reliable records were kept of
timber cutting operations (Heberle, 1997). In addition, Lane Poole acknowledged the
need for greater training in professional forestry, which resulted in a training school
being instituted for this purpose at Ludlow (Bosworth & Brad, 1997). Nationally, the
advent of modern forestry was marked by the establishment of the Australian Forestry
School in Canberra in 1927 (Carron, 1985).

Despite these seemingly radical changes, true reform of forestry practices remained
difficult to achieve, especially in terms of conservation, as forested land at the time was
still considered a target for farming and settlements. The suitability of jarrah country for
farming, however, was long disputed by the Forests Department (Bosworth & Brad,
1997). The Conservator's efforts to conserve parts of the State's declining tuart, jarrah,
and karri forests (Carron, 1985) collided with the post-World War I Group Settlement
Scheme of the then Premier James Mitchell, who parcelled out areas around Denmark,
Nannup, Margaret River, Balingup, and Donnybrook to returned soldiers (Bosworth &
Brad, 1997).

Lane Poole's initiatives also met opposition from agriculturalists, the

timber industry, and many members of parliament. Disquiet also grew among small
sawmillers who felt increasingly disadvantaged by stricter controls and regulations
(Dargavel, 1995). Lane Poole was also in battle with large concession holders over the
regulation of leases and the payment of royalties, the combination of which - in the
absence of support and success - led to his resignation in October 1921 (Calder, 1980;
Carron, 1985).

Lane Poole's five years of service changed the State's forest policy forever, and the
notion of infinite timber supplies was abandoned (Robertson, 1956, 1959). S.L. Kessell,
who was appointed Conservator three years after Lane Poole's departure, continued the
work of his predecessor, and indeed, the 1920s - following another Royal Commission
inquiry in 1922 (Royal Commission on Forestry, 1922) - saw many native forest areas
declared as State Forests and many forest management operations brought under the
control of formal working plans. State Forests and managed lands covered an area of
400 000 ha by 1929 (Carron, 1985). By the end of the 1920s, the target figure of 1.2
million ha for forest dedication, as set by the Interstate Conference at Hobart in 1920,
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was almost met by WA 22 (Forests Department, 1969). During the 1930s, the Forests
Department was also focused on fire management and re-planting activities, which were
assisted by unemployment relief work programmes during the depressed years of that
decade (Calder, 1980). By 1940, WA was renowned for its Forests Department's fireprotection organisation and methods (Carron, 1985), and Mundaring State Forest
became a model for water catchment protection in the whole country (Bosworth &
Brad, 1997).

World War II disrupted many of the State's industries, including the timber industry, as
many men enlisted to fight abroad (Carron, 1985; Dargavel, 1995). The annual timber
cut nearly halved, and timber was then used primarily for domestic fire and industrial
charcoal (e.g., charcoal was used as a substitute for rationed petroleum), the supply of
which had to be provided by a Prisoners of War reinforced labour force (Calder, 1980).
Export of timber was substantially reduced as most transport capacities were reserved
for war supplies (Cresswell, 1989).

The Post-War Era
Following World War II waves of war-displaced citizens and returning soldiers
generated a new housing boom in WA, pushing local demand for native timbers,
particularly plywood made from karri and jarrah, which effectively limited timber
exports (Government of Western Australia and Paterson Brokensha Pty Ltd, 1956).
The wartime-affected and hence under-resourced timber industry struggled to meet
local demand at that time (Cresswell, 1989). However, with the help of government
subsidies new saw mills were established in areas like Northcliffe, Donnelly River, and
Shannon, and much neglected infrastructure was repaired or renewed. In addition, the
arrival of American technology in the form of bulldozers, diesel trucks, and chainsaws
greatly helped the timber industry to meet the unprecedented boom in local demand,
marking the beginning of a new era for it (Robertson, 1956; Forests Department, 1969;
Calder, 1980; Cresswell, 1989); still, this technology also meant increases in capital
intensity for the industry, a transition many small to medium-sized operators were
unable to undergo (Dargavel & Bourland, 1988). This was also the time when Bunnings
Brothers, specialising in timber for housing, emerged as the largest player in the State's

22

The national target of 20 million ha was not met before 1965 (Dargavel, 1995).
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industry.

By the mid-1950s, WA had a fully recovered and indeed thriving timber

industry (Forests Department, 1969; Bosworth & Brad, 1997), largely enabled by a
combination of very high local demand due to the post-war housing boom, immigration
labour programmes, and government subsidies.

The task of the Forests Department proved rather difficult in the early post-war years
due to a lack of qualified staff in the ranks and poor funding.

Since 1944 the

department had been in control of the milling of all species in Crown Forests
(Robertson, 1959). The department also needed to extend the State's existing firecontrol programme, continue with afforestation efforts 23 , and contain the rapid land
clearing.

Land clearing resulted from the government's immigration and settlement

policies and caused the burning of much good timber on newly established paddocks
(Bosworth & Brad, 1997). High demand for timber resources during those years also
highlighted the need for more accurate forest inventories and careful planning by the
Forests Department (Robertson, 1959), which started to take advantage of the wartime
invention of aerial photography (Forests Department, 1969; Calder, 1980).

The

Department argued that current forest production represented a "far greater output
than the forests of the State can maintain" (Forests Department, 1953, p.1) and
therefore stressed in its annual reports of the early 19 50s the need for greater emphasis
to be placed by government on reforestation efforts and forest management to stem
overcutting and maintain forest productivity (see for instance Forests Department,
1952; 1953).

The staffing issue was addressed by the State's fourth Royal Commission into forests in
1951, which had a mandate to investigate all phases of forestry, the timber industry, and
timber trade. The Commission's report endorsed the principles laid down in the 1918
Forests Act and, inter alia, recommended the strengthening of the Forests Department
through the recruitment of professional foresters, the increase of funding for the
Department (this had implications for the levels of royalties which were to be set), and
increases in the planting of conifers (see Rodger, 1952). While initially there was little
government support for the implementation of the Commission's recommendations,

23

Early afforestation efforts date back as far as 1897, using coniferous softwoods (Pinus pinaster (for sandy

or coastal soils) and Pinus radiata (for moister soils)) for the establishment of plantations in order to reduce
local import dependence.
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during the mid-1950s and early 1960s under Conservator A.C. Harris changes were
slowly being implemented, particularly in the area of conifer plantings (Carron, 1985).
These developments were helped by amendments to the 1918 Forests Act in 1954
through the Forests Act Amendment Act and the lifting of Commonwealth-imposed
wartime import and export restrictions on the State in 1957. These restrictions had
placed tremendous strains on State-Commonwealth relations in the post-war years as
they were hampering WA's trade expansion (Carron, 1985). The role of the Forests
Department was further strengthened after the 1961 Royal Commission into bushfires
after a devastating fire in the summer of 1960/61, as a wide-ranging suite of
recommendations by the Commission highlighted the department's staffing and
equipment needs, which were acceded to by government (Stewart, n.d.).

Economic Boom and Environmental Change
The late 1960s and 1970s posed new challenges to the Forests Department in the form
of jarrah dieback24 and the advent of woodchipping and bauxite mining.

First

discoveries of dying jarrah trees in the 1920s did not trigger a response by foresters at
the time because these incidents seemed isolated (Education and Lands and Surveys

I

Departments of Western Australia, 1979).

I

become more than apparent with vast tracts of jarrah country infected, threatening a

I

whole suite of forest values. Today, over a third of affected forest areas are so severely

Towards the late 1960s the pathogenic

nature of the fungus responsible for jarrah dieback and its effects on native flora had

1

·:

degraded that they were ter~ed graveyard sites (Abbott & Christensen, 1994).25 These
discoveries prompted large-scale forest quarantine operations and the establishment of
co-ordinated research programmes involving mining companies, the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), the Forests Department, and
universities (Carron, 1985). Although over 30 years of research into the disease have led
to an understanding of how the disease is spread, viable control measures have not been
found.

24

Jarrah dieback is caused by the root-rot fungus Phytophthora cinnamomi, which has had a catastrophic

impact on the biota of a number of south-west Australian ecosystems. As many as 2000 of the estimated
9000 native plant species in the south-west of WA are susceptible to, and often killed by, dieback disease
(Department of Conservation and Land Management, 2003).
25

The use of the term gravryard sites is considered inappropriate by conservation groups as it is seen to

preclude the protection of dieback-infected areas.
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The spread of jarrah dieback was also found to be associated with the rapid expansion
of bauxite mining in WA. In the mid-1960s, it was discovered that the spread of the
pathogen was aided by earthmoving activities, principally those associated with bauxite
mining (the rate of spread is estimated to be an additional three hectares to any hectare
of land mined (Calder, 1980)). Bauxite mining in WA is largely conducted by Alcoa
Australia which commenced mining operations in the mineral-rich jarrah forests along
the Darling Scarp at a time when mining on the whole began to flourish in the State.
Reasons behind this boom was primarily WA's very mineral-rich topography.
Furthermore, successive WA State governments have shown a strong commitment to
self-development in the name of State prosperity. Such commitment is mirrored in the
terms and regulations that generally govern mining operations in WA (for instance see
Mining Act 1978).

Finally, world commodity prices for bauxite and alumina were

favourable during that time. All of these factors led to the rapid expansion of bauxite
(and other) mining operations not only in WA but Australia-wide. In fact, mining was
so successful that more than half of the area of WA's State Forests were under mineral
lease and claim by 1970 (Forests Department, 1976). However, numerous problems
were associated with open cut mining which included, as already mentioned, the
spreading of jarrah dieback, water catchment salination due to broad-scale clearing of
land to be mined, unsuccessful restoration and rehabilitation programmes after mining,
and, especially, the potential loss of a wide range of forest values since areas of prime
forest were the most mineral-rich (on these points see for instance Peck et al., 1977;
Institute of Foresters of Australia - Western Australian Division, 1980; Steering
Committee for Research on Land Use and Water Supply, 1984; Wykes, 1985; Croton &
Bari, 1997). These matters were raised by the Forests Department in front of a 1970
Committee of Inquiry into the Mining Act of 1904.

This Committee effectively

prevented a further expansion of forest areas under lease or claim, and co-operative
approaches for damage minimisation were sought between various government
departments and the mining industry. Despite the long-term effects on soil and forest
resources bauxite mining in WA was predicted to continue for another 70 years (Calder,
1980).

The introduction of woodchipping to WA could to some extent be considered a Forests
Department initiative. This is because it was the Forests Department who alerted the
State Parliament in its annual report of 1960 to large quantities of forest residues
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(predominantly marri)26, which - whilst unsuitable for timber convers10n

were

considered appropriate as raw material for pulping (Forests Department, 1960). After
eight years of research into the matter and in response to growing Japanese interest,
licenses were granted for woodchip exports to Japan. The Wood Chipping Industry
Agreement Act (1969) between the State government and W.A. Chip and Pulp
Company Ltd and Bunnings Timber Holdings Ltd laid the ground for an industry
established around Bunbury, which was to be the export harbour (Calder, 1980). The
species approved for export were jarrah, karri, and marri largely sourced from the
Manjimup-Pemberton district. Production of woodchips began in Manjimup in
September 1975 (Dargavel, 1995). The environmental impacts of woodchip operations
(especially salt problems) were initially found by the authorities to be of no great
concern despite a growing public disquiet over woodchipping (Calder, 1980; Carron,
1985). Indeed, the Forests Department welcomed the commencement of woodchipping
operations, citing improvements in resource utilisation and in suitability tests for logs of
questionable sawmilling quality as well as facilitation of regeneration treatments
following harvesting operations (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,
1981). In later years, however, and as will be shown at a later point, changing public
sentiment towards forests and forest utilisation was to place woodchipping at the centre
of hostile public debate and intense scrutiny (Calder, 1980).

The timber industry suffered from a severe recession throughout the late 1960s and
early 1970s with a fall in exports and a drop in local demand (Bosworth & Brad, 1997).
Ever since, employment has been decreasing in the industry (Thompson & Tracy, 1995)
as the economic importance of the industry to the State in terms export earnings and
employment started to diminish, heralding a period of capital intensification (i.e.
mechanisation) in the industry in the pursuit of efficiency and international
competitiveness.

A decline in resource availability was also contributing to the

industry's downturn.

This was partly due to mining operations on forested land

(Carron, 1985) but also due to a growing environmental awareness which changed the
public's perception of forests in Western Australia, resulting in more emphasis being
placed on forest conservation and reserves formation.

26

Largely considered a weed by timber interests (Calder, 1980).
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In WA, changes in public sentiment were initially met with strong State government
resistance. Still, with a brief for forest conservation the Reserves Advisory Council was
appointed by government in 1969, which passed a number of recommendations in
relation to nature reserves that were implemented by government. Mounting public
pressure partially resulted in the election of the Tonkin State government in 1971, which
adopted more conservation-minded policies in subsequent years (Rundle, 1996). For
instance, 1971 saw the establishment of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)
in the State, which was also concerned with the improvement of environmental quality.
The EPA set up the Conservation Through Reserves Committee (CTRC) in 1972, the
work of which culminated in the establishment of environmental management priority
areas and significant amendments being made to the Forests Act in 1976 (Carron, 1985;
Rundle, 1996). The Act allowed the establishment of Forest Parks within State Forests
for the purposes of flora and fauna conservation as well as recreation. Other changes
included the approval of multiple use of forests (see Parliament of Western Australia,
1976). In these changing contexts the responsibilities of the Forests Department were
substantially widened, which at the time included flora conservation, forest recreation,
wood production, the control of timber rights, and generally the management of State
Forests and other Crown Land.

The Department detailed its management policies in its 1977 General Working Plan
(Forests Department, 1977; see also Forests Department, n.d.) in which it formalised
multiple use strategies in view of the de facto elimination of single purpose use of forest
lands (fhe Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1981). Key issues of the plan
revolved around (a) water catchment management strategies, looking at relationships
between forest cover and salinity of water supplies27 , (b) wood production with a view
to providing sufficient levels of supply in the short-term with the longer term objective
of reducing hardwood volumes, (c) the increase of softwood plantings and sawlog
production (Forests Department, 1977) to delay the State's heavy dependence upon
imported timber (Evidence given to the Senate Standing Committee on Trade and
Commerce by the Forests Department, 1981), and (cl) improvements in the operations
under the woodchipping agreement. The designation of priority areas for biological

27

Water production takes prior place to all other forest uses, recognising that State Forests contain the

State's major catchment areas and that water supplies require prudent management in view of growing
population growth (1976).
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preservation was approved by government in the early 1980s and formally included by
the Forests Department in its 1980 Land Use Management Plan (Forests Department,
1980) and General Working Plan No. 87 in 1982 (Forests Department, 1982). These
changes also facilitated the expansion of facilities for active and passive forest
recreation, the demand for which had been on the rise since the early 1960s (Carron,
1985).

The Rise ofSuper-Departments
In the absence of a national forest policy, forest management and policy have
traditionally been the domains of state governments and their respective departments
and agencies. In the 1980s, with the widening of the administrative tasks of the states'
forests departments new super-departments emerged, assuming the much larger role of
public land management and conservation agencies (Mercer, 1995). In Victoria, for
instance, the Department of° Conservation, Forests and Lands (later known as the
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources) was formed in 1984, and similar
administrative changes occurred in New South Wales in subsequent years. In Western
Australia, with the proclamation of The Conservation and Land Management Act ( (No
126) of 1984) the Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) was
established in March 1985 by the Burke Labor Government, bringing together the
Forests Department, National Parks Authority, and the Wildlife Section of Department
of Fisheries and Wildlife with two controlling bodies; The Lands and Forest
Commission (LFC) and the National Parks and Nature Conservation Authority
(NPNCA).

A Forest Production Council (FPC) was also established to advise the

Minister on issues pertaining to production from State forest and timber reserves.

CALM continued the work of the Forests Department and immediately undertook a
complete review of forest management practices and strategies for timber production
(Thompson & Tracy, 1995), the results of which were published in the department's
Timber Strategy (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987c), its
Regional Management Plan (Department of Conservation and Land Management,
1987a), and Conservation, Environmental Protection, and Recreation Strategies
(Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987b) in 1987. One important
outcome of the timber review was the increase of timber royalties by more than 100 per
cent, quoting public opinion that the timber industry "should pay its own way"
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L

(Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987c, p.4).

The new pnce

structures were based on a rotational system of pricing, which created a significant price
differential between first, second, and third grade logs and promised improved
commercial viability of sawing degraded logs. However, the new system meant that
because of inadequate log size parameters at the time for karri and jarrah, according to
CALM, an increase in old growth logging above sustained yield in the short-term was
necessary to attain the correct age distribution and the correct volume of trees in the
long-term (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987c). The logic of
this strategy gained EPA approval for the short-term (Environmental Protection
Authority, 1988) but it gave rise to much hostility and conflict in ensuing years
(Thompson & Tracy, 1995), as will be shown in later sections.

The Evolution of Conflict over Australian Forests and the Genesis of the RFA
The description of the history of forestry and forest production in Western Australia
from the late 1980s onwards needs to become more national in scope and requires more
emphasis to be placed on the rise of environmentalism in the context of a mounting
opposition to a perceived excessive forest utilisation and forest mis-management
between the 1960s and the 1990s. This warrants a closer examination of the rapid
growth of environmental movements in Australia and their impact on forest policy. In
particular, central to this discussion is the issue of conflict for it was conflict that set the
agenda for a national forest policy framework and paved the way for the national RFA
process.

Birth ofa Con.iict: Forest Industrialisation and Social Change
The previous section foreshadowed a change in public sentiment towards forest
management and utilisation in Australia at the beginning of the 1960s. This period was
marked by an intensification of industrial forest exploitation in Australia and coincided
with the emergence of new cultural and social values. The efforts of groups like the
peace movement, the women's movement, and the Club of Rome (see Meadows et al.,
1972; Mesarovic & Pestel, 1974) aided the social re-definition of environmental values
and gave rise to the conservation theme, calling for the protection of native flora and
fauna. These value shifts triggered public disquiet to numerous environmental issues,
and a wave of conservation groups formed across the country, raising the number from
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approximately 50 conservation societies in 1950 to over 200 by 1970 (Dargavel, 1995).
In particular, it was The Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation
Foundation that, in conjunction with local conservation groups, helped bring the forests
to the fore within Australian politics (Dargavel, 1995).

Conservation groups also

received input from many Europeans who - dissatisfied with the economic and political
reality at the time - arrived on Australia's shores as part of the hippie movement and
various migration schemes.

Numerous alternative settlements formed around the

country based around small scale industries, as happened in Denmark, in Wes tern
Australia's south-west (Bosworth & Brad, 1997).

Although many environmental conflicts existed and still do exist in Australia, it was the
forest issue - which is well documented (see for instance Carron, 1985; Australian
Conservation Foundation, 1987; Dargavel, 1995; Mercer, 1995) - that proved to be
among the most contentious. Indeed, the national debate on forests has always been
highly polarised and acrimonious over the last 30 years. Arguments of ecological crisis,
species extinction, and threats to biological diversity from meeting timber demands,
stemming imports, employment, and trade balance improvements became symbols of
the conflict (Resource Assessment Commission, 1992; Dargavel, 199 5).

A more

detailed list of the key issues dividing the conservation movement and the forest
industry are listed in Table 3.1 (based on Australian Conservation Foundation, 1987;
Chindarsi, 1997; National Association of Forest Industries, 1997, 2002). It is important
to note that the issues listed below are broad in scope and that issues raised at state and
regional levels were dealing with very specific forest management issues. Some of these
issues together with the scientific disputes surrounding the forest debate will be
addressed in Chapter Six.

These essentially philosophical/ideological differences rooted in self-interest, value
conflicts, and uncertainty (Cullen, 1986) became more entrenched over the years, and,
despite many efforts at State and Commonwealth levels, little progress had been made
to resolve the conflict. Indeed, by the late 1980s the debate stalemated with both sides
arguing best science and leaving the public in doubt as to whom they should believe.
What had changed, however, was the intensity of the forest debate, which dramatically
increased with the decline in both log volumes and employment levels in the timber
industry (see Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1990, 1998;
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National Forest Inventory, 1998)28 coinciding with a growth in conservation reserves
and mounting opposition to woodchip exports; this is what fuelled the jobs versus trees
dichotomy.

Essentially, timber resource allocations and availability forecasts had

progressively become more political, and by the mid-1980s the forest debate
represented the country's single most controversial environmental issue with interest
groups from both sides of the debate placing immense pressure on the States and the
Commonwealth to endorse their respective views.

Table 3.1: Dominant Viewpoints in the Forest Debate
Conseroation Movement

•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

•

Australian native forests are overcut and
logged uneconomically
Loss of wilderness due to logging
Loss of flora and fauna due to logging
Decline of water quality due to
clearfelling
Loss of biodiversity due to logging
Logging of old growth is unsustainable
Loss of quality of life due to logging
Industry is out of step with community
aspirations and values
Expansion of plantations is needed but
not at the expense of native forest
clearing
Silvicultural prescriptions are
unsustainable
More National Parks are needed to
protect forest values

Timber Industr;x

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Contributes to national economy
Significant source of employment
Source of State revenue
Needed for forest fire prevention
Stemming national trade deficit
Preventing rise of imports
Industry is not woodchip driven
Plantations will never be a viable
substitute to native timbers
Multiple forest use has lower
environmental impact than most other
land uses
Forest management for timber
production is sustainable
National Parks unnecessarily lock up
timber resources, and enough parks
already exist

State-Commonwealth Relations
Numerous intergovernmental factors contributed to the complexity of the forest debate.
There is a well documented history of the regularly arising tensions between the
Commonwealth and the States and Territories over constitutional rights relating to
environmental policy matters (e.g. Davis, 1989; Economou, 1992; Carron, 1993; Kellow,
1996; Dargavel, 1998; Lane, 1999; Slee, 2001 ). These tensions were rooted in the fact
that the Commonwealth holds External Affairs and Trade Powers on the basis of S.51

(XXIX) of the Constitution, which were extensively exercised by the Commonwealth in

28

For information on the decline of the economic importance of the native hardwood industry also refer

to Clark (1995), Dargavel (1995), and Resource Assessment Commission (1992).
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a number of environmental and World Heritage disputes around the country (e.g.,
Fraser Island, Franklin River, Coronation Hill) and were reinforced by High Court
decisions (e.g., Murphyores Inc. Pty Ltd vs The Commonwealth (1976), The
Commonwealth vs. Tasmania [1983]). The dominant role of the Commonwealth was
felt particularly in Tasmania after the Lake Pedder dispute in the 1970s in the context of
the Dams Affair and the conflict over logging in the State's Lemonthyme and Southern
Forests area (Carron, 1993). The ability of the Commonwealth to intervene in what
were essentially localised resource disputes was perceived by green groups as an
effective means to overrule State's environmental planning and management decisions.
Hence, the involvement of the Commonwealth in environmental policy matters was
regularly sought by conservationists (Lane, 1999) and resisted by the States.

This recourse of environmentalists to the Commonwealth was also chosen in relation to
the issue of granting woodchip export licenses. Timber extraction and other aspects of
forest management were generally dealt with by State forestry legislation, which in many
States was quite old (e.g., Forestry Act 1916 (NSW), Forests Act 1918 CWA), Forests
Act 1958 (Vic)) (for further detail on legislation refer to Bartlett, 1999). The export of
woodchips, however, was regulated by the Export Control Act of 1982, which granted
powers to the Commonwealth to limit woodchip exports. The authority to limit export
licenses was applicable if the extraction of timber was seen to be in conflict with other
pieces of Federal legislation.

This legislation included the Environment Protection

(Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975, World
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, and the Endangered Species Protection Act
1992 (on this point see Tribe, 1998; Slee, 2001). This meant that the Commonwealth
could effectively veto attempts by State governments to expand woodchip export
operations, which in turn placed additional strains on historically already fractious StateCommonwealth relations. 29

Towards the late 1980s, these legal and constitutional

Commonwealth powers proved politically precarious for the Federal Government,
especially in view of the recurring need to grant woodchip export licenses by the 31" of
December each year as export licenses expired and needed to be renewed on an annual
I

basis.
11

29

This also relates to the powers of the arms of government such as the Australian Heritage Commission,

which were being criticised for politicising their role in the context ofwoodchip export license renewals.

70

The Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE), which was signed in
1992, sought to resolve inter-governmental tensions by committing all governments to
an agreement on their respective roles in environmental matters. The IGAE essentially
reduced the Commonwealth's natural resource-related powers and responsibilities to
that of a watchdog and facilitator by restricting its role to (as listed by Lane, 1999):

•

representing national interest;

•

assisting resolution of transboundary issues;

•

promoting co-operative approaches to assessment and standard setting; and

•

concern for its own environmental responsibilities arising from Commonwealth
actions and decisions.

These self-imposed restrictions on Commonwealth powers, however, were criticised by
political commentators and environmentalists, as the new role of the Commonwealth
was seen to be narrower than its legal responsibilities, and it was considered to be a
political cost cutting exercise (foyne, 1994; Sackville, 1995), leaving environmental
matters to the States and their often poorly funded environmental agencies.
Nevertheless, the States welcomed this new consensus-based approach, which dictates
Australian environmental policy-making to this day.

The Changing Intemational Context
As noted by Dargavel (1998), the Australian forest debate was occurring also amid a
changing international context, which saw an - albeit slow - international movement
towards ecologically sustainable development.

The publication of the Brundtland

Commission Report in 1987 (World Commission on Environment and Development,
1987) and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (see United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, 1992) changed the political rhetoric internationally.
Australia became a signatory to the Rio Declaration (United Nations - General
Assembly, 1992b) and signed the Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations General Assembly, 1992a), Agenda 21 (United Nations Division for Sustainable
Development, 1992), and the Global Statement of Principles on Forests (United
Nations - General Assembly, 1992d). Later, in 1994, Australia joined the Montreal
Process Working Group, which was working on the development and implementation
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of internationally agreed criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management (see
Appendix 5 for a complete list of RFA-relevant conventions and treaties).

These international developments also triggered a political response within Australia,
resulting in the formation of various Ecologically Sustainable Development Working
Groups (in relation to forests refer to Ecologically Sustainable Development Working
Group on Forest Use, 1991) and the release of the National Strategy for Ecologically
Sustainable Development (NSESD) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1993) and the
National Greenhouse Response Strategy (NGRS) (Commonwealth of Australia,
1992b).30 Both strategies, merely signifying an expression of governmental intent in
regards to sustainability (Wilkenfeld et al., 1995; Kinrade, 1997), were unable, however,
to defuse the Federal Government's problems in relation to native forests, particularly
in view of the mounting disquiet over woodchip export license renewals and a planned
Resource Security Legislation, which met staunch opposition from conservation groups
and was eventually blocked by the Federal Senate. In short, it became clear that by the
turn of the decade a national policy framework was needed to solve the forest issue.

Australia's National Forest Policy

The idea of a national forest policy framework was not new as its desirability had already
been acknowledged in 1964 by the forest sector's ministerial council and members of
the Institute of Foresters of Australia (IFA). Since then, attempts to formulate a policy
were made at the Forestry and Wood-based Industries Development Conference
(FORWOOD) in 1974 and again in 1986 by the Australian Forestry Council (Australian
Forestry Council - Standing Committee on Forestry, 1986), but both failed to result in
the formulation of a policy framework (see Bartlett, 1999).

A draft strategy was

eventually being produced by a Standing Committee in 1987, which was comprised of
the heads of the Federal and State governments' forest services. In addition, by an Act
of Parliament in July 1989 (The Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989), the
Commonwealth initiated the National Forest and Timber Inquiry, which was to be
conducted by the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) with a brief for a broad
scale investigation into forest matters (for a review of the RAC process refer to Stewart

JO

On the implications of ecologically sustainable development (ESD) and ecologically sustainable forest

management (ESFM) for Australia refer to McDonald (1999).
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& McColl, 1994; Economou, 1996).31 The appointment of the RAC was seen by many

as the "arrival of the environment as a policy issue of some national importance"
(Economou, 1996, p. 13) during a period that was being marked by strong governmental
commitment to growth and economic development. Thus, the environment posed a
major political challenge to the Federal Labor Government's industry and economic
objectives of the time (Stewart & McColl, 1994).

The task of the Commission was to identify, and to arrive at, use options for Australia's
native forest and timber resources. For this purpose, the national native forest extent
and forest locations were documented for the first time, and attempts were made to
assess ecological and economic forest values and to identify use-option trade-offs. After
nearly three years of hearings, submissions, and commissioned studies the RAC handed
down its report, which was welcomed by both sides of the forest debate despite much
acrimony during the inquiry. Among a vast suite of recommendations such as those
pertaining to old growth logging, the Commission proposed the safeguarding of as
much of the national forest estate as possible and the formulation of a national forest
policy (see Resource Assessment Commission, 1992). This call was acceded to, and the
Council of Australian Governments announced in December 1992 that a National
Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) had been formulated and signed by the Commonwealth
and all States and Territories, with the exception of Tasmania.32

After 28 years in the making, the NFPS document (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a)
represented a joint-agreement in response to a wide range of reports which were
produced over a number of years by the Ecologically Sustainable Development Working
Group on Forest Use (1991), the National Plantations Advisory Committee (1991), and

3t

In total, the RAC conducted inquiries into three highly controversial resource issues, forests being only

one component. The other two inquiries focused on mining in the Kakadu conservation zone and the
management of coastal zone resources. The administrative functions of the RAC were terminated by the
Federal Government at the end of 1993 without a public explanation (Stewart & McColl, 1994). It was
speculated that the Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups were used strategically to
undermine the RAC.
32

Tasmania did not sign before 1995 in part due to strong industry opposition towards the proposed

bioregional treatment of the State under the RFA process. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the
Tasmanian Scoping Agreement - also signed in 1995 - treated Tasmania as one single bioregion even
though some ecologists believe it to comprise seven biogeographical regions (Dargavel, 1998).
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the Resource Assessment Commission's Forest and Timber Inquiry (1992). The NFPS
was also building on the 1983 Commonwealth-initiated National Conservation Strategy
for Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983), and the 1986 Australian Forestry
Council's National Forest Strategy (Australian Forestry Council - Standing Committee
on Forestry, 1986) and was informed through a nationally distributed public discussion
paper termed Forests For Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 1990) issued in May
1990.

The NFPS document gave - albeit vague - expression to the IGAE and incorporated
many of the RAC recommendations, employing the language of a shared vision between
the undersigning governments in relation to the ecologically sustainable management of
Australia's forests and spelling out broad qualitative goals for the management of the
Australian native forest estate under 11 headings, as shown in Textbox 3.1. Despite the
wide scope of the agreement three aspects were to form the core of the policy
framework,

(a)

forest conservation

representative (CAR)

33

through a comprehensive, adequate,

and

network of reserve systems (also protection of old growth and

wilderness values), (b) ecologically sustainable forest management (ESFM), and (c)
development of sustainable and internationally competitive native timber production.
The importance of these o~jectives ought to be seen in light of the controversy
surrounding the forest debate, in that they promised predictability, stability, and
certainty for both conservation and timber interests, in tum allowing governments to
minimise the political and electoral weight of the forest issue. Therefore, the NFPS was
portrayed as a mechanism through which - once operationalised - a true win-situation
could be attained for all sides concerned.
1. Conservation
Maintenance of an extensive and permanent native forest estate and protection of forest values
including ecological diversity, heritage, and indigenous values.

2. Wood production and industry development
Development of internationally competitive and ecologically sustainable wood production and wood
products industries emphasising value-adding and the expansion of wood products manufacturing.

3. Intergovernmental agreements
Integrated and co-ordinated decision-making by the Commonwealth and the States and improved
interaction between forest management agencies.

33

For CAR reserve principles see Appendix 7.
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4. Private native forests
Maintenance of the private native forest estate in an ecologically sustainable manner to complement the
commercial and nature conservation values of public native forests.

5. Plantations
Expansion of commercial softwood and hardwood plantations for the formation of an additional and
viable wood resource for industry and the rehabilitation and restoration of degraded land.

6. Water supply and catchment management
Ensuring protection of high quality water supplies from forested land and protection of catchment
values.

7. Tourism and other economic and social opportunities
Sustainable forest management for multiple forest use, including use by forest-based industries such as
tourism and recreation.

8. Employment, workforce education and training
Expansion of employment opportunities and skill base in the forest sector.

9. Public awareness, education and involvement
Promotion of community understanding of and support for ecologically sustainable forest management
and provision of opportunities for effective participation and decision-making.

10. Research and development
Increase of forest research and development and the expansion and integration of knowledge to inform
forest management, conservation, and forest product development.

11. International responsibilities
Promotion of sustainable forest use and management outside Australia and fulfihnent of international
obliirations.

Textbox 3.1: The Qualitative Goals of the National Forest Policy Statement
(see Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a)
The Fonnat ofthe RFA Process
The RFA processes that emanated from the NFPS were intended to implement and
carry out the promises made under the NFPS. 34 Nationally, RFAs were to be arrived at
via a four-tiered process (see Figure 3.4). RFA processes were to commence with the

delineation of RFA areas as part of what was referred to as Deferred Forest
Assessments (DFA). DFAs represented interim arrangements to "ensure that options
for a CAR reserve system [were] not foreclosed by logging activities whilst . . . RFA
process[es] [were] completed" and "to minimise the social and economic impacts of
deferring areas" (Department of Agriculture Fisheries & Forestry Australia, 2002,
Section 11).

In other words, DFAs resulted (this was not always the case) in a

moratorium on logging in forest areas that were set aside until RFAs could be finalised.

34

Detailed information on the proposed RFA format can be found in the Commonwealth Position Paper

(Commonwealth of Australia, 1995b).
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Following the DFA process individual scoping agreements were to be formulated for
each of the delineated RFA regions, " ... identifying government obligations, regional
objectives and interests and broad forest uses ... [as well as specifying] arrangements for
managing the process, including details on timing, methodology, data requirements,
consultative

mechanisms,

and

administrative

and

management

requirements"

(Commonwealth of Australia, 1995b, Executive Summary). 35

The second stage was to involve the Commonwealth and the State governments
concerned in jointly identifying and assessing forest values during comprehensive
regional assessments (CRAs).

These assessments were to give consideration to

"environmental and heritage values [in relation to governmental obligations], economic
opportunities and social impacts of resource use options, and industry and community
aspirations, and taking particular account of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
concerns" (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995b, Executive Summary).

Information

needed for the assessment work could be drawn from already existing data or,
alternatively, could either be obtained via State processes that were accredited under the
IGAE or obtained jointly or independently by the governments concerned.

All

assessments were to be carried out consistent with various national and international
conventions and treaties respective governments were obliged to consider (such as
Native Title Act 1993 and Convention on Biological Diversity 1992). 36 In this context,
of particular interest were the proposed environment and heritage assessment projects
for they necessitated the development of specific assessment criteria. It was decided
that heritage assessment work should be closely modelled on the work done previously
in Western Australia between the Australian Heritage Commission (AHC) and the
State's Department for Conservation and Land Management in what became known as
t

the Southern Forest Heritage Assessment (Australian Heritage Commission and the
Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1992b, 1992d, 1992c, 1992a;
Purdie & Cavanagh, 1993), which was described by the Resource Assessment
Commission as "an example of successful Commonwealth-State cooperation"
(Resource Assessment Commission, 1992, Section 17.53).37 Environmental values were

3S

For details on issues covered in Scoping Agreements refer to Appendix 6.

36

For more details on RFA-related Acts, policies, and conventions see Appendix 5.

37

It needs to be recognised, however, that the co-operative nature of the Southern Forest Heritage

Assessment is contested.
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to be assessed subject to nationally agreed criteria for the development of
comprehensive, adequate, and representative reserve systems.

Scoping Agreement
Between Govennents

Environment
-and Heritage
Assessment

Aboriginal and
Torres Strait
Islander Issues

Economic and
Social
Assessment

- - - - - Generation of - - - - Options

Intergovernmental

Regional
Forest
A eement

Figure 3.4: The Regional Forest Agreement Process
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1995b)
The third stage of the RFA process was to integrate the results from the various
environment, heritage, economic, and social assessment projects and provide the basis
for the generation of forest resource use options. This integration phase was to draw
also on input from local governments, industry, unions, regional economic development
organisations, conservation groups and other interested parties (Commonwealth of
Australia, 1995b) and lead to the formulation of draft agreements.

The fourth and final stage of the process was to involve the Commonwealth and the
State concerned to formulate a regional forest agreement in light of the options
negotiated during the integration phase. These agreements were to spell out the details
for forest management and use arrangements in the delineated RFA areas and contain
agreed details on the duration of the agreement, its implementation, and provisions for
review.
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The Operationalisation ofthe National Forest Policy Statement (1992-1997)
The signing of the NFPS was followed by two years during which there was little
political movement towards RFAs.

Two issues may serve as an explanation here.

Firstly, problems arose out of the fact that the objectives spelled out under the NFPS
required an unprecedented degree of co-operation and information sharing between
traditionally adversarial governments and their respective departments (see Dargavel,
1998). Thus, the potential for conflict was high. Secondly, the development of the
national reserve criteria required by the NFPS was initiated by an inter-governmental
Technical Working Group in 1993. This group comprised of representatives from State
forest management and conservation agencies and the CSIRO and worked under a
Steering Committee of the Australia and New Zealand Environment and Conservation
Council (ANZECC) and the Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture
(MCFFA). It also involved the Australian Forestry Council (AFC) and a Commonwealth
Scientific Advisory Group (for detail on criteria development refer to Kirkpatrick,
1998a). Again, this highly bureaucratic process was very protracted, as agreement on
conservation criteria could not be reached by all States.

The consequent delays not only resulted in the breach of the proposed timelines for
criteria development but also in the Commonwealth being taken to court by the
Tasmanian Conservation Trust over the renewal of woodchip export licenses. With
some sense of urgency the Commonwealth developed a set of its own conservation
criteria in 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995a), which again were rejected by some
of the States. An agreement on nationally acceptable criteria was eventually reached in
'.I
.,,

1997 following a review of the draft indicators by bureaucratic experts. 38 What followed
was the release of what is known as the JANIS Report Ooint ANZECC/MCFFA
National Forest Policy Statement Implementation Sub-Committee, 1997). The JANIS
document outlined National Forest Reserve Criteria in relation to biodiversity, old
growth, and wilderness protection as follows: 39

38

Kirkpatrick (1998a) argues that the strength of the draft criteria was substantially lessened through the

use of socio-economic provisos (e.g., "when practical'), the deletion of conservation conditions for private
lands and others, shifting the emphasis from nature conservation to economic pragmatism and thus
casting doubt over the scientific credibility of the revised document. 1bis issue will be addressed in
Chapter Six.
39

For a detailed list of CAR reserve criteria refer to Appendix 8.
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Biodiversity: Protection of 15 per cent of the pre-1750 (pre European settlement)
distribution of each forest ecosystem and at least 60 per cent of forest areas which are
recognised as vulnerable.

Old growth Forest: General protection of 60 per cent of identified old-growth forest
and complete protection where old-growth forest is rare or depleted within a forest
ecosystem.

Wilderness: Protection of at least 90 per cent of high-quality wilderness areas.

During the time of the national reserve criteria development (1992 - 1995), largely in
response to political inactivity, the conservation movement organised nationally coordinated campaigns· through the newly formed National Forest Summit to bring the
forest issue back on the political agenda. These campaign activities served to trigger a
resurgence in the level of community concern about native forest logging but also to
increase the polarisation between conservationists and timber interests (Bain, 1995a).
By late 1994 the forest issue was making news headlines once more, forcing the hand of
the Commonwealth government to seriously address the matter.

In early 1995, tensions also grew within the Federal Cabinet. Then, David Beddall Minister for Resources in the Keating Labor Government - granted an expansion of
woodchip export licenses (Gordon et al., 1994; cited in Lane, 1999).40 The expansion of
licenses was granted against the advice of the AHC and John Faulkner, then Federal
Minister for the Environment, and against the wishes of the Prime Minister (PM) and
senior Labor backbenchers. Consequently, this decision angered members of the Labor
party as well as environmentalists and resulted in the aforementioned court challenge by
the Tasmanian Conservation Trust. Environmentalists protested nation-wide, calling
for these additional export licenses to be handed back and demanding the protection of

40

Fractious inter-Cabinet relations were not new to the Federal Government In fact, Cabinet tensions

were a permanent feature throughout the Hawke government era in the late 1980s. Then, acrimony arose
over numerous land-use issues between Environment Minister Graham Richardson and a coterie of prodevelopment ministers such as the Industry and Technology Minister John Button, Resources Minister
Peter Cook, and Finance Minister Peter Walsh, proving problematic for Labor party consensus-based
politics (Economou, 1996).
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further forest areas. The issue of woodchip export licenses struck a sensitive nerve with
the conservation movement, especially as the Hawke Labor government had promised
in 1990 to suspend woodchipping by the year 2000. This promise was amended in the
NFPS in 1992 assuring instead to "phase-out woodchipping in favour of downstream
processing" (Cadman, 1994, p. 29). In 1994/95, however, no signs of any industry
transition towards downstream processing were visible, and instead new woodchip
export licenses were granted.

In 1995, in an attempt to improve government-green movement relations Labor Prime

Minister Paul Keating proposed to set aside 509 high conservation value (HCV) forest
areas. This proposal attracted strong condemnation from the timber industry, which
quickly mobilised its workforce to blockade Parliament House in Canberra (Hutchings,
1995). Timber interests were also angered by the AHC's refusal to grant the roll-over of
numerous carryover coupes for which valid woodchip export licenses existed the
previous year. In the past, roll-overs were a routine procedure, and therefore the AHC
decision received strong criticism from the timber industry and from the unions who
argued that circumstances had not changed on the ground and who thus saw the refusal
to be politically motivated (Australian Workers Union (AWU), 2000, pers. com.). When
the forest dispute reached its zenith in late 1995 the Keating Labor Goverrunent
expedited DFAs around the country, promising the deferral of approximately six million
ha of HCV forests, imposing export restrictions for woodchips, and initiating an
extensive media campaign to announce the commencement of RFA processes nationally
(Faulkner & Beddall, 1995). The forest deferrals and woodchip export restrictions
triggered much criticism from timber industry groups, who saw in the Federal
Government's DFA process a bowing to green pressure and viewed the exercise as
unnecessary and harmful to the industry (Bain, 1995c, 1995b). In the end, with the
exception of the Western Australian case (at least at that point in time) the
Commonwealth reneged on its promise of a moratorium on logging in deferred forest
areas in many of the States, consequently generating disquiet among conservationists.
The outcome of the federal election in 1996 saw the election of the Howard Coalition
Government, which meant that the completion of the RFA processes was now in the
hands of a right-wing political party.
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The Weste.m Australian RFA Process
Nationally, most of the DFAs were completed in late 1995 (see Forests Taskforce,
1995b; Forests Taskforce, 1995a) while the Keating Commonwealth Government was
still in power.

In WA, both the Deferred Forest Agreement (Commonwealth of

Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1996a) and the Scoping Agreement
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1996b) were
signed by the newly elected Howard Commonwealth Government and the Court State
Government in 1996 to signal the beginning of WA's RFA process. Before describing
the WA RFA process, however, I will direct attention to events in WA between 1980
and 1996. This period saw an emergence of acrimonious forest stakeholder dynamics in
the State, which were to influence the nature of the WA RFA debate and thus form a
part of the background against which the RFA process was to advance.

The Lead-Up to the WA RFA Process 0980-1996)
In Western Australia, the 1980s were marked by political controversy over forests and
the economic future of the native timber industry. While the industry was facing a
severe recession with low log prices, little resource supply security, and hence little
investment, public conflict raged over wood production in State forest areas.
Environmentalists campaigned heavily for the protection of native forest areas, resulting
in the creation of numerous National Parks such as the Shannon National Park in 1984.
These campaigns also resulted in the publication of several proposals and reviews such
as Jarrah Reserve (Conservation Council of WA, 1980), Karri at the Crossroads
(Conservation Council of WA et al., 1982), and The Timber Industry of Western
Australia (Campaign to Save Native Forests (W.A.) & Workers Information and
Resource Centre, 1984).

When the Department of Conservation and Land Management was formed in 1985,
forests were still high on the conservationists' agenda. The agency's formation was
controversial for conservation groups saw a conflict of interest and a pro-timber
industry bias in the department (Campaign to Save Native Forests (W.A.) et al., 1987).
They were especially concerned that the department's responsibilities covered both
forest conservation and forest exploitation, the latter being a source of departmental
revenue. Controversy erupted also when CALM invited public comments on its earlier
mentioned Timber Strategy in 1987 (Department of Conservation and Land
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Management, 1987c). The Strategy was being criticised by conservation groups because
harvest levels for jarrah and karri were set at what they perceived to be unsustainable
levels and meant an increase in the logging of old growth forest in the short term.
Furthermore, CALM's Forest Management Plan of 1988 (Department of Conservation
and Land Management, 1988a), which incorporated the Timber Strategy of 1987,
essentially overturned previous forest management plans (e.g. Forests Department,
1982) which had envisaged a gradual reduction in log volumes.
:

,
Adding fuel to the forest debate, W.A. Chip and Pulp Co. Pty Ltd (WACAP) applied for
an additional woodchip export license in 1987 to expand their existing operations in
Western Australia. The timing of the application was regarded by environmentalists to
have been deliberate (Campaign to Save Native Forests (W.A.) et al., 1987). WACAP's
environmental impact statement (EIS), which formed part of their license application,
was reviewed by the Commonwealth Department of the Arts, Sports, the Environment,
Tourism and Territories in 1988, and it was recommended - as a condition for license
approval- that a study be conducted jointly by CALM and the AHC to "identify areas
of exceptional science and fauna, additional high value old growth forest, and
implement management plans for these areas" (Thompson & Tracy, 1995, p.8). Despite
initial resistance by CALM (see Department of Conservation and Land Management,

1988b), the joint-assessment project commenced in September 1990 and culminated in
the release of the aforementioned Southern Forests Heritage Value Assessment reports
(Australian Heritage Commi~sion and the Department of Conservation and Land
Management, 1992b, 1992d, 1992c, 1992a).

In 1992, further conflict arose when CALM moved to amend its 1987 Forest
Management Plans and Timber Strategy (Department of Conservation and Land
Management, 1992b), essentially proposing the logging of all unprotected old growth
over a period of 40 years - primarily for woodchips - and to manage all State Forests
on a multiple use basis with a focus on timber production. The amendments proposed
by CALM not only led to friction between CALM and conservationists but also to a
schism between CALM and the EPA, which became involved through the public
appeals process (see Environmental Protection Authority, 1992). The resulting EPACALM relations created a counter-productive climate of distrust and suspicion "beyond
reasonable proportions" (Barnett, 1992, p. 33; cited in Thompson & Tracy, 1995). Tos
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Barnett was called in by Jim McGinty, who was just newly appointed to the post of
Minister for the Environment after the resignation of Robert Pearce in the then WA
Labor Government, to form a one-man Appeals Committee to resolve the matter. His
subsequent report (Barnett, 1992) recommended, inter alia:

•

the maintenance of the 1987 timber harvest levels;

•

an extension of the reserve system;

•

the formation of wildlife corridors; and

•

an inquiry into CALM's public accountability.

Despite the recommendations made in the Barnett report, the Ministerial Conditions
(Minister for the Environment, 1992) placed on CALM by McGinty largely reflected
CALM's management proposals. Nevertheless, harvest levels were frozen at 1987 levels
for a period of six months. Following this six months period, the Minister for the
Environment was then required to rule on future harvest levels based on
recommendations made by an expert scientific and administrative committee that was to
be appointed to report on the implementations of the CALM management proposals.
Such a committee was formed in 1993 with Timothy Meagher as residing Chair under
the newly elected Liberal/National Parties Coalition Government of WA. The new
Minister for the Environment, Kevin Minson, essentially rejected most of the
recommendations made by Barnett the previous year in favour of those made by the
Meagher Committee (see Minson, 1993), which largely concurred with CALM's
amendment plans, stating that conservation values were not at risk from continued
timber harvesting; still, the allowable cut for jarrah was reduced by 30 000 ml /yr to 490
000 ml /yr, which was below the figures proposed by CALM in 1987 (Meagher, 1993).
As will be shown later, the Meagher Committee was not to be the last inquiry into
sustainable harvest levels. 41

Nevertheless, the Meagher report formed the basis for

CALM's 1994 -2003 Forest Management Plan (see Department of Conservation and
Land Management, 1994), which - as is important to note - was still subject to
McGinty's Ministerial Conditions.

During the Western Australian DFA process in 1994 and 1995 conservation groups
were involved in nominating HCV forest blocks, using grants money handed out by the
41

Chapter Six will also be dealing with this issue in more depth.
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Commonwealth's Environment Australia (Conservation Council of WA, 1994, 1995b).
Delineated forest areas were then meant to be protected through a moratorium on
logging until agreement had been reached between the Commonwealth and the State in
form of an RFA. However, the final WA DFA and Scoping Agreement did not include
the HCV recommendations made by conservation groups.

Instead, the documents

endorsed CALM's interim protection proposals including their controversial road and
riparian reserve proposal (on this point compare Conservation Council of WA, 1994,
1995b; Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1995; Forests Taskforce,
1995b, 1995a; Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia,
1996b). The WA DFA did not set aside any forest areas for biodiversity and wilderness

J

protection but deferred old growth karri and jarrah forest areas from logging (see
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Forests Taskforce, 1995b).

f.
The· DFA outcome not only attracted condemnation from conservationists (Wes tern
Australian Forest Alliance and Conservation Council of WA, 2000, pers. com.) but also
from scientific bodies (National Biodiversity Council and Royal Society of Western
Australia), who questioned the scientific credibility of the DFA process (see Hobbs,
1996; McKenzie et al., 1996; National Biodiversity Council, 1996; Rundle, 1996; Trayler
et al., 1996). Nationally, timber interests also voiced concerns over the DFA process.
While supportive of the scientific basis of the DFAs (National Association of Forest
Industries, 1995), the process was seen as a pursuit by the Federal Government to meet
conservationists' objectives (Forest Protection Society, 2000, pets. com.). DFA criteria
were regarded as excessive with undue economic and social cost and believed to have a
direct negative impact on jobs and the viability of many country towns, discouraging
new investments into the sector (National Association of Forest Industries, 1995).
WA's timber industry, however, seemed to have largely accepted the DFA process and
'
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indeed welcomed its outcome. In fact, the DFA was used by the industry sector to
promote the image of a responsible and sustainable industry, which supports a process
that "guarantees that the key conservation element of sustainable forest management no threat to key forest values in the regions - has been achieved" (Forest Industries,
n.d., p.18).

In summary, the developments of preceding years in WA make apparent that the State's
RFA process commenced in a climate of deleterious stakeholder relations and distrust
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between conservationists, the timber industry, and government (departments), setting
the scene for potentially volatile stakeholder deliberations.

From Scoping.Agreement to Process Condusion (1996-1992}
The Western Australian RFA followed the prescribed process outlined previously. 42
When the process commenced in late 1996, a Steering Committee was appointed, which
was comprised of officials from the Commonwealth (Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet (PM&C) and its Forest Task Force, Department of Primary Industries and
Energy (DPIE), which is now Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Australia (AFFA), and
Environment Australia (EA)), and the State (Department of Premier and Cabinet,
Department of Conservation and Land Management, and the Department of Minerals
and Energy (DME)) to oversee and coordinate the process. Based on knowledge gaps
identified through the DFA process and further deliberations on information needs
CRA projects were scoped and commissioned by the Steering Committee for the
purpose of options development.

All CRA projects (see Appendix 10) were then coalesced in a two-volume report
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a, 1998b) to
provide the basis for the Community Consultation Paper (Commonwealth of Australia
and Government of Western Australia, 1998c), which was developed during the
integration and options development phase and released in 1998. Both governments
strongly emphasised .the participatory nature of the RFA process, and stressed that the
public was to be consulted through a wide range of mechanisms. Consultation occurred
via publication of CRA reports and information kits, an information line, a video and

newsletters, fortnightly RFA updates published in the State's daily newspaper as well as
local papers, and a RFA internet website.

In addition, three consultative reference

groups were formed (Stakeholder Reference Group (SRG), Aboriginal Noongar Action
Group (NAG), and a State Agreement Acts Committee), community heritage
workshops and public meetings were convened, and surveys and interviews were being
conducted as part of the CRA social assessment component. Expert opinions were
sought via workshops, expert panels, and the commissioning of CRA research projects.
Despite these mechanisms the participative nature of the WA RFA process was being
criticised by various interest groups.
42

For example, environment groups like the

For details on management structure of the WA RFA refer to Appendix 9.
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Conservation Council, the Wilderness Society, and the Western Australian Forest
Alliance (WAFA) refused to be part of the RFA process for they considered it to be
insufficiently participative (Western Australian Forest Alliance and Conservation
Council of WA, 2000, pers. com.).

Similar criticisms were also voiced by SRG

members, scientists, and numerous members of the public who participated in the RF A
process (see for instance Booth, 1998; Capp, 1998a); however, opposition to the process
was, while in the public domain, still isolated.

The WA RFA process stretched over a period of three years from 1997 to 1999,
although it was meant to be finalised in December 1997 (see Commonwealth of
Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1996b). During that time numerous
controversies arose nationally and at the State level, which meant that - thanks to much
media attention - public interest in the RFA grew steadily. Nationally, for instance, the
Federal Senate debate over the Regional Forest Agreements Bill, 1998 (see Senate Rural
and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, 1999) sparked public
interest and controversy as did well publicised tensions between Federal and State
Ministers in relation to the WA RFA (see for instance Mallabone, 1998c). In WA, the
forest debate intensified after a RFA symposium convened by the National Trust of
Australia (WA), which enabled a public insight into the scientific controversy
surrounding the WA RFA (see National Trust of Australia (WA), 1997). Furthermore,
the publication of critical RFA-related reports by the WA Standing Committee on
Ecologically Sustainable Development (1998b; 1998c; 1998a; 1999) and the newly
erupted dispute between the EPA and CALM in relation to CALM's compliance with
the Ministerial Conditions placed on its 1994-2003 Forest Management Plan by Minister
McGinty in 1992 (see Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1998;
Environmental Protection Authority, 1998; Irying, 1998) served to capture the interest
of the public.

Conservation groups ran large media campaigns for the protection of all of WA's
remaining old growth forests, the cessation of large-scale clearfelling, and reductions in
woodchip volumes.

Also, consumer boycotts were organised of local retailers and

merchants associated with old growth logging. The efforts by conservation groups were
enhanced by an increasingly more vocal involvement of West Australian music (e.g.,
John Butler), literary (e.g., Tim Winton), sport (e.g., Mick Malthouse), and business (e.g.,
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Llz Davenport) celebrities in the RFA process (see Malpeli, 1998; Harvey, 1999). The
engagement of prominent Western Australians in tum helped the forest debate to
become a mainstream issue, resulting in more political pressure being placed on the
Federal and State governments and their agencies.

The emerging anti-logging

sentiment, as was identified by the WA RFA's Social Assessment Unit (Social
Assessment Unit, 1999), was strongly criticised by WA's timber industry and timberdependent rural communities.

Industry proponents - drawing support from the

Institute of Foresters of Australia (especially the WA section) (e.g. Spriggins, 1999) expressed a sense of betrayal by metropolitan Western Australians, who in their view
had fallen victim to extremist green propaganda and misinformation (see for instance
Perkins & Rechichi, 1999). "City people! Don't kill our communities" became slogans
for many marches, rallies, and meetings convened throughout the south-west of the
State by groups like the Forest Protection Society (later known as Timber Communities
Australia), the Australian Workers' Union, and the Forest Industries Federation CWA).
These protests gave expression to the fears of the timber industry and its workers
regarding job losses, declines in export, and rural economic downturns and were calls
for more balance and fairness in the RFA debate and an immediate finalisation of the
process (see for instance Rechichi, 1998b).

After nearly two and a half years into the process a public consultation paper Towards a

'Regional Forest Agreement (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western
Australia, 1998c) was released, inviting comments and input from stakeholders and the
general public on a selection of forest reserve and use options. It was emphasised that
the paper was "not to be seen as predetermining the outcomes of the RFA process",
and government assurances were given that "comments received during the public
consultation period would be considered before negotiating the final RFA" (see
Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998c, p. 1). Due
to the high profile the RFA had gained public interest was strong when the RFA Public
Consultation Paper was released, and more than 30 000 public submissions were
received; an unprecedented number of public responses. A large number of interest
groups (e.g., local shire councils, conservation groups, and tourism associations)
represented in the SRG and members of the public voiced their concerns about a range
of process-related aspects as well as the choice of, and scientific basis for, reserve and
forest use options proposed for adoption (see for instance Baile et al., 1998; Coalition of
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Organisations and Individuals Embracing Western Australian Industry, 1998; Western
Australian Municipal Association on behalf of Western Australian Local Government,
1998; Western Australian Tourism Commission, 1998).

Despite mounting public

disquiet about the proposed RFA outcomes, the Commonwealth and the WA State
government signed the WA RFA in May 1999, without providing further opportunity
for public comment,43 although a "Draft RFA" was promised in the State's Scoping
Agreement (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1996b,
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p.1). The failure to provide a Draft RFA and the governments' decision to continue old
growth forest logging triggered immense public hostility to the WA RFA, especially
among environmental groups - albeit an additional 55 000 ha of old growth were
protected under the RFA agreement (see The State of Western Australia and the
Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). It is important to note that the cessation of old
growth logging - according to a number of public polls (e.g. Westpoll, 1998; AMR:
Quantum Harris, 1999) - was supported by the majority of West Australians.
Consequently, a plethora of petitions, protests, and mass rallies were initiated with the
support of prominent West Australians in an attempt to compel the government to
reconsider the RFA (Wainwright, 1999). Also, the coalition State government became
increasingly divided over the forest issue, leading to coalition backbenchers crossing the
floor in State Parliament (Grove, 1999) and the formation of a new conservative proforest party (Liberals for Forests) staffed by former Liberal party supporters (Irying,
1999). Only eight weeks after the original agreement had been signed, in response to
public pressure and coalition-internal conflict over old growth forest logging, WA's
Premier Richard Court announced amendments to the original RFA, reserving
additional so-called forest icon blocks. This meant that further areas of tingle and karri
old growth were protected from logging.

The Premier's decision to amend the original agreement then sparked fierce opposition
from industry groups who felt they had been sold out (Armstrong, 1999e; Martin,
1999a). The Commonwealth threatened to dishonour the agreement (Martin, 1999c),
and conservationists also vowed to continue their protest campaigns as the amendments
did not bring about an end to old growth logging (Martin, 1999a; Tan-Van Baren, 1999).

43

The government did eventually publish an analysis of the public submissions following the finalisation

of the WA RFA (see Commonwealth and Western Australian Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) Steering
Committee, 1999).
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Subsequently, the RFA debate escalated, causing a great division within and among
political parties, the scientific community, and rural communities and leading to further
mass protests and even triggering violence directed against government employees and
environmentalists.

The RFA debate continued for several months following the

amendments made in July 1999, fuelled by continued forest blockades and protest by
conservation groups and a social fallout in timber towns in the State's south-west. Mill
closures and concomitant job losses were seen. by many timber workers to have been
caused by the RFA amendments, amplified by the Commonwealth's subsequent
decision to withdraw funding from industry restructuring agreements (Burns & Grove,
1999; Martin, 1999b).

At the State election in early 2001, the conservative Court

Coalition Government lost office, arguably in part because of the RFA.

In toto, the forest conflict had not been resolved by the RFA but arguably increased the
venom in the forest debate. Despite much time and money spent and the persuasive
rhetoric of best science, community involvement, and conflict resolution the WA RFA
seemingly failed to both provide a process and deliver an outcome that was acceptable
by RFA participants and the broader public.

Conclusion
In this chapter I provided insights into the anatomy of the (Western) Australian forest

dispute and conveyed an understanding of the dynamics at work prior to, and
throughout, the WA RFA process. I elaborated on the ecology of the forest region
under dispute, explained its social and economic significance, and sketched the history
of forest utilisation and management in WA.

I discussed the political developments which have led to the formulation of a national
forest policy and paved the way for the RFA processes nationally. In this chapter I also
introduced the key protagonists of the WA forest debate and described the dynamics
among WA's forest stakeholders and their impact on the WA RFA debate. Finally, I
gave a brief overview of the WA RFA and provided details on the process and its
outcomes.

In this chapter I intended to deliver context not only to situate the RFA case study but

also for the introduction of a methodological tool yet to be advanced. In Chapter Two
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I alluded to colour-coding for the in-text use of interview data but did not elaborate
further for I considered it to be context-specific.

The necessary background

information has now been provided, and thus I will turn to the issue of colour coding in
the following chapter. I will also deal with stakeholder expectations on the RFA process
as a means of contextualising further the WA RFA case study.
Chapter Four.
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Chapter Four
The RFA Discourse Community and Stakeholder
Expectations
Introduction

As foreshadowed in previous chapters, it is my aim to gain insights into the Western
Australian RFA process based on RFA stakeholders' perceptions of its outcomes as well
as their understanding of the prevailing dynamics over the three year duration of the
RFA. First, however, it is essential to shed light on the expectations that were placed by
the various RFA stakeholders both on the process and on the outcomes. The objectives
of the RFA processes were spelled out in the NFPS, and this chapter will examine how
the NFPS and contemporaneous government rhetoric were interpreted by RFA
stakeholders and whether stakeholders differed in terms of their expectations of the
process and of the process outcomes.

Also important in connection with the ensuing data analysis is the identification of the
RFA discourse community. With the term discourse community I am referring to those
stakeholder groups and individuals who shaped the various RFA discourses in Western
Australia throughout the RFA process and formed a part of the institutional
arrangements (after Selsky & Memon, 1995) governing the RFA forest areas.

As

described in Chapter Two, I .employed snowball sampling in order to obtain a
representative discourse community. However, as it was necessary to protect the
identities of research participants, I decided to partition the RFA discourse community
into five discrete groups giving each group a unique code for the purposes of the data
analysis.

Presented below is the underlying rationale used for the stakeholder

delineation and the method I used for the development of stakeholder categories. These
categories formed the basis for the analysis of stakeholder expectations of the Western
Australian RFA and for subsequent analyses throughout the thesis.

Mapping of the RFA Discourse Community

The systems perspective employed in this study is germane to analyses of discrete
groups (i.e., systems and their sub-systems) and the interactions and dynamics within
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and between various groups Therefore, I chose an approach that allowed research
participants to form their own (sub)systems through a process of self-identification.
This meant that research participants were essentially categorising themselves during the
interview process by way of stating their memberships, affiliations, and/ or the capacities
in which they were being interviewed at the beginning of the interview. A total of five
broad stakeholder categories emerged from the interview data, namely (see also Table

4.1):

I'

•

Environment Groups;

I

•

Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions;

•

Government/Departments/Political Parties;

•

Stakeholder Reference Group/General Public, and

•

Scientific Community.

. In what follows, I shall explain. my reasons for maintaining these participant clusters
throughout this thesis and elaborate on their appropriateness for the purposes of this
study.

Dichotomous rural-urban constellations are quite common within natural resource
conflict settings (see for instance Overdevest, 2000).

Consequently, one finds that

conflict communities are frequently clustered into rural groups and urban groups.
Admittedly, the Western Australian RFA displayed features not dissimilar to a ruralurban dualism exemplified by jobs versus trees discourses. Yet, a discourse mapping such
as this would have proven too simplistic for the WA experience. The historical review
presented in Chapter Three made apparent that the conflict that erupted over native
forest use represented a clash between governments (state and federal), conservationists,
timber industry interests, and other resource-based industries.

In particular, timber

industries and conservation groups featured as the main protagonists in the forest
debate, and various government reports and policy documents attest to the duration and
intensity of the conflict between these two factions (see Commonwealth of Australia,
1990; Resource Assessment Commission, 1990; Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a;
Resource Assessment Commission, 1992).

Reference is made to these opposing

factions in terms of a simple dichotomy between those who advocate increased forest
conservation and those who promote commercial forest access and utilisation. The
forces for conservation were a variety of environment groups whereas forest use
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advocates were largely union and industry based.

For these reasons, I included an

environment category as well as an industry category for the purposes of this study.

In Chapter Three I showed that the forest dispute became increasingly politicised over
the last 20 years.

Governments at both the federal and state levels often found

themselves either being attacked by, or adjudicating between, forest stakeholder factions
and being called upon to find a solution to the conflict. The RFA process itself was
presented as a Commonwealth-driven political solution to the forest conflict. The
integral role of various governments in the process is irrefutable, guaranteeing that a
government category would be applicable.

This category includes the respective

bureaucracies of the Commonwealth and State governments as well as members from
both houses of government at the Commonwealth and the State level. Commonwealth
and State departments and agencies were included in the one government category for they
were entrusted to operationalise the terms of the National Forest Policy Statement and
to be in charge of the RFA processes in the various states around the country. In this
regard a certain degree of organisational congruency between governments and their
respective departments/agencies was assumed.

Science was used to describe the fourth category, which is justifiable in light of the fact
that the RFA process was meant to be scientific in nature and that much of the
historical conflict in relation to forest use and conservation was also - at least in part scientifically grounded. Scientists were called upon in connection with the RFA (as was
also done in earlier processes but in a far less systematic way) to develop benchmarks
for forest reservation, guidelines for sustainable forest management, and to collect and
analyse data based on which an agreement on forest use and reservation could be
reached. Given the role assigned to science and scientists for the purposes of the WA
RFA a separate science stakeholder category seemed highly appropriate.

Other RFA stakeholders I assigned to a more general, fifth category called Stakeholder
Reference Group. Included in this group are Indigenous groups, apiarists, the tourism
industry, wildflower pickers, seed collectors, local councils, and also concerned (active)
citizens.
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Table 4.1: Partitioned WA RFA Stakeholder Community44
Environment
Groups

Timber
Industry /Union

Government/
kencies

I

Science
Community

I

Stakeholder
Reference Group

~
! epresented ... W.A.
!Department of
!Environment, Sport and onsultation project for Farmers Federation at
ITerritory
the RFA
the fSRGl meetings
National Working
!Federal Environmental !Groups, which led to .. .
Tourism
WA Forest Alliance
!Protection Agency
Wesfarmers Ltd.
IANIS criteria
!commission
ttend some of the
Department of Minerals
takeholders Reference
Conservation Council !Australian Workers
of Western Australia.
Union
tand Energy (://A)
~fechnical Committee ~ roups
Involved in interim
estern Timber
[I have] gone to major
Department of
protests, support peoplelForest Industries
ooperative and RFA
k:onservation and Land 1Rorest Agreement
in forest camps
Federation
!Management (://A)
!arrangements
~ akeholder Group
Environmental
Independent candidate
e were called
for Parliament (://A)
movement
Blueleaf Corporation
!Research scientist
!stakeholders
D epartment of
Attended all meetings of
ESFM expert panel in ~takeholder Reference
Donelly Timber
[Environment and
Wilderness Society
Company
Heritage
k;roup
es tern A us tralia
ember of Parliament Reviewed ...
Small saw mill o erator
A
submission to the RFA. 0011 ar Action Grau
tfimber Communities Labor Party shadow
!shire President
Australia
!F reelance botanist
!Minister (:II A)
Department of
epartment of
onservation and Land !conservation and Land !National Trust of
Bushmills Timber
Australia (:I/A)
!Management (://A)
~ anagement (://A)
Forest Task Force with
1e Department of
Ecologically Sustainable t enior [University]
rime Minister and
Forest Management
ecturer [who] ...
abinet.
Panel
!tended public meetings
epartment of
onservation and Land !western Australian
!Regional Tourism
!Museum
!Association
~ anagement (://A)
Whitakers Timber
Wilderness Society WA !Products

lwA

1w

1w

t

pepartment of
Environmental
Protection
egislative Council of
e West Australian
~ arliament

~ontracted to provide a talpole-Nornalup
report on disturbance
ational Park
cology
Association

!western Australian
!Museum (WA)
orestry Working
!Parks Australia within
roup in the ESD
!Environment Australia ~ rocess
olitical group called
iberals for Forests
Biodiversity Advisory
k:ouncil
~(WA)
Endangered Species
!Australian Heritage
k:omm1ss10n
!Advisory Council
!Environmental
~Jrotection Authority
'National Biodiversity
(:I/A)
!council
Department of
!conservation and Land
Management (://A)
Department of
!conservation and Land
!Management (WA)

ls hire President

IExpe~t on vegetation
lmappmg

44

Some responses have been edited .so as to prevent the identification of research participants.
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Their interests were similar enough to place them all into one category, however, they
certainly do not form a homogenous group of people. In fact some of the interests of
these groups are potentially conflicting. However, throughout the WA RFA process
this rather diverse group of people was treated as essentially one consultative assembly
for they were either members of the Stakeholder Reference Group (which was the
majority), the Aboriginal Noongar Action Group, or attendees of public meetings and
heritage workshops during the RFA process. Consequently, it seemed reasonable to
treat these groups as one for the purposes of this study.

While some timber and

conservation interests were represented at the SRG level, these were treated separately
in this thesis for reasons I have stated earlier and not in this group. To summarise, the
following stakeholder categories emerged from analysis:

Table 4.2: RFA Stakeholder Key

•

Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions

•

Government/Departments/Political Parties

•

Stakeholder Reference Group/ General Public

•

Environment Groups

•

Scientific Community

These categories I have maintained for the main part of the data analysis and were only
subject to further differentiation in Chapter Seven as part of a separate analysis
explained later in this chapter. I have devised a colour coding system (as shown in
Table 4.2) to show which group a person belongs to. This method allowed for the data
analysis to take place without the risk of revealing stakeholders' identities. Direct quotes
taken from the interview transcripts appear in the colours corresponding to the
participants' assigned group (e.g., statements by members of the scientific community
will be shown in blue, etc.).

To comment briefly on the validity of these groupings, the five participant categories
developed for this study need to be seen as necessarily arbitrary and provisional. They
represent working hypotheses I tested throughout this thesis. I recognise the potential
for, and indeed the likelihood of, heterogeneity within a,ry of the aforementioned
groupings. In fact, differences ought to be expected! Nonetheless, in light of the type
of analysis this thesis meant to produce I viewed these groupings as appropriate,
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especially since issues of dissent within groups will be addressed separately in Chapter
Seven. There, assumptions about group homogeneity are examined and the role of
certain individuals and charismatic leaders in the context of the RFA debate are also
addressed. In other words, the ensuing data analysis is not ignorant of potential and/ or
likely differences within and between stakeholder groups and is mindful of the
significance of individuals within the RFA stakeholder community.

Although the five participant categories were natural groupings for certain individuals,
assigning them to a single group proved problematic for they either assumed multiple
roles during the RFA process and/ or had been employed across the delineated
categories and were thus interviewed in multiple capacities. To make allowances for this
I allocated these individuals to multiple groupings. Multiple groupings were used for
members of the Science Community and Government/Departments/Political Parties
group.

The interview data derived from Stakeholder Reference Group/ General Public group
members and members of the Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group were
treated separately despite the representation of timber interests at the SRG level.
Individuals with multiple memberships are listed within all their respective groups in
Table 4.1 (hence, the number of entries does not match the overall number of
interviews conducted). Accordingly, in relation to the in-text use of interview data,
statements by participants with multiple group memberships were colour-coded based
on the hat they were wearing when responding to individual interview questions.
Overall, five research participants were subject to multiple coding.

Due to the

involvement of the State as well as the Commonwealth governments the selection of
participants from groups like Government/Departments/Political Parties, Science
Community, and Environment Groups included those from both the State and Federal
levels of Government and from the local and national levels of environment groups.

RFA Stakeholders' Expectations on the RFA Process45

In this section I examine the expectations of stakeholders of the WA RFA, chiefly
focusing on the timber industry and conservation groups. My decision to pay attention

4

s For corresponding collage refer to Appendix I (CD-ROM).
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to these two groups in particular is based on data availability and the fact that
conservation groups and industry groups were the key protagonists throughout the RFA
debate, and their reactions to the RFA process had a significant impact on the dynamics
of the RFA process. These groups' expectations are presented in light of the promises
made under the NFPS and statements made by government officials, their policy
advisors, and relevant civil servants in relation to the NFPS.

I also examine the

expectations of environment groups in order to find out whether these have changed
throughout the WA DFA process and whether this has influenced their decision not to
formally participate in the State's RFA process.

First, it is important to note that both groups, conservationists as well as advocates for
the timber industry, acknowledged that both camps were likely to have interpreted the
NFPS differently (I suppose it could be argued that we had a selective interpretation of
the National Forest Policy Statement where it says that Australia will continue to use
native forests for sawlogs, and those native forests that are not considered to be of high
conservation value or have wilderness values or old growth values will be able to be
used for the production of timber and the production of woodchips - and - we
interpreted [the NFPS] in our way, and industry and government interpreted in a
different ·way) and dealt selectively with the issues laid down in the policy document 0,Y./e
latched onto the things that were of interest to us). Hence, it is not surprising that
environmental groups and the timber industry were focused in particular on the issues
of wilderness and old growth and the policy objective of an internationally competitive
and ecologically sustainable native hardwood industry respectively. It is these policy
aspects of the NFPS that are investigated further.

Old Growth and Wilderness

In relation to old growth and wilderness the NFPS (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a)
stated that "[t]he Governments have agreed to a strategy designed to conserve and
manage areas of old growth forests and wilderness as part of the reserve system" (p. 11).
These intentions were reaffirmed by government group members who assured that the
NFPS recognised the need to look at the old growth forest issues[,] ... make sure that
the biodiversity was being maintained and for that purpose set aside sufficient amounts
of forest to provide an appropriate legacy for future generations.
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The NFPS was generally welcomed by conservation groups who saw it as a framework,
which would protect old growth and wilderness forests, which were recognised as being
an irreplaceable resource and in fairly serious decline. Indeed, compared to previous
attempts of policy formulation the NFPS gave the impression of being a fairly radical
document in that it clearly set out the need to protect biodiversity in the forests, to
protect old growth and wilderness and bring about substantive change in what was
happening to our forests. The perceived sense of clarity of the NFPS can only be seen
in relation to the document's objectives, however, as the NFPS itself only gave a broad
outline of things and [did] not give strict guidelines [for operationalisation].

For the interim protection of old growth forests and of wilderness areas the NFPS
envisaged, as part of the governments' five-pronged strategy for old growth and
wilderness protection, that "forest management agencies [would] avoid activities that
may significantly affect those areas of old-growth or wilderness that are likely to have
high conservation value" (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, p.11) until assessments
of forests for conservation values were completed (the term assessments refers here to the
DFAs).

It seems that the promise of a moratorium on old growth logging was

considered absolute and all encompassing by conservationists. To them the NFPS,
going by appearances, guaranteed a moratorium on the logging of forest that may be
needed for the CAR reserve system, which in their view seemingly included almost all
remaining old growth forests (just get out of the old growth - and - What they wanted
was all old growth - and - [the Greens] understood that the National Forest Policy
Statement would effectively mean an end to all old growth logging).

Conservation groups expected that the cessation of old growth logging was part of the
governments' intention to introduce ecologically sustainable forest management (ESFM)
(a framework . . . [which would]

. . . look at actually implementing ecological

sustainability in forest management), which was to be effected by "integrated planning
processes, codes of practice, sustainable-yield harvesting practices" (Commonwealth of
Australia, 1992a, p. 12), and other measures. At that point, however, ESFM was poorly
defined, and government sources admitted that expectations [were] very variable as to
what ESFM really mean[t] and that a lot depend[ed] on interpretation. It appears that
conservation groups expected that ESFM would include the cessation of all old growth
logging, while for government this was a matter of structural planning.
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It is important to note though that the NFPS did not mention the cessation of all old
growth logging. Whilst it did recognise a reduced reliance of native timber industries on
old growth forests, the NFPS envisaged this via the facilitation of the "continuation of
[the) transition" (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, p.10) to regrowth native forests
and plantations. In other words, logs derived from old growth forest would still be
taken by industry but the amount would decline in quantity over the years. Industry
members understood old growth still to be part of their future timber allocations,
although they expected their access to diminish (industry was working on the position
that it would have ten years to re-adjust). In addition, which also helps explain the
polarised positions in the ensuing RFA debate, there was a seeming lack of
comprehension as to why so much emphasis was being placed on old growth by
conservationists (the old growth debate absolutely amazed me ... what is so wonderful
and marvellous about old growth?). Also, in relation to the promised CAR reserve
system there was a sense among industry members that there was no need to create a
CAR reserve system ... because it was believed that it was already there in Western
Australia (there are sufficient forests in reserves for anybody to have an old growth
experience).

Internationally Competitive and Ecologically Sustainable Native Hardwood
Industry
In the context of wood production and industry development the NFPS envisaged the
integration of a range of commercial and non-commercial uses (such as tourism and
water catchment protection), efficiency increases, and value adding strategies.

The

NFPS gave the Commonwealth Government's commitment to "providing certainty and
security for existing and new wood products industries to facilitate long-term
investments in value-adding projects in the forest products industry" (Commonwealth
of Australia, 1992a, p.17). In short, the idea was to introduce new forms of forest
management for wood production that maintained the forest estate and balanced forest
uses. At the same time, assurances were issued in the context of changing market
conditions and consumer preferences that governments saw their role in "minimising
any adverse social and economic effects" on timber industries and their workers,
particularly in "rural communities where alternative employment opportunities may not
always be available" (p.19).
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Government sources echoed these calls for certainty and balance, suggesting that the
aim of the NFPS was to establish this mix of reserves that would reflect ... the needs of

the conservation interests as well as the state's interests for economic development (to
guarantee a certain yield for the industry but also to ensure that from the environmental
perspective there was going to be conservation aspects taken into account and trying to
get to that balance - and - achieve a balance between industry security and also to
achieve preservation - and - an endeavour to get the greatest level of conservation but
still at the same time to achieve what the RFA was all about; i.e. to get some industry
security (emphasis added) - and - it was about trying to create certainty). A number of
government agents, however, refuted these notions of balance, suggesting that the
NFPS was strictly and definitely driven by the logging agencies. In their view the NFPS
was designed to (a) get the Commonwealth out of forestry because it had been a
nightmare for a decade for the Labor government, and (b) to give resource security to
industry. Imbalance was seen to stem from the desire to grant resource security to
industry in order to get the conservation lobby and the broader community off the
governments' back (I mean the State as well as the Commonwealth), ... a suite of no
regrets measures, ... which was meant to deliver resource security to industry [but] not
to come up with the world's best reserve system.

Generally, industry members felt that the industry did not need the RFA (the RF A was
absolutely unnecessary) and had some reservations about politicians ... politicis[ing] the
outcomes of the RFA. Nevertheless, there was a sense of cautious optimism on the
industry side in that they saw in the proposed RFA process an opportunity to provide a
greater level of certainty in the very uncertain atmosphere that prevailed m·er the issue
of access to forest resources as well as a wonderful opportunity to create investment in
further value-adding and create some jobs in the manufacturing sector. Still, while
members of the industry seemingly believed that the RFA would give [them] ... longterm security·, it was acknowledged that this would come at somewhat of a price (:.Y/e
realised that ... there would be an increase in the conservation reserves). The industry
was aware that it need[ed] to make some concessions to ensure that it was possible to
get ... [a reasonable] outcome but maintained a position that there should be no net job
loss.
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Small sawmillers, however, were less optimistic for they believed that the reason for
ha\ring the RF A was obviously to destroy the industry based on the overriding desire of
the government . . . to promote conservation objectives. This notion of governmental
pro-conservation bias was to harden throughout the RFA process. Still, despite these
reservations and a general feeling that they did not need [ ... ] a RFA in \YIA because ...
[the industry] had confidence in the [WA State Government] Forest Management Plan
industry supporters showed a willingness to engage in that process.

To comment briefly on the expectations of other stakeholder groups, apiarists, for
instance, were anticipating that there . . . [would be] more conservation areas, that they
would be able to maintain all the access that . . . [they] had to State forests, get access
into areas which ... [they] previously did not have, and that the RFA would put an end
to clearfelling because clearfelling . . . [was seen to be] totally destructive for the
beekeeping industry. Beekeepers also wanted to make sure is that they [government]
would leave the big old trees instead of cutting them down. This case was also made by
local council representatives who stated that the community wanted to hear that we
won't be logging old growth forests anymore. Aboriginal stakeholders wanted to ensure
that secret, sacred, and significant places were protected and that they had a chance to
tell their story about their country during the RFA process. The tourism industry, who
saw forests as an asset for tourism, was looking for a balance . . . between the harvesting
of the forest and the needs of the tourism industry. The industry understood itself as an
obvious[] . . . key stakeholder in the RFA process and as one of the key industries as
part of the restructuring to provide opportunities for employment for displaced timber
workers. This last statement is indicative of a view that a reduction of the timber sector
was seen as inevitable, which is precisely what was feared by the timber industry, as
shown previously.

To summarise at this point, all stakeholder groups had a wide, but also conflicting, range
of expectations on the RFA in terms of what they saw it would deliver. Many displayed
a preparedness to engage in the proposed RFA process, viewing it as a vehicle to
achieve their respective ends. In particular, optimism was expressed by both the timber
industry and the conservation movement in light of their respective reading of the
NFPS.

However, some industry members had concerns about the possibility of

resource withdrawal due to excessive government catering to green demands.
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The Deferred Forest Assessment and Its
Expectations of the RFA Process

Impact on Conservationists'

46

Following the signing of the NFPS the Deferred Forest Assessment (DFA) process
commenced in Western Australia as well as in other States, which aimed at an interim
arrangement to "ensure that options for a CAR reserve system [were] not foreclosed by
logging activities whilst the CRA and RFA process [were] completed" and "to minimise
the social and economic impacts of deferring areas" (Department of Agriculture
Fisheries & Forestry Australia, 2002, Section 11). The Western Australian Conservation
Council was commissioned to be involved in the DFA process, helping delineate high
conservation value areas.

This particular environment group was also party to the

consultation process during the early stages of the DFA together with the Forest
Protection Society, Forest Industries Federation of Australia, Alcoa and Worsley
Alumina, and the Australian Workers Union.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Keating Labor Government deferred some 6
million ha of forest in 1995 prior to the federal election in an attempt to prevent further
alienation of the party's environmental power base. In Western Australia this meant
that all of the forests that were on the Register of the National Estate were [proposed to
be] withdrawn from logging (see also Commonwealth of Australia and Government of
Western Australia, 1995), which largely reflected the recommendations of the
Conservation Council. However, with the 1996 federal election ... came a change of
government, and the implementation of the RFA policy was left to the new
(conservative) Liberal government ... which brought about ... some fairly substantial
changes particularly in WA. These changes meant that a number of the forests that had
been deferred (for proposed forest areas refer to Commonwealth of Australia and
Government of Western Australia, 1995) were withdrawn, meaning their deferral status
was changed. In other words, the final DFA - largely due to the intervention from WA
(see Standing Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development, 1998a) - reflected
hardly any of the recommendations made in the reports submitted by the Conservation
Council (on this point compare Conservation Council of WA, 1994, 1995b;
Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1996a), which
resulted in a feeling among conservationists that [t]he government[s] did not take much
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notice of [them] . In fact, it was believed that [governments] had come up with their
own areas where there was to be a moratorium ... and to conservationists ... it was just
minimal. To them it seemed that [a]reas of virgin forest were just left out for the most
spurious of reasons and that the first step of the RFA process was to withdraw
protection for all of these icon and other high conservation value forests .

This seeming rejection of the Conservation Council's recommendations needs to be
seen in the context of the protracted DFA negotiations between WA, the
Commonwealth, and respective government departments. These negotiations proved
difficult in the absence of agreement on a working definition for old growth forest, the
pre-European forest extent, and the present level of forest reservation in Western
Australia pertaining to old growth. For the establishment of CAR reserves, however,
agreement on these issues was essential for it needed to serve as baseline data. While
these scientific issues will be looked at more closely in Chapter Six it appears at this
point - especially in light of subsequent publications by the Conservation Council (see
for instance Conservation Council of WA et al., 1999) - that there were obvious
differences in terms of assumptions and definitions between the Conservation Council
and other negotiating parties during the DFA debate.

What further infuriated conservationists in addition to the perceived refutation of the
Conservation Council's recommendations was the role played by the Department of
Conservation and Land Management throughout the DFA process, which stood
accused - inter alia - of having pressured the Commonwealth into accrediting road, river,
and stream zones (linear reserves) as well as non-statutory zones as part of the formal
reserve system (Conservation Council of WA, 1995a). Also, the inclusion of a proviso
in the final DFA document (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western
Australia, 1996a, Section III), which allowed "(m]inor clearing of old growth jarrah
forest ... in these national estate sub areas . . ." caused for further disquiet among
conservationists. Cynicism was also expressed in relation to the timing of the DFA
finalisation, for it was viewed to have been delayed for reasons of political expediency
([the State government] postponed signing that until after the 1996 federal election
when the coalition government was elected federally.

So they held off that in

anticipation that they [might] have a sympathetic Federal Government).
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It seems that the initial enthusiasm in connection with the National Forest Policy
Statement evaporated during subsequent events prior to the RFA commencing in WA.
In fact, environment groups seem to have come to the conclusion that the RFA
process, which was about to begin, was not to [deliver] . . . a genuine CAR reserve
system, to give us genuinely ESFM. Instead the belief was formed that the RFA's
primary objective was to give resource security to the native forest logging industry and
to get [forests] off the federal political agenda. Ironically, this - what perhaps could be
referred to as disillusionment - was perceived by some to be an advantage because it
meant that there would never [be] any illusion in the conservation movement in WA
that the RFA process was intended to deliver good conservation outcomes.

The DFA created a situation where in the end there were fears on both sides of the
forest debate (a) with conservation groups viewing the just to be commencing RFA as a
timber industry driven process and (b) some industry members, as previously
mentioned, being concerned about anti-industry biases. Industry concerns were fuelled
also during the DFA process because some of its wood [was] locked up in deferred
forest coupes and it just laid there. [Timber workers] could not get paid for it because it
had not gone across weighing bridges and ... [t)here was wood ... that could not go to
saw mills because there was no system of segregating residue. To them the whole DFA
(and subsequent RFA) was an extraordinarily long and slow process, which in their view
was wrought with immediate management problem[s] ... and had the unfortunate effect
. .. of greatly exacerbating the forest debate in Australia.

Conclusion
In this chapter I provided a map of the RFA discourse community and delivered a
rationale for its development. An analysis of events preceding the WA RFA shed light
on the differences between two key stakeholder groups in terms of what their
expectations were of the WA RFA process based on their interpretations of the NFPS
and subsequent events.

It became evident, while industry members were relatively optimistic towards the RFA,
albeit with some reservations, hoping it would deliver resource security, that the
conservation groups - following the conclusion of the DFA - invested little faith in the
RFA process, believing that it would not achieve meaningful conservation outcomes.
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The overall negative attitude of the conservation groups - certainly helped by other
factors yet to be advanced - unwittingly paved the way for an acrimonious RFA process.
The subsequent withdrawal of conservation groups as official RFA stakeholders and
their active campaigning outside process parameters made a significant impact on the
RFA itself, as will be shown in the following chapters.
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Chapter Five
The Participatory Nature of the Western Australian

RFA
Introduction

In Chapter Three I reviewed the history of the Australian forest debate. In this context
I made the case, like others (Chindarsi, 1997; Dargavel, 1998), that the dispute over
native forests has been messy, complex, and acrimonious. It appears that both federal
and state politics of forest use became gradually more precarious over time and that the
interplay of economic imperatives, scientific uncertainty surrounding forestry issues, and
the electoral significance of forest policy (Chindarsi, 1997; Lane, 1999; Slee, 2001)
increasingly polarised and paralysed any constructive debate and ultimately precluded a
political solution.

The consequent length and intensity of the forest conflict led to the suggestion that
I

political attempts in the past had failed to resolve or at least dampen this controversy.
Government intervention even, at times, increased the polarisation between the various
protagonists (Dargavel, 1998). The literature informs us that government intervention
often occurred in an ad hoc fashion, frequently lacked an understanding of the symbolic
and ideological factors involved in forest disputes (Syme, 1992; Lane, 1999), and
subsequently missed the mark in political and social acceptability.

Furthermore,

previous government processes, described as participatory rituals (Mercer, 1995), tended
to ignore public/ stakeholder views in the process outcomes, suggesting insufficient
stakeholder access to political decision-making processes and a lack of recognition of
their views and desire to have input.

The RFAs were purported to be different from past processes, and both federal and
state governments were keen to emphasise the inclusiveness and accessibility of the
proposed RFAs. The NFPS (1992a, p.38) spoke of "extensive public consultation and
advanced planning techniques" as a means to "enable the community to make ...
considered contribution[s] within the land use decision-making process and to forest
management issues." The Commonwealth Position Paper (1995, Executive Summary)
also recognised "that community acceptance can profoundly affect the durability of ...
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agreements" and indicated that "stakeholder consultation would be sought ... particular!)

in relation to identifying possible forest use and management scenarios for the region'' (Section 1.5.5,
emphasis added).

The WA Scoping Agreement (1996b) echoed these sentiments,

stressing the importance of effective community involvement. In fact community input
was considered "critical to the successful completion and enduring life of an RFA"
(p.11), and thus the development of consultation and communication strategies was
promised. Subsequent RFA newsletters were speaking of regular stakeholder access to
the process (Forests Taskforce, 1997) and even of "full community participation in the
development of options for the RFA" (Forests Taskforce, 1996, p.6).

In light of this self-confessed recognition by governments of the importance of
meaningful public input into government processes I present below an analysis of the
Western Australian RFA process with attention focused on its participatory nature. In
Chapter Four I outlined the expectations RFA stakeholders placed on the proposed
RFA process based on their interpretations of the National Forest Policy Statement and
related policy documents. These insights will now be placed in context with the RFA
process reality as perceived by those involved in the process.

RFA stakeholder

interview data will be used to examine the perceived accessibility and inclusiveness of
the RFA process. An initial survey, however, of the literature on public participation in
natural resource contexts will provide the necessary background and help further refine
the scope of this chapter. Reference will also be made to Australia's track record in
relation to community involvement in government processes.

Public Participation and the Australian Experience
''Full public involvement improves poliry development,
regulatory implementation, and service delivery. Public
participation results in more informed decisions, and a
greater identification and understanding of public issues,
concerns, priorities and solutions. "
(Office of Consumer and Public Involvement, 2000, p.2-1)

Active citizen participation in environmental decision making has become an accepted
notion (fuler & Webler, 1999), at least among theorists (see for instance Creighton et
al., 1983; Fischer, 1985; Kemp, 1985; Kasperson, 1986; Fiorino, 1990; Renn, 1992;
Forester, 1993; Laird, 1993; Landre & Knuth, 1993; Webler, 1995; Moore, 1996;
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Shindler & Creek, 1997; Buchy & Race, 2001; McCool & Guthrie, 2001). Also, within
the public policy arena there is growing recognition of the importance of governments'
responsiveness to community demands, showing signs of a seemingly forgotten
awareness that public participation is integral to democratic life.

What does public

participation stand for? The terms citizen or public participation or communi!J involvement
(used here synonymously) generally imply "an interactive process between members of
the public, individually or in groups, and representatives of a government agency with
the aim of giving citizens a direct voice in decisions that affect them" (Munro-Clarke,
1992a, p.13). The term also covers a wide variety of activities, and many methodologies
exist for enabling such participation (e.g., focus groups, citizens' panels, citizens' juries,
community planning and many others) (see for instance Slocum et al., 1995; Pratchett,
1999).

Many of the earlier writers in the field (see for instance Bachrach & Baratz, 1962;
Arnstein, 1969; Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Pateman, 1970) have seen public participation
as a means of giving a voice to minorities and underprivileged groups. Thus, there has
been a strong emphasis on power relations, the transfer of power, and the
relinquishment of power; the ·transfer of power refers here to a power shift away from
process managers to process participants to enable participant access to decision-making
processes, which in turn necessitates the relinquishment of power by process managers
(Snowdon & Slee, 1996). To this day, the notion of power has remained central to the
debate (see for instance Slocum et al., 1995; Snowdon & Slee, 1996) although such
emphasis is viewed as excessive by some (Schumpeter, 1976; Painter, 1992; cited in
Buchy & Race, 2001).

In more recent years, community involvement, also

encapsulating active citizenship, has been elevated in the literature to a symbolic pillar,
even the very key to the survival, of democracy (see for instance Saul, 1997; Theobald,
1997). Principally, these calls for active citizenship were voiced in response to a growing
perception of a wide-spread rational consumer ethic and concomitant political apathy
within western world democracies.

In general terms it can be observed that meaningful community engagement is seen to
be crucial to democratic life,· and while some commentators warn of high associated
cost (see for instance Davis, 1996) or the inability of the masses to participate
meaningfully (Schumpeter, 1976), most writers in the field agree that more is seemingly

108

better, implying that higher degrees of community involvement will generally lead to
better outcomes. Those outcomes could entail improvements for the communities
involved (Munro-Clarke, 1992b), for resource use and management practices or
community-government relations (Buchy & Race, 2001). Indeed, the list of perceived
benefits of community involvement is long.

Such benefits relate to the social and

political acceptability of government processes and thus the longevity of their outcomes.
Community involvement can lead to improved relationships and communication
between governments and the communities they govern, better risk communication,
community empowerment, ownership of processes and outcomes, formation of social
capital, sharing of power, expertise and knowledge, greater transparency and
accountability, mutual learning, and building of confidence and self-esteem (see for
instance Barber, 1984; De Sario & Langton, 1987; Forester, 1988; Renn, 1992; Forester,
1993; Laird, 1993; Slocum et al., 1995; Webler, 1995; Moore, 1996; McCool & Guthrie,
2001).

In light of the perceived benefits of public engagement numerous step-by-step guides
for community involvement have been developed over the years, spelling out the key
ingredients for successful participation processes (e.g. Cullen, 1977; Institute for
Participatory Planning (IPP), 1981; Renn et al., 1995; Davis, 1996; Buchy et al., 1999;
Tuler & Webler, 1999; Office of Consumer and Public Involvement, 2000; Buchy &
Race, 2001; Carson & Gelber, 2001; McCool & Guthrie, 2001) and formulating best
practice principles (better practice being the more appropriate word). 47 Moore (1996)
argues, however, that the development of these guidelines for effective community
involvement is predominantly based on input from theorists and practitioners. Often,
participant input is lacking (Moore, 1996; Tuler & Webler, 1999) and poorly understood
(Syme, 1992). There has also been a growing awareness in the literature that the
inflexible

operationalisation

of

such

better

practice

principles

can

yield

counterproductive and often costly outcomes, and practitioners have been cautioned to
take into account contextual and historical factors which may affect otherwise well-

47

The efficacy of such techniques and methods mostly hinges on the way they are being applied and

implemented (Lauber & Knut, 1998; cited in Buchy & Race, 2001) which is often dependent on the
mindsets of those charged with the management of the such processes. In other words, attitudes and
behaviours play a central role in processes of community involvement (Davis, 1996; cited in Buchy &
Race, 2001) as they generally do in the context of any human interaction.
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designed processes (Syme, 1992; Buchy & Race, 2001). In other words, process success
is not only technique-dependent but also, perhaps predominantly, subject to context.

Contextual complexity, also referred to as messiness (McCool & Guthrie, 2001), is often a
feature of natural resource conflicts; thus demands for active community involvement
within the literature on natural resource management and planning are no surprise.
New societal obligations for risk communication (Kasperson, 1986), repeated calls for
collaborative environmental planning and stewardship (Selin et al., 2000), and the
seeming intensification of natural resource disputes world-wide (Macnaghten & Urry,
1998) have given impetus to the work in the area of public participation in the
environmental policy arena. These calls for meaningful community input have also
been echoed in the context of ecologically sustainable development since the early 1990s
(Slocum et al., 1995).

At the 1992 Earth Summit delegates formulated an action plan for sustainability, called
Agenda 21 (United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992).

Chapter

Eight of Agenda 21 was calling for "public [access] to relevant information, facilitating
the reception of public views and allowing for effective participation." Also, the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations - General Assembly,
1992c) urged the governments of countries to "facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation." Hence, the sustainability literature perceives public
participation as a dimension of ecologically sustainable development (see Figure 5.1) and
crucial for the operationalisation of sustainability principles (see for instance Carew-Reid
et al., 1994; Franks, 1996; Palmer et al., 1997). Some steps, albeit largely rhetorical, have
been taken world-wide towards (a) more balanced48 and (b) more inclusive government
decision-making processes, ·and in context of the perceived globalisation of
environmental and planning law public participation is a recognised element (fabemer
et al., 1996). Yet, to this day commentators still observe a considerable dominance of
economic rationality over public policy (e.g. Gare, 2002), potentially constraining public
processes.

48

The notion of balance refers here to the issue of assigning equal importance to social, economic, and

environmental concerns as opposed to economic considerations only.
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Figure 5.1: Perceived Dimensions of Ecologically Sustainable Development
(adapted from Cooper, 1995; cited in Palmer et al., 1997, p.88)
The prevailing pro-development climate in many countries, including Australia (see
Chapter Three), has commonly led to an overrepresentation of economic interests
within (Miller, 1988) and outside of government processes (Crenson, 1971). Therefore,
past and current efforts to increase public input can be seen here as a means of
curtailing the hegemony of economics in often predetermined government processes.

In a conservation context, for instance, increased public participation - driven by
attitudinal shifts towards the environment over the last 30 years - meant disallowing the
preclusion of pro-conservation outcomes in environmental planning and policy making.
The existence of often heated conflicts over resource use and management in numerous
countries attests to this attitudinal change (at least within some segments of society).
Furthermore, it confirms that what Arnstein (1969) calls non-participatory and
tokenistic forms of community involvement mechanisms by governments are seemingly
out of step with community aspirations (McCool & Guthrie, 2001), which is evidenced
by fractious government-community relations in countries like Australia, Canada,
Britain, and the USA.

Buchy & Race (2001) argue that many resource conflicts are regularly linked to the
power held by individuals within government processes (on this point see also Jewitt,
1995; Robins, 1995) as well as mismatching expectations between process participants
and process managers.

Based on Nelson and Wright's (1995) distinction between

instrumental and transformative participation Buchy & Race (2001) point to a tendency
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for communities to aspire to. more transformative modes of participation, envisaging
change as a process outcome.

In contrast, process managers often see a mere

instrumental role for the community for the purpose of collecting and disseminating
information.

What becomes apparent here is that the calls for greater degrees of

community involvement often go beyond the degree considered necessary by many
governments and their agencies. With growing demands voiced by resource stakeholder
groups for more access to, and participation in, government decision-making processes,
conflict is hence pre-programmed. Buchy & Race (2001) suggest that "considerable
change needs to occur within institutions . . . to respond to 'grassroots' aspirations"
(p.305). I concur that the issue of governance and the very nature of the administrative
workings of representative democracies need addressing, as they form a part of the
wider context that affects the degree to which public participation can occur. This
wider context, which too was recognised by Buchy & Race (2001), also includes the grip
of economic rationalism on administrative mindsets, market forces per se, and
globalisation at large. These forces are also present in the Australian context, and below
I shall provide insights into this country' s political system and environmental legislation
against the background of discussions surrounding representative democracies and
growing calls for community empowerment.

I have indicated in the introduction of this chapter that Australia's track record on
public participation relating to environmental issues has been far from exemplary.
Conacher and Conacher (2000) support this assertion, explaining that with exception of
provisions for objections (mining legislation) and appeals (planning legislation) there is
little scope for community involvement within Australia's natural resource legislation.
Underlying this situation of limited public access is a belief in the strict separation
between the country's legislators and their electorates, especially in connection with
matters of economic significance. This separation is based on a negative bureaucratic
and governmental attitude towards community involvement and attributable to the
perception that participatory· measures are too expensive, lengthy, and amateurish
(Conacher & Conacher, 2000). This belief is said to have hardened at the federal level
over the last 25 years as government bureaucracies were "swept by a locust strike of
economic rationalism" (Pusey, 1991a, p.1) during the late 1970s and throughout the
1980s as part of Australia's public sector reforms. Seen from government departments'
new economic outlook, public participation constituted a clear threat not only to the
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Westminster system, which is built on vertical ties, reciprocal control, and a distrustful
political style (Barber, 1984), but also to the country's economic advancement, which
had become the love-child of the administration. A similar critique is voiced at the state
level, where development-driven governments

are

compared to

"plebiscitary

dictatorships" and their policy making described as "rigid" and "hostile to criticism"
(Walker, 2002, p.282).

Overall, community input strikes as undue interference in Australia's political process,
which may explain why the exercise of citizens' democratic rights is largely restricted to
elections and referenda. One could even speak of a fear that active public participation
would bring about anarchy and social disorder which, according to Deetz (1996), is a
prototypical discourse feature of normative mindsets within administrations and
governments. This perceived dislike towards, or fear of, active community involvement
was also echoed by Churches (2000) in his review of W A's bureaucratic power
structures, revealing a sense of anxiety that State control and authority would be
undermined by the increasingly public and political nature of the State's natural resource
policy debate.

Perhaps unsurprising, an anti-participatory sentiment is detectable in the recent changes
to pieces of environmental legislation around Australia. After an apparent increase in
public involvement measures taken by Australian state and federal governments since
the rise of the public participation movement in the 1960s (Conacher & Conacher,
2000), the 1990s saw a seeming reversal in the governmental stance towards community
involvement. Admittedly, in 1996 around 180 statutes regulating environmental and
planning matters existed in Australia, as noted by Tabemer, Brunton, and Mather
(1996), all incorporating the "notions of sustainability, precaution, equity, and the
desirability of public participation" (p.261).

Nevertheless, states including Western

Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria recently changed various parts of their
environmental legislation, all effectively reducing the public's opportunity to participate
and/ or object (for more detail see Raff, 1995; Stein, 1998). It is therefore not surprising
that recent government publications on community consultation (see for instance
Carson & Gelber, 2001; Land and Water, 2001; Citizens and Civics Unit, 2002), which
acknowledge the importance

of sound community-government relations

and

community empowerment, ring true neither to the public nor to analysts and are thus
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received with much cynicism in the absence of needed evidence that political decision
makers have a desire to walk their talk.

The above review of the literature on public participation has enabled me to establish
the context for this chapter. The analysis of the participatory nature of the Western
Australian RFA below will (a) focus on participant-informed process design with a view
on how RFA stakeholders define an ideal government process, (b) respond to the call
for contextual sensitivity within government processes with focus placed on the RFA
process environment, and

(c) give consideration to perceived constraints in

governmental decision-making processes.

The Western Australian RFA: An Exercise in Public Participation?

". . . ifgovernments ignore the community, will not permit it
to become involved, or Jail to provide people with the
necessary information, there is a real danger ofgovernments
creating an increasing!J disaffected electorate. "
(Conacher & Conacher, 2000, p.281)
A decision needed to be made_ whether to employ process principles for the purposes of
this study in light of their previously discussed categorical and inflexible nature. Despite
their restricted usefulness, benchmarks such as these nevertheless provide direction in
terms of process planning as well as a general understanding of better practice (at least
in terms of what not to do), which is why I felt that I needed some form of yardstick for
the analysis of the Western Australian RFA process. As mentioned earlier, many tools
exist for the planning and evaluation of participative processes and their outcomes. Out
of this selection, as a measure of process appropriateness, I have chosen the process
principles laid down by Tuler and Webler (1999), which are listed below. It should be
clear that these principles are by no means absolute:

• Access to process
• Power to influence process and outcomes
• Structural characteristics to promote constructive interactions
• Access to information
• Facilitation of constructive personal behaviours
• Adequate analysis
• Enabling of social conditions necessary for future processes
The above principles are based on what process participants identified as being
important in fairly recently completed forest policy processes in New England and New
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York (USA). Therefore, this seemed a suitable range of process criteria as this study
also attempted to develop stakeholder-informed process principles, which in turn
provided scope for comparison. As Tuler and Webler (1999) do not spell out in detail
what these criteria entail and stand for, an interpretation of their criteria is listed below.
Purposefully, supplementary criteria were not added to the list, nor were the existing
benchmarks modified because I considered it important to maintain the integrity of the
principles or, to say it differently, leave them as they were formulated by NorthAmerican stakeholders in New England and New York in hope that this would provide
a more suitable basis for comparison.

Access to ,Process: This criterion relates to equal opportunity for participation and receipt of
information for all parties who express interest, are affected by the process or its
outcomes or can contribute to a decision. This also relates to geographical accessibility
of venues and meeting places and the setting of timelines.

Power to i'!,fluence,Process and outcomes: This principle refers to the need for balanced power
relations, meaning a process that is free from prejudice, preferential treatment, and
imbalances in resource required for effective participation.

It also relates to the

representativeness of the process in terms of reflecting stakeholder views on process
design.

Structural characteristics to promote constructive interactions and facilitation of constructive Personal
1

D

D

1

behaviours: Constructive interaction draws attention to the discursive nature of, and social
interaction (behaviour) involved in, deliberative processes.

Emphasis is placed on

respect, openness, honesty, understanding, listening, and trust.

In other words, the

behaviour of process participants and managers is genuine, meaning that it is based on
the desire to constructively work towards solutions. The term structural characteristics
refers to the timing, location, and set-up of discussion fora and meetings.

Both

behavioural and structural characteristics define the quality of the discourse space.

Access to iffformation: Information flows are bi-directional between process participants
and process managers, and information is sourced from both formally recognised
experts and informal experts (e.g., local people, indigenous people, amateurs).
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Information is used as a mechanism for mutual learning and teaching, involving active
listening, and is transparent and accessible.

Adequate ana!Jsis: The adequacy of analysis criterion relates closely to the issue of access
to information with emphasis placed on the quality of data and its analysis. Data is used
for fact finding and informing the debate.

Adequate analysis also relates to

accountability in that decision-making is based on 'objective' data rather than on politics
or vested interest.

Enabling of social conditions necessary for future processes: This is an outcome orientated
principle which is directed at the implications for future processes based on the results
of the current process. In other words, a participatory process is to create a discursive
climate suitable for future planning and decision-making activities.

The data analysis below will proceed under the headings of these better practice
principles adopted. Subsequently, attention will be directed to stakeholders' perceptions
of the overall efficacy of the process and their views on ideal process criteria. This will
then lead to the formulation of a set of RFA stakeholder defined better practice
principles to be compared with benchmarks derived from similar studies.

At this point also a tighter definition becomes essential for the terms stakeholder and
public. Stakeholders are often defined as "[a]n individual, group or organization with a
stake in an issue, its outcome, and/ or overall public involvement process" (Office of
Consumer and Public Involvement, 2000, p.2-3) whereas the public is defined as "the
general public, consumers, and communities of interest such as environmental, health
and consumer groups, industry, scientific and professional associations" (p.2-2). Within
a CPR framework, however, I am reluctant to distinguish between the public and
stakeholders as the definitional differences between the two groups are not relevant for
this analysis. Essentially, all members of the public are stakeholders in a resource that is
considered common to all, although the stakes in the resource will admittedly always
vary among stakeholder groups (e.g., resource dependent income etc). Nevertheless, a
distinction of some sort is required. For the purpose of this thesis the term stakeholder
includes all RFA process participants including the general public, environment groups,
the government, scientists, industry, and relevant government agencies and departments.
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However, while all of these groups form an overall community view I shall distinguish
between that and the views of the community, a term which refers specifically to
members of the general public.

Perceptions of the Participato,y Nature of the Western Australian RFA
Access to Process49
While most interviewees viewed the process as generally accessible, the level or quality
of access proved to be contentious. There seemed to be agreement that essentially
anyone - as a member of a registered organisation - could be signed up with the
Stakeholder Reference Group and that individuals were free to attend public meetings
(We were more than happy to include people - and - There were public meetings, they
were open to anybody to attend - and - everybody gets a fair go). However, the SRG
was not viewed by many stakeholders, as will also be shown later, as a decision-making
body50• Also, due to its all-encompassing nature (this Mickey Mouse Committee [SRG]
of everybody from the prospectors to anyone who was nominated - and - the way in
which it was structured in terms of key stakeholder groups and the like, one could
hardly say that it was representative) the SRG was perceived to be irrelevant to the
process.

This appeared to be one of the reasons why most environment groups

boycotted the RFA for they were seeking admission to the Steering Committee, a move
rejected by both the State and the Commonwealth government. (they formed the
Steering Committee and left conservationists out of it - and - conservation groups
boycotted the RF A process because the) belie\'Cd that they ought to have been on the
Steering Committee itself) .

The exclusion of environmental groups from the Steering Committee and their
subsequent boycott of the RFA process as stakeholders was seen as a fundamental
weakness of the process (any kind of a process ... is in deep trouble from the very start
if it can't convene in such a way when not all stakeholders are actually willing to
participate - and - the WA RFA had a significant and insurmountable problem from
the very beginning in that some major stakeholders refused to participate).

49

For corresponding collage refer to Appendix Ill (CD-ROM).

so For the terms of reference of the SRG please refer to Table 5.3 on p. 136.
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Access in terms of timing, location, and advertising was rated poorly. Meetings were
considered badly publicised and at too short a notice

~e

would get notice at the last

moment - and - there was inadequate lead-time given, the publicity was not good).
Also, many SRG meetings were held in Perth (while most public meetings were held in
the south-west), which inconvenienced many SRG members who were living in the
southern parts of the RFA area; especially, in view of meetings being postponed or
cancelled at short or - at occasion - no notice (There was no real effort, even though
we as stakeholders had raised in the meeting that they needed to give at least one month
notice for people to be able to put it in their diaries and arrange absence from work and - they would basically invite everyone up from the south-west for a keystakeholders meeting and then 24 hours beforehand cancel it - and - [The SRG] would
have meetings without informing me that the meeting was on - and - In one case they
did not even give them any notice at all).

Complaints were common about the perceived haste with which the process progressed
and the rushed nature of meetings and their scheduling (meetings were called ... at too
short a notice - and - things were really rushed), which raised suspicion as to why the
process was hurried (People get very concerned if they are being rushed too much - and
- apparent rush and pressure on to get it all over and done with then that actually
constrains the process and provides or legitimises the whole argument that we don't
have time to have broad-scale community consultation).

Power to InDuence Process and Outcomes' 1
Process managers saw RFA stakeholder input as meaningful and to have had an impact
on the final RFA outcome (all issues raised were considered and discussed - and - All
representations made to the Commonwealth, to the Steering Committee, to
Commonwealth Ministers were considered - and - We did our best to adapt that
consultation to what people were saying they wanted it to be). Exception was taken by
a number of process managers to the criticisms voiced by those who chose to stay
outside the process (i.e. the environmental groups and some local councils) and argued
that participants' views were considered and indeed found expression in the final RFA
document (People actually have got to participate - and - we have actually moved green
because of those people who actually did participate in the debate). Still, some officials
51
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acknowledged that the sense of disempowerment felt by some stakeholder groups was
something the process failed to overcome (it was too alienated from the community and - the general feel was that they were not listened to - and - ignoring the
communities' wishes).

Members of the timber industry seemed - m general - far more accepting of the
structure of the process (you have to put your faith in the integrity and ability of those
charged with ... [the process]. We were prepared to do that - and - We all had the
opportunity, if we wanted to take it up, to fully participate in any of the modelling that
was done for any reason over the course of the RF A outside the Stakeholders Reference
Group), although it was acknowledged that the SRG was - from a stakeholder
consultation point of view - neither a truly participatory nor decisive forum in terms of
process outcome ([The Stakeholders Reference Group was] never going to be the actual
place where major decisions were made - and - a government that is very much topdown).

The industry stance towards the RFA, however, changed substantially towards the end
of the process when the final RFA document delivered what was perceived to be far too
green a compromise, being reflective of the views of those stakeholders who did not

participate within the RFA format (We ... believed ... that the outcome should have
reflected more the aspirations of stakeholders that have stayed in the process - and the environment groups . . . achieved all of their objectiYes, at least the major part of
their objective at the end of the RFA in spite of the fact that they were not part of the
process). This sense was further aggravated after the RFA was amended only eight
weeks after the original agreement had been signed. The so-called back.flip was seen in
light of the political nature of the process and the perception that the government driven by the polls - bowed to the pressure applied by the metro-people and Greenies
(the people up there in the city, they don't know, they don't understand it, they are just
going with that green movement - and - It all came down to where all the votes were and - it's very much a top-down process with timelines that look like they seek to meet
their political objectives in terms of elections rather than delivering things to people that
are meaningful on the ground), seemingly oblivious to the fate and wishes of the timber
communities (There is little or no opportunity for the communities affected to get an
agreement to say what they want and what help they can get - and - \Vhen the
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government then pulled the rug out from under that it had a huge psychological effect
not just on the industry but also a lot of the communities that depend on it).

Other SRG members, local council and environmental group members in particular,
also expressed a sense of disempowerment (fhey did not have ownership of it - and it's a terrific example of disempowerment - and - There has been no community
ownership of it - and -

it was very obvious that our concerns were going to be

sidelined). For many the concerns seemed to relate to the issue of decision-making,
being listened to, and to have an impact on the final outcome, which was not felt to be
the case (It was always talk-down: You sit down, and we will tell you, and you listen and - People in the environmental movement that really did all the work were totally
ignored - and - the options paper pretty much covered what CALM was on about and
there was little evidence of public input - and - The public rebelled against this because
they were not part of the decision making process). Further, it was believed that the
RFA process was entirely controlled by the Department of Conservation and Land
Management (CALM and the personalities within CALM had no intention of letting
other people be involved in the process - and - community sees CALM as the people
that drove that process) and therefore catering merely to industry demands and
effectively ignoring the views of the environment movement and the wider community
(It seemed to exclusively look at the needs of the timber industry - and - [the outcome]
was totally controlled again by the timber industry).

Structural Characteristics to Promote Constructive Interactions and Facilitation
of Constructive Personal Behaviours52
The words haste, marginalisation, acrimonious debate, battle, arrogance, and distrust
were used by a wide range of research participants when describing the perceived
structural (and here mainly behavioural characteristics) of the RFA process.

Most

interviewees acknowledged a pervasive hostility in the debate, which was partly seen to
be historical (No other environmental issue has caused so much conflict and
divisiveness in the community as tl1e forest issue in Australia's history), as was also
shown in Chapter Three. The resulting angst and frustration was fuelled further by the
way stakeholders, SRG members in particular, felt treated throughout the process
((stakeholders] were basically just being insulted by this process - and - they were
52
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actually expecting us to sit there while we were basically [being] insulted by this pathetic
process - and - [stakeholders] complained that the process was so perverted that ...
[they] actually made a complaint to the Ombudsman), which meant that [people] got
angrier and angrier ... as the process went on.

Perhaps most importantly, integral to the acrimonious nature of the RFA process was a
strong sense of distrust towards the Western Australian lead agency in the process,
namely the Department of Conservation and Land Management. This distrust was (a)
again historical (There was a sense of concern that CALM were going to take the
foreshadowed process and do the same thing to the process like they had done to a
number of other processes to do with the forests - and - there was distrust in WA
about CALM's processes) but (b) also directly related to the process itself (That
methodology used by CALM is what discredited the RFA - and -

[process]

demonstrates an incredible level of indifference towards community involvement and
community participation and community concerns, and I think it would represent the
absolute height of CALM's ability to not participate in the public debate - and - very,
very much dominated by CALM staff - and - it was going to be another CALM process
- and - the way in which some of the CALM people managed themselves in public
meetings, all that served to do was to heighten the distrust).

Process managers maintained that stakeholder meetings were civilised, perhaps
regimented but fair. Also, stakeholders conceded that CALM staff as well as federal
representatives ... and the state representatives were very professional, but there was no
trust in the process as people felt that they have been misled about things and that it was
a very unfair process; and in particular, the level of distrust of CALM, whether it is
warranted or not, was at such a high level that the summary was a vote of no confidence
in the RFA process.

Access to Informatiori 3

In terms of access to information RFA process managers maintained that the relevant
data was made available to RFA stakeholders ([the] information that has been provided
to the public, both the assessment information and all the other information is much
greater than you would have in most other government processes), albeit some

s3
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occasional delays in the publication process (Some of the data did not get out as early as
we would have liked but we made a choice that it was better to get out sufficient data
rather than to get out something that was really half-baked earlier).

It was not contentious, however, that data was being made available. Yet, stakeholder
disquiet arose over the timing of data publication (The documentation was nowhere
available until the last moment - and - When they put out the options paper only one
or two people had that booklet before the meeting. Nobody had the chance to read it ),
the type of information (the information that the Commonwealth officers had that
might therefore be in the public domain was very, very tightly controlled as well and
limited), the quality of the data (So the public as a whole and other institutions never
really had an entree into the debate because of the quality of the information available to
them), its sources, and how the information came together (the public did not get an
opportunity to actually see how all of the information that came out of the working
groups and the technical groups and the public comment on the options paper had been
addressed until they were given a document, which says that is has been signed).

Among stakeholders, including industry representatives, there was a strong sense that
data publication was poor not just to the general public but SRG members especially
(they did some limited publicity - and - a hell of a lot more could and should have been
done to make the basic workings of the RFA and its rationale known to the public and - very stifled publication process - and - [Stakeholders] did not get proper access
to information - and - the Stakeholder Group ... [did) not have ... access to all of the
information).

Process management seemed satisfied with the SRG arrangements (I actually found the
Stakeholder Reference Group forum was quite good because it allowed people from
across the community to express their opinion and to be heard), arguing that there was a
huge amount of time and effort put into talking to people and listening to people, ...
not just getting there and bang, bang, ... lecturing at ... even though so!lletimes it mqy have
seemed like it (emphasis added), that people got a chance to ask questions, and that the
SRG format was sufficiently flexible (we said ok: you want to have a say, and you don't
think we are listening, we will answer you, you can have the floor - and - we tried to ...
structure the meetings in response to what the members of the Stakeholder Reference
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Group wanted). In the same vein it was argued that to some people, listening to what
they are saying means you do what they want and that what was demanded by those
individuals was outside the policy framework we were operating in.

In contrast, many SRG members saw the structure of the process [as] closed, and the
process itself as being blurred, unpublic and far from [being] transparent. There was a
huge thirst of information by everyone, and consequently there was a stakeholder
expectation that at stakeholder meetings would be a more open debate (fhe idea of
course was supposed to be an exchange of information and ideas). Being very closely
linked to the criterion of power to influence the process, communication flows were expected
to be bi-directional. What was perceived, however, was that SRG meetings were more
like a briefing by CALM or a lecture by CALM as to what they were doing (fhe
meetings were more run as a briefing session rather than say a tutorial where people
were exchanging information - and - they were . . . being told what was going to
happen). People felt that they were lectured at and had no input whatsoever (It was like:
You don't know what you are talking about.

We have all the data. We have the

answers. We have been in this business for 100 years, and we will tell what we can do
and you better accept it - and - You sit down, and we will tell you, and you listen).

Stakeholder perceptions such as these seemingly underpinned the previously mentioned
distrust towards CALM and also fuelled suspicion that some databases ... CALM did
not make ... available in the actual process, especially in view of the agency's centrality
to the process (Ji/e have got to the point where the database was CALM), and that
information was kept strategically from the public based on the attitude that knowledge
is power or information is power ... [and that w]e will keep it to ourselves and use it in
maybe in agreed ways but it's never going to be in the public domain (we don't want a
particular sort of information, we don't want good data sets on this, we don't want to
know - and - There was a guiding fear that if there are good quality data and they are in
the public domain then the nature of the debate would change enormously. In other
words, knowledge is power and we won't share it.

Similar concerns were raised in connection with the type of data that was made
available. Here, the view was seemingly taken that the published information was of
limited usefulness (the material we had presented to us was very difficult for the
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layperson to understand because of gaps and imprecision in the materials - and - a high
use of acronyms and all this jargon, inappropriate use of maps - and - very complicated
formula and it was very difficult to sort out what ... really, some weeks were spent by a
subcommittee trying to really understand the formula and the process), again fuelling
stakeholders' anxiety levels (After a session with these people you had to say that that is
not right. Straight away you got a doubt about what the other information is like).

Adequate Analysis54
It was part of the RFA rhetoric that the process is based on science, and both federal
and state governments seemed to believe that science was always going to be the critical
element in terms of what [the RFA] was going to achieve. While it was accepted - in
part quite cynically - (science and scientists were used to validate a political process) that
many scientists were involved in the process there was controversy relating to the actual
number of scientists involved and who they were working for (there were a lot of
scientists involved, 490 I think - and - 500 scientists and experts . .. let's have their
names ... lthey] came up with 220 and 89 per cent or 80 per cent of them work for
CALM). Here, the centrality of CALM once again proved divisive as there was a fairly
high level of distrust in the public arena about whether CALM was being totally open,
was allowing its scientists to be totally open in their scientific findings (many forest
biologists in WA were either employed by CALM and therefore not free to speak up or
were at university and wimps and would not speak up - and - It was all done in-house).
I will not go any further on this point as the scientific nature of the RFA process will be
addressed in depth in Chapter Six.

The interview data attests to considerable public uncertainty and doubt relating to the
quality of scientific work undertaken for the CRAs that formed the basis for the RFA
negotiations as there was a perception that figures [were] fudged and massaged, that
some of the data was being chopped to pieces, that the database [was] fundamentally
flawed; all amounting to the view that there was . . . some incredibly shonky science
(there are not too many scientists who will say best science. They will say RFA science
very disparagingly). It is interesting to note that timber industry representatives, while
less concerned with the rigour of the ecological studies, expressed concern about the
social and economic assessment work that formed part of the CRA process (some of
54
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the social assessment stuff I thought was fairly ordinary - and - no criteria were ever
developed for the social and economic outcomes of the RFA - and - but I had some
doubts about some of the social assessment work). Overall, industry representatives
believed that a scientifically based assessment of the forest . . . would be [a] great
strength of the RFA, especially in terms of bringing about broad acceptance [of the
outcomes] by the community.

Some members of the scientific community expressed concerns regarding the scope and
timelines given for the assessment work (Not enough time was given and there was no
attempt to initially have a good look and decide what needed to be done - and - there
was no scope to go and acquire additional data which I think was fundamentally
required - and - the time aspect was utterly inadequate), the review process (there was
no editorial involvement, which is usually in a peer review process - and - it was a
higgledy-piggledy mess in terms of process, about how these reports were going to be
dealt with, how they were going to be reviewed, how they were going to be assessed and
handled - and - review process was fairly minimal), and the quality of the data sets used
for the CRA process (conclusions are extremely suspect in the sense that they are based
on inadequate data - and - it was relying on data that had been collected for other
purposes - and - not adequate at all - and - there was no real effort made to ensure
that the outcomes from any scientific process, especially those processes that were done
outside of CALM, were the best available).

While there was agreement that the resourcing of the scientific work was adequate (the
funding was adequate - and -

resourcing that was provided was reasonable) and an

acknowledgement of some good CRA work by process participants (The vegetation
mapping was good - and - there was some good stuff [science] in the \YI A RFA - and I was reasonably happy with the rigour) a considerable number of process participants
reached the conclusion that the involvement of the scientific communit; was an
absolute farce, that at the end the scientific side was lost, and that this RFA process has
not been about science. Comments by members of the timber industry were not so
much directed at science per se but rather at its bearing on the final outcomes of the
RFA, which many industry representatives perceived to have been all about stopping to
cut down trees.
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..
RFA process management countered the above assertions, stating categorically that the
RFA was a scientific process and that the Comprehensive Regional Assessment in WA
. .. was a very sound process. However, time constraints were acknowledged (there are
obvious limitations to what can be done within the timeframe). It was argued that the
majority of those [CRA] reports were actually peer-reviewed, that scientific data was
being examined by Commonwealth and State governments before it was going to the
Steering Committee, and there was certainly quite a lot effort that went into checking
data. Assurances were given that the assessment work was done in a very scientific
manner, and it was emphasised that the vegetation mapping in WA was probably the
best vegetation mapping anywhere and that that would have certainly fed into the
process in terms of designing the reserve system. Overall, the science of the WA RFA
was said to have put Western Australia in a very strong position in terms of protection
of . . . biodiversity in the future.

However, there was an admission that the science

might have been lost in the debate, but it was stressed that it [was] there, that it [was]
underlying.

Enabling: ofSocial Conditions Necessaqfor Future Processe;s
The stakeholders' verdict on the efficacy of the RFA, as it relates to the enabling of
future processes, was overwhelmingly negative, which probably ought to be seen in light
of the fact that no single group of process participants seemed satisfied with the
(amended) RFA outcomes. Still, some members of the scientific community saw the
RFA as a stepping stone for future processes (we will have the capacity to improve, to
identify further weaknesses and improve on those areas as we go - and - All sorts of
defects and things to be learned out of the process were an improvement of what
existed). Others expressed confusion about the RFA outcome (The question that is still
out there is which RFA do we have. The one that's signed off on or the one the State
government has actually adopted. No one really knows clearly).
Local council members expressed concerns about the local impacts of the RFA (The
RFA has done a lot of damage down here, huge), and expressed considerable cynicism
about future processes (There are bigger issues than the RFA. The RFA is only one
little thing down here, and we can't get that right. So what hope have we got on trying
to get the others right?).

Other SRG members stated that the RFA had created

uncertainties and emphasised that the emotional and the community cost ... [was]
55
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enormous. Cynicism towards, and frustration with, the RFA process were expressed (In
terms of an outcome I think the outcome is entirely unsatisfactory. [But] in terms of
what one might expect to come out of a Coalition Government in WA, the outcome is
not all bad), and it was made clear that if someone in future was to bother with
consultation and spend taxpayers' money on it, then they should state exactly what it is
stakeholders are going to be able to do and let them do it (otherwise don't bother).

Many timber industry members thought that [the] process ... was not required and a
waste of time, that it's messed up the normal state's processes of decision making, did
not take account of the human cost involved (People don't matter in all of this - and One of the real losers out of this whole process is people - and - we ·were screwed),
only had the effect of bringing the whole forest stuff on to the boil, and fuelled anxiety
as to what might happen in future processes (any certainty has been shattered, and there
is always that expectation that perhaps [the government] will be pressured further to do
sometlung).

In particular, following the amendments to the RFA, timber industry

stakeholders thought that the RFA led to a lesser understanding of forest management
amongst the ordina0 troops and represented a case of political expediency in its worst
form and another nail in the coffin of ... democracy.

Generally, conservation groups seemed equally disenchanted with the process, viewing it
as a waste of taxpayers' money (tragedy - and - $10 million down the drain). Their
responses also hinted at a bleak future for processes to come with all these barriers with
lack of trust, lack of engagement, and all those layers of disillusionment in the
community (The next time a massive government process comes up, people -..vill look
back at the RF A and say: ah, don't go near it).

While voices within both the State and the Federal Government as well as their
respective departments suggested that the RFA will be of value for the next 20 years and
that the RFA process was overall successful (it's been a very successful process), there is
also admission that the RFA failed to be accepted by a substantial segment of the
community and, therefore, does not get credit for [its achievements] because it was too
alienated from the community and failed to overcome a level of distrust already in the
environment. Again others went as far as to call the WA RFA a failure for it was meant
to create stability, which in their view it did not achieve. It was also felt that the
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processes that the government undertook, specifically in relation to consultation,
exacerbated the existing conflict ideologically rather than created an environment in
which there could be a more constructive dialogue between the two endpoints.

Discussion 56
The data presented above revealed a fairly dichotomous discourse environment with
RFA stakeholders by and large demonising the process (the process was so perverted or
[we were) massaged into believing that what the RFA was offering was the very best
outcome) and both governments with their respective departments defending the
process to have been appropriate (huge amount of public consultation - and - We did
our best to adapt that consultation to what people were saying they wanted it to be). 57
This stereotypical us-and-them situation is depicted in Table 5.1, which divides the
discourse community essentially into two groups; one (process managers - good
process) who held the view that justice was done to the process they designed (we tried
to . . . structure the meetings in response to what the members of the Stakeholder
Reference Group wanted) and another (process participants - bad process) which
considered the process to have been insufficiently inclusive (there was little evidence of
public input).

What is important to note here is that the data analysis produced merely four pages of
raw data 58 supporting the participatory nature of the process in contrast to more than 10
pages of adverse data despite a balanced selection of participants across the five
categories and a common interview methodology. Furthermore, as illustrated in the
previous sections, the RFA was rated poorly by stakeholders in light of Tuler and
Webler's (1999) process criteria. Stakeholders generally felt poorly informed throughout
the process, not listened to, marginalised, and excluded from the actual decision-making,
and overall a lack of ownership. For all of the six criteria considered the earlier stated
us-and-them constellation dominated, which may mean that the WA RFA failed to meet
the benchmark set by these process principles. But can a public process be considered a
56
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The issue of dissenting views within governmental and departmental ranks will be addressed in Chapter

Seven.
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failure on grounds of insufficient participation alone?

In other words, does the

perceived violation of the six process principles equate to process failure, let alone
flawed process outcomes?

The grievances listed above in relation to the process

certainly may have contributed to the rejection of the RFA outcomes. Yet again, does
such a rejection constitute failure? An answer to that question I consider premature for
I believe that this notion of stakeholder/public rejection of the process and its
outcomes needs to be contextualised further.

Table 5.1 Discourse Group Mapping on the Issue of Participation59
Process Management
"Good Process"

Process Participants
"Bad Process"

regimented but fair
everybody gets a fair go
very high level of public involvement
we were more than happy to include people

[people] did not have ownership of it
inappropriate use of the stakeholders

[the] information that has been provided to the
public, both the assessment information and all the
other information is much greater than you would
have in most other government processes.
there was a huge an1ount of public consultation
allowed people from across the community to
express their opinion and to be heard
strong participatory role played by that local
community
What we wanted to do was for them to have ...
ownership
people got a chance to ask questions
we listened to the people

the incompetence was spectacular
they had not been allowing interaction between the
people
very much a top-down process
there was no sharing of knowledge within the
broader community
a real feeling that they were not being listened to
no genuine attempt to aim at conflict resolution
reporting ... was flawed
public ... never really had an entree into the debate
it was a waste of our time to eyen tr) and
participate
it was not a participatory process
not a transparent process

Commonwealth officials recognised that Western Australia presented a different case
compared to other RFA regions (the polarisation was so great, and WA was the most
particularly polarised - and - the difference with WA perhaps . . . the difference is more
with the community than with the RFA itself) , implying that the other stuff I was
alluding to earlier is likely to have played a significant role throughout the WA RFA
process. I am referring to the mood, the emotional context, of the RFA debate, the
issues that were underlying RFA stakeholder deliberations. What I found in this context
to be a common thread throughout the interview data was the issue of trust, or lack of
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it, which for its seeming centrality to the RFA process and its dynamics I would like to
expand on here.

The Issue of Trust in the Westem Australian RFA Contexl'0
The RFA attests to the fact that trust is decisive in political processes for it frames
perceptions, communication, and actions. Giddens (1991) informs us that basic trust is
needed in day-to-day life and needs to be earned by the person to be trusted. Active
trust, in contrast, "has to be actively produced and negotiated" (Giddens, 1994, p.93)
and is essential in public affairs and processes such as the RFA. Active trust (social
becoming of trust) is seen to develop from a background level of trust culture, which is
dependent on a structural context (such as transparency of governance and
governmental processes) and so-called agential endowment (social moods and collective
capital) (Sztompka, 1999; cited in Marks & Zadoroznyj, 2002).

Thus, trust is

evolutionary and requires time and process, and trust culture can therefore be positive
or negative depending on inherited experience. It follows that positive past experiences
with government processes (e.g., competence, unbiased, due process, caring (see
Kasperson, 1986)) are likely to aid the social and political acceptance of current/ future
government processes and their outcomes, and vice versa.

It therefore seems

reasonable to suggest that trust is not only integral to, but also requisite for, public
processes.

Distrust towards the RFA process and the people running it was identified by many
RFA stakeholders, as shown earlier, as the key obstacle to public acceptance of the
process. In reference to stakeholder responses I consider this innate sense of distrust to
be based on three inter-related source problems: (a) the history of the forest conflict, (b)
the perceptions of, or real, unpublic forest management practices of the State's
Department of Conservation and Land Management, and (c) the primacy given to
economic imperatives over social and ecological concerns. All three issues were shown
(also see examples below) to be central in the evolution of the conflict over forests in
Chapter Three and are underpinned here by the interview data.

°For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XI (CD-ROM).
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History:
•

RFA has a long tortured history

•

The conflict here is huge. It permeates all levels of society, and it goes across
industrial and social linkages and so on. The conflict is a great encumbrance to
social and business dealings.

•

That acrimonious debate has included public attacks on scientists, who have
expressed opinions on forest management. This goes back over 20 years.

•

No other environmental issue has caused so much conflict and divisiveness in
the community as the forest issue in Australia's history.

Forest Management and Public Image of CALM:
•

There is a strong history of polarisation between conservation groups and
CALM in WA.

•

There was a sense of concern that CALM were going to take the foreshadowed
process and do the same thing to the process like they had done to a number of
other processes to do with the forests and that was to dominate the government
process in such a way that other scientists, other people that want to be involved,
the public at large, and so on, and certainly the conservation movement, were
excluded from participating. So there was a sense that this would occur.

•

Most state forest management agencies are not trusted by the community, but
WA's had the worst community relations, if you like, of any state in Australia.

Economic Constraints:
•

We have got a resource the government has an interest in and some may say has
a biased interest in as long as we have a resource that motivates the industry in
the manner in which it does and that industry and government are perceived to
have an unhealthy relationship, we are going to have problems.

•

Freeing up the industrialisation of the forests

•

There was just a feeling that it was just favouring the timber industry

As to the history of the forest conflict, the length and intensity of the debate gives an
indication of how great the need was to resolve the forest problematique. As described
in Chapter Three, the introduction of woodchipping and bauxite mining in WA in the
mid-1970s led to vast tracts of forested land to be logged, which periodically sparked
vocal community protests and raised concerns about sustainable forest management and
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the long-term integrity of the State's south-western forests. These concerns continued
to be fuelled throughout the 1980s and 1990s and subsequently could not be alleviated
during the RFA process through a seemingly expert-driven and rational science
approach (I think there was a reasonable amount of scepticism around that science
could provide us with an answer to the forest issue).

On the contrary, the lack of

scientific agreement prior to, and during, the WA RFA (there has been a long history of
acrimonious dispute and debate in the scientific community) and voiced allegations of
political abuse of science indeed heightened community concerns and lessened public
trust in the process (science and scientists were used to validate a political process - and
- involvement of the scientific community was an absolute farce).

As to the Department of Conservation and Land Management, it had been the centre of
a hostile debate since its inception in 1985. The department was accused of a conflict of
interest for it was in charge of both forest conservation and forest production, being
revenue dependent on timber royalties (there was perceived to be a conflict of interest
within CALM) . In addition, the department's forest management practices 61 (e.g., there
was a forest management approach then adopted by CALM which was aimed not only
at taking the forest which grew but actually promoting the rate of growth of forests ...
chopping it up at a faster rate), its public relations (e.g., knowledge is power and we
won't share it), and perceived philosophical position (e.g., we are the professionals, we
know what we are doing) were criticised by members of the public, conservationists,
and scientists. Against this background strong opposition at the onset of the WA RFA
towards CALM's appointment as lead agency in the process does not come as a
surprise.

Just to recapitulate on the nature of this opposition, below is a list of some of the issues
over which controversy arose throughout the RFA process in relation to CALM:

•

CAIM's leading role at the Steering Committee level- (CALM was absolutely and
completely in control of the process - and - CALM definitely dominated the
process there is no doubt about that)

61

E.g., sustainable cut, old growth logging, water catchment management.

132

•

CA.IM being msponsible for the exclusion

ef conservationists from

the Steering Committee: (it

was pretty clear that our representation on the Steering Committee was vetoed by
the WA State government, acting ... on the advice from CALM)

•

CA.IM seemingfy controlling the publication

ef data:

(CALM has a number of databases

that were not made available to us - and - CALM had appeared to want to retain
information to itself, not make it publicly available)

•

CA.IM being the guardian

ef most ef the State's data on fomts-.

<:We have got to the point

where the database was CALM)

•

CA.IM providing most ef scientific expertise during the process: (the Herbarium and CALM
itself received a lion's share in terms of the funding and they also were the lion's
share in terms of involvement of scientists - and - It was all done in-house)

•

CAIM's perceived anti-cooperative and anti-conservation philosopf?y: (The very confident,
the very dismissive nature of CALl\f made it very obvious that we were not going to
be listened to in any genuine way - and - CALM had no intention of letting other
people be involved - and - [CALt\f] have not really been prepared to share power
with the community to have genuine participation)

•

CA.IM being msponsible for data misrepmentation: (scientific criteria that were supposed
to have been used to develop the definity of the resef\'e system for the forest were
completely wroughted and misapplied - and - [CALM] were trying to force the
assumption that this data was adequate - and - figures are fudged and massaged)

In light of the public perceptions outlined above it becomes apparent that the
department's public image was tainted (there was distrust in WA about CALM's
processes), and indeed it is quite remarkable for a forest department such as CALM to
have become a symbol of closed management and forest exploitation. It is remarkable
for it seems ironic in that it was the country's forest departments at the turn of last
century that were at the forefront of forest protection.

The aforementioned is not to suggest in any way that criticisms directed at the
Department of Conservation and Land Management are true and correct. In fact, this is
somewhat immaterial for it is simply the existence of such perceptions that casts doubt
over the acceptability of the process, especially since many stakeholders saw their fears
confirmed throughout the process (the way in which some of the CALM people
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managed themselves in public meetings, all that served to do was to heighten the
distrust).

It is important to acknowledge here that the department has since been restructured
into two discrete departments, one responsible for nature conservation and the other
for commercial forest production accountable to separate Ministers (see 2002). Also,
senior CALM management has since acknowledged that the organisation was out of
step with the community during that whole RFA process. This does not validate the
stakeholder sentiments captured above but it adds weight to the basic argument that the
department's public relations were on perpetual collision course with the public. More
importantly, the recent changes to the structure of CALM may instil some hope that
lessons have been learned from the RFA process.

What I hope to have demonstrated here is that the issue of distrust towards a key player
in the RFA process has been decisive in terms of process acceptability.

The

philosophical trenches between CALM and process participants were seemingly deep,
and to some extent the RFA process actually deepened them, which was shown earlier
in connection with the RFA's impact on future government processes. The question
remains whether under the given RFA format the perceived trust issues could have
effectively been dealt with in a more meaningful way. Certainly, more positive steps
could have been taken towards the establishment of trust, but due to the existence of
this more or less historic and well-entrenched culture of distrust, which was seemingly
mutual, it could be argued that no matter how participative the process design might
have been, the outcome was likely to be similar. This is because trust is the outcome of
a constructive process of trust establishment, which did not occur prior to the
commencement of the RFA (see Chapter Three). Also, trust establishment is a process
which requires time, a commodity the RFA process officially did not have much of. All
in all, it can be seen clearly that without the establishment, or the existence, of trust
process acceptance is difficult to obtain. Yet, as made clear by a senior ministerial
advisor, policies are only as good as [their level of] acceptance, which suggests that
process acceptance is an important dimension of enduring and meaningful
environmental policy-making.
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General Observations'2
Commenting more generally on the consultative nature of the process, the Western
Australian RFA delivered, with a few exceptions, what was foreshadowed in the
National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a) and the WA
Scoping Agreement (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western
Australia, 1996b), both envisaging a process of community involvement based on
consultation and communication. As pointed out earlier on, this appears to be common
government practice, a point attested to by a senior civil servant: ... consultation ... that
could be just simply putting out a report to the public and receiving written
submissions. I mean that's the minimum that would be required to meet the public
consultation guidelines or the term public consultation. Thus, it seems only consistent
that stakeholder input was restricted to a Stakeholder Reference Group, public
meetings, and public comments on the options paper.

In short, active stakeholder

participation would have gone far beyond the prescribed scope of the RFA process and
standard government procedure.

Here, the question arises whether the decision to consult as opposed to enable active
participation was adequate (prudent) given (a) the widespread acknowledgement of the
generally tokenistic (Arnstein, 1969) nature of consultation processes, (b) the proven
benefits of co-operative and participatory processes (e.g. Renn, 1992; Laird, 1993;
Webler, 1995; Moore, 1996), and (c) the stakes in, and the context of, the (Western)
Australian forest debate. The RFA was certainly aiming high. As mentioned in Chapter
Three, the Commonwealth powers regulating woodchip export licenses were to be
transferred to the States, and ecologically sustainable forest management and resource
security for the timber industry were meant to be achieved on the ground while CAR
world-class reserve systems were supposed to be established. These measures were
intended to put to rest an annually recurring political nightmare and settle a nation-wide
conflict that had been going on for more than 25 years (with particular intensity in WA).
Hence, stakeholders might have justifiably been hoping to play a more active role during
the WA RFA. This point also relates to the issue of stakeholder expectations, as raised
in Chapter Four, where the various stakeholders were shown to have interpreted the
National Forest Policy Statement and the outlined aims of the proposed RFA process
quite differently.
62
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Differences between expectations on the process and process reality were also
recognised by SRG members. SRG members were provided with quite specific terms
of reference of the [group] (see Table 5.3), and SRG members might have therefore
been justified in thinking that [they] would have input.

Table 5.3 Stakeholder Reference Group Terms of Reference
The SRG will provide advice to the Steering Committee in its discussions and decisions on
management of the RFA process. In undertaking this function, the SRG will:

•

provide consolidated advice to the Steering Committee on issues relating to the strategic
management of the Comprehensive Regional Assessment (CRA)/RFA process in the southwest forested region of Western Australia (WA).

•

provide the Steering Committee with a regular brief on stakeholder interests, issues, and
concerns.

•

provide comments on items listed for discussion on the Steering Committee's agenda, in
particular any agenda papers circulated.

•

provide a forum for discussing and coordinating a response to key decision papers produced
as part of the CRA process.

•

provide a forum for participating in the process of developing RFA options for Government's
consideration.

•

seek information, advice and clarification of key issues from the Steering Committee.

•

provide a forum through which stakeholders' input on key assessment projects can be
provided directly to the Steering Committee.

•

provide a conduit through which information about progress in the CRA process can be
regularly provided to stakeholders.

•

assist the Steering Committee to design and implement effective mechanisms for seeking
public input, including by preparing contributions to the newsletter, providing advice on
potential participants in technical workshops.

The terms of reference referred to here were distributed at the onset of the RFA
process, spelling out the role and function of the SRG. In particular, the terms stipulate
a close working relationship between the SRG and the Steering Committee and an
intimate involvement of the SRG with the RFA process. However, SRG members'
perceptions of the character of their involvement in the RFA do not match their role as
envisaged by the SRG's terms of reference. This is because a far greater participative
role was being promised and expected than was perceived to have been allowed for by
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process management. The perceived failure to deliver on the terms of reference and to
meet SRG members' expectations serves as an explanation for the expressions of anger
and frustration by SRG members with the RFA process.

At this point it seems appropriate also to look at the issue of success and failure, which I
was previously reluctant to comment on. My reluctance was based on the perceived
need to address the underlying issues first that shaped the dynamics of the RFA process.
I am still hesitant to comment on the overall effectiveness of the RFA process as further
aspects of the process still ought to be considered, and certainly more questions about
outcomes, time, etc. would need to enter the equation. Yet, I would like to draw the
following conclusions relating to the issue of public participation.

Buchy et al. (1999) assert that "it is impossible to answer categorically whether
participation is successful or not as this judgement depends on the definition of
'success' and is very much linked to the purpose of participation in the first place"
(p.16).

The point here is that the WA RFA was seemingly lacking precisely that

definitional clarity. Based on observations made previously relating to stakeholders'
expectations on the process (see Chapter Four) and stakeholders' perceptions of the
their process reality it stands to reason that the WA RFA was lacking what Moore
(1996) calls a shared understanding

ef success

and that the evaluation of success was not

negotiated between process managers and stakeholders. The SRG example above may
attest to this point or, indeed, represent a breach of agreed terms by process managers.
Either way, it appears that RFA process management saw an instrumental role for
process participants while RFA stakeholders seemed to aspire to play an integral part in
what they perceived to be a transformative process, meaning an avenue to accomplish
their particular ends (based on Moore, 1996) founded on what they thought the process
would deliver.

Such transformative powers, however, were vested with process

managers and political decision makers. In that regard one can speak of process failure
as process success per se was not only poorly defined, but also the definition of success
neither shared nor sufficiently communicated which is exemplified by statements such
as: the majority of the public wanted something significantly different to that set out by
the RFAs to achieve. This indicates that the objectives of the RFA against which its
success can be measured were not widely understood or shared. The RFA process
mirrored these misperceptions, and, when seen in this light, only served to aggravate
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already existing tensions between process management and the various stakeholder
groups, which this chapter has amply documented.

The notion of failure also raises questions as to how the WA RFA process could have
been improved or more generally what an ideal process would have looked like. In what
follows, I shall describe what RFA stakeholders considered to be the ingredients of an
ideal government process.

Stakeholder Perceptions ofan Ideal Process63
Research participants were asked to elaborate on their perceptions of an ideal
government process based on both their WA RFA experience and experiences with past
government processes.

From the stakeholder responses seven process principles

emerged which are listed below.

These benchmarks can been seen as aspirational

principles for participatory processes but neither as absolute nor as representative of a
social consensus.

•

Involvement of All Stakeholders
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

•

Trust and Relationship Building
o
o
o
o
o
o

•

All stakeholders involved
All people with a finger in the pie should come together
You have got to ha,·e everyone involved on the ground level
Participation of all the stakeholders
All stakeholders come together
All have to be involved at the ground level
You don't kick off a process until you got the right people sitting
around the table
[Eliminate] stakeholder dominance

Believable, acceptable, and tell the truth
Active attempt to build consensus
Establish basis of truth and confidence
Genuine desire to resolve the conflict
Gain public trust
Genuine, transparent, credible, participatory process

Stakeholder Input Into Problem Specification and Decision-Making
o

63

Community participates in defining the problem and setting the
goals
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o
o
o
o

•

Restructure the decision making process so that key groups are
involved at the steering level
Helping communities design their long-term future together
Community determines what the problem is and sets the goals
If an asset is owned by the community, then its disposal should be
dependent on community support

Equal Access to Information
o
o
o
o
o
o

•

Scientific Integrity
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

•

True database
Diversity of scientific opinion
Data are gathered by people that can be trusted
Make decisions on merit
Ask for scientific input to phrase a research question in the first
place
Involving the science community more directly and explicitly
Acknowledge the existence of all the relevant [views]
Clearly independent environmental authority

Independent Process Facilitation
o
o
o
o
o

•

All information on the table
Equal access to information
Information and everything should be made available, everything
Level playing field
Data are made totally and fully available
Level playing field

Independent facilitators
Genuinely independent facilitator
Get independent facilitators
People who run this have to be independent people who can be
trusted
Completely independent, highly professional facilitator

Unconstrained, Open Process
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

You are not going to get the best environmental outcomes if you
are worrying about the economic bottom line first-up
Willingness to change
Slow process
Genuinely open
Better to have done it over a longer period
Balance of proof should shift from conservationists to developers
Not being rushed

In expounding these categories, trust and relationship building refers to stakeholder
participation in good faith and gives expression to the desire for honest and genuine
stakeholder interactions. Scientific integriry implies a desire for scientific independence,
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allowing for the inclusion of a plurality of scientific viewpoints and the enabling of
decision-making processes based on the merit of scientific arguments.

Finally,

unconstrained, open process suggests that process design and outcomes should not be
predetermined or externally controlled, allowing for the possibility of transformational
change. The term unconstrained also includes the timeframe of processes, suggesting that
they should not be unduly restricted by time.

It is important to note that no hard lines can be drawn between these principles. The
lines are fluid for all principles are interrelated and mutually affecting one another.
Consequently, the order in which these principles are presented does not imply a
hierarchy or signify degrees of importance.

Furthermore, all seven principles are

contextual and need to be seen as experiential products. They are an amalgam of (a)
stakeholders' expectations on the process, (b) their perceived RFA process reality, and
(c) other related past experiences. In WA there has been a legacy of community disquiet
about, and resulting cynicism towards, public processes, especially as it relates to
forestry.

In turn, this perhaps meant that participants were anxious, probably also

because of the nationally unprecedented format of the RFA and accompanying rhetoric,
to play a meaningful role in a process that was to determine the nature of forest
management and conservation for the next 20 years. Conservation groups, for instance,
particularly stressed the importance of having access to information and independent
process management, representing two of their major grievances with the RFA process
and also being reflective of their experiences had in dealings with CALM in the past. In
contrast, SRG members emphasised the issue of credibility and honesty, relating back to
their terms of reference and their desire to be taken seriously in the process. Members
of the government group predominantly raised issues relating to process acceptance,
attaching importance to credibility, trust, and consensus building, which is something
process management arguably failed to attain.

Scientists held strong views in relation to the dominance of individual process
stakeholders and stressed the desirability of involving plural perspectives in decisionmaking processes (the reasons for this will become more evident in Chapter Six).
Members of the timber industry were primarily focused on the issue of balance,
stressing that their concerns should have received treatment equal to those raised by
conservationists (There would need to be a commitment by the government to social
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and economic outcomes as well as conservation outcomes - and - There would need to
be resources applied that were equal; people, personnel, studies etc. that were equal to
the amount of resources that went into the assessment of environmental needs).
Although these recommendations were not included in the selection of statements
underpinning the above process principles, they are reflected in, or implied by,
expressions such as level playing field and the categories involvement ef all stakeholders, equal

access to information, and unconstrained, open process, which suggest the equal treatment of all
participating stakeholders.

Common to the responses from industry members, scientists, SRG members, and
conservation groups was the focus on what Moore (1996) calls interest-oriented success.
This is a two-dimensional measure of success, which, in terms of process, looks at the
involvement of interest groups and, in terms of outcome, at the protection of segmental
interests. This means that all interested parties should not only actively participate in
the process but also have their interests acknowledged and protected (at least partially).
The responses from the members of these four groups suggest that their interests/views
were poorly reflected in the process and/ or the final process outcomes. The views
expressed by RFA stakeholders are case-specific for they are - albeit influenced by past
experiences - related to experiences had during the RFA process. In other words, the
process principles derived in this study need to be understood as a product of the WA
RFA. Thus the question arises as to how emblematic RFA stakeholder experiences are
of those had by stakeholders in other natural resource conflicts.

To answer this

question I would like to direct attention to a selection of better practice process
principles derived from other studies, hoping to get an indication of how comparable
stakeholder experiences might be.

Table 5.3 allows for the comparison between the RFA stakeholder-defined process
principles and those determined by stakeholders in the studies of Tuler and Webler
(1999) and McCool and Guthrie (2001) whose work focuses on stakeholder perceptions
of participatory processes in natural resource conflicts. What becomes apparent in this
comparison is that the results from similar research in the field are broadly mirrored by
the data derived from this study, as one can identify considerable overlap in terms of
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what stakeholders saw as the foundations of good, ideal or successful public processes.64
For instance, there is considerable overlap between the process principles relating to
process accessibility by stakeholders, relationship building, and the accessibility of
information. This may suggest that a violation of these process principles could be
common in natural resource conflicts and that stakeholder experiences generally had in
resource conflict situations may be quite similar and comparable.

Table 5.3: Comparison of Stakeholder-Defined Process Principles
RFA Stakeholder Defined
Process Principles

Involvement of all
stakeholders
Stakeholder input into
problem specification and
decision-making
Trust and relationship building

Categories of Normative
Principles
(adopted from Tuler &
Webler, 1999, p.442)

Access to process

Proce88 Dimensions of
Succe88ful Participation in
Me88y Natural Resource
Situations
(adopted from McCool &
Guthrie, 2001. p.314)
Interest representation

Power to influence process and
outcomes

Responsibility

Relationship building

Equal access to information

Structural characteristics to
promote constructive
interactions
Access to information

Scientific integrity

Adequate analysis

Independent process
facilitation

Facilitation of constructive
personal behaviours

Unconstrained, open process

Enabling of social conditions
necessary for future processes

Leaming

Participatory processes are processes of collective learning based on the collective
construction and dissemination of knowledge, and the process principles derived from
this and other studies may therefore be seen as safeguards for this learning,
construction, and dissemination of knowledge to occur. Strict adherence to any better
practice guidelines may not guarantee success (Syme, 1992; Buchy & Race, 2001). This
is because processes themselves are interpretive and fluid but not absolute, which means
that a belief in the absoluteness of better practice principles would be misguided. Yet,
failure to structure government processes around guidelines such as these is likely to
increase the chance of process/ outcome rejection. Selective compliance with guidelines

64

The stakeholder-defined principles derived from thls study also share similarities with research

undertaken by Creighton et al. (1983), Fischer (1985), Renn (1992), Forester (1993) Fiorino (1990), and
the National Research Council (1996).

142

by process managers is equally likely to yield counterproductive results due to the interrelated nature of such guidelines. In that sense, the violation of one principle may
constitute a breach of other, in some cases all, principles, again increasing the likelihood
of process rejection by participants.

For example, WA RFA stakeholder responses indicate that an ostensibly closed process
was adopted by process management, which arguably due to exclusion led to narrow
and incomplete problem specifications, prevented access to information, compromised
the scientific credibility of the process (this issue will be expanded on further in Chapter
Six), and restricted access to the decision-making process. This meant that the process
was not trusted by a large number of process stakeholders whose trust, because of the
history-laden nature of the conflict and the resulting uncertainties and anxieties, was
crucial to obtain.

Consequently, the process ignored negative public feedback and

delivered an outcome that missed the mark of social and political acceptability.

The literature cited at the beginning of this chapter is congested with examples of
process failure. Government processes fail for a number of reasons, and their failure is
usually the result of structural, procedural or systemic constraints at work inside and
outside those processes. Arguably, this is why RFA stakeholders expressed a desire for
government processes to be unrestricted and free from constraints. Then again, it can
be argued that this is an ideal rather than a realistic expectation as the existence of
process constraints is a political and economic reality and as put by one scientist of the
RFA part of the human condition. Nevertheless, it is valid to examine the legitimacy of
certain constraints placed on government processes, and it is this issue that I would like
to turn to in the remainder of this chapter.

Process Constraints6 5
One constraint commonly cited in connection with government processes is time (see
for instance Buchy et al., 1999), and it was time that was considered by RFA
stakeholders to have been an impediment to the overall process. Time constraints exist
as processes cannot last forever, and often neither politicians nor society have the time
or the energy to wait for processes to come to a natural end. In fact, long drawn-out
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For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XIII (CD-ROM).
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processes can be counterproductive (Buchy et al., 1999). Nonetheless, time constraints
ought not to be used to justify unnecessary haste and pressure as was perceived to be
the case during the WA RFA. Here, not only the timeframe for the RFA, which initially
was only meant to be one year (e.g., It was meant to be basically done in a year from
1996 to 1997), was considered inadequate (e.g., It was never planned for the whole
process to take three years ... but in the end it did. They kept setting stupid deadlines
that they could not meet because they wanted to get it off their agenda) but also the
amount of time allocated for the conducting of the CRA projects for the WA RFA was
contentious (e.g., all of this time we were being told hurry, hurry, hurry - and - [our
work] had to be done quickly because that was the dictate - and - That was a huge
problem with the RFA in that unrealistic time lines were set for most of the research
projects and then the research projects, the reports would sit and gather dust for nine or
twelve month; and there was no need for a rush at al). Generally, one would expect a
government process supposedly based on science - science, as will be shown in Chapter
Six, was considered to be the backbone of the WA RFA - to allow for the time required
by science to follow its processes in order not to compromise the basis of the process.

It could be countered that if you have a policy process which is entirely science driven,
[this] means that you never ever get a solution because you will be waiting forever for
the answer because there is always something else that needs to be done. Certainly,
society cannot wait for unambiguous answers to be produced by science before any
political action can be taken. In any case, it is questionable whether science is in a
position to deliver that degree of certainty. However, credible government processes
can only rely on a science that is itself credible, and thus the political process would
need to accommodate a scientific process to an extent that any doubts about the
integrity of the scientific process can be removed. These and other aspects relating to
science and the science of the WA RFA will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six.

The second constraint I wish to consider here is that of ecologically sustainable
development. This issue arises, somewhat paradoxically, for some research participants
suggested that environmental policy processes should operate under sustainability
principles (I think the first thing would be to focus on ecological sustainability and make
that the clear outcome), implying that sustainability maxims should be employed as an
umbrella constraint for political decision-making processes.
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Of particular interest in this context is a statement made by a Western Australian
parliamentarian, who commented on a hypothetical roundtable discussion on the issue
of old growth forest logging:

At the end of the day, government would . . . have to
make a political decision about whether or not they
accept what came through that roundtable, and my
personal view is that if what came from that roundtable
was not to stop logging in old growth forests, then
government should override it to say: you had your say,
you had your input but we are going to stop logging in
old growth forest.
Leaving aside the ecological and ethical arguments for or against the logging of old
growth forests, the question here is whether it is legitimate for governments, assuming
good faith, to intervene and to override widely supported decisions made on resource
use and management so as to uphold sustainability principles. Also, how suitable a
policy guide are sustainability principles?

For sustainability to be a workable umbrella constraint the concept would need to be
defined in detail and decision rules would need to be established to provide needed
guidance in situations of uncertainty. If consensus could be reached on the issue of an
ESD-constraint for public processes, the decision for its application would then be
consistent with notions of democratic decision making. Yet, it would be problematic
could such a consensus not be attained.

When considering the progress made

internationally towards ESD since the Earth Summit a decade ago, one might conclude
that indeed a consensus has not yet been reached (see for instance Lafferty &
Meadowcroft, 2000; O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002b). This was exemplified also
by recent events at the last World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002, which did not bring
about international agreement on the direction sustainable development should take
globally (greenhouse gas emissions featuring prominently in the debate).

The literature on sustainability attests to the fact that the definitional aspects
surrounding the concept are proving difficult (Barbier, 1987; Lele, 1991; Steer & WadeGery, 1993; Milbrath, 1994; Basagio, 1995; Dobson, 1996; McManus, 1996). As
suggested by Y earley (1996), there is no uncontested, universal discourse of
sustainability. The resulting ambiguity may therefore render this development model
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somewhat unsuitable as a yardstick for policy direction. While Costanza, Low, Ostrom,
and Wilson (2001) view criticisms directed against the workability of the concept of
sustainability as misguided and ignorant of the real problem, which they consider to lie
in prediction rather than definition, others tend to concur that sustainability harbours
operational problems due to interpretive ambiguity. For instance, in the analysis of the
work done by Pearce (1988) and Solow (1992) in view of the implementability of
sustainable policy prescriptions Kennedy (1994), too, found sustainability to be an
inappropriate guiding principle for the design of policy in a democratic setting. He
argues that the use of sustainability principles leads to planning problems in that policy
implementation is dependent on a matching egalitarian ethic by voters, which cannot be
assumed. Sustainability criteria would therefore need to be positive in character, and an
overriding by governments of democratically arrived decisions as a means of upholding
sustainability principles is thus problematic because a mandate to do so from the
societies they govern is, especially within today's neo-liberal climate, rather unlikely.
While numerous techniques and approaches (e.g., safe minimum standards, adaptive
management, risk assessments (for an overview see Dovers et al., 2001)) have been
developed over recent years to provide decision support for dealing with uncertainty in
the environmental policy arena and attempts have been made to operationalise
sustainability (Daly, 1990; Solow, 1992; Lafferty & Meadowcroft, 2000), it seems that
the concept per se "can provide only limited guidance for the design of implementable
policy in a democracy of heterogeneous individuals" (Kennedy, 1994, p.7). In fact, it
could be argued that sustainability criteria can only be effective process constraints
when public policy processes designed to deliver movement towards sustainability are
able to match the magnitude of the ecological problems they are meant to be addressing,
which is not likely until political decision makers can actually draw on public support
for, and a societal willingness to accept, policy process outcomes in the face of socioeconomic trade-offs.

What that means for the design of political decision-making

processes and the needed institutional arrangements I shall address as part of a wider
discussion in Chapter Seven.

In the absence of a political, social, or scientific consensus on the nature of sustainability
the wide use of the term is more than puzzling. It seems reasonable to suggest that we
ought to know what the concept of sustainability entails, what decision criteria to use,
and the nature of the trade-offs involved since references to sustainability can be found
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m over 120 Australian law documents (Davers et al., 2001), providing a sense of
agreement on the nature of the concept. Whilst it is encouraging to see, on the one
hand, that sustainability has penetrated the political and legislative realms in Australia,
this could also be interpreted, on the other hand, as prima facie evidence for political
tokenism. As mentioned earlier, much of Australia's environmental legislation has been
tightened in recent years, effectively minimising the public's ability to partake in, or
object to, environmental planning.

Genuine public participation, however, as was

illustrated earlier, is a pillar of sustainability, suggesting that Australian environmental
policies run counter to the spirit of the sustainability paradigm.

The absence of an unequivocal political mandate for the implementation of
sustainability targets might also strengthen politicians' faith in the moral incontinence
(akrasia) of the people they govern, meaning that people might be expected by their
governments to "act contrary to both what [they] know and desire" (Brennan, 1992,
p.2). Some research participants saw cases of moral incontinence to have been exposed
during the WA RFA as people, philosophically opposed to old growth forest logging,
were found to buy native hardwoods for private purposes, which in the absence of any
timber certification scheme in WA could have easily stemmed from old growth forests
(There is nothing wrong with usingJarrah in a house but do you see what I mean? You
might just only be talking about people in polls, we are talking about people who were
campaigning against us who are big users of our product). Also, interview data suggest
that timber sales of the WA's largest timber company, which conservation groups
organised large boycott campaigns against during the RFA, were not affected by the
boycott (We have never experienced any buyer resistance, and the builders we supply
have never experienced any buyer resistance to the timber that goes into the houses. If
that sentiment was to be really genuine and people wanted to go and do something
about it, I assume they would go to their builders and say so). Without assuming the
moral high ground on the issue of old growth forest logging and timber acquisition,
these examples illustrate that there can be a discrepancy between how citizens view the
environment ethically as opposed to how consumers relate to the environment
rationally.

This discrepancy is prone to exploitation by any short-term focused

government and may translate into hollow, pro-environmental rhetoric matched by little
political will and inaction. This discrepancy also attests to the existence of a subtle, yet
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powerful, process constraint which is systemic in nature and which I will broadly refer
to as economic rationality.

In earlier parts of this chapter I referred to the prevalence of economic rationality within
the mindsets of governments and their administrative bodies.

Also, economic

constraints were cited earlier on as one of three inter-related source problems related to
the existence of public distrust of forestry in WA. Indeed, much of the interview data
revealed a widespread concern about the commercialisation and commodification of
forest resources as well as a resentment towards the perceived protection of timber
industry interests during the WA RFA (it was just favouring the timber industry - and anyone who did not agree with the continued, widespread logging, woodchipping, and
clearfelling of old growth forest was marginalised throughout the whole process - and It seemed to exclusively look at the needs of the timber industry - and - It's quite clear
that forestry on public land is clearly being to benefit industry primarily and the
community very much secondarily). Many RFA stakeholders stated their discontent
with what they perceived as economic limitations imposed on the forest use and
reservation options made available for public discussion during the RFA process. Yet,
hardly any reference was made by research participants pertaining to the desirability of
removing overriding economic constraints from government processes, although the
dominance of economic rationality in debates about environmental management and
protection featured strongly on stakeholders' lists of complaints. The absence of any
specific stakeholder recommendations relating to the dominance of economic rationality
comes as a surprise. The silence could suggest stakeholder acceptance of, ignorance
about, lack of awareness of, or helplessness in connection with, such an economic
reality.

The case study data provides ample evidence of economic constraints at work during
the WA RFA. Yet, it is difficult to measure the extent to which economic rationality
may have constrained the WA RFA process and it outcomes.

A more complete

understanding of the forces at work during the RFA process will have been gained, once
the science of the RFA and the economic influences on science have been explored in
Chapter Six. There, the degree to which science was perceived by RFA stakeholders to
have been affected by economic rationality will be explored, and I will look at the
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question as to which kind of science proved to be the most influential in determining
the outcomes of the WA RFA.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to investigate stakeholders' perceptions of the inclusiveness and
participatory nature of the Western Australian RFA process. The overall impression
gained was that many RFA process participants rated the process poorly when gauged
by Tuler and Webler's (1999) process principles. Further analysis led to the suggestion
that the process, in relation to its participatory nature, has failed to meet the mark of
social and political acceptability and was found to have contradicted - at least in part the accompanying rhetoric by process management.

A case could also be made for the importance of understanding the contextual richness
surrounding public process, and it was shown that the Western Australian RFA in
particular was well endowed in terms of contextual complexity, especially in relation to
trust, which proved to be decisive in terms of process acceptance.

A set of stakeholder-defined process principles was derived from the interview data,
which were considered to be reflective of the stakeholder experiences had during the
RFA process.

These principles were also shown to share similarities with process

criteria derived from other studies on resource conflicts.

In this chapter I hinted at the significance of the role of science in the WA RFA
process. The interview data presented here revealed that science was considered integral
to the workings of the process but perceived to have been highly contentious. I have
deliberately not expanded on the science aspects raised earlier for I decided to dedicate
an entire chapter to this subject given its centrality in natural resource settings and
debates surrounding sustainability. In the following chapter I will therefore look more
closely at the science-related issues explored in this chapter and substantially add to the
list of factors that have affected the RFA process and its outcomes. The information
gathered will then be synthesised with that educed from the preceding chapters in
Chapter Seven.
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Chapter Six
Science and the Science of Western Australian RFA
Introduction
In previous chapters I drew attention to the pivotal, but also contested, role of science
and scientists during the WA RFA process. Critics voiced concerns about the political
use of science in the process, the rigour of data collection, data analyses, and resultant
recommendations.

These concerns were raised by the scientists themselves and by

members of the wider RFA stakeholder community. Thus, a closer examination of the
involvement of scientists in the RFA is warranted, particularly since all Australian RFAs
were hailed as "agreements backed by science, science and more science"
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2000b, p.9).

Indeed, RFAs were promoted as having

been based on the most detailed and comprehensive scientific assessments ever made in
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1997),
and science was said to have formed the basis for sound decision making on commercial
forest use and conservation (Hill et al., 1997; Forests Taskforce, 1998). In light of the
claims made for science in the RF A process, I will present in this chapter a multistakeholder account of the science of the WA RFA, detailing RFA stakeholders'
perceptions of the scientific nature of the process and its scientific credibility.

An investigation such as this also raises more general questions as to the function(s) of
science and scientists within democratic systems at large and, more specifically,
deliberative and participative processes designed to solve land and water use disputes.
Work on science and democracy has become increasingly topical in recent years in light
of a growing resentment of expert-driven processes (Yankelovich, 1991) and mounting
antagonism towards the perceived marginalisation of the general public by the
dictatorship of scientific and political elites (Waller, 1995). Therefore, the subsequent
analysis of the scientific nature of the Western Australian RFA process is produced
against the background of a discussion on science, democracy, and scientists'
responsibilities in the sustainability context.

This chapter will also draw on the findings of a related research project by Bigler Cole
(1998), whose work focused on the perceptions of science in the WA RF A process with
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an emphasis on the nature of science itself. Her findings will be compared with those
derived from this study to identify potential overlaps and/ or contradictions. The issues
arising out of this chapter will then be explored further as part of a broader synthesis in
Chapter Seven.

Views on Science

'Jcience is the beliefin the ignorance of experts"
(Richard Feynman quoted in Root-Bernstein, 1999)

Science, possibly counter to popular belief, can be seen as an ever-changing constant
since the dawn of modernity.

What I mean by this oxymoron is that there is no

universal conception of science and that definitions and perceptions of science have
changed over time (Riggs, 1992), whereas the centrality of science and expertdom to the
human endeavour of fact finding and truth seeking in modern society has not. It is this
intimate connection between science, knowledge, and truth that has allowed science and
scientists to attain a pre-eminent societal status and to play a central role within
democratic processes. Yet, science's claims to truth, once perceived to be absolute,
have become far more relativistic over the last 150 years. In other words, the notion of

truth's autonomy (after Aronowitz, 1988) has come under attack and thus science has as
well. The underlying reasons for this are explored in the following sections.

Modern science is commonly said to have its beginning around the time of Galileo in
the early years of the seventeenth century after more than a millennium of intellectual
stagnation in Europe following the Greco-Roman antiquity. 66 It was then that the work
of Brahe, Copernicus, Galileo, Keppler, and others gave birth to what is known today as
the Scientific Revolution.

Science subsequently evolved and informed humanity's

understanding of natural phenomena and helped reveal regular patterns amidst nature's
chaos.
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Briefly, it ought to be noted that this eurocentric perception of the birth of science is ignorant towards

the scientific achievements in China, India, Byzantium, and the Muslim world throughout the Middle
Ages. A discussion of the hegemony of western science, however, would go far beyond the scope of this
thesis.
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Reviews of the rise and history of science (such as Chalmers, 1982; Riggs, 1992; Dunbar,
1995) document the changing understandings of science, generally starting with the
Baconian codification of scientific methods and the commodification of science,
followed by science's claims to universalism through contributions by Descartes and
Newton, then turning to the perceived schism between science and philosophy brought
about by Hegei and more recently presenting challenging twentieth century conceptions
of science such as Popper's falsificationism and Kuhn's introduction of paradigmatic
revolutions.

The works in the field attest to the fact that science, its methods, its

sociological and its philosophical underpinnings have been debated intensely. Today,
interested readers are presented with a plethora of discussions on induction versus
deduction, rationalism versus relativism, scientific anarchy, objectivism, truth, the
politics of science, and various other discourses on ontology, heuristics, and
epistemology by a wide range of contributors (e.g. Kuhn, 1962; Scheffler, 1967; Davies,
1968; Popper, 1968; Colodny, 1970; Bloor, 1971; Habermas, 1971; Ravetz, 1971;
Foucault, 1972; Dixon, 1973; Merton, 1973; Suppe, 1977; Chalmers, 1982; Collins, 1982;
Barnes, 1985; Aronowitz, 1988; Klemke et al., 1988; Fuller, 1989; Riggs, 1992; Collins &
Pinch, 1993; Fuller, 1993).

This thesis does not intend to add to these theoretical and philosophical debates on
science for they are well documented elsewhere. 67 Perhaps, as noted by Ziman (1988), it
may not even matter practically, and perhaps be quite healthy, not to know what science
really is and thus to accept, and live with, this philosophical enigma. 68 Instead, I would
like to draw attention to the observation that these esoteric debates about what science
is, or is not, chiefly involve experts rather than laypeople and perhaps therefore give the
impression of being somewhat removed from the public.

Paradoxically, public

perceptions are what shape and define the dominant conception of what science is and
what it stands for. As Ravetz (1971, p.12) points out, "science depends on the general
public for its support", and thus "the public understanding of science is crucial ... for
the continued health of the community of science." It might be immaterial, therefore,
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I acknowledge, however, that some debate on the nature of science seems inescapable, and I shall

return to this matter at a later stage.
68

On this point, Ziman uses the example of the average churchgoer who would generally refrain from

pondering the deeper theological and metaphysical aspects of his/her faith and indeed reject such inquiry.
The question remains, however, whether scientists can afford such blissful ignorance.
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whether experts consider sctence and its methods to be best characterised by
conventionalism (e.g. Duhem, 1962), inductivism (e.g. Reichenbach, 1938), deductivism
(e.g. Popper, 1968), golem (see Collins & Pinch, 1993) or indeed Dada (see Feyerabend,
1975) since science's public image and perceived essence is defined outside the expert
realm.

Public perceptions of, and attitudes towards, science have changed considerably over
the last 100 years. Traditional perceptions of science are described in the literature in
terms of a so-called standard view of science (see for instance Scheffler, 1967). This
standard view, also coined inductivism, although not in the Baconian sense (Riggs,
1992), portrays science and its methods as the one best way of discovering and learning
about the laws of nature. A view such as this perceives science as a vehicle for the
discovery of truths about the external world via impartial observation, experimentation
or logical reasoning. The work by unbiased and value-free specialists is thus rendered
factual, objective, and correct (Bijker, 1995). Unsurprisingly, this essentially positive
view positioned science and scientists in the centre of public life as the principal
problem-solving authority (Cotgrove, 1982; Milbrath, 1989).

Indeed, science has

become a much traded commodity today within the media, commerce, and politics
Oasanoff, 1986; Salter, 1988).

Although there is a widespread admiration for, and acceptance of, the wonders of
science (Ravetz, 1971 ), there is an incongruence between what scientists and the public
perceive as objectivity. Inductivism seems to confuse, or indeed replace, what scientists
would regard as the ideal of objectivity in science (Scheffler, 1967) with the myth of
objective science. Certainly, science attempts to "transcend the social and economic
background, to overcome the weight of prejudice, of custom and example, and to
formulate statements that in some way or another capture how the world is" Garvie,
2001, p.560).

And science is considered credible and is respected because of its

methodical nature, rigorous protocols, in-built checks and balances such as peer review
and all the other hallmarks of scientific research. Objectivity, however, as would readily
be accepted by most scientists, is a philosophical maxim, which the scientific protocol
aims to maintain but cannot guarantee. Still, the perception of an objective or quasiinfallible science exists, and this perception is underpinned by science itself. Snow
(1964) argues that the shallow optimism ostensibly exuded by (in particular hard)
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science is fuelling and perpetuating this myth of objectivity. Hard sciences with their
highly codified and quantitative work, as argued by Deetz (1996), are often privileged to
receive the objective label and are therefore favoured in public and political life. Soft
sciences, or interpretivists in general (after Morgan, 1986), are given the subjective label
for the more qualitative nature of their work, which deals with interpretations of an
interpreted world (Giddens, 1984), and are therefore considered less credible and
reliable in the eyes of the public (Deetz, 1996). In fact, it seems as if openly stated
assumptions and values raise greater suspicion than the same assumptions and values
hidden behind methodology and numbers.

Still, leaving this subjective-objective

dualism aside, the perception of objectivity provides relative certainty, and it is this
notion of scientific certainty that has given rise to scientific determinism. This in turn
has allowed science to attain a prominent social status and to become a symbol of
progress and human welfare for it attempts to overcome limits and to further improve
the human condition (Paehlke, 1989). So, within inductivism, science is not only seen as
humanity's provider and guardian of knowledge and truths but also as one of the driving
forces behind social and economic advancement.

It is therefore not surprising, perhaps, that the twentieth century has witnessed an ever
growing reliance on science by a society, which has been willing to invest considerable
public trust in the expert system (see Giddens, 1990). In part, this trend is seen as the
result of the growing complexity of modern, technology-driven, life (Cotgrove, 1982),
the establishment of relative autonomy for the scientific profession (Yearley, 1994), and
the perceived inability of laypeople to make informed decisions in the light of today's
complexities (Ophuls & Boyan, 1992); thus, the concomitant need and push for
scientific competency in decision-making processes on policy, governance, and control
(see Postman, 1992). However, over the last 60 years the hegemonic social status and
position of power held by science and scientists has come under threat, as is recognised
in new discourses about changes in the public perceptions, and understanding, of
science (for reviews on changes in the public understanding of science refer to Wynne,
1991; Yearley, 1994; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Felt, 2000). Nowadays, many references can
be found to tensions which are considered to exist between science and the general
public.

In this context, a growing lack of public trust in science and a rise in the

perception of the irrelevance and untrustworthiness of science (see Wynne, 1995) have
become accepted notions. These tensions, as argued by Matthews, Young, and Elliott
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(2002), are a hallmark of late modern society. In fact, Giddens (1990) and Beck (1986)
attribute these to the process of reflexivity and perceive them as both cause and effect
of risk societies in general. In other words, the dissipation of public trust in traditional
institutions, including scientific institutions, is considered more or less natural and to be
a characteristic of post-modernity.

Reasons behind the dwindling public faith in the customarily accepted authority of
science are manifold. Of particular interest to this study, however, is how environmental
changes impacted on public perceptions of science.

Certainly since the Manhattan

Project in the early 1940s there has been a growing public awareness of the less than
benign (political and commercial) applications of science, their consequences, and their
associated risks. This awareness was heightened further by published scientific work on
the environmental depredation caused by industrial life (see Carson, 1962) and the
1970s' postulations of impending doom in the context of unconstrained population, and
economic, expansion (e.g. Ehrlich, 1970; Meadows et al., 1972; Mesarovic & Pestel,
197 4).

Publications such as these provided the scientific backbone for modern

environmentalism69 and marked the arrival of a new counter-science, a science of limits 70
(after Paehlke, 1989), blurring the boundaries between science and environmental/ social
advocacy and deepening the aforementioned trenches between so-called soft and hard
sciences; the latter being more closely linked to the political and economic status quo.

In the ensuing years, well publicised environmental disasters such as Love Canal, Three
Mile Island, Chernobyl, climate change - or more locally, salinity in many parts of
Australia - gave an increasingly alarmed public a sense of science, or certain spheres
within science, "[being] at the heart of many environmental disruptions" (Paehlke, 1989,
p.116), implying science to be (part of) the problem and yet also the solution.

Predictably, this tainted image of science has triggered a growing distrust of science and
technology (a product of science) manifested in public resentment of expert control and
power over fateful political and social decisions Oasanoff, 1996), a trend which of
course has not been without its political implications.

Foucault (1982) gives an

understanding of the reasons for the rise of science in modern societies. His concept of

69

The term modern is used here to acknowledge that environmentalism per se is not a social phenomenon

of the twenty-first century (see Grove, 1995).

°For Paehlke (1989), environmental science represents this counter-science.
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governmentality, as was shown by Darier (1996), serves as a good explanatory tool for
the rise of knowledge as a means of exercising political influence on the basis that
knowledge constitutes power. Knowledge was seen by Foucault to serve as a more
gentle substitute in modem society for the coercive, and often physical, exercise of
power of autocratic forms of government.

Those in possession of knowledge can

exercise control over those who do not, which means that power is relational,
potentially transient as knowledge changes, and access to it a matter of strategy.
Scientific knowledge, therefore, potentially allows scientists and those in possession of it
to influence public affairs and indeed create a culture of technical control (Yankelovich,
1991). I purposefully use the term potential!J in that it requires the deliberate use of the
cognitive powers offered by science to achieve ends such as political legitimacy, social
acceptance, and/ or economic gain.

Furthermore, the degree of control exerted by

individual scientists obviously differs, and there are also certain limits to that control due
to constraints imposed by the heterogeneity of the scientific community, its
organisational allegiances, and many other aspects that are discussed in detail elsewhere
(Ravetz, 1971; Dietz & Rycroft, 1987; Lester, 1989; Stehr & Ericson, 1992). The point I
am making here is that experts' cognitive powers are a political tool available to those
who wish to underpin their own cause, in a sense taking advantage of the widespread
reverence for scientific knowledge or distrust of it.

Indeed, Foucault's concept of governmentality seems to find much empirical support in
what Waller (1995) calls scientific-cum-political struggles in the public arena where the
strategic, or opportunistic, use of knowledge can be observed.

The attempts, for

instance, by Keynesian and neo-classical economists to attain hegemonic status within
the political economy can serve here as an example; so can the arms race or the isolation
and patenting of human genes. In contexts such as these where knowledge is used to
frame public discourses, based on experts' assessments of what is possible and probable,
debates can be limited and controlled, and experts' public accountability can effectively
be minimised (Waller, 1995). The perceived advantages of using knowledge, scientific
knowledge in particular, have been recognised by many players in the public arena and
not just by scientists and politicians. Today, many debates are carried out using science
as the principal means of either supporting or refuting positions within the debates.
Stalemates between ideological adversaries, with both sides arguing best science, are
therefore quite common as can be seen, for example, in the global climate debate,
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resource availability forecasts or land and water use disputes. Such stalemates can either
be counterproductive in circumstances where there is a pressing need to initiate action,
or produce creative tensions, which can lead to more mature (informed) debates and
refined problem specifications.

It is of interest here that in many of the current debates in Australia on environmental
protection, science is used to validate claims either in favour or against more
precautionary measures to be taken by governments to ensure long-term environmental
integrity. It seems, however, that scientists themselves rarely come to the fore in these
discussions. In this context, there is a view that the "scientific world has a modesty
about expressing opinion" and that this may only occur once "ideas have been tested in
the realm of their peers through publication in peer-reviewed literature" (Gascoigne &
Metcalfe, 1998, p.6). In other words, scientists are viewed here as methodologically
handcuffed and as reluctant to engage in public discourse for their "commitment to
accuracy and proper scientific procedures" (p.6). A contrary position has been taken by
a number of Australian ecologists (e.g. Hobbs, 1998; Recher, 1998) who call for the
abandonment of the "traditional boundaries of science" (Recher, 1998, p.9).

They

demand - as a matter of professional responsibility - a more vocal and active
involvement of scientists in political life to inform and guide public processes in light of
perceived past failures of the scientific community to speak up.

These calls for

advocacy and scientific responsibility are echoed internationally (see Stoll-Kleemann &
O'Riordan, 2002).

The view of the publicity-shy and timid scientist may seem to be in stark contrast to
notions of power and political influence exerted by the scientific community.
Proponents of active involvement of scientists in public processes do not deny that
science is used to influence public opinion and political outcomes. In that regard, their
views are congruent with the arguments referring to scientific hegemony and power. It
is suggested, however, that often it is not the scientists themselves who exercise this
power and that instead scientists are usually the ones who are used to legitimate political
processes and should therefore become more outspoken and involved. In that sense,
proponents of the active engagement of scientists may not so much be contradicting
arguments of scientific control and dominance but perhaps rather be helping demystify
power relations between the science community and society. Put differently, power and
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control may be exercised but not necessarily by those who generate the knowledge that
underpins it.

As a consequence, science and the work of scientists are subject to

politicisation, and individuals may find it difficult to uphold their personal and
professional values when their work is drawn into the political spot light. Scientists who
allow themselves to fall into this perceived passive-defensive trap are criticised by those
who demand their colleagues to be more pro-active and, if need be, more belligerent
when it comes to defending what they value and work for.

The centrality of science in public life cannot be disputed but it raises questions whether
science is actually capable of providing the necessary answers to today's complex
problems, especially as they exist in public policy areas such as the environment or gene
technology where intertwined and often conflicting ecological, ethical, social, and
economic aspects are involved. There is some agreement that experts are needed in the
public policy arena for reasons relating to the complexity of policy making (e.g.
Yankelovich, 1991; Waller, 1995; Lubchenco, 1998). Disunity exists, however, on the
extent to which rational science should be employed on social and cultural matters,
which also, at times chiefly, contribute to political complexity. Socio-cultural affairs are
generally considered wicked or trans-science issues (Weinberg, 1972).

Thus, the

normative and dogmatic approach to science may be considered to be at odds with
inherently wicked natural resource issues, for it is considered to create more rather than
less uncertainty. Moreover, a possible contradiction may be seen between expert-driven
public processes and calls for intimate participatory processes (as discussed in Chapter
Five) in light of public resentment towards perceived power differentials between
experts and other process stakeholders (on these points refer to Lau, 1992; Rip, 1992;
Miller, 1993).

The questions about the appropriate use of scientific expertise on matters such as
natural resource use and protection are particularly complex as exemplified by the
current debate on ecologically sustainable development.

The case of sustainability

would have to represent the height of messy, complex, wicked, trans-science affairs with
its calls for holistic and trans-disciplinary approaches to counter trends of global
ecological, social, and economic collisions. Efforts are underway to formulate principles
for a new integrative sustainability science (Kates et al., 2000; Lowe, 2001), highlighting
the perceived inappropriateness of traditional approaches to science within messy
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contexts.

The notion of a new meta-science, however, is contested territory and

alternative approaches

are

currently sought

to

address

socio-econo-ecological

complexities via trans-disciplinary integration. Some inroads have been made in that
area through advances in disciplines such as ecosystem health and ecological economics.
While perhaps further conceptual and epistemological groundwork is required for a new
or different science, it is clear though that science in whatever shape or form will remain
integral to sustainability debates and will continue to play a decisive role. After all,
science is considered to be humanity's "principal thought structure and analytic tool for
the understanding and protecting of the environment and human health" (Diesendorf,
1993, p.1). It is not surprising then that science, at an international level, is regarded as
"essential for achieving endogenous development and progress" and that its function
lies in the development of new knowledge to provide "educational, cultural, and
intellectual

enrichment"

(United

Nations

Organization (UNESCO), 1999, Section 1).

Educational

Scientific

and

Cultural

Science is here to stay; however, the

previous discussion might suggest that self-reflection and perhaps some steps towards
re-invention are required not only to be better equipped for a rapidly changing and
increasingly complex world but also for science to be able to retain its relevance and
legitimise its authority. Given the high hopes for, and demands placed on, science it
could be argued that the socialisation of science or the integration of traditionally
perceived trans-science issues into science is more likely to enrich science and to make it
more relevant and robust than it is to render science obsolete, as feared by
traditionalists.

I will return to this debate but conclude at this point by saying that the debate on issues
surrounding science, its aims, essence, societal, and political role is not only complex but
also paradoxical. The embrace and simultaneous rejection of expert control in times of
unprecedented societal dependence on expertdom is most perplexing. The literature
portrays science as both cause and cure for many social, economic, and environmental
wrongs today as it was science that has enabled humanity to conquer the stars and
defeat diseases but also given it the ability to kill itself and the planet. Moreover, there is
seemingly no agreement among scientists and philosophers on what science really is; the
public's, and experts', perceptions of science differ substantially, and there is public
disagreement on the desirable degree, and the pros and cons, of scientists' involvement
in public affairs. All these factors combined raise doubts about the role science would
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ideally assume in processes of public policy formulation, and a government process
purportedly 'backed by science, science, and more science' is thus perhaps a rather
uncomforting proposition.

Contested Forest Science in Western Australia

Over the last 30 years doubts have been raised not only in Western Australia but also in
other parts of the country about the scientific management of native forests. For most
of that time, calls for more conservative management of the forest estate came from the
environmental lobby, which saw forest management practices and the rate of timber
extraction as unsustainable and as a threat to forest flora and fauna (e.g. Routley &
Routley, 1975; Cameron & Penna, 1988; Conservation Council of WA, 1990). In WA,
conservationists raised concerns in relation to various forest management practices such
as the use of prescription burns as a means of controlling wildfires and regrowth
management and the rate of timber extraction based on so-called sustained yield
principles. Conservationists feared that both practices would lead to forest degradation.

For instance, in relation to sustained yield principles conservationists have long been
arguing based on science that the long rotation cycles of Australian hardwoods make
these native species prone to overexploitation as rotation cycles are likely to be
shortened due to perceived economic needs (Australian Conservation Foundation,
1987). By cutting high value stands first, following a Ricardian regression of resource
quality, commercial felling would then resume too early in regrowth areas and also
expand to lower-quality forests, cutting previously uneconomic tree species to stem
inevitably declining sawlog supplies (Rawlinson & Penna, 1982). Thus, following this
logic, all high quality forests (i.e., high conservation value old growth) would disappear
and systematically be converted to comparatively inferior tree farms for quick
commodification and capital intensive value adding (Wootten, 1986). In other words,
sustained yield principles are believed to be undermined by impatient market forces and
most of all self-interest, both of which are seen to drive accelerated forest exploitation.

For many years, the native hardwood industry responded to these allegations, essentially
refuting this greed driven view of the industry (for relevant quotes see Routley &
Routley, 1975; Australian Conservation Foundation, 1987).

More recently, industry

groups have argued that the industry actually moved closer to the conservationists'
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definition of sustainable forest management (National Association of Forest Industries,
1997) and highlighted the compatibility between economic forest exploitation and forest
conservation. The case is made that trees regrow (Watson, 1990) and, if prudently (i.e.,
scientifically or silviculturally) managed, can continue to support a timber industry
indefinitely (National Association of Forest Industries, 2002). It is interesting to note,
however, that the economic need for shorter rotation cycles and the uneconomic nature
of true-cost forest regeneration and management has long been admitted to by the
industry (see for instance Lawrence, 1964; Gilbert, 1972).

The industry's reference to silvicultural or scientific forest management attests to the
industry's faith in science. Indeed, science is seen as essential for the future viability of
the industry, which in turn highlights the previously acknowledged link between
positivistic science and economic activity (progress).

In conjunction with market

dynamics and legislative frameworks governing the industry scientific research, scientific
advice, and scientific forest management practices have a significant impact on
commercial decision-making processes of timber-dependent industries.

Even the

legislative framework itself is based on scientific input. Therefore, it is not surprising
that very close and somewhat symbiotic71 working relationships between the forestry
profession, forest departments, and forest industries have developed not just in
Australia but also in other countries like the USA and Canada. It seems, however, that
this relationship is grounded not only on economic pragmatism but also to some extent
on a shared ideology. To clarify this claim, also in view of the value-laden nature and
Marxist flavour of the term ideology, the forestry profession/ science itself needs to be
examined more closely.

Forestry and Environmentalism

Forestry, as defined by one of the founding fathers of modern forestry, "is the
knowledge of the forest. In particular, it is the art of handling the forest so that it will
render whatever service is required of it without being impoverished or destroyed"
(Pinchot, 1914, p.13).

71

Today, the philosophies and mission statements of forestry

The term .rymbiosis, in the true biological sense of the word, is perhaps misleading in that the mutuality

of benefits in true-cost accounting terms is contestable (see Australian Conservation Foundation, 1987;
Cameron & Penna, 1988).
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institutions still reflect Pinchot's view, broadly defining forestry as a profession that
embraces the science, art, and practice of creating sustainably, managing, using, and
conserving forests and associated resources to meet societal goals, needs, and values
(e.g. Institute of Foresters of Australia, 2002; Society of American Foresters, 2002).
There are two interesting features to this self-portrayal. Firstly, forestry is an applied
natural science that invests confidence in the scientific management of forests,
positivistic in nature with a strong adherence to measurable and quantifiable evidence.
Secondly, forestry has an anthropocentric orientation for it sees its role in the
maintenance of perpetual human forest uses. Positivistic anthropocentrism are features
of today's business reality and western world economies at large. It is perhaps for this
reason that ecocentric conservationists -ideologically opposed to anthropocentrism and
economic rationality - have seen in forestry and forest departments a symbol of
commercial forest exploitation (Routley & Routley, 1975; Dargavel, 1995) in that forest
management was considered to primarily serve extractive forest uses. In other words,
for these groups scientific forest management and forest destruction have seemingly
become synonymous terms.

Ironically, as it stands today, there is an apparent standoff between two groups in
Australia, both claiming to be the real conservers of the country's native forests. There
are the foresters who see themselves as the first conservationists who developed and
promoted forest conservation in Australia in the early years of the twentieth century
when conservation came to mean scientific and rational planning for the efficient use of
natural resources (for more information on Empire Forestry refer to Barton, 2001);
they also look back at a long-standing European forestry tradition. Foresters seemingly
perceive the other environmentalists as emotive romanticists and take the stance that they
are the ones who have the science - their national websites attest to that (see Institute of
Foresters of Australia, 2002; Society of American Foresters, 2002) - and thus, the facts
and the answers about how forests ought to be managed. Also, calls are being made by
foresters both in the USA and Australia for a more rational debate and the overcoming
of ideological approaches to forestry (e.g. Spriggins, 1998; Tombaugh, 2000). In other
words, foresters seem to argue that debates about forest management should be left to
those who know best about f~rests, in essence, forest scientists.
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Then there are those conservationists who emerged from the grassroots movements of
the 1960s and 1970s who made their goal the protection of nature's intrinsic and nonuse values and the minimisation of humanity's ecological footprint. It would be wrong,
however, to suggest that all the claims made by the environmental grassroots
movements were not scientifically based (leaving a number of some ideologists of the
movement aside). The green movement has had long standing ties with the scientific
community, a relationship which Yearley (1992, p.514) considers to be doubly bound
"by epistemological affinity and common descent."

He argues that, while

environmentalists are distrustful of science in the context of animal rights abuses for
research purposes, nuclear power and weapons technology, gene technology, and other
issues, they themselves have relied on the authority of science to legitimate their claims
and to exert what Weber would have called legal-rational authority in the political arena
(Yearley, 1991, 1992).

So, what has widely been labelled emotive romanticism and

utopian idealism has seemingly received considerable scientific backup, which in turn
allowed the pro-environmental message to penetrate the public sphere and to varying
degrees affect political agendas for the last 40 years.

Returning to the issue of Australian forestry, this conservationist-conservationist
dichotomy has created a situation where two groups claim respectively to promote
sustainability in the country's native forests.

Yet, they cannot agree on what

sustainability entails nor can they reach common ground on the means of achieving
sustainability for they are ideologically opposed. The trenches are deep, and the verbal
battles over the years have been very personal and explicitly abusive (for some insights
into that debate refer to Australian Conservation Foundation, 1987). Forestry, it seems
to foresters, is almost by definition sustainable, whereas ecocentrists (I use this term
here for the purpose of differentiation) ostensibly see forestry as a euphemism for
scientifically sanctioned forest industrialisation.

In Western Australia, this rift between foresters and the environment movement
widened dramatically throughout the 1990s.

Local conservation groups took legal

action against the Department of Conservation and Land Management in 1994 amidst a
heated dispute over the woodchip license renewal

for

the

following year.

Conservationists sought injunctions to halt logging operations in so-called icon forest
blocks in the State's south-west and to obtain statements as to CALM's legal
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responsibilities (Barns & Webb, 1999, unpublished paper), broadly suggesting a breach
by the department of its obligations spelled out in its own Forest Management Plan.
Four years later, after a series of appeals the High Court of Australia eventually ruled
against the WA conservation groups - a decision some commentators saw as another
nail in the coffin of judicial reviews of environmental decision making (e.g. Schoombee,
1998; Churches, 2000), feeding into the debate on the effectiveness of Australia's
environmental laws and the judicial system (e.g. Preston, 1991; Schoombee, 1991).
However, this litigation was only part of a wave of allegations made against CALM, and
the following will provide insights into how science became part of the dispute between
forestry and conservationists.

Public Scrutiny on Departmental Processes

Nationally, there has been some discussion for a number of years on intellectual
suppression of environmental scientists (Martin, 1981, 1992).

In WA, the Barnett

Inquiry (1992), for instance, found instances of intellectual suppression, the withholding
of information, and the suppression of the ability of individual officers to contribute to
the debate, which according to the report brought into question the whole nature of the
CALM Forest Management Plans.

In 1993, allegations surfaced with reference to

specific cases of scientific censorship and perversion of the scientific process by CALM
management as a means of protecting commercial interests (Lowe, 1993; Schultz, 1993);
all amounting to a call for a public inquiry into the department.

Many of these

accusations were publicly denied by CALM (e.g. Armstrong, 1993) and condemned at
the end of an independent review as unfounded allegations by Kevin Minson, then the
Minister for the Environment. Other cases of alleged professional censorship came to
the fore in later years (e.g. Nicholson, 1995). A particularly well publicised case was that
of CALM Research officer Dr Elaine Davidson who claimed to have been unfairly
victimised and transferred within the department as a result of her research findings into
dieback, which was considered to have run counter to the official line on forestry
(Nicholson, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). Her claim, however, could not be substantiated at a
subsequent Industrial Relations Commission hearing (Schoombee, 1998).

Similar battles were also fought by CALM with scientists working outside the
department.

One such conflict involved the well publicised (however, factually

somewhat distorted (see Kirkpatrick, 1998b)) case of Susan Rhind, a doctoral student
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from Murdoch University, who was making a potential link between CALM's
silvicultural practices and the fate of phascogales72 in the jarrah forest (fan-Van Baren,
1996b, 1996a). Her work was publicly discredited by CALM, and she stood accused of
being ideologically prejudiced and biased and was made to apologise for what was seen
by others to be a minor error of fact (see Recher, 1998; Kirkpatrick pets. com., 2000).
Incidents, not dissimilar to the case of Susan Rhind, occurred involving Edith Cowan
University and the University of Western Australia (e.g. evidence given to the Standing
Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development, 1998d).

In light of this climate of animosity and distrust, Schultz (1993, p.93) may have been
correct in asserting that there was "doubt cast over every CALM publication, whether
popular or scientific" in that questions would have remained - justified or not - about
CALM procedures and the interference by CALM management with the work of its
scientists. But it was also a matter of how, or the means by which, CALM responded to
criticism. All cases cited above show a sense of aggression and hostility in the treatment
of dissenting views, which raises questions as to what precisely the department so
rigorously tried to defend. The active protection of commercial (timber) interests has
always been denied by CALM management in connection with the allegations made
against the department. Still, it may be reasonable to suggest that CALM's philosophical
orientation offered a de facto protection of such interests relating back to the earlier
mentioned ideological alignment of the forestry profession and the timber industry
strengthened by the positivism exuded by forest science. This alliance has led not only
to a division between grassroots conservationists and forest departments but also to a
split within scientific communities, echoing Paehlke's (1989) reference to an environmental

counter-science. This is a fitting description of the forest debate in WA during the 1990s
where there was the standoff between CALM scientists, who seemingly defended the
status quo, both of their science and the economics it underpins, and others who
challenged the long-standing beliefs about forest use, management, and conservation. I
shall elaborate on an example of this below, which ought to be seen as a part of a wider,
concurrent, scientific debate on forest management issues in WA, focusing on aspects
such as local endemism and ecosystem heterogeneity (e.g. Wardell-Johnson & Horwitz,
1996; Abbott & Burrows, 1998; Wardell-Johnson & Horwitz, 2000), conservation and
reservation (Trayler et al., 1996; Shea et al., 1997), jarrah die back and water-logging
72

N octumal, carnivorous marsupial.

165

(Shearer & Tippett, 1989; Davison, 1997), hollows (Gibbons, 1994; Mawson & Long,
1994, 1997; Stoneman et al., 1997), and others.

Departmental Neo-Positivism Versus Calls for Precaution
In the late 1980s and early 1990s calls for caution were issued in relation to forest
management (particularly fire management) and forest reservation in light of what was
perceived to be incomplete and insufficient knowledge of complex forest ecosystem
functions (Wardell-Johnson et al., 1989b; Wardell-Johnson & Nichols, 1991). 73 Similar
views were expressed by the Resource Assessment Commission (1992), which raised
concerns about the lack of sufficient knowledge relating to long-term impacts of forest
uses, including timber extraction, on environmental values.

In this context, staff of

CALM's Science and Information Division published a paper, proposing 20 general
ecological principles which were applied to the forest ecosystems in the south-west of
Western Australia and used to examine "past exploitation of the forest as well as current
forest management" (Abbott & Christensen, 1994, p.110). The paper was directed at
critics of the department's forest management practices and attacked their "dismal
viewpoint[s]" and "emotive and unscientific approaches" (p.119) towards forestry.
Ostensibly, it also served as a justification of then current timber cutting operations
overseen by the Department of Conservation and Land Management and as an implicit
critique of the Barnett Report (1992), which at the time was critical of CALM
operations (also see Chapter Three).

Abbott and Christensen took the approach that the pessimism expressed by some, in
their view, extreme biocentrists was unwarranted and that the previously mentioned
concerns of the Resource Assessment Commission and concerns about perceived
knowledge gaps could be alleviated. The authors concluded in light of the "ineluctable
facts and. scientific principles" presented in their paper that Western Australian
silviculture, notwithstanding its critics, had been successful in "conserving the entire
forest ecosystem with all its species intact" and that "forest managers ... [would] have
good reason to be proud of their efforts" (p.119).

73

Authors of these publications included scientists from the Department of Conservation and Land

Management.
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In a response to Abbott and Christensen scientists from Murdoch University, CSIRO,
Edith Cowan University, and The University of Western Australia published a paper
asserting that "the paucity of good data on management issues ... [would preclude] any
confident assessment of the impact of forestry in Western Australian forests" (Calver et
al., 1996, p.4).

The authors expressed their disappointment with the perceived

confrontational character of Abbott and Christensen's paper and argued that the pair
had - consistent with their philosophical position regarding forestry - paid insufficient
attention to non-timber perspectives and subsequently downplayed research priorities in
those areas.

The usefulness of the ecological principles laid down by Abbott and

Christensen was questioned, and concerns were raised about the arbitrary and selective
nature of these principles. They were considered too general to be useful and their
interpretation too optimistic and overly supportive of the status quo in forest use and
management.

Abbott and Christensen (1996) replied to Calver et al. (1996) and launched, going by
appearances, a personal attack on the authors, describing their comments as
"inappropriate" and "irrelevant" and their critique to be of "little substance" (p.206).
Calver and his colleagues were accused of being subjective relativists and opposed to
commercial native forest logging and current forest management practices based on
ideological biases rather than scientific argument.

Abbott and Christensen (1996)

reinforced the views put forth in their earlier paper (Abbott & Christensen, 1994) and
asserted that no scientific argument could be made against current forest management
practices for the "unalterable fact that W A's forests are one of the very few major
ecosystems in Australia still retaining almost all of the original pre-European species and
ecological processes intact" (p.211). In other words, the pair did not see what all the
fuss was about (Abbott pers. com., 2002). Yet, their comments left the debate on the
sustainability of forest management and commercial logging sharply polarised.

In a reconciliatory bid, at a time when the Western Australian RFA gained momentum,
Calver and six co-authors (Calver et al., 1998) responded to Abbott and Christensen. In
this paper Calver et al. (1998) clarified their concerns in relation to Abbott and
Christensen's ecological principles.

They also questioned Abbott and Christensen's

conclusions about the sustainability of Western Australian forestry and their confidence
about the sufficiency of data on the ecological impacts of current forestry practices.
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The authors defended their post-modern approach towards forest ecology in light of
what they saw to be an opening in the wider scientific community towards sciencesociety relations. They questioned the existence of "value-free research" (p.261) but,
insisting on the distinction between bias and context, dismissed claims of being
"prejudiced" and "anti-logging greenies" (p.261). The authors stressed the need for
further applied research and suggested the establishment of guidelines for the consistent
and codified operationalisation of the precautionary principle within forestry and called
for the creation of open and t;ransparent lines of communication (full publication of all
relevant data etc.) between Australia's foresters and ecologists.

Once more Abbott and Christensen entered the debate and replied to the views of
Calver et al. (1998), this time, however, via an unpublished report prepared for the
Executive Director of CALM (Abbott & Christensen, 1999). They welcomed the in
principle admission by Calver et al. (1998) to the possibility of sustainable native forest
logging and their acceptance of the general applicability of fundamental ecological
principles to forest management.

However, they defended what the pair seemingly

perceived as another attack on CALM's burning and logging practices, citing CALM
protocols and procedures as examples of applications of the ecological principles they
proposed earlier, standing up for the adequacy of current impact data, and supporting
their stance towards the precautionary principle. Abbott and Christensen strongly
rejected Calver et al.'s (1998) post-modern tendencies, commenting on the perceived
dangers associated with "Calver et al's. (1998) marginalization of objectivity" which they
equated to the "loss of scientific credibility and reputation" (Abbott & Christensen,
1999, p.20), and they cautioned their colleagues not to become professionally obsolete
by blending science with advocacy and activism.

Since the report has not been

published, there has never been a response by Calver and his co-authors who were not
formally aware of the report's existence or content (Calver, 2002, pers. com.).

This debate, when assessed from the outside, seemingly represents a philosophical clash
between perceptions of risk and its treatment. The self-confessed functional realists
(see Abbott & Christensen, 1994, 1996) argue that scientists have a "reasonable
understanding" (1994, p.110) of the impacts of current use and management practices
on forest biota, asserting that current knowledge is "most complete" (1996, p.206)
which in turn would enable them to confidently manage the forest estate. They admit to
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the usefulness of further research but generally express considerable faith in their
current understanding of the impact of their management practices on forest ecology.
This understanding is backed by their many years of experience as "active forest
ecologists" (Abbott & Christensen, 1996, p.208). Consequently, they object to what
they call a "narrow ideological interpretation" (1996, p.206) of the precautionary
principle, which they see as a demand for complete knowledge prior to any action being
taken, believing it to be unrealistic and ultimately leading to a paralysis of all human
activity and progress. They disagree with what they regard as idiosyncratic emphasis on
precaution by Calver and his colleagues., particularly, in light of the assumed fact that
logging impacts on the south-west forests have been minimal and that forest
management has not caused extinctions relative to past geological and climatic changes
(Abbott & Christensen, 1994, 1996).

On the other hand, Calver et al. (1996; 1998), the indicted relativistic precautionists (see
Abbott & Christensen, 1994, 1996), side with the arguments brought forth by WardellJohnson et al. (1989b) and Wardell-Johnson and Nichols (1991) who suggest that,
despite a substantial volume of literature on WA's south-west forest wildlife and habitat
management, a poor ecological understanding has remained. While Calver et al. (1996;
1998) accept the possibility of sustainable native forest logging and management, they
caution Abbott and Christensen not to see the absence of additional data as de facto
support for the status quo in forest management.

Indeed, it is this uncertainty

stemming from the perceived knowledge gaps that prompted Calver et al. (1996; 1998)
to call for further applied research on forestry issues and to suggest more conservative
approaches towards native forest logging and management in the interim.

In summary, the scientific debate on sustainable forestry in Western Australia in the
1990s had science on both sides of the divide, each side launching accusations of
ideological bias, self-serving and selective argumentation, and flawed methods and
reasorung. The dispute mirrors the soft-science-hard-science divide alluded to earlier
for it highlights the philosophical differences towards the treatment of objectivity and
risk, and it provides a stereotypical example of the rationales employed by so-called
positivists and pessimists. The scientists' disagreement on their respective treatment of
risk and uncertainty can be exemplified by a statement from CALM staff participating in
this study.
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... in jarrah on the question of what size trees and how many
you should leave per ha when you log in jarrah forests. It
started of with three trees per ha above a certain size back in
1989 and then more research came on stream, and it was
changed to four, and I think now with the latest possum
research that is in the Draft Management Plan it has gone up
to six trees per ha left.

In light of Calver et al's. (1996; 1998) interpretation of precaution, the approach to
forest management as portrayed in the above statement seemingly constitutes a reversal
of the precautionary approach. While this could be construed as an example of adaptive
management (see Holling, 1978), the gradual increase of habitat trees left standing after
felling in response to new research data supportive of such action strikes as a sign of
reaction rather than precaution.

Possums are only one component of the fauna

assemblage in the forest and overall habitat requirements may indeed be greater than
indicated by possum research. In the face of uncertainty surrounding the impacts of
potentially inadequate habitat provisions a precautionary approach would result in too
many rather than too few habitat trees. While for Calver and his colleagues this is what
precaution is all about, for Abbott and Christensen this merely represents an
idiosyncratic, narrow, and ideologically biased interpretation.

In the above sections I hope to have shown three things. Firstly, earlier assertions
about the de facto protection given to the industry from forestry science should have
become clearer.

As was shown in the Western Australian example, the categorical

nature with which the profession defends forestry practices provides the basis for this
bond between industry and science in that claims to an unsustainable and destructive
nature of current native forest logging are scientifically discounted. It also leads to the
suggestion that commercial imperatives, pragmatism, and positivistic science operate on
similar philosophical platforms, which are, circumstantially, mutually reinforcing and
thus making this tie between science and industry so resistant to change.

Secondly, there has been a discernible sense of unease prior to the commencement of
the WA RFA process among a number of scientists, especially ecologists who took a
more holistic view, towards the optimism conveyed by some CALM scientists. Also
CALM's categorical dismissal of dissenting views towards forestry in the state within the
wider scientific community was cause of concern.

This sense of nervousness has

arguably added to the already complex and volatile context surrounding the Western
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Australian RFA (see Chapters Three and Five) and impacted on the ensuing process in a
number of ways. For instance, the words of caution and scepticism expressed by Calver
et al. (1996, 1998) in relation to forest management certainly provided welcome
ammunition to conservation groups to be used for their RFA campaigns, which widely
publicised the scientific disagreement.

Consequently, the scientific standoff - albeit

unwittingly - may not have only underpinned certain existing views towards forestry in
WA and the State's respective department in charge (as shown in Chapter Five) but also
helped shape and challenge views on science among members of the general public.

Thirdly, science was to form the basis for the WA RFA process. In light of the seeming
inseparability of forest science and timber interests, the resultant distrust in the work of
CALM, compounded by the scientific disagreement on essential matters pertaining to
forest management preceding the RFA process, the science of the RFA was prone to be
contested. This in tum was likely to have implications for the process' acceptability,
which could be expected to draw on the dominant departmental science.

At this point, it needs to be pointed out that concurrent to the Western Australian
science dispute efforts were underway that - involving science at the federal level would also impact on the credibility of the country's RFAs. The science matter I am
referring

to

here

is

the

formulation

of the JANIS

criteria

(after Joint

ANZECC/MCFFA National Forest Policy Statement Implementation Sub-Committee).
A brief coverage of the criteria formulation is important for they formed a part of the
scientific backbone of all RFAs. 74 Thus, prior to an examination of the WA RFA
science I will briefly address the JANIS process and its scientific underpinnings and
subsequently tum to the Western Australian case.

The Science ofJANIS75

In the review of the events leading up to the WA RFA in Chapter Three I described the
protracted nature of the process that was intended to provide the national benchmarks
for old growth, wilderness, and biodiversity protection.

74

In this context, I showed that

East Gippsland in the State of Victoria represents a different case as the East Gippsland RFA was

concluded prior to the finalisation of the JANIS criteria.
75
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this process took four years following the rejection of previous attempts of determining
conservation targets in 1993 and 1994. It was after these initial attempts that a group of
respected and experienced senior scientists was entrusted with the task of designing a
set of nationally acceptable criteria. This section looks specifically - using interview data
- at this group's work and the scientific debate surrounding their efforts to develop
what became known as the JANIS criteria.

The criteria development for the conservation of biological diversity in native forests
was mandated by the National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia,
1992a). These criteria were to form the basis for the establishment of comprehensive,
adequate, and representative (CAR) forest reserve systems. Scientifically credible criteria
were needed not only to operationalise the terms of the NFPS but also to overcome
conservationists' distrust of government-driven processes in relation to forestry
(Kirkpatrick, 1998a). The need for credibility made it appropriate, if not essential, to
involve scientists in setting those criteria, and it was for this reason that a specialist
committee [was] set up to advise the bureaucracy on how much [forest area] ... should
[be] set aside. The formation of this committee would have certainly been based on the
hope amongst officials that there would ... [be] some sort of sense from the scientific
community about the appropriateness of the . . . [criteria] that would be developed,
especially as there would be an element of political judgement involved.

The scientists in charge of the criteria development were confronted with the
problematique that essentially no amount [of reservation] is enough and that they- due
to their brief - had to take a practical look, balancing these competing aspects. The
main problem for the criteria development was that there was no theoretical or
empirical basis for justifying 15 per cent ... over 12 per cent or 16 per cent or 50 per
cent (the CAR criteria/percentages are explained in Appendix 8) other than to say that it
was far in excess of what was being promoted anywhere in the world at that stage. For
reasons relating to this absence of scientific justifiability strong opposition towards the
criteria development was voiced from within the wider scientific community, which was
fundamentally unhappy with putting quantitative restrictions on forest management and
fundamentally opposed the whole concept and the set of criteria that were being
adopted. It was feared back then that, because there was no scientific justification for
the criteria, science and scientists were used to validate a political process.
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Still, the process went ahead, and the group of chosen scientists developed a set of
prescriptions in science, which were then put out to the broader stakeholders who were
. . . the policy people, who then took the view on where those policy guidelines should
be put in place or where the targets should be set. It was this process that followed the
drafting of the criteria, however, that further affected the credibility of the reserve
benchmarks because the draft that was produced was basically shunted, it was shunted
back to JANIS. This meant that the work done by the group of scientists was referred
back to the "experts within the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats at the higher policy
levels" (Kirkpatrick, 1998a, p.34).

These ministerial representatives . . . put a lot of

"may" or "if it's appropriates" etc., etc. in to it so that . . . [the criteria] did not have any
real force like [in] the original document. On this point Kirkpatrick (1998a, p.34) points
out that "while much of the wording of the original criteria document remained intact,
additions and deletions were made ... ", which essentially excluded the conservation of
biological diversity on private land, leaving open the "question of the proportion of the
reserve system that should be secure", allowing for socio-economic provisos to weaken
the strength of the criteria initially proposed, and deleting "all reference to the
maintenance of the unreserved forest in a largely native condition."

The last point highlights the extent to which the bureaucratic modifications weakened
the scientific credibility of the JANIS criteria given that the scientists involved in the
drafting thought that the percentages they had given for forest reservation were
meaningful only if there was sympathetic management of what is going on outside of
the reserve areas.

Modification meant that the final JANIS document had "little

scientific credibility" (Kirkpatrick, 1998a, p.34).

There were also other points of

contestation, as mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, such as the flexibility criterion and
the inclusion of linear reserves in the conservation estate, measures which potentially
allowed the minimisation of coherent reserve areas given that it was a matter of to what
degree these options would be used.

The responses to the JANIS criteria were mixed. Some government officials, especially
those entrusted with the running of the RFA processes, maintained that the JANIS
criteria were very good, especially when bearing in mind that ten per cent of ecosystems
being considered ... [were] a pretty good international standard. For the supporters of
the JANIS criteria the scientific dissent to the criteria was expected. In fact, it was

173

conceded that it may have been that some scientists did not agree with those JANIS
criteria but that was largely seen in the realms of: If you have 100 scientists in a room,
you might get 90 per cent agreeing generally, and there will always be a ten per cent
dissent. It was seen as a matter of getting general agreement, knowing that you will
never get full agreement.

Other government employees were more critical in their stance towards JANIS for they
saw this set of criteria developed by the bureaucracy as an imposed formula which
[would satisfy] certain groups of the community . . . but . . . ignore the communities'
wishes. According to those critics, although scientists were involved in setting those
criteria, they were finally a product of bureaucracy, and that it was the bureaucrats who
interpreted [the figures] wrongly.

The Western Australian timber industry had its own reservations about JANIS.
Industry representatives saw the departure from the 10 per cent figure for forest
reservation, as was then promoted by the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the subsequent adoption of
the 15 per cent as a huge political mistake. Given that the government decided to make
the national standard by five per cent better than the prevailing international standard,
industry thought that that [w] ould be a quite acceptable outcome for the people of WA
because it was better than ... [anywhere else] and ... not some criteria dreamt up by
CALM or some shonky deal. In other words, the industry would have preferred a lower
reservation requirement for the 15 per cent [figure adopted] ,vas [considered] huge. Yet,
at the same time the industry seemed hopeful that this concession would calm down
antagonistic conservationists for their demands were, as they saw it, more than acceded
to.

Western Australian conservation groups perceived the JANIS process as a distortion, a
perversion, and a fraud from start to finish and the stupid-looking JANIS figures as
totally arbitrary, believing that there [was] no scientific basis for the 15 per cent or the
60 per cent chosen by JANIS. Also, given that these criteria ... were developed for
Australia as a whole, conservationists felt that they would not apply over here [in WA] ,
and it was held that it was unfair dragging ... [the State] down to the lowest common
denominator. Conservationists perceived the JANIS criteria as baseline figures [which]
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.. . became target figures to be achieved where possible or pragmatic. The inclusion of
riparian reserves and the flexibility criterion was interpreted as an attempt to strategically
minimise reservation areas, and overall, conservationists saw in JANIS a huge disservice
to the WA's reserve estate.

Concerns such as these, however, were not raised by

conservationists around the time of the criteria development but at a later stage when it
came to the application of the criteria to the Western Australian RFA throughout late
1997 to 1999, especially in relation to old growth and wilderness protection.

The issues surrounding the JANIS criteria development add to the tally of contested
science. Although the JANIS criteria development process was designed to deliver the
scientific basis for the country's RFA processes, it only succeeded in effectively blurring
the lines between science and politics.

From a Western Australian perspective, the

JANIS criteria failed to convince a number of RFA stakeholders that the RFA process
would be both credible and based on best science. As a consequence, the science of the
WA RFA was prone to be highly scrutinised and contested.

Perceptions of the Science of the Western Australian RFA

'The RFA will underpin forest emotion with facts"
(Edwardes, 1999)
A scan of the interview data76 for comments on the science of the Western Australian
RFA process showed that the issues raised by research participants ranged from general
comments (a lot of scientists involved -

and - one extreme of bogus . . . or

manipulation of science) to very specific aspects of scientific projects carried out for the
RFA (huge misgivings that the process was in any way arriving at reasonable
conclusions as far as the probability of species occurring was concerned - and - CALM
has a number of databases that were not made available to us) and the processes that
governed the scientific assessments (there was no editorial involvement - and inadequate time was given). I therefore decided to examine these responses in more
detail under the following headings and subheadings:
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•

Comprehensive Regional Assessment (CRA)
o

CRA Reports

o Peer Review and Data Handling
o Perceptions of the Political Climate and Power Structures During the
Process of the WA RFA

o Specific Issues of Contestation
The following analysis does not intend to provide a detailed study of the scientific
disputes that were carried out in the course of the WA RFA; it is the treatment of
science in general that is being analysed. The need to protect the identity of research
participants and data availability, on occasion, precluded a detailed analysis of scientific
disagreements.

The Comprehensive Regional Assessment (CRA)
The comprehensive regional assessment work done for Western Australia was intended
to deliver the scientific basis on which a Regional Forest Agreement would be reached
between the Commonwealth and the State governments.

The various reports

emanating from the assessment work were compiled and published in 1998 in a
Comprehensive Regional Assessment Report (Commonwealth of Australia and
Government of Western Australia, 1998a). The report stated that "natural, cultural,
social, resource and economic values in the forest of the South-West Forest Region"
had been examined and that detailed assessments were made of "biodiversity, oldgrowth forest, national estate, wilderness, world heritage, social values, forest resources
and forest-based industries and ecologically sustainable forest management" (p.ili).
7
CRA Reoorts7
.

Many of the CRA reports were unique in that they were the first of their type compiled
in the State. Particularly noteworthy were the six disturbance reports among the CRA
studies.

These disturbance reports were concerned with the impacts of key

disturbances, largely anthropogenic disturbances such as logging, clearing, mining,
recreation, and others, on forest biota (Bougher, 1997; Christensen, 1997; Horwitz et al.,
1997; Lamont et al., 1997; Majer & Heterick, 1997; Safstrom & Lemson, 1997). These

77
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reports were supposed to provide much of the ecological basis for the RFA and were
considered to be of special interest because they addressed disturbances from an
ecosystem perspective. They were also intended to bring together all existing ecological
knowledge of forest ecosystem disturbance. In addition, the disturbance studies drew with the exception of one project (Christensen, 1997) - on expertise outside the
Department of Conservation and Land Management; the significance of this decision
will be addressed at a later point in connection with the characteristics of the scientific
process of the WA RFA. It is these research projects and related environmental studies
that I would like to focus on here because of both their status and the fact that much of
the controversy surrounding the RFA revolved around this part of the assessment work.
This is not to suggest, however, that other CRA assessments were of lesser significance
to the WA RFA, and reference will be made to these at a later stage.

Common to all disturbance reports were comments by their authors in relation to the
time they were given to conduct their reviews and compile their reports, which on
average was a period of six weeks. This was considered an "extremely brief contract
time-frame" (Lamont et al., 1997, p .3), substantially limiting their capacity to critically
reflect on, and digest, their often complex data (Horwitz et al., 1997; Majer & Heterick,
1997). In the end, the authors of all disturbance reports indicated that additional time
might have enhanced the quality of their work. Similar views were expressed by authors
of other CRA reports who also argued that not enough time was given and that overall
the time available to them to complete the reports was utterly inadequate. There was a
general sense that the apparent rush and pressure on to get it all over and done with ...
actually constrain[ed] the process, and nobody seemed to understand why the time that
scientists were given . . . was constrained ... since there [was] no reason why it should
have been ... because the whole process took four years anyway ewe were constantly
told while we were doing these reports that this had to be done, we only had five weeks,
it had to be done, because it had to be signed . .. all the Ministers wanted to sign this
very quickly. None of the Ministers did sign it very quickly and that's the point).

Government officials justified the timeframes, stating that [i]t was a legislative
requirement for the RFAs to be completed by a certain date, and that tended to drive
how you structured your timetable for doing all of the assessment work. This was true,
the WA RFA Scoping Agreement (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of

177

Western Australia, 1996b, p.13) did envisage the process completion "by end December
1997." Still, to a number of interviewees the rush meant that ... there was no attempt
to initially have a good look and decide what needed to be done and that [i]t was not
really possible to do anything new or to decide what needed to be found out to do
things properly. This last concern was raised in relation to the scoping of the reports,
which was, together with the establishment of the timeframes for the CRA studies,
something the Steering Committee ran. One Interviewee questioned whether ... shortterm desktop review[s] , which many of the studies were, [were] adequate for the topic[s]
researchers were asked to look into. While in general scientists maintained that the
funding was adequate and they did an exceptionally good job with the resources that
were available and the limitations at the time, many of those interviewed expressed
unease in relation to the adequacy of the data that was meant to underpin the Western
Australian CRA (the data sets that were available are totally inappropriate really for the
modelling process that was defined). In relation to flora and fauna studies which were
supposed to provide input to distributional or biogeographical modelling, numerous
scientists complained that there was no scope to go and acquire additional data.
Especially in the case of fauna it was argued that there needed to be data collected, not
just data compiled and that [t]here needed to be directed research programmes aimed at
obtaining specific information which ... [they] knew was lacking. To some interviewees
the scoping of projects which effectively prevented the collection of additional data was
deliberately based on the attitude that: We don't want a particular sort of information,
we don't want good data sets on this, we don't want to know. It was alleged that there
was a guiding fear that if there are good quality data and they are in the public domain
then the nature of the debate would change enormously.

Additional data was called for because it was believed that there ... [were] maior
shortcomings in the temporal sequence . . . and . . . spatial sequences of the data that
were thought to be fundamentally required. Furthermore, fauna mapping showed that
there were huge gaps in . . . [the scientistsl knowledge of distributions within the forest
of the core species that ... [they] had chosen and that there were lots of species where
there was none or very little information available on their distribution or habitat within
the forest. It was also suggested that the data that was available in Western Australia on
fauna was not really suitable for the modelling process, because it had been collected for
other purposes; not in most cases in a systematic way, consequently producing
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computer results which, biologically, were just nonsense. To illustrate this point, it was
held that 90 per cent plus of the Museum data, which constituted a considerable
proportion of the available data on fauna, [was] not at a fine enough spatial scale of
resolution to be particularly useful for modelling purposes. In other words, it was
argued that there was insufficient data to make it worthwhile to be doing the modelling.

Consequently, there was considerable concern that the process was in any way arriving
at reasonable conclusions as far as the probability of species occurring was concerned.

It was repeatedly stated that the conclusions were extremely suspect in the sense that
they ... [were] based on inadequate data and neither ... on a fair and comprehensive
assessment of the entire forest region nor ... on any assessment of major conservation
requirements throughout the forest region. In relation to fauna there was a widely held
perception that there was inadequate timing given to acquire ... [additional] data ... and
that proper survey[s] [were] not conducted, and a number of interviewees expressed
great misgivings about the whole process and considered the outcome ... [as] quite
flawed. Also, the scientists concerned saw their fears validated by the fact that fauna, as
opposed to the predictive modelling or mapp[ing of) ... the vegetation and the floristic
data, never played a particularly important role in the RFA process in the end due to
those limitations cited above.

All of the above illustrates that a number of serious concerns were raised by scientists

regarding the reliability of some of the CRA data used for the formulation of forest use
and management prescriptions under the RFA. Certainly the issue of time, terms of
reference, and data quality were shown to have been the underlying cause for most of
the unease expressed by research participants. In relation to the CRA studies there are
also range of process-related issues that need to be addressed. For instance, on the
question of impact of the CRA studies on the final CRA report and the RFA document
the interviews revealed that some scientists felt that the process . . . was limited and
controlled and that certain scientific views that have been expressed about the ecology
of the south-west forests ... did not find their way into any of the RFA documentation.
In the following section I will be looking at the scientific checks and balances that were

in place to ensure the veracity of the CRA data and will analyse the atmosphere in which
the science was conducted and debated. I also hope to identify the power structures
that may have affected the scientific of the WA RFA.
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Peer Review and Data Handling 8
It is considered a standard procedure in science that researchers seek a peer review, and
[that] then a third person, who is [neither] reviewer [nor] author, makes a decision as to
whether changes need to be made to the document or not. This view was also taken at
the ministerial level of the State and the Commonwealth where it was held that the
normal scientific process for doing a study . . . is to do the study and have a peer review
process and then refine the work.

In general terms, the aim of peer review is to

establish the validity and quality of research; it is supposed to keep the charlatans out of
science and to help maintain science as a process. Peer reviews legitimise science and
are therefore considered a vital part of the scientific method.

Scientists involved in the CRA projects suggested that there ha[d] been an inadequate
review process, that all . . . reports went through some sort of haphazard review, an
unclear process of incorporating the material found within them, [and] a very stifled
publication process in which the reports were made public.
reviewers expressed their reservations.

Both researchers and

Research scientists suggested that the peer

review was a higgledy-piggledy mess in terms of... how [the] reports were going to be
dealt with, how they were going to be reviewed, how they were going to be assessed and
handled, and there were complaints that there was no editorial involvement, which ...
[would be] usual .. . in a peer review process. Misgivings were expressed about the way
the reports were dealt with in that it was apparently the scientists who had to argue that
the reports [should) get reviewed, which was thought to be ridiculous. One interviewee
spoke of disturbance reports that were submitted on time to the Technical Committee,
which at the same time were sent to the three names ... [the authors] offered as the
reviewers, and they [the reviewers] responded to both the Technical Committee and the
authors. Supposedly, that was the public review process for those disturbance reports,
and that was about as good as it got. It was also alleged that [t]here was no formal
acceptance of the peer review and no instructions, coming from the Technical
Committee to the authors as to how they were to deal with that review. Attempts by
scientists to have the peer review improved were said to have been faced with resistance
the whole way through that process in that calls for the findings of those disturbance
reports ... [to] be disseminated to the wider scientific community ... [were) not taken
up .. . [and) refused.
78
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One reviewer felt that the submitted reports had been compiled too hastily and that a
disturbance report copy that ... [was] received ... (for] review was clearly incomplete.
This was attributed to the fact that the authors (had] not been given adequate time and
hence, in response to very pressing time deadlines, submitted a draft rather than a final
version and then presumably, when a final version was received, that it was actually felt
that the time was too short to actually go through with the review process. Thus, there
was a sense that the process itself seemed to leave too little time for the actual
preparation of the reports and then for the proper assessment of those reports once
they were submitted. These comments were congruent with statements expressing a
general sense that mighty haste and errors were characteristic of what happened in the
larger process, primarily because of the pace in which everybody was moving. Certainly,
the issue of time was a recurring theme with the added irony that the review process and
the process of acceptance, after scientists were being told (to] hurry, hurry, hurry, was
taking months.

Senior government sources defended the review process, maintaining that the majority
of . . . (CRA] reports was actually peer-reviewed, although not . . . all 46 reports were
reviewed, ... definitely all the critical ones were, and it was suggest(ed] that was the
majority of them. This last assertion was subsequently qualified by the statement that
those 46 reports . . . were not just scientific reports, there were also socio-economic
reports etc., etc ... [and] where appropriate there was peer review. This qualification
shows a clear distinction between hard science and soft science, the former presumably
representing science and the latter representing some type of undertaking somehow
distinct from science. Also, this statement discredits the CRA process and devalues the
final CRA report in that it suggests that social and economic CRA data, for instance,
were not based on science and thus not worthy of review. This second point was
underpinned by the assurance made that the assessment work was done in a very
scientific manner by, in most cases, scientists themselves either from government or
contractors to the government. Finally, the selective and closed review process suggests
that value judgements were made by the Steering Committee, as to which projects were
worthy of review, which ones were not, and what the review would entail.

Another issue of concern was data handling and data publication.

Interviewees

expressed considerable misgivings about how the reports were dealt with and how they
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were incorporated into the process. It seemed that they were concerned that the people
who were actually in control were not scientists and had no knowledge.

One

interviewee described a situation where Commonwealth bureaucrats assigned to the task
of reading ... [a disturbance] report were picking out the bits to go into the
Comprehensive Regional Assessment. It was felt that the bureaucrats took facts, or
what they thought were facts and figures, out of the report but never told ... [the
scientists] how ... [the] report [was] going to be dealt with. In the end, a number of
scientists found that . . . [the] recommendations that were in . . . [their] disturbance
report were not included in the summary, which was released at a time when the
disturbance report in question had not even received final assent. It was suspected that
other disturbance reports received similar treatment.

Comparable statements were

made by State parliamentarians who were approached by scientists involved in the RFA
process stating concerns about the data and what was being collected and what was not
being collected, . . . where their studies have been taken, about the timeframes, and
about the data that was used. The issue of selectiveness was also addressed by Horwitz
& Calver (1998). As part of their critique of the scientific credibility of the RFA process

they took issue with the fact that much of the current scientific debates on aspects of
forest management were ignored in the final CRA report (e.g. Abbott & Christensen,
1994; Mawson & Long, 1994; Abbott & Christensen, 1996; Calver et al., 1996; Davison,
1997; Mawson & Long, 1997; Stoneman et al., 1997; Calver et al., 1998). In the end, the
CRA process was not only criticised for being selective about data derived from CRA
reports and about research conducted prior to the RFA but also for not being explicit
about serious matters of debate that remained unresolved.

In an attempt to verify these claims I searched the Comprehensive Regional Assessment
document (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998a)
for references to the recommendations made in the disturbance reports in question and
merely found a general acknowledgement that the disturbance reports on fauna (i.e.
Christensen, 1997; Horwitz et al., 1997; Majer & Heterick, 1997) represented "the initial
stage in the identification of potentially threatening processes" (p.152); this was the only
reference to the disturbance reports on fauna.

In contrast, the aforementioned

concerns expressed about the data quality and suitability for flora and fauna modelling
were recognised in the CRA document, yet it contained little information, for instance,
on key disturbances and ecosystem processes as addressed by Lamont et al. (1997)
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whose recommendations, as a point of interest, mirrored a number of the
recommendations made by Calver et al. (1996; 1998). In short, scientists' claims were
valid that a number of issues addressed in the CRA studies were not included in the
final CRA Report.

Statements made by Horwitz & Calver (1998) regarding the

omission of relevant literature were also verified. It seems that most of the data that
was said to have been omitted by the interviewees was data that was disapproving of
aspects of current forest management processes or which challenged assumptions about
ecological processes. Many of the concerns raised in the disturbance reports were not
incorporated in the CRA document nor were any of the earlier mentioned studies on
jarrah dieback, water-logging, hollows etc. incorporated.

This gave a number of

interviewees the impression that the coverage [of certain views] was inadequate and that
the process was failing to take into account the intensity of some of the scientific
dispute that has occurred prior to the RFA.

The timing of the publication of the documents and the selective inclusion of data in the
CRA report must have had an influence on the public consultation process. Many of
the disturbance and other CRA reports did not reach the public domain until close to
the end of the public review period of the Comprehensive Regional Assessment, if at all.
The Comprehensive Regional Assessment was released in February 1998, but according
to government sources the comprehensive regional assessment work [was only
completed] round about October 1998 with the exception of the National Estate Report
... [which] came out a little bit later. This also meant that numerous CRA reports were
not made publicly available prior to the release of the Public Consultation Paper
(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998c), which was
published in May 1998.

The Public Consultation Paper (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of
Western Australia, 1998c, pp.6-7) stated under the heading 1.2.4 Stages

ef the

Regional

Forest Agreementprocess completed to date that the details of the CRA projects were contained
in the final CRA Report (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western
Australia, 1998a), the World Heritage Report (World Heritage Expert Panel, 1998), the
Assessment of Mineral and Hydrocarbon Resources (Geological Survey of Western
Australia & Bureau of Resource Sciences, 1998), the report on Ecologically Sustainable
Forest Management (Ferguson et al., 1997), and the then forthcoming National Estate
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Identification and Assessment Ooint Commonwealth and Western Australian Regional
Forest Agreement Steering Committee, 1998).

The Public Consultation Paper

(Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia, 1998c, p.7)
referred to CRA reports as part of the "materials developed to assist community
consultation." However, not all reports were made available in time to meaningfully
complement both the Comprehensive Regional Assessment and the Public Consultation
Paper, and indeed some reports remained unpublished for the time being. Interviewed
RFA stakeholders found that to be a fundamental weakness of the process because they
believed that [t]he public needed to know what the processes were, why those reports
were commissioned, what was important about each of the reports; in other words, the
rationale for each report, and the public needed to have time to review and adequately
assess all of these reports to enable the logic trail, the reason trail, and the paper trail to
be followed from the commencement of the RFA process to the final decision (the
working papers that were generated . . . some of those key reports were either never
written or they were written very late).

It becomes apparent that, in the eyes of process participants, the CRA process exhibited
significant shortfalls relating to the obtainment, analysis, handling, and publication of
scientific data on which the WA RFA was meant to be based. These concerns were to
be fuelled also by the perceived atmosphere under which CRA data was being produced
and the power structures in place that were seen to affect data access and
communication.

Perceptions of the Political Climate and Power Structures During the Process of
the WARFA 79
Newspaper headlines such as "Five arrests as war restarts in forests" (Rechichi, 1999a)
and newspaper articles employing terms such as "battle" (Rees, 1999), "warriors"
(Barrass, 1999), "kill" (Burns, 1999b), to only mention a few, give an impression of
military conflict during the RFA process to describe the climate in which negotiations
over WA's forests occurred. Interviewees acknowledged that there ha[d] been a long
history of acrimonious dispute and debate in the scientific community over forest
management in the south-west of Western Australia. It was felt that there was a general
recognition among some scientists with expertise and interest in the area that to speak
79
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critically of current management practices risked attack from some of the government
departments working in the area. Examples of such attacks were provided earlier in this
chapter. In the context of the assessment work for the WA RFA it was argued by
research participants that many forest biologists in WA were . . . employed by CALM
and therefore not free to speak up for there was perceived to be a climate and an
atmosphere in which people might [have] be[en] reluctant to speak their full opinions.
Interviewees pointed towards a general level of fear or uncertainty within the scientific
community [that] would [have] inhibit[ed] good, fruitful, and honest debate on some of
the issues at the heart of the RFA. This is presumably what Horwitz (evidence given to
the Standing Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development, 1997) described as
"science based on power relationships."

Power relationships, at the time, seemingly influenced the accessibility of data sources
and data access. Due to the nature of many of the biological CRA studies it was not
surprising that much of the data came from existing information held by [the
Department of] Conservation and Land Management obviously as the primary data
holder for forests in WA.

There were questions, however, whether all the CALM

databases had been made available to CRA researchers, and while some scientists
suspected that a lot of data sets that had been contributed to CALM ... were not [made]
available to them others stated categorically that there were quite a few databases, or sets
of data ... that were not available. In general, it was felt that information ... was very,
very tightly controlled . . . and limited. Commonwealth participants also stated data
access problems, suggesting that they were spending meeting after meeting negotiating
data access with CALM senior management. It was claimed that [t]he Commonwealth
felt that it needed full and open access to the data during and after the completion of
the CRAs, especially if the RFA was going to be credible and durable; however, it was
indicated that their access was restricted.

These comments relating to data access were part of a wider critique on the centrality of
CALM to the RFA process, which was considered to be very, very much dominated by
CALM staff, CALM officers. Although CALM staff argued that all these consultancy
reports were mostly written by outsiders, a question in the Parliament of Western
Australia to the Minister for the Environment revealed that of the 38 CRA reports
commissioned at that point in time 26 involved CALM staff (WA Parliamentary
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Debates - Hansard, November 1997). This degree of CALM involvement gave weight
to the perception that the Herbariurn and CALM ... received a lion's share in terms of
the funding and [that] they also . . . [had] the lion's share in terms of involvement of
scientists.

To some scientists, however, this did not seem to be an accurate

representation of the amount of science that [was] ... going on in the forests outside of
CALM, and it was thought to be a disproportionate representation of CALM. It was
this very substantial CALM input into the RFA that caused a large number of RFA
stakeholders to be concerned that CALM [would be] ... absolutely and completely in
control of the process. Furthermore, it was alleged that there was no real effort made to
ensure that the outcomes from any scientific process, especially those processes that
were done outside of CALM, were the best available. To further expand on that point
we need to return to the issues of project scoping and the inclusion of outside expertise.
The Public Consultation Paper (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of
Western Australia, 1998c) promised consultation with the scientific community
throughout the RFA process. It also made reference to a number of independent expert
panels and workshops that were employed to contribute to the process on matters
relating to biodiversity assessment projects, assessment of project methodologies,
validation of project results, and others.

Interviewees who participated in these

processes felt that they were fairly well marginalised, that there had been very infrequent
meetings, very inadequate agendas, and [that] basically their advice was ignored. In
addition, there was a sense that scientists were only called to bring in some independent
arbitration because the Commonwealth people and the State people did not agree. The
only one [group] that was actually based upon an independent committee process was,
according to stakeholder views, the Expert Advisory Group on the assessment of
ecologically sustainable forest management. The only other science forum that received
a positive mentioning by research participants was a symposium at Murdoch University
convened by the National Trust of Australia (WA) on the WA RFA in 1997. This
forum was considered a good way of bring[ing] all the parties together, such as local
government, CALM, Commonwealth, beekeepers, and all sorts of people, for a public
exchange of views and ideas (for details on the symposium refer to National Trust of
Australia (WA), 1997). Ironically, this forum was external to the RFA process.

So far I have dealt with issues of CRA procedure, and the data has revealed perceptions
of a wide range of process-related flaws, including data suppression, intimidation,
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monopolisation of research, and poor data publication.

In the next section of this

analysis I shall concentrate on more specific subjects of contention. Members of the
scientific community identified a wide range of issues that they saw to have been at the
core of the RFA debate. These included clearfelling (I think that clear-fall logging in
native forests is unsustainable. There is no way that clear-fall mimics in any form of
disturbance this forest has been subjected to in its evolutionary or historical past),
reservation (See, I think the position that ... [CALM staff] went into at the beginning of
the RFA was that (a) they hated greenies, especially after the mauling they received over
the Forest Management Plans, and (b) we have given away enough forests as parks and
reserves, we don't want to be placed in the position of having to have more parks and
reserves taken out of what's left), the amount of cut (There was an accelerated rate of
logging in the jarrah and the karri forests), woodchips (Really, you have to say, looking
at Australian forestry, that sawn timber products are a residual to a pulp wood driven
industry), job losses (The instructions were from the Commonwealth that there should
be no net job losses. I mean that was the political basis that the Commonwealth should
pursue no regrets measures), old growth forest logging (The extinction of old growth by
its very nature is not an ecologically sustainable process and neither is the continued
intensification of native forest management), and many others. As it is impossible to
analyse all the relevant data for all of these issues, I will concentrate on the issues of old
growth forests, the accreditation of linear/informal reserves, and allowable cut. These
issues were chosen also because they had given rise to much of the public disquiet about
the RFA in the late 1990s and, as was shown in Chapter Three, provoked heated debate
in the years preceding the WA RFA.

Sveci.ic
Issues of Contestation
...

Old Growth Forests8°
The protection of old growth forests was arguably the single most contentious issue of
the WA RFA. It featured prominently on the front-pages and one-page lift outs of
newspapers and magazines throughout 1998 and 1999 (Capp, 1998d, 1998c) and being
the subject of various public opinion polls (Westpoll, 1998; AMR: Quantum Harris,
1999). Interview data mention conflict arising over old growth forest logging given the
high profile of that forest in the community and the fact that the conservation

°For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XIX (CD-ROM).
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movement were wanting no logging in old growth forests . The RFA conflict centred on
the fact that it [the cessation of old growth logging] never was intended to be an
outcome of the RFA, which promulgated the slogan 'stop old growth logging'.
Consequently, scientific debate grew around the issue of which parts of the forest were
old growth forest and around the degree to which old growth should become part of
reserve design in WA. 81 The JANIS criteria endorsed the definition for old growth laid
down in the National Forest Policy Statement (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a,
p.49), which defines old growth as "forest that is ecologically mature and has been
subjected to negligible unnatural disturbance such as logging, roading and clearing. The
definition focuses on forest in which the upper stratum or overstorey is in the late
mature to overmature growth phases."

This characterisation, however, proved

problematic in Western Australia for two reasons. 82

Firstly, in relation to karri forest, karri fitted well into ... [the] agreed national definition
and CALM and Commonwealth officers could agree that karri . .. old growth forest was
older mature forest that was negligibly disturbed. However, the national definition did
not mesh well with the jarrah forest because it was considered practically impossible to
use Qarrah] canopy characteristics to determine old-growthness. In other words, aerial
photography, which old growth mapping is highly dependent on, could not be used to
identify the old-growthness of jarrah forest. In this context, it was held that CALM
sought to impose their own definition of old growth and presented a methodological
approach, which they had used for the karri forest (i.e. mature forest and the stand
configuration to identify senescence) (on this point also see Standing Committee on
Ecologically Sustainable Development, 1999).

This approach implied that the

measurement of trees to be reserved on the basis of old growth were to be determined
by canopy dominance via remote mapping. This approach was challenged however by
federal government negotiators, and in the end it was agreed, because of the way that
the jarrah forest canopy behaves, to use disturbance as a surrogate for old growth.
81

This debate included strong disagreements also over the pre-European old growth forest extent, which

was to serve as a baseline for negotiations on old growth reservation. Conservationists estimated the pre1750 old growth forest extent to have been 4.2 million ha whereas CALM saw that figure to be closer to
3.5 million ha (see Conservation Council of WA et al., 1999).
82

This problematique is also recognised in the Old Growth Mapping Report by Bradshaw (1998) and the

review of data and methodology for old-growth mapping by the Environment Forest Taskforce,
Environment Australia, and CALM (1997), which formed a part of the CRA.
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Secondly, the adoption of disturbance as an old growth proxy for jarrah left open the
meaning of negligible disturbance. Broadly, the question was whether forests had been
subject to timber harvesting or not and a range of other disturbances including disease
(primarily Phytophthora cinnamomz). Interview data revealed that State-Commonwealth
negotiations on old growth protection were complicated by philosophical differences
([there were] a lot of arguments over the basis for the determining of negligible
disturbance).

The NFPS (Commonwealth of Australia, 1992a, p.11) recognised the

"high aesthetic" and "cultural" values of old growth but also its "nature conservation
values." Yet, it was held that CALM . . . fundamentally did not believe in a special value
pertaining to old growth.

Interviewees alleged that CALM staff actually held an

explicitly stated philosophical view that old growth forest was an anthropogenic
construct.

Indeed, CALM staff confirmed that there is nothing particular about

[Western Australian] old growth forests which is absolutely indispensable for
biodiversity conservation for the main attribute of old growth forest is hollows .. . [and]
hollows are not only found in old growth.

In the end, 347 578 ha of old growth forest was identified but a total of 24 300 ha of old
growth were excluded on the basis of disease (WA Parliamentary Debates - Hansard,
April 1998). This decision was seen to have come about because of CALM's stance on
old growth forests.

The department appeared to have used phytophthora mapping

strategically to determine the areas that were not old growth so as to minimise the
amount of forest that could be classified as old growth.

These scientific disagreements at the State-Commonwealth level were publicised by
conservation groups for whom old growth was a particular issue. Conservationists held
the view that [CALi\,f] really did fiddle the figures. They saw the formula: old growth is
virgin forest minus dieback affected forest as a way that ... allow[ed] them to minimise
the area of old growth. This view was formed primarily in response to the . . . oldgrowth forest mapping (Bradshaw, 1998), which was said to have been the one [CRA
report] that probably was subject to most criticism because it was believed that CALl\1
ha[d] . . . the old growth wrong. As a reaction to stakeholder agitation a second old
growth report was commissioned by Environment Australia "to independently review
the old growth status of areas not mapped as old growth by the CRA" (Mattiske
Consulting Pty Ltd, 1998, p.1) .

However, green groups also criticised this report
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because it was held that the timeframe ... allocated made it .. . impossible ... to find ...
old growth that CALM had missed. In other words, the second report was seen to have
incorrectly assessed old growth (see Capp, 1999a) and was therefore considered to be an
endorse[ment of] CALM's assessment of old growth forest. The inclusion of old gravel
pits and [a] rubbish tip into the old growth reserve estate (see Armstrong, 1999c; Bums,
1999d) and the revelation that over 350 000 ha of reserved areas were not forest but
swamps, sand dunes, rocky outcrops and cleared land (see Burns, 1999c) further fuelled
the cynicism of many stakeholders. Antagonism also grew when RFA maps revealed
that forests with the highest timber production areas ... [seemed to] coincide with the
areas that ... [were] not protected (see also Burns, 1999a; McKenzie, 1999). Within the
science community the old growth issue remained contested even after the RFA had
been finalised in May 1999. Some scientists supported the conservationists' calls for
more old growth protection for they feared, amongst other things, that the "survival of
a wide range of animals" would be threatened by continued old growth logging (see
Taylor, 1999, p.1). Others like Dr Turner from the Forestry Department at Australia
National University, who headed the RFA expert panel for the determination of the
sustainable sawlog yield for the jarrah and karri forest, were reported to say that
"enough old growth forest had been preserved for environmental purposes" and that
further reservation would be "a political and social decision, not a scientific one"
(Armstrong, 1999b, p.6). In other words, the science community was divided on the
issue of old growth protection.

The RFA signed in May 1999 protected a total of 232 800 ha of old growth forest,
which meant that the RFA delivered an additional 45 700 ha to the old growth estate; a
24 per cent increase (WA Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, 1999a). The area nominally
protected under the RFA exceeded the figures stipulated by JANIS by 11 per cent
(including informal reserves) and was said to contain "some important areas of old
growth - areas which best meet the nationally agreed reserves criteria" (WA
Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, May 1999a, p.7890/1).

The areas that were not

included were considered "not [to] contain significant areas of old growth or were not
needed to meet nationally agreed criteria" (WA Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, 1999a,
p.7890/1). It is these points pertaining to the quality of the old growth protected,
however, that were contested (see WA Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, May 1999a).
This issue of the quality of protected old growth forests also relates to the general make-
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up of the reserve system. Critics of the RFA argued that informal reserves featured
excessively in the design of the reserve system, resulting in forests of high vulnerability
and poor quality being protected whilst high quality forests remained available for
logging.

Informal Reservel3
The issue of linear/informal reserve accreditation was controversial both politically as
well as scientifically.

The JANIS Ooint ANZECC/MCFFA National Forest Policy

Statement Implementation Sub-Committee, 1997) document made it clear that the use
of "linear reserves should be avoided where possible except for riverine systems and
corridors identified as having significant value for nature conservation" (p.18). Informal
reserves should only be employed where it was "not possible or practicable to include
conservation values into Dedicated Reserves" (p.7). In recognition of the ecological
problems associated with reserves of that nature (e.g. Saunders et al., 1991; WardellJohnson et al., 1991; Bachelard et al., n.d.), the inclusion of informal/linear reserves was
intended to be a last resort where formal reservation was not achievable (There is a very
large body of literature available which all indicate that in terms of secure reservation
systems linear reserves are not much good but ... and that the JANIS criteria were quite
explicit in that ... basically they are not much good). Yet, WA wanted to accredit a large
contribution from those linear informal reserves because - as argued by some - there
[was] no logging potential (see also Conservation Council of WA et al., 1999). While in
the eyes of some · stakeholders that represented a stretching of the flexibility criteria
made available under JANIS, Commonwealth officials found it difficult to argue against
the accreditation of these reserves because of the compromises that had already been
made in other RFAs (such as Victoria and Tasmania), which meant that science did not
enter into the debate.

According to one interviewee, [t]he problems were that the Commonwealth accredited
some dodgy linear reserves in Victoria, and then they accredited some even more dodgy
linear reserves in Tasmania to minimise the impact of resources withdrawals ... in that
context it was very, very difficult to argue best science with the Western Australians (So
a bad decision is made, and an even worse decision is made the next time). Still, to a
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number of RFA stakeholders this struck as an another attempt to effectively minimise
the extent of new conservation reserves to count ... road, river and stream reserves as
informal reserves . .. [with] real genuine environmental value. Stakeholders saw many
injustices in the inclusion of linear reserves including that [t]he RFA ... [did] not
recognise the Valley of the Giants (a well known tourist destination in the south-west of
WA) as old growth but [recognised] the scrub on the side of the highway south of it [as
old growth] . The RFA, as signed in May 1999, delivered approximately 1.5 million ha
CAR reserve system (44 per cent of the public land in the region), which included 12
898 ha of informal reserves on Crown Land and 137 886 ha of informal reserves in
State Forest (The State of Western Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia,
1999).

Allowable Cuf4
Matters relating to the allowable cut for jarrah and karri have been the subject of
considerable debate in the State for over 15 years, as indicated in Chapter Three.
McComb (1994, p.1) described an "aggressive philosophy to timber harvest within some
high-level administrators of CALM." This stance by CALM gave rise to a number of
inquiries into the sustainability of timber cutting in Western Australia's forests (e.g.
Barnett,

1992;

Environmental

Protection

Authority,

1992;

Meagher,

1993;

Environmental Protection Authority, 1998; Standing Committee on Ecologically
Sustainable Development, 1999). As mentioned in Chapter Three, CALM proposed in
1992 (see Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1992b) to amend its
1987 Timber Strategy (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987c)
based on what was understood to be "incomplete knowledge of ... [associated] long
term consequences" (Environmental Protection Authority, 1992, p.33) and raising the
concerns of conservationists and forest scientists. Critics viewed the proposals as a
prescription to raze the forests. One interviewee saw the proposed amendments as
being based on the philosophy that the intensity of harvest of the non-conservation
areas was [to] significantly increase in order to more than offset the amount timber that
was not to be harvested from the conservation reserve schemes (original emphasis).
The last comment is to be seen in context with CALM's recommendation to increase
the allowable cut for jarrah representing a radical shift in thinking.

84
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The new plan

envisaged a temporary increase in the cut to 675 000 m 3 /yr followed by a stabilisation in
the sawlog yield at around 300 000 m 3 /yr ([I]n the jarrah forest, for example, they were
proposing a massive increase in the rate of logging and a major change in the style of
logging where they go from selective logging to almost clearfelling). This was in stark
contrast to the 1982 General Working Plan (see Forests Department, 1982) and the
1987 Timber Strategy (see Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1987c),
both predicting a long-term decline in the saw log yield for jarrah rather than a
stabilisation in resource availability (see Figure 6.1) (There was an accelerated rate of
logging in the jarrah and the karri forests; logging was maintained at its 1983 level rather
than being scaled back as had originally been intended in the previous Forest
Management Plan).
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Figure 6.1: Long-Term Sawlog Yield Scenarios for Jarrah
(adapted from Minson, 1993)
CALM's proposal was criticised by the EPA (see Environmental Protection Authority,
1992) and subsequently rejected by the Barnett Appeals Committee (1992) (the EPA
report and Toss Barnett's report saying that this whole thing [the Forest Management
Plan] was corrupt more or less). Yet, the Meagher Committee (1993), the following
year, approved 490 000 m 3 /yr for jarrah first and second grade sawlogs on the basis of
social and employment considerations. While the approved level of cut was significantly
lower than that initially proposed by CALM (675 000 m 3/yr), questions remained as to
the sustainability of this level of cut because 490 000 m3 /yr were "not claimed [by

193

CALM] to be available in perpetuity" (Evidence to the Standing Committee on

Ecologically Sustainable Development, 1999, p.41) and substantially exceeded all
available sustainable yield predictions available at the time. 85 In the end, the 1994 Forest
Management Plan (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1994)
incorporated an allowable level of cut for jarrah, a level previously seen as unsustainable,
while a reduction of the allowable cut to sustainable levels was postponed until 2003 in
an attempt to minimise resource uncertainty, protect employment, and foster
investments into the industry. The set levels, however, were frequently referred to in
the WA Parliament (including the ESFM report by Ferguson et al. (1997)) as the
sustainable cut, leading to public confusion about the difference between allowable and
sustainable levels of cut (see Environmental Protection Authority, 1998, p.28).

Given that the level of cut was central to the WA RFA and that these levels were
knowingly set above sustainable levels throughout the 1990s, it became a highly
contested issue. Turner (1998, p.31) appraised CALM's wood resource yield estimates,
as part of the CRA process, and found them to be "appropriate, internally consistent
and [to] contain adequate safeguards on the quality of the data." Surprisingly, however
the question of sustainable yield was not addressed by Ferguson et al. (1997) as part of
their determination of ESFM in the State. This oversight was surprising because ESFM
was one of the key objectives of the NFPS. The Standing Committee on Ecologically
Sustainable Development (1998a, p.5) stated that "the issue of achieving ESFM [was]
probably more important than the other intended outcomes of the RFA process, both
for industry and conservation."

Given the impact of the level of cut on the

maintenance of the productive capacity of forest ecosystems it seems odd that Ferguson
et al. (1997, pp.11-13) restricted their comments to the rehabilitation of former mine
sites but did not comment further on what constitutes a sustained yield other than to say
that "native forest logging should be based on sustained yield principles."

The Public Consultation Paper (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of
Western Australia, 1998c) proposed three forest use/management options, stipulating
figures for the allowable cut for jarrah and karri ranging from 457 700 m3 /yr to 496 300

ss The Meagher Committee noted that estimates of a sustainable level ranged between 300 000 m 3/yr and
450 000

m3

/yr. In subsequent years, as confirmed by CALM experts, a cut of 250 000

considered to be sustainable in perpetuity (see Environmental Protection Authority, 1998).
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m3

/yr was

m3 /yr and from 193 500 m 3 /yr to 211 200 m3 /yr respectively. These figures, in the case
of jarrah, were all above the previously suggested sustainable level of cut. This might
explain as to why research participants thought that the Public Consultation Paper
seemed to exclusively look at the needs of the timber industry (as was shown in Chapter
Five). The debate over sustainable yield was to intensify in late 1998 following the
publication of a report by the WA EPA (1998) on CALM's environmental performance
and compliance with the 1992 Ministerial Conditions. The report criticised CALM for
not complying with 25 of the 37 environmental conditions attached to the 1994 Forest
Management Plan. The EPA report also suggested that the allowable jarrah sawlog cut
of 490 000 m 3/yr should urgently be reduced to 300 000 m3/yr, as indicated by Minson
(1993), to avoid a substantial decline in these sawlogs by the year 2030. CALM rejected
in its response (Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1998) many of the
EPA claims arguing that much of the EPA report was based on errors of fact and logic
as well as selective interpretation. In relation to the allowable cut for jarrah CALM
(1998, p.6)dismissed allegations that the jarrah forest was being overcut and stated that
it would be "operating in accordance with a precautionary approach." As no agreement
could be reached between CALM and the EPA an adjudicator was called in by the WA
State Government. Without publicly available terms of reference for the undertaking,
Michael Codd, a former Canberra bureaucrat, was in charge of brokering an agreement
between CALM's Executive Director Syd Shea and Bernard Bowen, the EPA Chairman.
After three weeks Codd submitted a four-page report (Codd, 1999) to the State's
Minister for the Environment. The report, which was reportedly dismissed by Federal
Forestry and Conservation Minister Wilson Tuckey as irrelevant (see Mallabone, 1999),
spoke, inter alia, of an agreement between the two parties to have an independent expert
group, including EPA representatives, for the assessment of sustainable yield figures
consistent with ESFM principles.

Under this agreement Turner, Ferguson, and

Fitzpatrick (1999) reviewed the calculations for sustainable sawlog yields and suggested
a reduction in the levels to 286 000 m 3 /yr and 178 000 m 3 /yr for jarrah and karri
respectively. A second ministerial advisory group on karri and tingle forest management
was to be formed later the same year.

The RFA document (Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western
Australia, 1999, p.18) as signed by the State and the Commonwealth in May 1999,
endorsed 324 000 m 3/yr for first and second grade jarrah sawlogs and 186 000 m 3 /yr for
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r
karri first and second grade sawlogs until 2003 to be reduced not before the year 2004
down to 286 000 m 3 /yr and 178 000 m 3/yr for jarrah and karri respectively "to produce
a non-declining yield of sawlogs." The WA State Government admitted that the "RFA
set .. . out the expected sustained yields for jarrah and karri sawlogs from 2004"

~A

Parliamentary Debates - Hansard, May 1999b, p. 7757 /1), which meant that the
allowable cut was left above sustainable levels until the expiration of the then current
Forest Management Plan.

The fact that the allowable cut [was] in excess of what ... [was considered] sustainable
made it difficult for the WA government to convince many Western Australians, who
were told that the RFA [was] giving [them] ESFM. Despite scientific support for the
reduction of logging levels, the decision to reduce levels was postponed until 2004 to
protect current timber contracts and employment in the timber industry.

The

controversy surrounding sustained logging levels and the reserve design combined with
the refusal to protect all remaining old growth forests under the RFA ensured that, after
the signing of the RFA, the debate would continue and ultimately lead to the
amendment of the RFA eight weeks later.

Discussion86

''All that science, and in the end it 1vas all 1vorth nothing"
The previous sections attest to the point that the RFA process tended to rely very much
on the scientists, who were heavily involved in the process and that there were a lot of
professional people ... employed, [we are] talking about the top scientists in WA. In the
beginning of the RFA process, the strong involvement of science was well received by
many RFA stakeholders who were welcoming a scientifically based assessment of the
forest, hoping that this would be one of [the RFA's] great strengths; instead of the
rhetoric, emotion, and the general bullshit that goes on in these debates. This is true in
particular for members of the timber industry (The underpinning science of the RFA
that we were going to have a comprehensi,,e, adequate, and representative reserve
system that protected the full suite of features in a permanent and lasting way).
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Quantity, however, does not necessarily deliver quality. In WA, so it seems, the strength
of the RFA was to be gauged on the amount of science and number of scientists
involved in the process.

As suggested by research participants, [i]t was almost a

numbers game, and the number of 500 scientists purported to have been involved in the
process was stated many times during the RFA (see WA Parliamentary Debates Hansard, 199%). The philosophy behind such an approach was described as a sort of
religious blessing type approach to science, which means that a process would simply
need enough science ... so that it has veracity. Indeed, high numbers meant that the
RFA process [was] based on science. Public relations research (Keys Young, 1996)
commissioned by the Forests Taskforce of Department for Prime Minister and Cabinet
emphasised the need for scientific credibility. WA State Government officials agreed
that the use of science [seemed] inevitable and that science was always going to be the
critical element in terms of what [the RFA] was going to achieve. However, it was also
acknowledged that the use of science in a process like this . . . [would] automatically
mean ... that there are going to be problems. The main problem was that science did
not speak with one voice, neither prior to the RFA nor during the process. At times it
was almost like having one group in the debate saying: Look, we have 17 scientists to
say we are right, while another group was saying: We have 17 scientists to say that it is
not right. Consequently, it was difficult to convey a sense of scientific unity on highly
contested issues, and the stumbling blocks for the RFA proved to be (a) the way in
which these scientific disputes were dealt with and (b) to what extent science would
determine the final outcome.

Interviewee responses gave the impression that the science of the WA RFA was tamed,
meaning that dissent was ignored or vehemently rebutted and that science overall was
made compliant with a dominant scientific/political viewpoint.

This imposition of

scientific viewpoints instilled the feeling in RFA stakeholders that science was used as a
weapon. Some respondents believed that science was used to build a fac;:ade, a fac;ade
... the process would be using science to provide [Western Australians] with ...
answers, and that was publicly acceptable, whereas in reality, the guidance, the levels of
forest reservation and so on, was coming from elsewhere, and it was not coming from
science. It was this blurring of science and politics that led stakeholders to believe that
the RFA process ha[d] not been about science and overall that the scientific arguments
were rather unimportant. A number of stakeholders, members of the timber industry in
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particular, had confidence ... in the scientific studies and were reasonably happy with
the rigour of the assessment work (with the exception of the social assessment work (I
had some doubts about some of the social assessment work)), and even conservationists
conceded that there was some good stuff in the WA RFA. Still, most were convinced
that the RFA had nothing to do with logic or science and that in WA it was all about
politics where [e]ven some of the science outcomes were political outcomes (we are
looking at very much not a scientific process at all but a political process). In other
words, the strong scientific thrust of the WA RFA, as promised by politicians and RFA
process management, stakeholders were unable to see.

In this context, commenting once more on CALM's scientific role in the WA RFA

process, it seems that CALM was defending more, or perhaps something other, than
just a scientific argument. Admittedly, the same could be said of other stakeholders as
well. Nevertheless, earlier references to signs of scientific neo-positivism within CALM
might have been misplaced. Members of WA's scientific community interpreted the
position taken by CALM during the RFA process as being symptomatic of a
profession/ administration being in denial (they [CALJ\1) are in denial). The issue of
denial was raised because some stakeholders believed that there was no way in the world
that they [CALJ\1) would accept (a) that they have done things wrong in the past, that
they have been over-exploiting the forest ecosystems for years, and (b) they can't seem
to come to terms with the idea that community attitudes and values have changed and
therefore there are different expectations placed on the forest in the way is to be used.
The term denial may also better explain as to why CALM seemingly did not want to
know about dissenting views because it would have meant that they might have [had] to
change [their] current procedures although [they] have been arguing that [they] do know
and what [they] are doing is right. Some interviewees saw this sort of behaviour to be
endemic in a lot of those sorts of professions, including for instance the agricultural
science fraternity. These professions were considered to be very much a closed shop,
and the forestry profession in Australia, for that matter, was also regarded by
interviewees to be a closed shop, staffed with graduates from two universities who
generally are all buddies. Closed-shop professions, just as any form of organisation, are
at a risk of cultural cloning, breeding practitioners with systemic blind spots and
myopias towards change around them (Emery & Trist, 1965; Emery, 1997b; Trist et al.,
1997). As a consequence, confrontation and fervent defence of culturally entrenched
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views can become the norm. Also, perceptions of crisis are rejected and ridiculed, and
faults or errors of judgments are not admitted to. This is also akin to what Torgerson
(2001) refers to as the limitations of the administrative mind. Administrations are also
prone to strongly reject criticisms for it is feared that any admission to errors or flaws
would put into question the raison d'etre of the entire administrative complex. Thus, in
the case of CALM the issue of denial may indeed be seen as two-tiered.

CALM

exhibited features of a closed shop mentality towards forestry and public relations
during the 1990s and during the RFA process, its staff maintaining that [t] here is not
really a problem and that all that needs to be done is to tweak the dials and to change
the formula slightly. This professional stance also received administrative backing.
Consequently the scientific disagreements of the WA RFA, and those preceding the
RFA process, should perhaps not only be seen in light of this dichotomy of positivism
versus pessimism as suggested earlier but also in connection with a profession and an
administration being in denial, with its practitioners and managers responding
systematically and apprehensively to challenges to their professional pride, identities,
and egos.

Having regard to what the WA RFA delivered, it may not come as a surprise in light of
the above that many stakeholders believed that the scientific outcomes [of the CRA
work] were not necessarily reflected in the outcomes of the RFA, meaning that [t]he
nexus between what the science has found out and what actually happened was not
[considered] particular strong. This feeling was also expressed in connection with the
amendments of the WA RFA. The RFA was described many times as an "extensive
scientific process" with "[m]ore than 500 scientists and experts address[ing] the
economic, social, environmental and cultural issues of the ecosystems in the south west
forest region"; "a process [that] cannot be overturned overnight" (::I/A Parliamentary
Debates - Hansard, June 1999, p. 9390/3). Yet, the whole thing [was] ... dissolved ...
in ten weeks, and the resolution was pretty much a spontaneous thing rather than an
outcome of all that good science that had been done. As was put soberly, [p]olicies
come and go. The nature of the amendments was defended by members of the State
Government who saw the forest debate turning into a very emotional debate, suggesting
that when emotion gets in you can't better it with science. Still, this argument was
countered by other participants who were saying that if the science had been used
honourably to really work out the best long-term reserve system, the best silvicultural
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methods etc., .. .it could have been a much better outcome; possibly, it would never
have come to the amendments. To put it differently, the debate turned emotional
partially because of a perceived manipulation of science.

It was this treatment of science that was seen to have damaged both science and the

process, and it raised the question of whether science should be put in that role to begin
with, meaning whether [one should] ask science or scientists for moral guidance in a
processes such as this. It was argued by a number of participants that the RFA was
damaged because people could not see how science was giving [them] the answer[s].
The problem was that science could not give the answers, as suggested by some
stakeholders, because it was science that needed to be given an honest direction; yet,
stakeholders did not think that science was given that moral guidance. This guidance
was considered important because science itself cannot make this last step to policy and
to outcomes in the real world and the real environment and in the forests. It could not
. . . [produce the answers] because the reductionist nature of science was in this
particular case exploited as a weakness ... especially, its weakness as an integrating
perspective was absolutely exploited to the maximum by the Department of
Conservation and Land Management in order to control the process. It seems that very
useful strengths of science to have that precision and that reductionist ability allowed
that to occur.

As to the quality of scientific data, stakeholders suggested that there was some very
good data ... lt]hat may in the long-term prove useful and some good scientific work.
Nevertheless, the WA RFA seemingly failed in terms of being an acceptable scientific
process delivering, while perhaps politically credible, scientifically incredible outcomes.
It is these sentiments that were also expressed in the work done by Bigler Cole (1998),
and it is the results of her study that I now wish to compare with the findings of this
chapter.

Many of the respondents in Bigler Cole's study, titled "Perceptions

ef science in the

Western

Australian Regional Forest Agreement process'', pointed to the exclusion and/ or
marginalisation of what was coined reliable scientists and bureaucratic elements limiting
scientific inquiries and placing restrictions on what scientists could either say or do.
This was said to have been particularly true for government employed scientists. Similar
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arguments were put forth by research participants in this study. Bigler Cole unearthed
signs of institutional positivism and a strong sense of disinterestedness, objectivity, and
truth among individuals working as scientists for government departments.

These

aspects of scientific dogmatism within government department were also identified in
this study.

Three quarters of Bigler Cole's research participants questioned, not dissimilar to the
findings presented in this study, the empirical validity of the WA RFA process. Many
expressed concerns about the secrecy involved in the process, a sense of distrust in
relation to CALM, and much public confusion about the science of the RFA. She
identified many criticisms directed against the CRA studies identifying perceived
deficiencies, like this study did, in relation to the quality of the CRA reports, the
timeframes allowed for the CRA studies, the stifled publication process, poor public
consultation, and the lack of peer review.

A very interesting aspect raised by Bigler Cole is that the RFA process was about
integrating science (the integration of broader issues, methodologies, logical and
empirical assumptions), however, that it was not the scientists who were in charge with
the integration, which also raised the question whether science can deliver on the issue
of integration. That point gave rise to the issue of the potential limitedness of pure
science in political processes and drew attention to the divide between pure and applied
science, in particular, as it relates to truth conflicting truths. Her work highlights the
political nature of science, especially in connection with environmental matters where
often the line between science and advocacy is difficult to discern. Overall, Bigler Cole's
research hints at a stronger role of science in science/policy partnerships and thus
echoes statements made earlier with regards to the political engagement of scientists in
processes where professional values and ideal can become compromised.

Bigler Cole's case study analysis is restricted, however, to an assessment of participant
responses in light of the Mertonion norms of universalism, disinterestedness,
communality and organised scepticism and does not engage with a wider discussion of
science and the policy process. Yet, it is these more general questions that I wish to
tum to in the following chapter drawing together the data produced in this study
relating to public participation, science, sustainability, and political processes.
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Conclusion

In this chapter it was my task to provide an understanding of the scientific nature of the
WA RFA process. The RFA case study was presented against the background of a
broader discussion on the role of science in public processes and policy formulation.
The review showed that societal dependence on science today is unprecedentedly
strong, yet problematic and controversial due to a sense of alienation by the public from
science-driven government processes and wide-spread distrust of scientific dogmatism.
Within the broader debate on environmental policy-making and sustainable
development science was also shown to be pivotal. However, it was suggested that
perhaps a new or more holistic science is needed to adequately address the complex and
wicked problems confronting humanity.

The case study data presented in this chapter suggested that many interviewees viewed
the science of the WA RFA (a) to have been controlled and manipulated, (b) scientific
protocols to have been violated, (c) science to have been used as a political tool and its
use to have been tokenistic, and (d) science to have had little impact on the final RFA
outcomes. Overall, the science of the WA RFA was shown to have been tame(d).

Stakeholder views identified in this study were shown to be congruent with the findings
derived from the study by Bigler Cole (1998), who also revealed a strong sense of
stakeholder dissatisfaction with the science of the WA RFA. Her work pointed towards
perceptions of procedural flaws regarding CRA work and its analysis, raised questions
about staffing decisions, and echoed calls for a stronger participatory role to be played
by the science community in government processes.
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Chapter Seven
Contextual Analyses, Syntheses, and Conclusions
Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to integrate the case study data and to synthesise my findings
with the socio-ecological framework adopted for the purposes of this study. Prior to
this synthesis, however, I will introduce three brief analyses as foreshadowed in
Chapters Two, Four, and Five as a means of providing a more holistic view of the WA
RFA process. The first analysis will explore the roles of personalities within the WA
RFA process, assessing the influence of special individuals on both the WA RFA process
and

its

outcomes.

The

second

analysis

will

address

the

issue

of group

homogeneity /heterogeneity, in particular concentrating on the views held by members
of the Government/Departments/Political Parties group and examining the degree of
agreement and dissent among its members. A third analysis will focus on the media's
role in raising the public profile of the WA RFA process. Subsequently, I will present a
summary of the WA RFA as seen from multiple stakeholders' perspectives.

As part of the theoretical integration, I will analyse the WA RFA in light of the open
systems framework introduced in Chapter Two. The insights derived from OST and
the socio-ecological commons framework will be used for a systems critique of the
events in WA, using the behavioural stakeholder model for CCPRs for an assessment of
the outcomes of the WA RFA process and exploring the model's conceptual strengths
and weaknesses.

This systems analysis will then inform a wider discussion on the

implications of this study, which will culminate in a reflection on the notions of system
openness and closedness and their implications for the political treatment of science and
public participation in processes of environmental policy-formulation.

The Role of Personalities in the Western Australian RFA87
In this section I will explore the significance of individual actors in the forest debate as
perceived by RFA stakeholders and the impact their involvement had on the RFA
process and its outcomes. I will also look at the roles of individuals within government
87

For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XXII (CD-ROM).
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departments and assess the impact of any divergence between personal agendas and
departmental views during the course of the RFA process.

The focus on individuals is important for it needs to be recognised that individuals play
a critical role within participatory processes. It is important also for analyses of political
processes usually concentrate on group dynamics but, as suggested by Buchy and Race
(2001), direct insufficient attention to what they coin pecial individuals in whom power
is vested due to their socio-political or professional status. The concept of power is
generally understood in terms of power inequalities between groups and as having the
"capacity . . . to control and dominate . . . social structures and natural resources"
(Kaufman, 1997, p.154). In the context of political processes, the distribution of power
is considered to be predetermined by those who initiate and control those processes. In
other words, powerful groups are seen to be in control of political processes and shape
their directions and outcomes. However, special individuals also have the ability either to
reinforce or to challenge established power structures, which in turn suggests that
paying closer attention to the roles of those individuals can lead to a better
understanding of the dynamics of political processes. Therefore, in what follows focus
will be placed on pecial individuals in the context of the WA RFA in an assessment of
their roles in, and their influence on, the process as seen by RFA stakeholders.

I suggested in Chapter Three that the involvement of prominent individuals in the WA
RFA process lifted the public profile of the forest debate and impacted significantly on
the public mood in relation to forests and the RFA. The change in public sentiment
proved to be decisive because, as indicated by one interviewee, [i]t was the general
public's concern that changed the day. In fact, it was suggested by a member of the WA
Coalition Government that it was not the Conservation Council or the Forest Alliance
that really generated the debate. You did not see the change in the community with
those groups raising the banner so to speak. That happened essentially when Mick
Malthouse got involved. The debate changed very much in the community's opinion
when you have a coach of a very successful AFL [Australian Football League) team, a
winning team, enter the debate. Media content also supports the notion that "the
televised outrage of West Coast Eagles coach Mick Malthouse" was "the turning point
in the debate" (O'Brien & Martin, 1999, p.1).
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In May 1998, Mick Malthouse, then the popular coach of one of WA's AFL football
clubs, took a public stand against old growth logging and CALM's forest management
practices (Malpeli, 1998). Malthouse's televised statement angered many timber workers
and timber town residents, who felt betrayed and regarded his actions as an abuse of his
high public profile.

His public opposition towards old growth logging resulted in

cancellations of football club memberships, the burning of the club's flags, and threats
by fans from the State's south-west to boycott future games and to shift their business
away from the club's main sponsor (Miller & Burns, 1998; Rechichi, 1998a). However,
Malthouse's actions also mobilised a group of prominent Western Australians, who saw
their role in swaying public opinion in relation to old growth logging (I believe that my
business profile and my credibility as a business person had an influence on raising the
awareness of the seriousness of the forest issue and shifting it from being an issue that
was - or perceived to be - a protest issue by so-called unemployed youth or ferals as
they are called ... shifting it into the business community and into the city where other
people could actually say: Yes, that's exactly what I believe in as well). This group came
about because ... a group of ... business people [were invited] for a briefing in Dame
Rachel Cleland's (Liberal Party matriarch) lounge room on a Sunday morning. There
were community leaders and mayors, sports people, Aboriginal representatives, and
artists; just a whole range of people from the community that were concerned about
forests (see also Malpeli, 1998).

The group became active throughout 1998 and 1999, and its members could frequently
be seen as guest speakers at RFA-related public seminars, anti-logging protests, and
rallies (Armstrong, 1998; Wainwright, 1999). In particular, in mid-1999 when the forest
debate reached its zenith around the time of the signing of the WA RFA, the group's
members featured regularly on the front-pages of local and national newspapers
showing their support for forest protesters in their efforts to stop old growth logging
(O'Brien & Martin, 1999; Rechichi, 1999b); some were even arrested during forest
protests, which served to fuel the public debate (Mayman, 1999). Concurrently, antilogging sentiments were expressed by groups such as the Anglican Church (Capp,
1998b), medical doctors (Conservation Council of WA, 1998), musicians (Armstrong,
1999d), the National Trust (Armstrong, 1999a), prominent environmentalists like David
Bellamy and David Suzuki (Pryor, 1999), and Western Australian business people
(Anon, 1998). This somewhat unlikely coalition proved successful in placing the "stop-
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old-growth-logging-message" into the public's gaze creating synergies with widely
publicised slogans such as "stop a virgin from rape" (Friends of Jane, 1998) and "oldgrowth carnage" (Schultz, 1998) by conservation groups, which had been campaigning
for the protection of old growth for many years. These combined efforts were cause
for much public agitation and arguably caused "thousands to join the fight for forests"
(Miller, 1999) at anti-logging protests in Perth mid-1999.

The work undertaken by the group of prominent Western Australians also attracted
critics who perceived its lobbying efforts to be a means of turning the forest issue very
emotive. Members of the group admitted to having become involved on the emotional
basis of having an attachment to those old trees (Simply because of my personal
attachment to those old trees I did not think there was any justification for knocking
them over). Another reason for this group's engagement in the RFA was a stated
attachment to the democratic process and a belief in an individual citizens' democratic
right to object to the destruction of what ... [was thought to] rightfully belong ... to the
people. In their view, formed on the basis of opinion polls (Westpoll, 1998; AMR:
Quantum Harris, 1999), 85 to 90 per cent of people wanted to stop the logging (The
cessation of the lo&,oing is what the community wants, cessation of the logging in our
old growth forests is the only acceptable outcome). It was felt that the government was
not doing it, and it was considered offensive that a government in a democracy ignores
the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the community on a subject such as this. In
other words, the group members had no faith in the Regional Forest Agreement and
wanted to become involved for they saw the forest debate as a personal, community,
and social justice issue.

The timber industry was angered by the interference of the group, especially since the
amendments to the original RFA document in July 1999 were seen to be the result of
that interference (This also relates to the role of the media during that time period,
which I will turn to at a later stage). Purportedly, members of the industry attended a
meeting with Richard Court ... where the Premier said that he had spoken to Mick
Malthouse, Liz Davenport, one of the local QCs and his wife, Janet Woollard, and he
had come to the view that, notwithstanding that he signed the RFA, he was going to
reduce the karri volume to 50 000 m3• It was felt that [h]e basically tipped the RF A on
its head for political, expedient reasons. Industry members were under the impression
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that the Premier was quite prepared to listen to . . . or to be int1uenced by Mick
Malthouse more than he was prepared to be int1uenced by his own and independent
scientists, which they saw as political expediency in its worst form. The industry's anger
was also fuelled by the fact that a number of the 'celebrities' campaigning against them
were users of their products (we are talking about people who were campaigning against
us who are big users of our product), relating back to the issue of alleged akrasia
mentioned earlier in Chapter Five (Llz Davenport shops are full of jarrah. Even the
Liberals for the Forest in their Nedlands office have a beautiful jarrah floor).
Moreover, some of the group members' attitudes towards logging and timber usage (e.g.
I think there is a case for harvesting very small amounts of timber for fine furniture)
were considered elitist for it meant that the rich people from the \Vestern suburbs can
... buy [their] rich bit and everybody else can get pine.

Other SRG members also believed that the Mick Malthouses, Liz Davenports, and the
general public . . . [had] more influence on policy making than the beekeepers and the
tourism industry, who were official stakeholders.

However, while timber industry

representatives regarded this as another nail in the coffin of our democracy, other SRG
members did not view this as problematic but rather as what a democracy is about.
This reaction is explainable in light of SRG members growing frustration with the RFA
process, as indicated in Chapter Five, which resulted in many stakeholders siding with
the conservation movement whose message was amplified by the involvement of WA's
'celebrities'.

Chapters Three and Six indicated that the amendments to the RFA led to an increase in
the reservation of areas of karri old growth, which - as shown above - was attributed by
stakeholders to the involvement of people like Mick Malthouse. Also, a member of the
Coalition Government conceded that the amendments to the RFA were in response to
the pressure applied by members of that group and their supporters (The Premier said:
Ok, lets then work on the basis of karri because the pictures that were being shown
were the tall karri trees). In other words, it seems reasonable to suggest that the group
of prominent Western Australians succeeded in its pursuit of swaying public opinion
towards the RFA and to change the trajectory of forest policy but without addressing
substantive policy or operational problems such as existing timber contracts,
retrenchments, and other matters of transitional management (it's a very simple process.
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It will cost millions of dollars, they just have to make a hard decision at some stage and
then work around it). While the amendments to the RFA might strike as a victory for
the democratic process, a later discussion will give consideration to the concerns raised
by members of the timber industry and look at the problems associated with sudden
changes in political direction brought about by an influential minority.

Another issue of importance in connection with the WA RFA is that of individuals'
influence within, or over, government departments. This is because there is evidence to
suggest that it was the pursuit of individual goals that intensified the forest conflict in
WA and indeed gave rise to the RFA process nationally.

In WA, one individual featuring prominently in the controversies prior to the
commencement of, and during, the WA RFA process was the head of CALM, Dr Syd
Shea.

During the early 1980s, Shea was influential in setting the Australian Labor

Party's forest policy in the capacity of senior advisor to the Burke Labor Government in
WA, and he was the principal architect of CALM during those years prior to the
department's inception in 1985 (see Sharp, 1983). Since, Shea was the CEO of CALM
and maintained his position under the Burke, Dowding, and Lawrence Labor
governments and another six years under the Liberal-National Party coalition, serving a
total of six ministers. During that time, he is reported to have ruled the department
"with an iron hand" (Capp, 1999b, p.10), politically surviving the Barnett Inquiry, the
Federal Government's Industry Commission, and constant attacks from conservation
groups.

As indicated in Chapters Three, Five, and Six, CALM was at the centre of many
controversies, which according to some research participants were largely a result of the
stance taken by the department's CEO. For instance, in relation to the 1992 Draft
Forest Management Plan it was suggested that Syd Shea was able to convince Bob
Pearce [then WA Minister for the Environment] ... that what was proposed [by CALM]
was completely right, irrespective of the enormous public outrage. During the public
response period to the Draft Forest Management Plan there was a huge amount of
public agitation, which, however, had no effect whatsoever, implying that in the end
there was almost no difference between the draft and the final documents. [A]ll of this
was allegedly orchestrated by . . . Syd Shea, meaning that the entire conflict over
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CALM's Forest Management Plan was a Syd Shea-driven process. Much of this kind of
anecdotal evidence I collected during the interviews with RFA stakeholders (I bet you
hear interesting stories about Syd Shea), who hinted at the centrality of Shea to CALM's
public relations and successive State Governments' forest policies. Since Dr Shea did
not participate in this research project, for the sake of balance and fairness I shall only
concentrate on more general interview data pertaining to his role throughout the 1990s
to give an understanding of stakeholders' perceptions of his influence on events prior
and during the RFA process.

Overall, according to RFA stakeholders, controversies arising over the 1987 Timber
Strategy, CALM's initial opposition to the CALM-AHC joint assessment of the
southern forests, the 1992 Draft Forest Management Plan, the EPA assessments in 1992
and 1998, the DFA, and the RFA itself were processes controlled by Syd Shea. In
relation to the DFA, for instance, it was suggested that Peter Voss, Environment
Minister for WA at the time, was either completely misled by Shea with regards to, or
absolutely complicit in, what was considered a deception about the state of the forest,
which helped shape the belief among stakeholders that an outrageous presentation and
deception ... led [the Western Australian public] into the RFA.

At the onset of the WA RFA, Shea was said to have taken control of the process,
leading the debate with the Commonwealth.

Purportedly, [i]t was always a debate

between Syd Shea and the Commonwealth because of a power relationship between the
negotiating parties and because of a general distrust of the Commonwealth in the east in
Western Australia. Furthermore, Syd Shea was believed to have employed a conscious
tactic to have a process of: we will try and slow them down as much as possible, give
them as least information as possible and you just obstruct as long as we can, which
supports assertions made in Chapters Five and Six about transparency and CALM's
alleged stalling tactics during the WA RFA (information is power ... we will never allow
the Commonwealth to have that information - and - CALM ran stalling tactics as much
as they possibly could).

Overall, the RF A in general was considered to have been very much controlled by
CALM, by Syd ... giving directions on a daily basis to Alan Walker who was the
manager of the RFA process and maybe to Geoff Stoneman from time to time who was
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the scientific person. The philosophical position allegedly taken by senior CALM staff
at the beginning of the RFA was that ... they hated greenies, especially after the mauling
they received over the Forest Management Plans, which is perhaps why it was believed
that CALM vetoed (the] participation [of conservation groups] on the Steering
Committee. It was also alleged that CALM had taken the position of: we have given
away enough forests as parks and reserves; we don't want to be placed in the position of
having to have more parks and reserves taken out of what's left. This may serve as an
explanation for the protracted nature of the negotiations between CALM and the
Commonwealth about the original forest extent, oldgrowthness, and the extent and the
design of the forest reserve system discussed in Chapter Six.

Support for the director of CALM came from members of the WA State Government,
who suggested that Shea was a victim of a smear campaign and that (p]eople tried to pin
Syd Shea up there. Any suggestions that CALM would unjustifiably protect industry
interests were rebuked. Instead, it was argued that it was Shea who pioneered ideas for
the restructuring of WA's timber industry and that it was he, as early as 1992 and 1993,
who was actually driving down the industry take. Attacks on himself and CALM were
largely attributed to personal vendettas carried out by members of the conservation
movement. For instance, Dr Beth Schultz, a former CALM employee and later vicepresident of the WA Conservation Council, was warning together with others at the
time of the formation of CALM of a conflict of interest within the department. Since
her departure from CALM she has been an ardent campaigner against the department's
forest management practices. Against this background, it was claimed that there were
some personality conflicts between her and Syd Shea and that public accusations made
by her against him would need to be seen in light of the fact that she would have no
kind words whatsoever to say about Syd at all. Consequently, these personal differences
were seen to have evidenced themselves out in the public arena, and it was considered
unfortunate for them to have been so very heavily portrayed.

Dr Shea also received

praise from other RFA stakeholders outside of CALM for the work he had done as the
director of CALM. For instance, it was acknowledged that CALM had the best nature
conservation organisation ... of any state in Australia because Shea used to divert a lot
of the forest royalties into real conservation activities like the Wheat-Sheep-Belt and
threatened species (fhe animal recovery programmes that CALM continues to run, they
are good things). Notwithstanding, the tenet remained that Shea had taken his hubris a
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bit too far in relation to the forest[s] , and with regards to the RFA it was thought that he
had done a lot to the process, . . . [meaning that] he damaged the whole thing right
through.

Essentially, by his defenders the director of CALM was seen as a victim of public
opinion (CALM really became the meat in the sandwich), a notion seemingly supported
by the director himself who is reported to have said that the conflict over forest
management was "based largely on subjective value judgements" and that the "dispute
[over forests] was a political issue", a "government policy issue" which "would have to
be resolved by the Environment Minister" (Mallabone, 1998a, p.3). But who was in
charge of forest policy? Certainly, Shea and members of the WA State Government
maintained that forest policy is government policy and that to blame CALM for it ...
[would be] unreasonable (the debate was a political debate, and it should never have
been a debate against CALM).

However, the question posed by many RFA

stakeholders, either explicitly or by implication, was whether Shea, with this huge ...
power structure that [he] established ... and those people with an enormous loyalty to
him and to the approach that he perpetrated in the department, essentially determined
forest policy (The government's ... problem is it listens to CALM). Indeed, CALM was
a single agency both responsible for the policy and the operational side with a figure
head who was very influential, and while the degree to which Shea could hold sway over
the Minister responsible will remain subject to speculation, many RFA stakeholders
were convinced that Shea was the person ultimately responsible for forest matters in
WA.

Finally, I would like to address briefly the issue of departmental leanings. Members of
the timber industry felt that the genesis of the RFA process nationally was triggered by
the deliberate abuse of office by staff of the Australian Heritage Commission (AHC).
Allegedly, AHC staff refused to grant the more or less automatic rollover of carryover
coupes in the early 1990s, as discussed in Chapter Three, although nothing had changed
in official policy direction or forest management at the time (We had a situation where
from one year to another nothing changed in terms of management plans but the advice
to the Minister from the Heritage Commission changed). Purportedly, AHC staff used
their position to compel the government to engage in Regional Forest Agreements. In
other words, industry members were convinced that the AHC calculatingly changed its
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advice to the Federal Minister for the Environment so as to pursue personal goals of
individuals within the Commission instead of acting upon their official mandate.

Similar views were also held by industry representatives in relation to the conduct of
membets from Commonwealth departments during the RFA process. It was argued
that, for instance, staff from the Commonwealth Department Environment Australia
(EA) felt that it was quite legitimate to pursue [their] own personal green ideals within

the bureaucracy irrespective of what government policy would be (Commonwealth
officials that came from Environment Australia that very much had a Green agenda as
opposed to people in the Commonwealth process that maybe set within the
Department of Prime 11inister and Cabinet, or AFFA).

Ostensibly, it was quite

common that people had a personal view that they ,vere projecting as a Commonwealth
official rather than . . . a government policy view. It was thought that for individuals
who had a few letters after [their) name that [it] was quite legitimate ... that [they] were
pursuing a personal view rather than a government Yiew, and [that they] could use the
bureaucracy to justify that view.

Suggestions such as these were countered by

Commonwealth staff, suggesting that their behaviour was misinterpreted and that a
distinction should be made between activism and maintaining professional relationships.
It was held that there was a great deal of suspicion and hostility about the relationship[s)
between Commonwealth departments and outside interest groups, particularly between
Environment Australia and the conservation movement. It was considered hypocritical
that it was perfectly alright for Commonwealth officers on the industry side and
industry portfolios to have very close working relationships with industry groups,
whereas for EA staff any contact with the environment movement had to go through
senior management. This meant that during the RFA process the communication
[between EA) with both the scientific and the conservation community . . . was
constrained, as direct contact would have been interpreted as liaison with the enemy (the
RFA itself became superimposed on how people could dialogue or, as it turned out,
people could not dialogue). While there was said to have been communication between
Environment Australia and WA conservation groups and the scientific community
(there was a lot of informal contact - and - \V/e were in constant contact over the phone
- and - [They were] leaking us documents, giving us information, warning us of things,
expressing their frustration), this exchange occurred surreptitiously and remained
unofficial (Commonwealth officers had to be extraordinarily careful).
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The above illustrated how special individuals, as seen by stakeholders, influenced the
forest debate in WA and indeed gave rise to, and changed the course of, the RFA
process itself. A minority of influential, private individuals was believed to have been
able to exert more political pressure than a sizable protest movement, although it needs
to be acknowledged that the success of this minority would not have been possible
without the efforts of the conservation movement.

Individuals within government

bureaucracies were considered to have been more powerful than the Ministers they were
answerable to, essentially single-handedly steering the direction of policy debates and
outcomes. Also, the efforts of individual actors within positions of relative political
influence were thought to have set in train, influenced, and to have been protected by
large political processes.

It was also shown that perceptions of, or reactions to, individual conduct differed
depending on the degree to which such conduct challenged dominant views and from
where these 'blows to the system' were being dealt. For instance, for many years the
vocal opposition to forest policy from the conservation movement in WA could
effectively be ignored by political decision makers as it could successfully be framed as
extreme, fringe or left-wing. However, once the 'green message' was being echoed from
a select number of prominent businessmen and women and other people of high public
esteem, the newly found enemy from within caused sudden change within the political
realm. Such reactions became visible when the involvement of high profile Western
Australians not only changed the public sentiment towards the RFA but also caused
much internal friction within the ranks of the ruling Coalition Government, which led
to the amendments of the RFA. Moreover, the comparison between EA and other
Commonwealth departments on the issue of departmental leanings showed that
departments subscribing to orthodox economic or neo-liberal development agendas
could have been forgiven for, or may have even been expected to be, liaising with their
respective private sector counterparts (e.g., the mining sector) whereas departments the
portfolios of which require the inculcation of views running counter to the dominant
perspective were essentially denied contact with their constituencies. While there may
be substance to claims of activism, and the abuse of office, within certain departmental
ranks the forcing underground of undesirable departmental communication with the
outside world only serves to strengthen views of bureaucratic anxiety towards
heterogeneity of thought and plural perspectives as argued in Chapters Five and Six.
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The sections above, or the entire thesis for this matter, dealt with individuals through
methodological layers of distance and abstraction so as to anonymise the research data
and to de-link research participants and individual players in the RFA process. It was
shown that process dynamics were greatly influenced by special individuals who, as a
matter of perspective and conviction, could be described as either local heroes or
autocrats.

Chapters Five and Six spoke of process constraints, which were often

systemic in nature and, as shown above, either reinforced or actively challenged by
individuals active inside and outside the RFA process.

In this context, constraints

affecting open communication and freedom of expression featured prominently. These
perceived process constraints also affected this thesis methodologically, meaning that
the methods I employed were a mirror of the process restrictions themselves. For
instance, openness and transparency were re-occurring themes in this thesis and were
identified by stakeholders as key obstacles to effective participation and science
communication in the RFA process.

While through the use of interviews I was able to unearth perceptions of process
constrainedness, the insights gained could merely be relayed in an opaque fashion
employing stakeholder groupings and colour-coding. This was because the notion of
process constrainedness gave rise to the issue of data sensitivity, which resulted in the
use of methodological safeguards (I better be careful with that. They can get into heaps
of trouble - and - what you hear from me on this you probably won't hear from
anybody else. So you have got to be careful how you use it - and - In fact, don't put
this down - and - but, you know, be careful with that). These safeguards meant that I
directed attention away from the individual onto groups as a dejeopardising technique,
which enabled me to give expression to an individual's perceptions of the RFA while
protecting that individual via the anonymity granted by group membership. Therefore,
in a way, all that is left is the group as an expression of method, which is why I now
wish to turn to a discussion on the stakeholder groups I devised for the purposes of this
study.

The discussion sets out to deconstruct these groupings, to test earlier

assumptions about group homogeneity/heterogeneity (see Chapter Four), and highlight
issues related to multiple group memberships.
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RFA Stakeholder Group Homogeneity /Heterogeneity88

In Chapter Four I introduced discourse groupings, employed in this thesis for the
analysis of the case study data. The grouping of individuals is inherently problematic as
it harbours the risk of inappropriate homogenisation, as there is a tendency to see those
groups as undifferentiated wholes, although they are usually embedded in complex
circumstances with multidimensional intra-group relations and interacting group
attributes (Slocum et al., 1995). In Chapter Four, I therefore highlighted the arbitrary
and provisional nature of these groupings and alerted readers to the potential for, and
indeed the likelihood of, heterogeneity within a'!)I of these groupings.

Of the five groups delineated, three groups appeared to hold internally consistent views.
These groups were the Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group, the
Stakeholder Reference Group/General Public group, and the Environment Groups
group. 89 As to the timber industry, it was shown throughout Chapters Four, Five and
Six that industry representatives were generally accepting of the participatory nature of
the RFA process, its science, and the outcomes it delivered prior to any amendments to
the policy document.

Overall, merely some national/ regional differences between

members of the industry relating to the expectations on the process and its overall
desirability (necessity for it) could be identified.
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Interview data derived from members of the Stakeholder Reference Group/General
Public group also revealed a strong degree of group homogeneity, although this group

i

represented a forum which comprised of over 60 interest groups. While this outcome
seems unlikely it is explainable in terms of the discourse groupings developed for this
study and the sampling method employed. The sampling design used in this study
resulted in both discursive a/Jies and discursive opponents within the SRG group being
recommended by research participants as candidates for inclusion into this study.
However, the separate treatment of the timber industry and its interest groups as part of

88

For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XXIII (CD-ROM).
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This claim for homogeneity can only be made in light of the themes pursued in this study. This is not

to suggest that the Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group, the Stakeholder Reference
Group/General Public group, and the Environment Groups group were homogenous groups per se.
While there was no indication of dissent during the interview process and the data analysis, it seems
improbable for the views of group members to be fully consistent.
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the Timber Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group meant that pro-timber views were
not expressed by members of the Stakeholder Reference Group/General Public group,
yet in actual fact timber interests were represented at the SRG level. The referral system
used for the snowball sampling method also meant that views outside the divide
between timber and non-timber interests were ignored due to the nature of the
recommendations made by interviewees. This in tum helps explain the concurrence of
viewpoints among the SRG members interviewed, who were largely members of local
governments, the tourism industry, Indigenous groups, and concerned citizens. They
shared a concern about the accessibility of the process, exhibited a degree of distrust of
CALM and the department's forest management practices, and were sceptical of the
science of the WA RFA.

The highest degree of homogeneity among stakeholders occurred within the
Environment Groups group, of which members both from the national and regional
level provided a coherent and internally consistent account of the WA RFA process and
its outcomes.

In Chapters Four, Five and Six I demonstrated that there was a

consensus among Environment Groups members on the expectations placed on the
RFA based on their interpretations of the NFPS and subsequent events, its scientific
credibility, its inclusiveness, and on what the process had delivered in the end. These
findings support the idea of commonly shared values and beliefs among members of the

conservation movement.

Commonalities can also be explained by the degree of

cooperation among, and organisation by, members of environment groups which attests
to the strength of the national network of environmental activists, which formed in
Australia over the last thirty years (see Chapter Three).

The Scientific Community group was shown to have been broadly divided into two
groups on two levels. On the State level, there was a division between CALM and nonCALM scientists, as illustrated in Chapter Six, respectively supporting and criticising the
scientific integrity and credibility of the WA RFA. Disputes between CALM and nonCALM scientists were also shown to have been somewhat historical, relating back to
earlier disagreements on forest management prescriptions. Thus, these disputes were
prone to have an impact on the nature of the scientific debate during the RFA. The
second level of division was at the State-Commonwealth level between CALM scientists
and Commonwealth officers. This division is not particularly clear for its entails a
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blurring of the lines between science and government bureaucracy, which also relates
back to the double-coding of research participants' interview data as discussed in
Chapter Four. Thus, this level of division is going to be addressed below in conjunction
with an assessment of the homogeneity of views among members of the
Government/Departments/Political Parties group. It needs to be recognised, however,
that due to data sensitivity some of these issues cannot be fully disclosed and will need
to be addressed implicitly and via reference to previous chapters.

The Government/Departments/Political Parties group proved to be the most
heterogeneous of all discourse groupings devised. This is largely because this group was
the broadest in terms of membership, comprising members from the WA State and
Commonwealth Governments, their respective departments, and individual members
from both houses of the WA parliament as well as non-elected independent political
activists. A divergence of views was therefore inevitable. The interview data presented
in Chapters Five and Six illustrated that discourse divisions existed between members of
that group in relation to the DFA, the RFA process, its participatory and scientific
nature, and the outcomes achieved by the RFA. Such divisions ostensibly grew between
the WA State government and the Commonwealth Government and their respective
departments and between the WA State government and other members of the WA
State Parliament and independent political activists.

From a State perspective, the RFA was considered by some a Commonwealth
imposition on what was essentially regarded a matter for the state (I actually considered
the RFA an imposition by the Federal Government), and great doubts were expressed
as to whether a sophisticated and highly centralised political process imposed by
Canberra would be the best way of actually getting to the heart of the issues (fheir [the
Commonwealth's] entering into a whole national process of forest reconciliation, as I
suppose it ideally would have been, was not necessarily going to be a very effective
process). Others were more supportive of the RFA, believing that it can be a good
thing ... when the Commonwealth can drive a policy benevolently and force the states
along. In fact, it was hoped by some that the Commonwealth had played more of a
leadership role because the Commonwealth's view was a bit more progressive than the
State's and far more open to engage with stakeholders. These divisions of opinion I
found across the entire political spectrum in WA. From a Commonwealth perspective
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this was merely a repeat of the age-old argument of State rights versus Commonwealth
rights: you want the Commonwealth when do you do not like something going on but
you do not want the Commonwealth otherwise.
Opposition to the Commonwealth Government's involvement also came from within
the WA State Government and its agencies. CAIM, for instance, reluctantly engaged
with the RFA process because the department had a strong belief in their own existing
systems and their own approaches to forest reservation, and they were . . . pretty
strongly of the view that the process should endorse their existing arrangements (. .. they
had the fundamental belief that they had their own ticked-all-signs-off process through
the Management Plan). This was a strong perception from the Western Australian
government but probably more strongly from the Department of Conservation and
Land Management (I think it's fair to say that they were sort of disquieted with the idea
of the Commonwealth involving itself in what they felt to a large extent was something
that they had responsibility for and were doing what they believed to be well). As a
consequence, [t]here was considerable resentment by State people against the
Commonwealth officers who [did] not understand the forests (hardly any of them had
any great knowledge of WA or forests that we could see) and came across pretty much
with a mindset of the Eastern States where perhaps aspects of forest management had
been detrimental to nature conservation (Commonwealth people largely had this sort of
prejudices when they came across). Seemingly, CALM feared that there would be an
automatic assumption that any logging is a bad practice environmentally. Another
source of resentment towards the Commonwealth's involvement was that CAIM had
all this information so that the whole process seemed to be re-inventing the wheel to a
large extent.

These sentiments helped reinforce the Commonwealth officials'

perceptions of CALM cited above, resulting in a stalemate and, as addressed in Chapter
Six, in a number of technical disputes between CALM and Commonwealth
representatives.

Overall, the State's concerns in relation to the Commonwealth's involvement cited
above found reflection in the dynamics between the State and the Federal Government.
The relationship between WA and the Commonwealth was marked by a fair bit of
friction as the relationship was described as not as cooperative ... as [one] could have
engendered. Apparently, there was some tension there in the relationship

and an

element of tension in the discussions because, in addition to its constitutional powers,
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the Commonwealth had financial power (to fund the restructuring of WA's timber
industry) whereas WA had power in terms of that they had data and the control of data
(on this point see Chapter Six). Consequently, the Western Australian Government was
at loggerheads with the Commonwealth because essentially there were two governments
... aspiring slightly different outcomes from a process. These dynamics, however, were
regarded as fairly predictable, and in sense typical for intergovernmental negotiation[s]
of this kind, especially since WA [has] always fought with the Commonwealth. In other
words, conflict was historically pre-programmed because there has been quite a long
history to it and because of the nature of the whole process. Nevertheless, while StateCommonwealth relations were described as quite variable, overall their cooperative
nature was stressed by State and Commonwealth senior officials alike.

State-Commonwealth dynamics changed with a change in government at the federal
level, which impacted on the dynamics of the WA RFA process. When the Keating
government was still in power in Canberra, then the Commonwealth was pushing very
strongly to ensure that they would drive the process (The process was initially driven by
the Commonwealth to meet their obligations to discharge forest policy under the
National Forest Policy Statement). Commonwealth efforts, however, were frustrated by
a complete lack of willingness of many of the senior bureaucrats, especially by State
Government officials who just did not want any more "greenness" in the forest. As
soon as Keating lost power and Howard came in, the Commonwealth kind of took an
attitude: we just want to get this over and done with, with the minimum of fuss , which
meant that the Commonwealth power base fell like a heap of cards and . . . that the State
continued to drive the process while Commonwealth officers who were involved
became mere functionaries . In other words, the Commonwealth left the door open ...
to the West Australian government dictating how it was going to deal with the process
(I think it did leave the Commonwealth vulnerable to a very strong representation from

the West Australian government and probably other State governments), which enabled
senior bureaucrats within CALM, to play that game, too, and in such a way that CALM
became the lead agency in Western Australia (Once the process started in WA, the
process was absolutely driven by the WA side, by CALM). Perhaps unsurprisingly, from
a CALM perspective this meant that the RFA got better and got stronger and more
cooperative as the process went on, particularly, as it moved towards its completion.
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State-Commonwealth relations changed again towards the finalisation of the WA RFA
because of the creation of a new federal ministerial office for the RFAs to which Wilson
Tuckey was appointed by the Howard Government. His appointment and subsequent
involvement in the WA RFA was the cause of much publicised friction between the
Commonwealth and the State (e.g. Mallabone, 1998c; Capp, 1999d), whose
representatives thought that the introduction of the third person at that very late stage
. . . was not complementary to the finalisation of the RFA, especially since the new
person coming in ... was representing one side; that was the timber industry ([I]n the
WA RFA, the intervention of Wilson Tuckey as the Minister fundamentally changed the
... honesty of which the Commonwealth could be viewed in the process). Tuckey was
fully supportive ofWA's timber industries and thus critical of what he considered to be
concessions to the conservation movement in relation to forest reservation granted by
the State Government, which served to fuel the already intense conflict over forests in
the WA (e.g. Mallabone, 1998b; Capp, 1999c; Dore, 1999).

Within WA, as indicated in Chapter Three, the political landscape was divided over the
forest issue. While the ruling Coalition Government defended the credibility of the
RFA and highlighted its benefits to conservation, forestry, and the industry, as shown in
Chapters Five and Six, opposition party members as well as independent members of
parliament (MPs) and political activists became increasingly vocal in their opposition to
the RFA process and its outcomes, which was encouraged by the swing in popular
opinion about the RFA. Traditional supporters of the Coalition Government even
moved to set up a new pro-forest party called Liberals for Forests as an act of
demonstrating their discontent with the direction of the coalition's forest policy. These

ne1v liberals (fhis Liberals for Forests party is an entirely separate group from the Liberal
Party although it has a lot of ex-Liberal people in it) had a simple message: stop the
logging of our oldgrowth forests, which they perceived as the only proposal that [would]
achieve majority community support.

Party members saw in WA's forests a public

asset, the disposal of which should be dependent on community support. However, the
RFA in their view did not make any genuine concessions for it merely acceded to the
demands of all sort of different minority pressure groups, resulting in a permission of a
programme of logging designed to fulfil the wishes of the timber industry and CALM
and a formalisation of continued logging plans designed to suit the commercial
purposes of the timber industry. While the amendments [to the RFA] were [seen as] a
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step in the right direction, they were only a very small step. The amendments were only
of modest benefit because they merely meant a reduction in old growth logging, ...
notwithstanding that the community view was that it should all stop. Similar sentiments
were expressed by other MPs and parliamentary candidates, unelected individuals who
entered politics 'on behalf of the forests'. In their view, the RFA did not go far enough
in terms of what the community wanted (it just was not what people wanted), people
wanted their trees but the government ... refused to listen to the people [who] elected
it. The RFA was thought to have held little regard for the workers and that no thought
given to the communities. [C]onservation issues were [not] adequately represented for
political reasons, people . . . tinkered with the edges of the RFA, and the RFA itself did
not bring about substantial change for WA's forests (I think no particular major change
has occurred, only little incremental change was made along the way; some of them
forwards, some of them backwards). Overall, there was agreement that the process
should have been more open, that conservation groups and external groups should have
had a greater involvement, and that more emphasis should have been placed on
environmental or conservation outcomes.

The differences in perception shown above hardly strike as surprising as they are largely
reflective of the State-Commonwealth and government-opposition dichotomies
identified in Chapters Three, Five and Six. However, while differences of viewpoints
between the State and the Commonwealth as well as between the WA State
Government and members of the political opposition were somewhat to be expected,
the occurrence of strong differences in perception among members of discrete groups
such as individual government departments is noteworthy. Although this is an area an
in-depth analysis cannot be carried out due to reasons of data confidentiality, it can be
noted that differences in perception existed within and between government
departments in relation to the role, and the quality, of the science in the RFA (see
Chapter Six), ...
I think the science was always going to
be the critical element in terms of what
[the RFA] was going to achieve.

Science was, I would not say it was a
minor component, but it was just a
component of the RFA.

- and -

- and-

. . . this process is based on science

... it's second rate science

versus
- and... science did not enter into the
debate

- andThe assessment work was done in a
very scientific manner
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the participatory nature of the RFA process (see also Chapter Five), ...
. . . in terms of due process it wasn't a
desirable process

[T]here has been information that has
been provided to the public, both the
assessment information and all the
other information is much greater than
you would have in most other
government processes.

- and ... the public as a whole and other
institutions never really had an entree
into the debate because of the quality
of the information available to them

versus

- and... there was a lot of consultation

as well as its overall efficacy of the RFA, only to cite a few examples.
The outcomes from the process .. .
represent an unambiguous failure of
policy in that the policy settings that
were established in the NFPS by any
objective measure failed to have been
met in terms of conservation.

[T]he Regional Forest Agreement was
a well balanced document that met the
objectives of the Regional Forest
Agreement process as laid down ...
coming out of the NFPS and the
JANIS criteria.

versus

- and -

- and-

The final agreement bore no
semblance of the real changes that
needed to be made in terms of
managing native forests.

... the objectives of the RFA were
met

Overall, disparities such as these were particularly strong within departments with
environmental portfolios and between them and those working on behalf of either State
or Federal Cabinet.

In relation to these inter and intra-departmental differences in

perceptions of the RFA, it is also worthwhile pointing out that there was a discernible
relationship between an individual's departmental rank and affiliation as well as
proximity to the decision-making process concerning the RFA and that individual's
views of the RFA itself. As shown in the example in Figure 7.1, individuals of lower
departmental rank and lesser influence in terms of decision-making were more likely to
be critical of the RFA than their superiors within the same department. This was true
for all State and Commonwealth departments where interview data permitted
comparisons of this kind and was applicable to issues pertaining to the participative
nature of the RFA (see Chapter Five), the science employed (see Chapter Six) as well as
the

overall

efficacy

of

the

RFA.

This

means

Government/Departments/Political Parties group was
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that

although

the

a highly heterogeneous

assemblage of stakeholders per se, homogenous pockets existed within that group,
members of which not only shared similar perceptions but also similar degrees of
influence over the process and similar ranks within the political/bureaucratic hierarchy.
The hierarchical and influence-based relationship depicted in Figure 7 .1 also seems to
reflect a more generic relationship between an individual's degree of influence over a
process and that individual's perception of that process. This is supported by the data
presented in Chapters Five and Six which showed that the members of the Timber
Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group, the Stakeholder Reference Group/General
Public group, and the Environment Groups group who, of all stakeholders interviewed
for the purposes of this study, proved to be the most critical towards the RFA, but were
also the most remote stakeholders in terms of access to the RFA decision-makingprocess. This would suggest that both power and perceptions are relational as well as
mutually determining.

An analysis such as this is complicated by the fact that multiple affiliations and varying
degrees of allegiance blur the boundaries of the categories used for the purposes of this
study. This blurring effect is compounded by my inability to provide full disclosure of
relevant data which would enable a disentangling of stakeholder affiliations and
allegiances. Thus, one is left with mere imputations on RFA stakeholders' values and
motivations.

Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suggest that people with multiple

stakeholder memberships were affected by what could be seen as a multiple hat dilemma, a
conflict of multiple and varying allegiances, which in part explains the disparity of views
among stakeholders with similar affiliations and the strong reactions by certain
stakeholders who viewed group dissent as a transgression. Multiple memberships meant
that individuals' senses of belonging to particular groups varied and that, metaphorically
speaking, stakeholders acting on behalf of one stakeholder group were in fact wearing
the hat of another whom they had stronger allegiances to. For example, public servants
who have private affiliations with the conservation movement are likely to be tom
between their departmental brief and personal views, which find expression in their
outside work activities, should these two be in conflict with one another.

Thus,

challenges, as those put forth by members of the timber industry, stating the abuse of
office for the pursuit of agendas external to that office do seem plausible. In fact, one
would expect individuals to engage in strategic behaviour to either further their own
interests or those of a group, the goals and values of which they share. In particular, an
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individual can be expected to act strategically should the goals and values held within the
environment that individual is operating run counter to the goals and values held by that
individual.

Departmental Rank

... the objectives of
the RFA were met

~::::in/
Perce/

The outcomes from the process
. .. represent an unambiguous
failure of policy in that the
policy settings that were
established in the NFPS by any
objective measure failed to have
been met in terms of
conservation.

Proximity to Decision-Making
Figure 7.1: Differences of Perception of the RFAin Relation to Departmental
Rank and Proximity to Decision-Making Process

Overall, this section highlights the role of the individual as well as an individual's
affiliation, values, and beliefs at work within large systems and processes, as they can
influence system behaviour and process dynamics either by virtue of the power vested
within an individual, the tactics he/ she employs or a combination of the above. Often,
however, changes resulting from influence exerted by an individual are socialised,
meaning that individual actors are effectively hidden (or hiding) behind the dynamics of
change or the momentum they have or create. Hence, little attention is being paid to
individuals per se, especially within large systems and processes, although it is often an
individual and the synergies he/she can create that ultimately drive or bring about
change.

It was shown in this section that earlier assumptions about group homogeneity could be
supported for three of the five discourse groupings devised, namely the Timber
Industry/Industry Groups/Unions group, Stakeholder Reference Group/General
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Public group, and the Environment Groups group, the last proving to be the most
homogenous of the three. In contrast, a substantial, albeit predictable, degree of dissent
was identified among members of the Scientific Community group and members of the
Government/Departments/Political Parties group.

It was shown that individuals

differed substantially in their perceptions of the RFA. These differences could be
indexed against stakeholders' affiliation and relative influence in the RFA process. This
section also highlighted that, while a treatment of perceptions within groups, as
necessitated here by research conditions, can be useful in terms of highlighting
differences and similarities of opinion, an approach such as this is inherently limited to a
superficial analysis, as underlying issues remain unaddressed.

Yet, individuals, their

allegiances and affiliations as well as their impact on power relations are what largely
determine system and process behaviour.

The Public Profile of the RFA and the Role of the Media 90
In Chapter Two, I mentioned that the role of the media during the WA RFA process
was controversial.

Controversy arose over the issue of one-sidedness and bias in

relation to the media's portrayal of the RFA debate. The media was also seen to have
been critical in accentuating the involvement of celebrities in the forest debate and in
raising the public profile of the RFA. These issues are now going to be addressed in
light of stakeholders' perceptions of the media coverage of the RFA.

Accusations of biased media coverage of the RFA came predominantly from timber
industry representatives and WA State Government officials. It was suggested that
Greens actually ~1ad] the media behind them, meaning that media and the Greens were
putting on all this misinformation (e.g., ... people are of the opinion that we are
clearfelling jarrah. Jarrah forests have never ever been clearfelled), using myths which
were able to create fear. The media was held responsible for showing people these
moonscape pictures on a regular basis instead of the sight two years later, five years
later, and ten years later, which meant that the RFA debate turned into a very emotional
debate. The alleged alliance of conservation groups and the media resulted in the
framing [of] a bad picture when there [was] not a bad picture to be painted.

90

For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XXIV (CD-RO:M).
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It was also alleged that there was not any intellectual rigour attached to the media
commentators. People unable to differentiate between a native forest and a softwood
plantation . . . [were] given air time and credibility on talk.back radio in Perth while
[p]eople (who] wanted an argument based on facts did not get a great deal of time
because that was not what the people in the media wanted (There was some interesting
form of censorship that went on, particularly in terms of talkback radio. When you rang
up and put a pro industry and pro RFA position it was mostly like: Thank you very
much for your view). Implicit in that critique is also a metrocentric bias of the media.

The media was also seen to have lacked balance in that it presented a one-sided media
coverage of the entire issue, showing forest block(s) on TV that ha[ve] been clearfelled
and burned [b]ut they (did not] go and show the hundred year old forest that was
clearfelled Karri forest and cleared to a wheat farm that failed and has now grown
naturally back to a Karri forest. Also, the media [did not] publicise actions of forest
protestors who vandalise[d] ... machines (they ride on them, scribble all over them,
throw the fuel caps away, let the tyres down) and unlawfully disrupted forest operations
of people who were going about their work, which they have got a contract to do, and
legally they should be there (\Vhen I had that incident with the log truck and the Greens
standing in front of the log truck I contacted the media but there was no response.
They did not want to know). In other words, the truth about the forests and the nature
of the debate did not get reported back to the city people.

Other stakeholders perceived the work of the media as a valuable contribution to the
RFA debate in that it raised people's awareness of the issue(s) . [T]ere was a huge media
campaign, which meant that suddenly on television you had graphic footage of what
actually goes on. While it was conceded that this kind of coverage was selling papers, it
was largely seen as means of informing Western Australians about the details of the
RFA debate, such as the way that areas of non-forest were included as if they were
forest, the definitions that were used of, for example, old growth forest were completely
wrought and re-written to a,·oid protecting old-growth forest (Some of the revelations
that came out were some of errors ... with the reservation of paddocks as old growth
forest). So, while timber interests thought that the media ha[d] a lot to answer for and
had done a lot of damage by effectively driving a pro-green propaganda war, other
stakeholders saw the role of the media as more benign in that it laid out the issues and
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gave protesters a real platform, triggering [p]eople [to] change their views about forestry.
In their view, due to the awareness-raising role of the media, the RFA [Western
Australians] have got [now] was a bit better than [they] would have got before.

The above data illustrates how divided stakeholders were about the role of the media
during the RFA process.

From a pro-RFA or pro-industry perspective the media

coverage was considered biased and misleading whereas stakeholders with alternative
perspectives of the RFA saw in the media's role a service to society. Chapters Three,
Five, and Six drew attention to the dramatic newspaper headlines used during the RFA
process, employing a language of open conflict, even warfare, which certainly added to
the emotional charge of the RFA debate. The media's portrayal of the debate hardened
the conservation-industry dichotomy and helped fuel scepticism about forest
management practices, the rigour of RFA science, and the acceptability of the process
itself and the outcomes it produced. The nature of media coverage, however, needs to
be seen in context.

At the onset of the WA RFA, forest issues - from a media perspective - were not front
page material, and the reporting of the progress of the RFA process was largely based
on government media releases.

As the process evolved, conservation groups made

increasing use of the media to expose what they perceived as flaws in the RFA. Yet,
their opposition to the process was largely covered by opinion pieces in local
newspapers, and thus they still needed to rely on flyers, newsletters, and online
publications.

The degree of media attention changed significantly once prominent

Western Australians entered the forest debate, turning the RFA into a mainstream issue.
From then onwards, the nature of the media coverage changed, and critics point out
correctly that much of the media content focused on green viewpoints, which is what
gave rise to the notion of a biased presentation of the debate.

Yet both groups,

conservationists and industry supporters, were keen to seek access to media outlets. In
the end, however, it was the conservation movement that proved more effective in
terms of media access, arguably because it offered a product with greater graphic and
semiotic strength (see Figure 7.2 and Plate 7.1), which initially resulted in prominent,
and subsequently in public, support for the green argument. This melange of drama and
celebrity involvement made an impact on a largely urban readership, the views and
opinions of which proved to be of political significance given its electoral weight. In
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that sense, a rural opposition was never lik~ly to succeed in influencing political
decisions in view of likely ballot box results, as people up here in the metropolitan area
... [were] having a very strong position, which did not match the position down in the
South-West; thus, the earlier accusations of metrocentricism. The nature of the media
coverage changed again, once the social fallout from the amendments to the RFA
became visible.

Following the amendments to the WA RFA, the plight of timber

workers and their towns was heavily portrayed, however, at that point in time [t]he noisy
people in the metropolitan area and Green metropolitan politics had already decided
over their fate, and the media was seen to have contributed to that outcome.

Figure 7.2: Advertisement by the WA Forest Alliance and The Wilderness Society
(Source: The West Australian 20th August 1998)
The media reaction to the unfolding of events in WA is understandable, especially in
light of the underlying economic rationale of news reporting: sensation = sales. It raises
questions, nevertheless, about the trustworthiness of media outlets on the score of
oijective reporting of current affairs, especially on matters where the nature of the
information presented ·is decisive in terms of shaping public opinion. The media as a
receptor and re-interpreter of public opinion faces a kind of double hermeneutic (after
Giddens, 1984, p.284), which means that media coverage and public opinions are
inexplicably linked in that public opinions affect media coverage, which in turn affects
public opinion and its media coverage.
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These feedback loops can be subject to

deliberate dampening and amplification; however, the exact delineation of the drivers
behind such interventions is problematic. Sensationalism as such can be seen as a form
of intervention and its use regarded as both economically and/ or politically motivated.
Media sensationalism is not a new phenomenon, and in today's largely privatised and
deregulated media markets audiences are expected to read between the lines, as
highlighted by the coverage of recent international conflicts or debates on gene
technology and climate change. Yet, the desirability of this trend is questionable for it
has far-reaching implications in relation to information dissemination, the power of the
media, and those who control it in the face of a growing need for objective reporting.

Plate 7.1: Clearfelled Karri Coupe
(Photo: Simon Judd)

An in-depth media content analysis would have been beyond the scope of this thesis,
and therefore any conclusions as to the role of the media during the RFA process will
necessarily be speculative. Still, it can be asserted that the media did play a role during
the RFA process in that it impacted on people's levels of awareness, and perceptions, of
the nature of the forest debate. The issue of bias, however, is perceptual and thus
difficult to address. Language use as well as the depth and focus of coverage during the
peak of WA's forest debate in 1999 could easily be construed as a reflection of the state
of the debate at the time, a deliberate attempt to sell news, to change the nature of the
debate or as a combination of the above.
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As to the methodological issue of bias and filtering, as raised by Butteriss et al. (2001) in
connection with media content vis-a-vis interview data (see Chapter Two), this thesis
could not identify instances of non-corroborating data, meaning that the media content
considered in this thesis91 could be supported with interview data. However, certain
interview data I could not substantiate with media content, which gave rise to some
thematic groups being weaker than others throughout Chapters Five and Six. This can
be explained by the personalised, and highly contextual, nature of interview data.

Personal accounts, especially on sensitive subjects, can provide more detail and context
than can often be obtained by media reporting. This, however, is not to deny the
existence of biases and filters in media content; it merely explains the differences
between the two data sources identified in this study. The media's interpretation of
events is inherently subject to bias and filtering due to the abovementioned social
embeddedness of media reporting, meaning that the media is internal to its subject
matter. Again, these biases may simply reflect societal biases or indeed reflect the
institutional bias of a media outlet, its agents or constituencies. Hence, irrespective of
the possible existence of biases and filtering relating to the media in the case of the WA
RFA, research projects such as this should generally include a wide variety of data
sources.

An exclusive reliance on media content may harbour the risk of merely

unearthing mainstream perceptions, leading to asymmetrical data analyses.

The

inclusion of interview data, for instance, offers the advantage of providing insights into
a wider spectrum of perceptions within a target group. The high degree of data overlap
between interview data and media content in the case of the WA RFA needs to be seen
in light of the fact that certain views on forestry, which were historically held by
members of political minority groups, temporarily became mainstream. Whether the
media was indeed a driver of this perceptual transformation or merely acted as an
information relay in the public sphere will remain subject of debate.

A Synopsis of Stakeholders' Perceptions of the WA RFA92

This thesis provided insights into RFA stakeholders' perceptions of the WA RFA; its
history and evolution, the processes and dynamics involved as well as the outcomes

91

The inclusion of certain media content was a matter of availability but not one of selection.

92

For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XXV (CD-ROM).
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achieved. Based on their descriptions, understanding, and evaluation of these events, in
what follows I shall present a stakeholder-informed synopsis of the WA RFA.

In WA, [t]he forests in the south-west ... had long been very contentious with the local

environmental groups, and there was a lot of concern from conservation groups about
forest management practices and the levels of reservation in WA. There has [also] been
a long history of acrimonious dispute and debate in the scientific community over forest
management in the south-west of Western Australia. However, the tension that was
there in relation to the forest issues was not just in WA but all over Australia. In fact,
[n]o other environmental issue has caused so much conflict and divisiveness in the
community as the forest issue in Australia's history.

Nationally, very intense campaigning lby conservationists] in the 1980s ... , amongst
other developments, culminated in the Resource Assessment Commission being
established to conduct a full scale inquiry into what was happening to Australia's forests .
Against a backdrop of much national agitation over forestry and changes in the
international environmental policy context, in 1992 an agreement was reached between
the Commonwealth and the States as to the future management of Australia's forests .
This agreement became known as the National Forest Policy Statement, which laid the
groundwork for the RFA processes. The NFPS aimed at resolv[ing] the long-running
conflict over forestry, promising the establishment of comprehensive, adequate, and
representative reserve system [sJ and security of resources for the timber industry. Yet,
the NFPS was interpreted differently by different stakeholders. To some it was a clear
statement about multiple forest uses in Australia and that Australia [would] continue to
use native forests for sawlogs, and those native forests that are not considered to be of
high conservation value or have wilderness values or oldgrowth values [would] be able
to be used for the production of timber and the production of woodchips. Others saw
in it a fairly radical document that set a framework, which would protect oldgrowth and
wilderness forests and looked at implementing ecological sustainability in forest
management.

From 1992 onwards, [t]he Policy just sat there, it just languished, [n]othing had been
done. However, the uproar each year over export woodchip licenses continued. The
issue of woodchipping and woodchip exports was controversial because woodchip
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exports required a Commonwealth license. The Commonwealth approved the export
licenses on a yearly basis and there was a controversy every time they went about to
approve a license. The lack of political movement in relation to the forest issue resulted
in the Tasmanian Conservation Trust [taking] the Federal Government to court over
woodchip export licenses on the grounds that it violated the agreed National Forest
Policy, big demonstrations before parliament house by green groups who did not want
to see an increase in the woodchip export quantities, and logging trucks blockading the
federal parliament over the government's subsequent withdrawal of woodchip licenses.
The political crises ... [over] the annual renewals of the woodchip licences in late 1994
... to the early part of 1995 ... was on the front pages of newspapers around the country
for about three months. It was a problem that simply would not go away. Thus, the
genesis of the RFA exercise was a realisation by all players and particularly at the
political level of Federal Government that the annual process of deciding what was
going to happen with exporting woodchips was an inefficient and ineffective process.

In that sense, the RFAs were a political solution to an even bigger political problem for
the Commonwealth. The RFAs were a political attempt to get away from the ridiculous
situation that had arisen over woodchip exports and the licensing arrangements which
just engendered the political games between the Common"\Vealth and the State
governments. The driving force behind the RFA processes was a desire to get the
Commonwealth out of forestry, to grant resource security to industry, to get the
conservation lobby and the broader community off the governments' back (both State
and Federal), and to bring an end to this constant bitterness and squabbling.

Environmental benchmarks were needed to operationalise the words of the Forest
Policy Statement. The government realised that [fjorest management needed to be done
on a longer time horizon than on an annual renewal basis which also caused political
and public pain, uncertainty in industry, and uncertainty from a conservation viewpoint.
Therefore, instead of having all these fights block by block and tree by tree, the need
was recognised to develop in advance ... [a set ofj criteria [that would be] building on
the National Forest Policy.

[E]stablishing the criteria in advance [meant avoiding]

controversy, so (that] a successful Forest Agreement [would] be one in which these
[predetermined] environmental criteria [were] met. Scientists were entrusted with the
task of developing a set of criteria for old growth, wilderness, and biodiversity
protection and came up with a set of prescriptions in science, which were then put out
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to the policy people . . . who then took the view on where those policy guidelines
should be put in place or where the targets should be set. The report released by JANIS
in 1997 contained a set of national criteria agreed upon by the Commonwealth and the
States for the assessment of RFA areas. The report was controversial in that there was
no theoretical or empirical basis . . . for putting quantitative restrictions on forest
management and because the criteria proposed were based on an element of political
judgement by bureaucrats, also containing a lot of "may" or "if it's appropriates" etc.,
which meant that there were questions about the strengths and validity of the criteria
underpinning the RFA processes.

The RFA process in WA was coordinated by a Steering Committee, which was
portrayed as a facilitator and process mover to manage the process for the governments,
to try to have that process running as efficiently as it could and identify issues which
required decisions by Ministers and putting briefing notes to Ministers to get those
issues resolved so that the process could move forward. The committee comprised of
four people from the Commonwealth, [and] four people from the State government
with a sharing of the chairmanship between the senior State Government official and
the senior Commonwealth official.

Conservation groups feared that the Steering

Committee was going to be run b) CALM and demanded representation but were
refused the opportunity to be on the Steering Committee. Instead they were invited to
be part of the process in the Stakeholder Reference Group, which had about 60
officially registered stakeholders who were to provide consolidated advice to the
Steering Committee on issues

relating to the strategic management of the

Comprehensive Regional Assessment process in the south-west forested region of WA.
Conservationists felt that their concerns were going to be sidelined as in their view the
Stakeholders Committee [was] treated with total contempt and thus decided that there
was no point in [their] continued involvement in the RFA process.

Promises of extensive stakeholder consultation were made in the NFPS and echoed in
information materials released for the WA RFA. The Stakeholder Reference Group was
advertised as means of giving a voice to stakeholders (come and have your say and
input) during the governments' public consultation process for the RFA, which gave
stakeholders the chance to ask questions, to make submissions, and to express their
opinions. While the SRG was officially portrayed as a forum for participating in the
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process of developing RFA options for government consideration, many participants
did not perceive it as a very satisfactory arrangement for, in their view, it made
inappropriate use of the stakeholders. There was a widespread perception that CALM
totally controlled the agenda, minutes were unsatisfactory, there was no public debate,
and that the RFA seemed to exclusively look at the needs of the timber industry. In the
end, many stakeholders accepted that the public process was not transparent and that it
was not a public process, which resulted in many calling for a proper process and true
consultation.

Science, the critical element of the RFA process, was also contested. In WA, it was
perceived that science was conducted in a climate of fear or uncertainty, which inhibited
good, fruitful, and honest debate. Science was seen to have been very much dominated
by CALM, meaning that certain scientific views that have been expressed about the
ecology of the south-west forests . . . did not find their way into any of the RFA
documentation. [I]t was [seen as] a rushed process, in which information [was] very,
very tightly controlled as well as limited, data access was allegedly stymied in that
databases ... were not made available to scientists, and datasets that were available [were
at times] totally inappropriate. Also, it was alleged that scientific reports went through
some sort of haphazard review and a very stifled publication process. In toto, despite
assurances by both governments that the RFA itself was . . . a scientific process, the
science of the RFA was widely regarded as second rate science because the science ...
became politicised and was used as a fac;:ade and a weapon, which ultimately damaged
both science and the process.

When the WA RFA was signed in May 1999 it triggered a groundswell of dissent, as the
community felt it had been misled about things in a process that was very much
controlled by CALM and [gave] the timber industry ... virtually all they wanted. Hence,
many stakeholders had no trust in the process. While what was signed in the RFA was
considered by both the State and the Commonwealth .. . [as] green of the balance and
as a fair outcome by a timber industry, which overall thought that the RFA process itself
was fine, the RFA was rejected by the wider community because the RFA was too
alienated from, and the basic decision making mechanism was arrogant of, the
community.

After eight weeks the WA State [G]overnment [was] succumbing to

political pressure and amended the RFA, reducing the cut in karri. This change of
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policy direction by morning press release was viewed by conservationists as a side-step
in response to huge community concern, by others as a step in the right direction.
While government representatives remained convinced that the WA RFA delivered a
good outcome and an outcome that was justifiable in all its aspects, the RFA remained
open to the charge that it did not achieve the outcomes it set out to do, and, in
particular, that the amendments to the RFA delivered an absolute antithesis of the RFA
objective by having done a lot of damage and having caused enormous unrest,
uncertainty, and discomfort in the timber communities.

A Systems Critique of the Western Australian RFA93
Open systems thinking, as described in Chapter Two, is concerned with the organisation
and behaviour of systems and their survival within changing environments. 94

To

recapitulate and expound, the theory sheds light on system-environment relation by
conceptualising the internal (L11 ), transactional (L21 , Ln), and contextual (L2i)
interdependencies that exist within and between systems and their environment. The
theory's notion of changing environmental textures highlights the dynamic nature of the
relationships between systems and their environments, giving rise to complexity and
relevant uncertainty and underscoring the need for adaptive system responses to cope
with environmental change. In that sense, OST enables the articulation of a response
repertoire for human systems operating within dynamic environments.

The "loss of the stable state" (frist, 1997, p.118) characterises today's environment
(constructed and natural).

The environment is described as turbulent (fype IV), as

amplified and resonated system responses lead to high rates of change and
interconnectivity in the environment (Emery & Trist, 1965).

In other words, the

environment itself becomes a source of turbulence, increasing the potential for
unintended consequences caused by system responses and in tum enlarging the relevant
uncertainty faced by systems. The increase in environmental variety CLzi) increases the
risk of maladaptive system responses to change for systems potentially lack the requisite

variety for their survival. According to Ashby's Law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1960),

93
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For corresponding collage refer to Appendix XXVI (CD-ROM).
For an explanation of the multiple connotations, and socio-ecological interpretation, of the term

enviromnent, refer back to Chapter Two, p.13.
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the response repertoire (L11) of a system ought to match the variety of its environment
to ensure system survival. For human systems, the term variety translates into pluralism,
broadly to be understood as "the acceptance of difference", recognising that "diverse
understandings are bred by varied experience" (Schlosberg, 1999, p.110).

Survival is a function of learning as it underpins planning in anticipation of, and in
response to, environmental change. Interactive planning (see Ackoff, 1997) is seen as
the most appropriate system response in the face of environmental turbulence for
planning becomes pro-active and continuously adaptive. The interactive mode focuses
on learning and problem solving via collaboration of interest groups, the identification
of shared values, continuous learning, evaluation, and modification (frist, 1997). The
metaproblems arising in Type IV environments are seen to defy an understanding solely
derived from reductionist and other left brain dominant forms of knowledge
construction. Therefore, synthetic and holistic approaches for the capturing of the
"gestalt of system-connectedness" are considered "pertinent to the development of
response capability to meet Type IV conditions" (frist, 1997, p.524).

A systems approach to learning and planning has implications for system structures in
which learning and planning is meant to occur. The onset of turbulence in the last
quarter of last century (evidenced by stagflation, unemployment, resource depletion,
growing income gaps, and environmental decline) saw a growing dysfunctionality of
hierarchical structures (frist, 1997), perhaps best signified by the cost-blowouts of
western world bureaucracies from the late 1970s. It is these traditional, western world
structures that often prevent what Argyris and Schon (1978) refer to as double loop

learning, a learning to learn how to cope with change, and therefore respond poorly to
increases in environmental variation and suffer from entropic effects.

Hierarchical

structures are what Emery (1967) calls DP1 structures, where learning is experience
based and incremental but contextually blind.

DP2 structures, in contrast, are

collaborative arrangements where cooperation and learning towards shared goals are
encouraged, facilitating the communication of assumptions and values and creating a
consciousness of context (Emery, 1997b). DP2 structures are essentially democratic in
nature and represent a shift away from a hierarchical to a socio-ecological order based
rather on interdependence than dominance.
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From an OST perspective, the WA RFA was a process occurring amid Type IV
conditions. Even prior to the commencement of the WA RFA process environmental
turbulence was already salient as over many years forest stakeholders' actions,
perceivably inappropriate first and second order responses, led to high degrees of
complexity and relevant uncertainty for political decision makers and forest stakeholders
alike. Nationally, for instance, in the face of a changing environmental ethic a growing
societal segmentation over forestry led to high degrees of polarisation and the freezing
of entrenched positions.

In WA, for example, challenges to forest management practices were met with
ignorance

(superficiality),

neo-conservatism,

and/or

aggressive

counter-attacks

(dogmatism) by the government bureaucracies. The resultant turbulence was what
arguably gave rise to the RFA processes nationally, which were meant to serve as a
dampening element, a tool to reduce turbulence and relevant uncertainty for
stakeholders (see Figure 7.3); members of industry were to be certain of future resource
availability; conservationists were to be assured of the long-term ecological integrity of
the forest areas; and even politicians were to be safe from any future political fallouts
over forestry, the Commonwealth in particular.

Rate of
Change

WARFA

C

turbulent field

Dampening of turbulence

disturbed, reactive

/
placid, clustered

placld, random

Complexity & Connectedness

Figure 7.3: The RFA Process as a Means of Turbulence Reduction
(based on McKenna, 1996, p. 29)
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The term dampening does not only relate to environmental complexity but also to system
complexity or variety as, referring back to Ashby (1960), the amount of variety within a
system as well as the amount of relationships that exist among its parts define the
complexity of that system (Beer, 1984; Klir, 1985). The history of the forest dispute (see
Chapters Three and Six) bespeaks the difficulty of the management and governance of
systems with large variety (e.g., networks of forest stakeholders at the national, state, and
local level with conflicting agendas).

Despite the presence of environmental turbulence, the WA RFA represents a process
that exhibits a high degree of closedness and pervasive DP1 structures, indicative of
poor system responsiveness to change. The RFA process was hierarchical with stark
power differentials between the national, state and local levels, which determined the
degree to which individuals could influence the decision-making processes. Ostensibly,
these were centralised and controlled by those in the higher echelons of the State and
Commonwealth hierarchies. From a stakeholder perspective, the process format was as
rigid as the process structure itself, as both structure and function of the RFA process
were based on the DP1 paradigm. The process structure was linear and analogous to
what Feldman and Kanter (1965) call rational problem solving (see Figure 7.4), a hard
systems approach often criticised for its reductionist and often too simplistic treatment
of complexity and dynamism as well as lack of contextual sensitivity (Rowe, 1989;
McCall & Kaplan, 1990).
Identifying
the
Problem

Identifying
alternative
Solutions

Evaluating
each
Alternative

I I
--+

Implementing
the
Solution

Transforming
the System

Figure 7.4: Rational Decision Making: The Problem Solving Process
(adopted from Cavaleri & Obloj, 1993, p.109)

The limitations of this approach are seen to lie in its closedness, exacerbated in the case
of the WA RFA in that problem specifications were pre-determined and endpoints
assumed rather than negotiated (on associated problems see Emery, 1995).

RFA

stakeholders felt confronted with a set forest problem and already established guidelines
for problem resolution. Consequently, the RFA process could not cater for aspirations
beyond process parameters, which is why process management found that what many
stakeholders wanted was outside the policy framework (they] were operating in (e.g., It's
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very hard to have a process that would make the people happy when their main issue
was with the rules with which the whole process was being conducted). This suggests
that the process was divorced from its social context, effectively excluding those who
were to be affected by the process outcomes and for whom the process was supposedly
initiated.

The forestry problem, as addressed by the RFA process, was to be solved using the best

science available, this however was understood as being abstract, reductionist knowledge.
Alternative modes of knowing, knowledge creation, and other levels of expertise were
largely ignored during the RFA, as inputs from the Indigenous community (I mean we
would argue that if you left the land we could manage it just like our ancestors have
been doing it for thousands and thousands of years (but] [t]he government does not see
it as a practical way of scientific management), dissident scientists (they ignored all of our
recommendations), and stakeholders with local knowledge (the stakeholders who were
involved at the local level would have a lot of experience and knowledge to offer to the
process ... [but they] did not intend ... stakeholders [to] have any input) were impeded.
So, stakeholders not only perceived a hierarchical process structure and decision-making
hierarchies but also a hierarchy of experts. Chapter Six showed that sharp distinctions
were drawn between the different types of research that formed a part of the CRA
process, scientific and social studies, inferring different degrees of value, credibility, and
importance. Wide-spread perceptions of the dominance of CALM science and its
connection to the economic and political apparatus indicate a sense of capture and cooption of the RFA science by DP1 structures since, as was shown in Chapter Six, values
were neither shared nor differences appreciated but instead attacked and discredited.
This suggests that the scientific approach to the RFA was one rather based on exclusion
than collaboration.

The issue of exclusion and closedness may best be illustrated usmg an example
borrowed from the social sciences applied here to knowledge systems. Science, hard
science in particular, distinguishes between valid and invalid modes of knowing.
Abstract, reductionist knowledge is elevated to the status of accepted scientific
knowledge, whereas other modes of knowing and knowledge outside the empirical
realm of science are seen as inferior and of less value (at least within the context of
scientific inquiries). Figure 7.5 shows what is called the Mobius strip of topology (see
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Booth, 2000), symbolising here the field of human knowledge, which expands as the
ribbon is being stretched. Following the analogy, the outer side of the ribbon represents
accepted modes of knowing distinct from the inner side of the ribbon, which represents
alternative modes of knowing. Both sides are separated by the outer edges of the
ribbon and remain separated, even if the ribbon's ends (AC and BD) are joined
together.

AB

co
Figure 7 .5: The Separation of Modes of Knowing
(adopted from Booth, 2000, p.93)

OST advocates a holistic and synthetic understanding of the world, akin to Pepper's
(1942) contextualism, which requires connections to be made between the two sides of
the ribbon. It is recognised within open systems thinking that boundaries are break

points (after Emery & Trist, 1965), which need to be overcome to improve the chances
of successful system adaptation under inherently complex Type IV conditions (frist,
1997).

In this context, OST ascribes a greater degree of complexity to system-

environment relations than is generally acceptable to empiricists.

This larger

complexity, manifested in so-called messes, systems of problems or metaproblems (see
Ackoff, 1997; Trist, 1997), is considered a product not only of measurable events but
also of processes and mechanisms that defy measurement. This perspective challenges
the foundation of reductionist science premised on the Humean worldview which
equates empiricism to realism. OST, on this point more closely aligned to Bhaskar's
(1975) critical realism, questions the wholeness and appropriateness of reductionist
approaches, which are exclusively focused on the establishment of causalities, in light of
a realism that is understood to be greater than empiricism. This does not invalidate
empiricism, it merely puts it into a new perspective. This new perspective may be
described by the scenario depicted in Figure 7.6, where the connecting of the ends (AC
and DB) of the ribbon with a twist creates a singular surface which, following Gorsz'
(1994) interpretation of this re-conceptualised topology, brings together the inside and
the outside.

The duality between accepted and unaccepted modes of knowing is

demolished for they are now one. The dichotomies of objectivity and subjectivity,
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experts and non-experts, hard and seft science become intertwined, rendering
reductionism only one of many modes of knowing along the spectrum of knowledge.
Treating different modes of knowing as valid enables a synthesis of knowledge and
understanding, enhancing a system's contextual sensitivity (Lz1 and Liz) and hence
improving its adaptive capacity.

CB
Figure 7 .6: Connecting Different Modes of Knowing
(adopted from Booth, 2000, p.93)
The RFA was meant to deliver an integration of knowledge, drawing from the best
expertise available.

A process such as this could have been expected to make the

connections between the different modes of knowing relevant to forest use and
management. Yet, as occurred in the years prior to the RFA, this integration was
seemingly restricted due to the domination of reductionist thought. As the entrenched
hierarchy of knowledge was maintained during the RFA process, a detailed
communication of RFA management with its socio-ecological environment was
precluded, which resulted, as perceived by many stakeholders, in a scientific, incomplete
endorsement of the status quo.

So, instead of breaking down barriers within the

scientific community and between the expert and non-experts realms, the RFA seemed
to have hardened them.

The closedness of the RFA science was reflective of the structure of the RFA on the
whole, as many stakeholders lamented the existence of similar constraints on many
levels and aspects of the process.

Chapters Five and Six documented a list of

constraints that stakeholders thought affected their ability to participate, to obtain
information, to gain access to decision-making processes, and thus to influence the
overall direction and outcomes of the RFA. Arguably this is why the forest use options
presented in the Public Consultation Paper (Commonwealth of Australia and
Government of Western Australia, 1998c) and the final RFA document itself, were
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viewed as narrow, neitp.er reflective of. public opinion nor best science, and essentially
mere variations of one. option (e.g., ... what you are saying to the community is: get
stuffed, basically. There was no admission that the vast majority of submissions on the
RFA were opposed to what the RFA was suggesting). The RFA was therefore criticised
for failing to take into consideration the views and aspirations of its stakeholders.

The alleged failure to include and increase system variety raises the question of political
commitment and will to enable system transformation. Stakeholder data suggested that
there was an overall lack of political commitment to transformational change, evidenced
by the restricted roles available to stakeholders. This lack of commitment was said to
have found reflection in a structure and a process which arguably also militated against
such a commitment, a point I now shall expound. The RFA process was described by
stakeholders as one of great power concentration because of highly centralised
processes dealing with decision-making, communication, the commissioning and
evaluation of scientific work as well as the interpretation and relaying of information.
Ostensibly, this high concentration of power led to instability as the maintenance of
these power relations (a) reduced the variety within the decision-making realm (b)
reduced the variety of the science underpinning the RFA but (c) increased
environmental variety and turbulence, evidenced by growing community disquiet, the
somewhat unexpected, yet critical, involvement of prominent citizens, and mounting
scientific and political dissent.

However, established power structures proved non-

responsive toward these developments as political system-environment relations had
already stalemated.

The closedness of the decision-making structures arguably

prevented the acknowledgement of growing turbulence as a perceivably noncompromising course was maintained by decision makers, which further intensified
already volatile Type IV conditions.

As a means of illustrating decision makers' inability (or unwillingness) to respond to
environmental change, an appropriate analogy may be that of a cyclonic silo where from
within the intensity of the storm outside cannot be gauged. RFA management within
the silo felt saf~ and justified in its approach as, judged from its position, everything
appeared calm outside; yet, it was the eye of the cyclone. Only upon the emergence of
Type V conditions (after McCann & Selsky, 1984), which threatened to destroy the silo,
was action taken to secure it. The signing of the RFA document by the Prime Minister
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and WA's Premier created hyperturbulent conditions, triggering mass protests, rallies,
and public disobedience, which not only posed an external threat to the silo but also
challenged the tranquillity among those living within the structure. The amendments to
the RFA to a degree dampened the turbulence both within and outside the silo.
However, for some people outside the silo the rapidity of environmental change,
brought about by temporary hyperturbulence, was far beyond their level of influence
and control; they became victims of social vortices. Once the RFA was amended, those
casualties became known as the social fallout from the RFA process, the timber workers
and timber towns in the south-west of the State.

In the end, the supposed strength

derived from the concentration of power became a fundamental weakness of the RFA,
as it led to unintended consequences ultimately hurting those the process promised to
protect. Also, it could be argued that the silo itself collapsed under its own weight as
the Coalition Government lost power in the subsequent state election. The guiding fear
that the relinquishment of power, both in a scientific as well as participatory sense,
would lead to the loss of power gave rise to added closure of an already closed political
system and further centralisation of power. However, closure and power centralisation
seemingly proved to be the precise cause for the loss of power as feedbacks triggered by
existing DP1 structures not only served to harden those structures but also to amplify
further the feedback loops to a point where the structures collapsed. As suggested by
Emery (1995, p.8), "maladaptive dynamics are often associated with participative events
as the result of DP1 structures and forms of management which introduce elements of
that design principle", which in the case of the WA RFA meant that the structure
collapsed for the dynamics it created eroded its foundations.

Ironically, resistance

towards change is what seemingly brought about change in the end.

The WA RFA in Light of the CCPR Model
Selsky and Memon's (1995) CCPR model, as introduced in Chapter Two, served as a
structural tool through which the RFA was situated and described. Accordingly, the
resource system itself and the governing institutional arrangements were described,
treating the RFA itself as a political arrangement designed to determine future forest use
and management patterns. Chapters Three to Six provided insights into the history-rich
and conflict-laden contexts in which negotiations on future forest use and management
took place, highlighting the applicability of the CCPR framework to the case of the WA
RFA. Stakeholders' overlapping and conflicting demands on a limited natural resource
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were shown to have given rise to much conflict, which over the years became a political
problem the RFA sought to resolve. This section will examine the outcomes of the
RFA in light of the behavioural model and assess the model's conceptual strength when
applied to the WA experience.

The RFA promised a transition towards sustainable forestry, timber industries, and
forest conservation. Therefore, the issue to be addressed at this point is the nature and
sustainability of the emergent use and management patterns that emanated from the
WA RFA. However, at present the biophysical sustainability ofWA's forest ecosystems
cannot be assessed as this will need to be determined in years to come. Then, interim
assessments will be conducted of the new Forest Management Plan which,
incorporating the outcomes of the RFA, comes into force in 2004. Ongoing monitoring
and evaluations will then enable an analysis of whether the RFA advanced efforts to
bring about ecologically sustainable forest management in W A's south-west, delivered
an adequate forest reserve system, and helped the native timber industry to become
more sustainable and internationally competitive. Similarly, more time may need to pass
to allow judgements on the long-term socio-economic and socio-political outcomes of
the RFA. Yet, turning the focus to the more immediate outcomes of the process, based
on stakeholders' reactions, the RFA may be seen to have triggered emergent patterns
with long-lasting implications for the future governance ofWA's native forests.

Chapter Five detailed forest stakeholders' perceptions of the RFA process and its
impact on their trust in political decision makers and the political system per se. The
data revealed that a sense of .disillusionment and disenfranchisement with the process
was prevalent among stakeholders, which arguably weakened further an already
fractured relationship between the political apparatus and the electorate with regards to
environmental policy.

A general distrust of RFA management was shown to have

permeated many facets of the RFA (e.g., science, process, participation, decisionmaking, power structure etc.). Decision makers were considered oblivious to the hopes
and aspirations of stakeholders and arrogant in their management of the RFA process.
Stakeholder perceptions were fuelled also by a lack of trust in the State Government
department in charge of the RFA and its leadership.
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The CCPR model treats emergent patterns as "an intervening variable between
institutional arrangements and outcomes" (Selsky & Memon, 1995, p.266), allowing here
for an illustration of the divergence between policy intents and stakeholder responses.
In its conception the RFA can be seen as a trust building exercise for forest stakeholders
and governments, an attempt to settle past conflicts by working jointly towards a
resolution of the forest conflict as a means of creating certainty for forest users and
managers. The longevity of the RFA, as signed in May 1999, was thus to be determined
by the degree to which trust could be established throughout the process for that was to
affect the RFA's political and social acceptability.

For reasons explored earlier on,

attaining acceptability proved illusive as both the structure and process rather served to
feed cynicism and di_strust resulting in the public rejection of the agreement. Distrust
can therefore be seen as an emergent pattern of the RFA, which undermined the
sustainability of the original agreement.

The public rejection meant that the RFA was not going to be politically sustainable,
prompting ad hoc amendments to the agreement by the Western Australian
Government only eight weeks after it had been signed. The amendments to the RFA
constituted a change in the institutional arrangements governing the south-west forests,
a substantial shift in policy direction, which resulted in much confusion as to the status
of the RFA; whether the agreement, and which of the agreements, was in force. The
State Government's erratic response to public pressure gave rise to the perception that
the amendments to the RFA were merely politically motivated and not based on due
process, best science, and community input, changing the fate of rural communities
over night.

Consequently, the meaningfulness of the preceding three years of

negotiation and research was brought into question. Also, doubts were raised over the
reliability and permanence of political decisions, all of which resulted in even greater
cynicism towards politics and a general unwillingness by stakeholders to participate in
future government processes.

Interview data pointed towards a considerable discrepancy between policy intent and
stakeholder responses. The RFA promised certainty and conflict resolution, yet many
stakeholders did not see these aims fulfilled.

Instead, the policy was seen to have

created greater uncertainty and conflict and to have fed stakeholders' suspicions about
political processes. While it remains to be seen whether the RFA will have a lasting
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effect on stakeholders' views on environmental policy-making, interview data showed
that the process did not help improve government-stakeholder relations. Relationships
such as these shape the institutional arrangements that govern the use and management
of natural resources and thus potentially affect their future resource sustainability. On
this front, the RFA did not contribute to the future sustainability of WA's forest
resources but potentially threatened it.

In this context, the question of what constitutes sustainability is vague, however, and
proves problematic within policy processes. Implicit within Selsky and Memon's (1995)
CCPR model is a recognition that sustainability cannot be understood in absolute terms
for a definition of the concept is always perception-based and context-dependent.
Sustainability means different things to different people and does not represent only one
best way of human-environment relations. While, for instance, sustainability may be
understood by timber industries in terms of constant returns from the forest resource in
perpetuity, conservationists may approach the concept on ethical and spiritual grounds,
arguing against the commodification of natural assets on the basis of forests' intrinsic
values. At a later point, I shall return to this issue as part of a discussion on how
sustainable policy outcomes may be negotiated.

The CCPR model, while systemic in its treatment of stakeholder interactions and their
influence on the use and management of natural resources, may be seen to pay
insufficient attention to the socio-ecological embeddedness of CCPRs.

Selsky and

Memon (1995) acknowledge that system interactions occur embedded within larger
social systems, the collective. of which they term societal context.

They accept that a

societal context, which can include "national culture, economic and political systems,
and ideological forces" (1995, p.263), can constrain as well as give opportunities for
decision-making affecting natural resources. Yet, the societal context for their purposes
was treated as external to the CCPR setting under observation and thus merely regarded
as a contextual factor. This treatment of context creates a barrier to a systems analysis
and harbours the risk of underestimating the degree to which external influences, the
broader socio-ecological context itself, can affect the resource system in focus.

CCPRs are arrangements nested in large socio-ecological contexts where social and
ecological systems are in exchange with one another, giving rise to feedbacks within and
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between the two systems and their sub-systems. Resource systems and institutional
arrangements are not divorced from these dynamics; they are a part of them. Socioecological inter- and intra-dependencies and dynamics make up the texture of the CCPR
environment. The point here is that the environmental texture, as argued earlier on, is
critical in terms of the environment's relevance to, and impact on, the management, use,
and sustainability of CCPRs. To illustrate this point, a legacy of agriculture, logging,
mining, and scientific forest management changed the landscape in WA's south-west.
In response to these changes, perceptions grew of natural decline and permanent loss of
ecological diversity and integrity, which over the years gave rise to public agitation and
scientific disputes. . The emergence of scepticism/ cynicism formed a part of the
background against which the RFA process was going to be judged by a number of
RFA stakeholders. The mainstreaming of this scepticism during the RFA helped change
public attitudes towards forests as well as the external dynamics of the RFA despite the
stalemate inside the process.

By late 1998, the amalgam of a conflict-laden past and

growing synergies among an unlikely alliance of external stakeholders (musicians,
dissident scientists, the churches, doctors, businessmen/ and women, athletes, and
academics, and the conservation movement) not only impacted on the RFA process but
also on its likelihood of being accepted by the public. It was this contextual variety the
RFA process did not match, which meant that external forces were more than just a
contextual variable; the socio-ecological context became an intervening variable.

It is plain, that high levels of contextual complexity preclude a systems analysis to
consider all factors and variables relevant to resource systems and their governing
institutions. Still, as it is important for analyses such as these to be sufficiently open to
the potential for external influence, which was highlighted by the WA experience. On
this point, one can see parallels between the working of the model and government
process realities. Closure, in terms of whom and what to consider as part of the picture, is
a matter of judgement, based on values, beliefs, and perceptions. In a practical sense it
also highlights the need for closure as boundaries need to be determined as parameters
for political processes and systems analyses alike. However, especially in the case of
CCPRs which by definition are likely to face contextual complexity, the determination
of points of closure is problematic due to the dangers of oversimplification and a
consequent lack of internal variety. What becomes apparent also is that decisions on
closure are not only fateful but inherently political in nature. Accordingly, an awareness
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of the occurrence and politicality of closure is paramount, and one may therefore need
to look more closely for agreed modes of negotiating closure, a notion I will expand on
below.

Lessons from the WA RFA: Final Synthesis and Conclusions
This thesis, based on stakeholders' perceptions of the WA RFA corroborated with
media content and RFA-related literature, sought to provide an understanding of factors
that may constrain political processes. Moreover, my aim was to identify what could be
considered an adequate level of public input into such processes and the degree to
which, and what kind of, science may need to inform environmental policy making.
Upon reflection, my goals set for this thesis outlined in Chapter One now strike as
somewhat na.i:ve and unrealistic. My objective was to distil the lessons to be learned
from the RFA so as to spell out a new set of rules for civic and scientific engagement in
political processes. I now realise that the articulation of a new set of rules would not be
appropriate. I learned that many rules have already been devised; yet, changing political
contexts and realities, featuring a mix of vested interest, power relations, and sometimes
unpredictable stakeholder dynamics, often render such rules too inflexible to be
meaningful and effective.

Also, instead of producing answers to the political

problematique I investigated, I unearthed meta-problematiques which give rise to reflection
on the political apparatus and its processes. What I can articulate here is a sense of
understanding of the questions that needed asking in this thesis and still need asking and
answering.

For many of the issues that I raised I have no answers, and my sense-

making of the RFA and its political implications, as will be outlined below, is inevitably
incomplete.

Nonetheless, I hope that the insights I could gain can add to the

understanding of political processes and serve as a foundation for future inquires into
environmental policy-making.

First of all, I acknowledge that any final verdict on the RFA in terms of failure and
success is necessarily perceptual and dependent on perspective. Failures can easily be
construed as successes and vice versa. For instance, the splitting of CALM subsequent
to the RFA as a means of overcoming perceptions of conflict of interests and past
prejudices against the department could be seen as a sign of reflexive learning and as a
positive indirect outcome of the RFA. Yet, as commented by a number of research
participants, the changes to the CALM Act could mean that the now separated nature
248

conservation agency of CALM will be basically going into the same penurious status like
all other nature conservation agencies in the country as timber royalties are no longer
available to fund conservation activities. From this angle, the splitting of CALM would
constitute a disservice to nature conservation and thus represent a failure.
Consequently, the final synthesis presented here is to be seen in light of RFA
stakeholder feedback and the thesis' theoretical framework.

The findings of this study point towards the existence of multiple constraints, which
affected the RFA process dynamics and the longevity of the process outcomes. The
data analyses suggested that public participation was insufficiently enabled and that a
merely tokenistic role was permitted to RFA stakeholders throughout the process. A
lack of transparency and information sharing, restrictive communication flows, and
stakeholders' disconnectedness from the decision-making processes were seen to have
been responsible not only for stakeholder dissatisfaction with the RFA process but also
for the disparity between the process outcomes and stakeholder aspirations. Similarly,
the scientific input into the RFA was regarded as constrained by the imposed format
under which science was conducted and by a differential attention to scientific
information dependent on its acceptability to RFA management. The process critique
presented above pointed toward the exclusion/ marginalisation of stakeholders whose
involvement was believed to have been constrained by decisions regarding, inter alia,
problem specifications, process management and leadership, stakeholder consultation,
use of science, and the development of problem resolutions.

These decisions represent points of closure, as depicted in Figure 7.7, for they triggered
a closing of the RFA, a separation of the process from its socio-ecological context. This
separation precluded an interactive learning between RFA

management and

stakeholders and thus impaired adaptive planning and limited opportunities for
transformational change.

The problems associated with these limitations became

evident in the stakeholders' reactions to the process and the rejection of the process
outcomes. The perceived restrictions on input and communication precluded the jointexploration of goals, values, and common ground. This communication failure meant
that divergent expectations on the process could not effectively be relayed throughout
the process, which in the end resulted in both sides of the process, seen from the RFA
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management-stakeholder dichotomy, blaming each other for not having understood
what the process was about.

Figure 7.7: Points of Closure in the WA RFA Process - The diagram shows the various
aspects of the RFA that, according to RFA stakeholders, were subject to contested closure. The solid
lines connecting these points of closure depict the directionality of the process. Dotted lines denote
impaired communication among RFA stakeholders and their limited input into the process.
The critical issue here is not that closure occurred but the way it occurred and that its
existence was denied by some of those who brought it about. As illustrated in van
Straalen and Souren's (2002) example of the life-cycle of science-policy communication
applied to environmental risk ·assessment (see Figure 7.8), growing levels of complexity
are shown to lead to greater turbulence and management problems. Action is prevented
as the introduction of variety increases complexity to a point where resultant turbulence
ultimately leads to the stagnation of the process. This means that a trimming of
complexity is required for the sake of practicality. Closure, in this sense, can be seen as
a prerequisite for action and as a natural phenomenon in political processes.

Explicit in van Straalen and Souren's (2002) model is the need for closure and awareness
of its occurrence when problems are being trimmed.

In the case of the WA RFA,

similar processes of closure or trimming occurred, however, without being admitted to
by those at the heart of the closing, which in turn proved to be a source of conflict. In
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addition, conflict arose in relation to the issues of where, when and l?J whom closure was
initiated, an issue of added precariousness in light of strong perceptions of political
closure in the past. Closure in the WA RFA experience was a matter of autocratic
decision-making undertaken by those at the top of the decision-making hierarchy and
most closely aligned to the political, scientific, and economic status quo. The RFA
presented a situation, as exemplified by the composition of the RFA's command module,
where closedness and autocratic behaviour were reinforced by the structure of the
decision-making apparatus. The majority of members on the RFA Steering Committee
were, with the exception of EA representatives, closely aligned to the positivistic
economic and scientific paradigms, which where identified in Chapters Three, Five, and
Six to have produced precisely those dichotomies the RFA was supposed to overcome.

Stagnation

Complexity
of regulation

t

Turbul~

~

/

7opment

Trimming

Identification
Time

Figure 7.8: The Need for Closure (Trimming) in the Face of Complexity
(adopted from van Straalen & Souren, 2002, p.32)
The review of science revealed that the problems faced by modern science are
inexplicably linked to its ontological and epistemological closedness. The social science
of economics, in particular, "is characterized by dosed-system theorizing" and thus
"forced in the face of complexity of the world to direct its energy to close it by creating
and/ or changing the institutional structure within the boundaries of which the theory is
supposed to work" (Ozel, 2002, p.1-2).

Moreover, Chapter Five showed that the

Westminster system itself is characterised by closedness, proving restrictive to active
participation by individuals outside the political and bureaucratic apparatuses. This view
was reinforced by the fact that the RFA, in terms of community consultation, was seen
to have more than fulfilled government regulations regarding community input,
although this did not involve the contemplation of any measures beyond Arnstein's
(1969) understanding of consultative tokenism. It follows that the WA RFA Steering
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Committee was itself prone to be structurally and ideologically closed toward the RFA
stakeholder community. The absence of any attempts by the Steering Committee to
open the process can hence be considered consistent and the perceived narrowness of
the RFA outcomes, which many stakeholders viewed as being reflective of a proindustry bias, considered perhaps a matter of course.

In 1990, a Commonwealth Discussion Paper (Commonwealth of Australia, 1990)
investigated policy strategies that could break the cycle of acrimony over forestry in
Australia. The paper recognised that the forestry debate was counterproductive and that
conflict resolution would onfy be possible if there was a partnership and collaboration
among stakeholders. It also drew attention to a series of what were considered to be
significant issues of the forest debate, issues a policy initiative would need to address in
order to resolve the long-standing conflict. These issues revolved around questions
such as:

•

Is timber harvesting a legitimate use of native forests?

•

Does old growth have special values?

•

Should agricultural land be reforested?

•

Should native forests be converted to plantations?

All these were questions the RFA did not address, nor, for that matter, were issues such
as climate change despite their pertinence to forestry. The Commonwealth Discussion
Paper also acknowledged that the conflict over forests was exacerbated by an
uncertainty in the community about forestry principles, inadequate information on the
extent and nature of forests, and a lack of agreement in the community about
appropriate processes for public participation.

Precisely these issues formed the

substance of the grievances ~rought forward by stakeholders in relation to the RFA.
This thesis showed that many stakeholders reflected upon the RFA with a sense that
uncertainty over forestry principles remained, that information flows were restricted and
learning prevented, and that an agreement on modes of community participation was
not reached, as all of these issues were subject to closure throughout the RFA process.

It is somewhat striking that the criticism of closure cannot be directed squarely at
individuals within the management team of the RFA process.
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Indeed, certain

individuals were seen to have been responsible for the closure of aspects of the process.
For instance, the director of CALM was believed to have been responsible for the
institutionalised access of science to politics and vice versa. Yet, despite perceptions of
personal influences affecting the openness of the RFA process, closure itself seemed to
have been an autonomous force not driven by any individual or group of individuals.
Closure, so it seems, was an emergent pattern of the process, one that was structurally
determined and behaviourally reinforced by members of the upper decision-making
stratum, who themselves claimed to have been merely working within the limitations of
a pre-determined framework. Yet, such a framework did not exist as neither the NFPS
nor the WA Scoping Agreement spelled out any strict guidelines relating to the enabling
of public input or the use of science in the process other than to say that these should
be elements of the process.

Overall, my analysis of the RFA unearthed the pervasiveness of the paradigms of the
past within Australia's political apparatuses and their treatment of science and
community involvement. The concerns expressed by RFA process stakeholders were
found to echo the contemporary critiques of science and participatory processes
congesting the literature. Although the rhetoric of the RFA gave the impression of
empowerment and shared governance, the process reflected a programmed governance,
hierarchical in character and steered only in directions RFA decision-makers had control
over. Power was centralised not diffused, and information was treated as a source of
power and as a determinant of power relations. It represents an approach to political
problem solving that O'Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann (2002a, p.96) regard as the
"governance of the twentieth century" premised on the linear, hard science problem
solving paradigm mentioned earlier, which is based on exclusion and power
concentration, short-termed and quick-fix orientated, and prone to unintended
consequences that give rise to complexity, uncertainty, and injustice (see Figure 7.9).
This form of governance is resistant to stakeholder input, exhibiting a form of resilience
to external change, as decisions on problem definition, process design, process
leadership, and the implementation of process outcomes remain in the domain of a
narrow policy community. This system does not facilitate or encourage the education of
stakeholders but rather seeks to control information, resulting in highly constrained
discourses and problem definitions that only serve the convenience of the political
system. The closedness of the structure results in an unhealthy relationship between the
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governing and the governed, as secrecy breeds distrust.

The ad hoc nature of

bureaucratically mediated policy making creates what Walker (2001) describes as garbagecan policies.

Moreover, continuity of policy is permanently threatened by the re-

emergence and worsening of previously solved political problems, rapid changes

1n

political direction, and external shocks, as shown in the case of the WA RFA.
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Figure 7.9: The Governance Model of the Twentieth Century
(adopted from O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002a, p.96)
On the question of what determines adequate levels of participation, in Chapter Five I
produced a wish list, compiling stakeholder responses to the question of what an ideal
process would look like. The literature review preceding the analysis in Chapter Five
highlighted the futility of the employment of rigid guidelines for the enabling of public
participation in political processes for these processes are context dependent and
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therefore unique

in

a sense.

Therefore, I shall not speak of certain formats that

participatory processes should follow but highlight instead commonalities between
existing frameworks to give an understanding of what I perceive as prerequisites to
meaningful participation.

Common to all b{!tter practice guidelines regarding community engagement are
recommendations concerned with the blurring (dispersal) of power and responsibility, a
shift away from government and passive compliance to the sharing of governance
moving towards stakeholder self-determination. The contemporary literature speaks of
participatory deliberation based on open and collectively engaged decision-making, a
widening of the basis of power.

An approach such as this, the governance of the

twenty-first century (see Figure 7.10, after O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002a),
embraces openness, implicitly incorporating open systems principles.

This form of

governance opens traditional closure points (e.g., leadership, problem specification,
process design etc.) to processes of collective deliberations through which negotiated
points of closure become the basis for action along agreed process parameters
(negotiated barriers). Collective deliberation based on inclusion and openness enables
the pooling of mental resources, mental models, ideals, and forms of knowledge leading
to a substantially broader collective outlook on the negotiating parties' connectedness to
their environment and thus increases vastly their response repertoire to environmental
change. Search conferences, a recognised tool within the OST literature, represent an
approach through which a process opening can be achieved in that they provide a
forum for open and reciprocal learning and network building. Many other participatory
modes have been developed in recent years (e.g. electronic democracy, consensus
conferences, citizen juries etc.), and all intend to increase openness via inclusiveness so
as to obtain requisite system variety and thus to improve learning and planning
capabilities.

It must be recognised, however, that no format can deliver absolute

openness. Openness, just like objectivity, is a maxim that ideal-seeking human systems
can aspire to; however, openness in an absolute sense cannot be obtained. To illustrate
this point, deliberative participation relies on the representativeness of participating
stakeholders achieved through active inclusion and openness. Yet, the very notion of
representation implies closure, as the group of all potential participants is reduced to a
representative selection of stakeholders. Here, a contextual (environmental) awareness
is required so as not to simply replicate societal power constellations within deliberative
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processes. This, however, according to the Foucauldian understanding of power, would
represent one of the fundamental challenges to pluralism in policy-making.

The

seemingly unavoidable duality of social praxis and structure raise doubts over the
preventability of this kind social replication.
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Figure 7 .10: The Governance Model of the Twenty-First Century
(adopted from O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002a, p.97)

It is evident also that a new Bill of FJghts for political process stakeholders not only
transfers power but also responsibilities to process participants. Arguably, the most
fundamental civic duty lies in the willingness to participate. Many government-driven
processes today, despite their societal and environmental importance, seem unable to
trigger public interest in participation for they are complex and personal involvement
time-intensive. Also, as shown by the WA experience, past efforts by stakeholders were
frequently frustrated by governments and their bureaucracies.

This means that

stakeholder participation and public representation is generally limited to small interest
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groups, therefore effectively pre-programrrung the replication of societal power
structures.

A person's willingness to participate is largely dependent on an

understanding of the importance of personal involvement which requires education and
a communication of the values of participation. Education is also needed in relation to
outcome ownership ~specially in the face of potential costs. For instance, calls for the
cessation of old growth logging imply the retrenchment of timber workers, the payingoff of existing timber contracts, and a suite of other social and economic transition
costs.

While those costs are initially socialised, in the long-term they have direct

implications for taxpayers, who might resist additional taxes levied for the protection of
old growth. In the case of the RFA, as indicated by stakeholders across the political
spectrum, the public's push for a cessation of old growth logging is not to be mistaken
for an environmental mandate for government.

In other words, there is a high

potential, indeed likelihood, for moral incontinence of stakeholders when faced in their
dual capacity of ethical beings and rational consumers with the economic costs of
solving social and environmental problems. Here too, education is needed to facilitate
informed ethical and rational discussions on the bigger picture within which political,
especially environmental, problems ought to be seen. An understanding of true costs
and benefits needs to be explored, shedding light on short-term and long-term
implications and th~ trade-offs involved when dealing in concert with complex
environmental, social, and economic dimensions. Only then can environmental policy
processes and their outcomes be fully owned by process participants.

The prevtous section indicates that there is a need for an informed public within
functioning democracies, and - as was shown in Chapter Five - the sustainability
literature also recognises the importance of public participation to any future
sustainability transition. In this context, science, despite signs of dwindling public trust,
is still to be seen as the public's most authoritative educator and foremost policy
informant.

Chapter Six also underscored the argument that science is needed.

However, it was also shown that the exercise of science is invariably linked to power
and thus prone to abuse, a predisposition exacerbated by the closedness of the
dominant reductionist paradigm in science and its attraction to economic rationality.
Science is always at risk of being either a driver or mere reflection of social structures
and dominant constructions of order and reality, which jeopardises its future relevance
and trustworthiness in policy processes that are increasingly dependent on a science that
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thinks outside rational squares. A new or more robust science, often coined holistic,
would be one that faces a reduced risk of cooption and corruption as it would prevent
the narrow political framing of complex policy issues.

This means an active

involvement of a conscious arid politically aware science in the political process.

The notion of openness, as presented in this thesis, demands a widening of
understanding and a widening of the recognised expert realm.

This could be

understood as a broadening of Haas' (1992) epistemic communities or Funtowicz and
Ravetz's (1991) extended peer communities to what might be seen as knowledge networks.
Science's instrumental role in policy processes is that of reducing uncertainty. If science
is to effectively reduce uncertainty, then the uncertainty's underlying complexity ought
to be matched with humanity's complete arsenal of tools of understanding the world.
''The path to action lies clearly in the best understanding of nature available"
(Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, p.271), yet incomplete approaches to seeing the world
are not only unlikely to deliver such an understanding they also increase the politicality
of science as remaining uncertainty becomes a source of political power (Handmer et al.,
2001). Therefore, the counterproductive barriers between hard and soft sciences as well
as between experts and non-experts may need to be overcome as their partial
explanations of reality can jointly form a more complete picture of reality, reducing
uncertainty and the likelihood of unintentional consequences (see Cavaleri & Obloj,
1993) (see also Figure 7.11).

The fusion of various modes of knowing in knowledge networks would help unite
perspectives for the analysis and management of natural systems. Natural sciences are
relied on to explain and to dampen human-induced turbulence in natural systems. Due
to complex socio-ecological interactions and inter-dependencies, the socialisation of
natural sciences has long been advocated, especially in connection with highly complex
and wicked sustainability problems. For instance, White and Walker (1997) advocate
the use of contemporary and historical reference information in restoration ecology. In
this context, environmental narratives - sources of contextual knowledge - can offer
useful perspectives, contributing to the restoration of ecosystem health in degraded
landscapes (see Robertson et al., 2000). The benefits associated with the use of multiple
perspectives are also recognised within the field of strategic decision making. According
to Mitroff (1998), the framing of problems using narrow, single perspectives can lead to
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incomplete problem specifications and result in what he refers to as Type 3 errors
(perfect answers to wrong problems). Also, recent conceptualisations of a science
deemed sufficiently equipped to tackle sustainability issues recognise the need for other
forms of understanding nature, also drawing insights from intuition and feeling (see for
instance Kates et al., 2000). It is suggested that humanity's relationship with nature
cannot be reduced to a cogito-ergo-sum formula as life is larger than cognition.
Echoing the feminist critique of dominant science (e.g. Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1980;
Arditti et al., 1989), a fusion of hard and soft science can perhaps be understood as the
joining of the head (masculine/cognitive/rational) and the heart (feminine/emotional)
in a quest for self-awareness to gain awareness of others (gender/ environment). An
approach such as this may be needed in science for science and its practitioners to gain a
fuller understanding of itself and themselves so as to come to a better understanding of
the planet. A growth in self-awareness may also help science to overcome its lack of
self-confidence, as addressed in Chapter Six, which has traditionally prevented its
practitioners from engaging in advocacy and political debate.

Future debates on

sustainability science will show whether such a new science will form a new metadiscipline or indeed represent the birth of adisciplinarity.

__.

Broodcned lJnderSlanding

~~
Figure 7 .11: Broadened Understandings Through a Fusion of Modes of Knowing
(based on Cavaleri & Obloj, 1993, p.69) - A single perspective (mode of knowing) is segmental
and incomplete and can only enable a limited understanding of the reality of the system it is applied to.
Fused modes of knowing or multiple perspectives can lead to a broader, more complete understanding of
a system reality.

The notion of knowledge networks recognises the value of possible contributions of socalled non-experts to our understanding of nature based on local knowledge and venerable
experience. Non-experts local (contextual knowledge), observations, and inclinations
about local contexts, processes, and connectivity formed over years of personal
exposure can prove more insightful than the results of meticulously executed short-term
studies by acknowledged experts (Holman & Dutton, 1978; Krimsky, 1984; Funtowicz
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& Ravetz, 1991; Renn, 1992; Laird, 1993; Bailey et al., 1999). As noted by Funtowicz

and Ravetz (1991, p.149). "[k]knowledge of local conditions may not merely shape the
policy problems, it can also determine which data are strong and relevant." This is not
to suggest that lay-knowledge is necessarily scientific but that it is another valid source
of knowledge worthy of consideration. All modes of knowing are equally valid, yet not
equally useful and applicable to certain problems. This is why the existence and validity
of answers produced outside the traditionally recognised expert realm should not be
denied or dismissed but their value and possible contribution to a given problematique
acknowledged and considered.

Again, it is a matter of negotiating these points of

closure in terms of how such an integration of different knowledges could occur.
Critical in that regard are also questions as to the when and how non-experts should, or
may need to, become involved. Also, echoing Yearley's (2000, p.110) concerns, how are
non-experts' insights or the "extended facts" (after Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991) to be
treated, how can their truthfulness be determined, and how should these facts be
incorporated into processes of political decision making? These questions still need
answering and further conceptual and empirical work may be needed. Yet, in light of
the data presented in this thesis, I am inclined to suggest that far more work may still be
required in making explicit the need for breaking down the resistance toward the
opening of "closed bodies of knowledge" (Wynne, 1995). Despite much progress in
theoretical debates, certain perceptions, which view these opening attempts as direct
attacks on the authority and robustness of science, are still held widely.

Overall, what dampens my enthusiasm in regard to the new conceptions of deliberative
participation advanced in this work is that these so-called new ideas are not genuinely
new. Many of them are as old as the early debates on democracy themselves, though
some have been revived over the last 40 years. Thus, the question as to why some 40
years later one continues to speak of their theoretical desirability as opposed to their
political actuality is reason for concern.

It is the absence of new decision-making

structures (there are isolated exceptions) that demand a final reflection on the issue of
power also as it relates to this thesis' research question regarding process constraints.

The issue of power highlights the fundamental weakness of any participatory model that
seeks to change traditional patterns of decision making or entrenched structures of
thought and governance. For instance, O'Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann's (2002a) vision
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of a new mode of governance still relies heavily on the accommodation of stakeholder
needs by those powerful actors, who the model assumes to relinquish power. Active

I
J;1
i
~;

participation is dependent on education and active enabling and assistance, fundamental
to which is a genuine willingness of those who hold power for this to occur. They
possess the means of education, facilitation, and enablement. Tertiary institutions and
NGOs used to be able to fulfil an educator role. However, mounting market pressures

?t

faced by these institutions today increasingly compromise their ability to educate and
inform democratic processes, which threatens to further reduce societies' pluralistic
learning and planning capabilities.

The strength of participatory or deliberative models is usually derived from the logic of
collective benefit, implying that higher degrees of participation/ cooperation lead to
larger collective benefits. This is also the case in OST, which sees humans as purposeful
systems with the potential to work collaboratively towards a better world, yet contingent
on their willingness to do so. However, as evidenced in the plight of open access
resources, the logic of collective action (group theory), and the prisoner's dilemma, the
collective is neither ranked as highly by individuals as may be collectively assumed nor
encouraged by political systems subscribed to free market liberalism, consumer
sovereignty, and individualism.

The problematique arising from the unlikeliness of

group consensus on matters regarding the common good was also highlighted in the
discussion on sustainability constraints in Chapter Five.

Habermas (1987; cited in O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2002a, p.99) suggests that the
emancipatory ideals of modernity are under threat of "being subverted to the directed
rationalities of commerce, expertise and private interests."

I concur with this

interpretation and point, in this context, to the marketisation of politics, nature, and
society that has led to what Foucault coined engraving. I am referring to the engraving of
economically sanctioned views in science and political discourses, which fuel the widely
lamented ecologico-economical and socio-political dualisms and work against change
from outside the political apparatus and produce politically apathetic and self-interest
based societal dynamics and structures. These processes of economic normalisation even
find expression in the models/theories employed in this thesis. Social ecology, for
instance, adopts the language of resource commodification used in commons research
when dealing with natural assets. Stakeholders are referred to as resource users or are
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addressed in terms of appropriator classes (see for instance Selsky & Creahan, 1996).
While this vernacular might be highly reflective of today's economic reality, it
unwittingly replicates and fuels patterns of economic hegemony. This kind of language
use also attests to the degree to which not just language but society in general has been
engraved by a rationality, which, however, is increasingly understood to undermine the
integrity of social and ecological systems. Moreover, this rationality is underlying the
actions of contemporary governments world-wide, Australian governments representing
no exception (see Chapters Three, Five, and Six).

The largely unquestioned and

culturally accepted dominance of this mechanistic and utilitarian worldview (Milbrath,
1994; Schafer, 1994), despite promises of diversity through deregulation and
competition,95 has led to an unprecedented degree of power concentration on the
markets (e.g., food production, information technology, media) and in social and
political structures, which all have become aligned to serve an overriding economic
development agenda.

This agenda represents a meta-constraint for it prevents, not

directly but mediated through normalised social and political structures and discourses,
the broadening of, and inclusion of alternative, perspectives This means, as pointed out
by Handmer, Davers, and Norton (2001), that other rationalities (e.g., ecological
rationality) remain subordinate to the dominant economic rationality in the context of
the political problem conception, framing, and decision-making.

Issues are raised,

framed, and solved in accordance to underlying, often unspoken, but strongly adhered
to economic maxims, which may explain why social and environmental problems persist
despite much energy spent on rational problem solving.

In the end, a pervasive

economic rationality constrruns socio-political structures, discourses, processes, and
dynamics; yet, quite covertly as the constrainedness is implicit. Despite its visibility, the
constraint's engravedness is what thwarts its recognition.

It is this meta-constraint, as was foreshadowed in Chapters Five and Six, which framed
the RFA as a national process. The constraint became evident in the analysis of the
interview data which revealed widely held views of the political protection of industry
interests, especially those of large businesses. Perceptions such as these were reinforced
by the alleged narrowness of the public consultation paper and the RFA document

95 Globalisation

increases connectivity and rates of change, which is why competition as the basis for

market-mediated exchange and interaction may expose itself as an inappropriate behavioural principle for
human systems in the twenty-first century.
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itself. The mining sector served as another prompt for the forming of these viewpoints,
for this resource sector, while a key stakeholder in the process, was - being subject to
different resource legislation - largely exempt from scrutiny under the RFA, despite the
industry's impact on forested ecosystems.

Moreover, Bunnings, the largest timber

company in WA, which was seen by conservationists to have been behind the drive for
continued old growth logging, was widely believed to have had its interests served by
the process and the final RFA agreement.

Even the State Government's ad hoc

amendments to the RFA, which reduced the industry take for karri timber, effectively
favoured Bunnings, yet at the expense of small timber millers, confirming stakeholders'
suspicions that economic muscle meant political protection and highlighting parallels
between political an economic power concentration. The implicitness of the economic
constraint was captured by statements made earlier about a seemingly autonomous
closure of the RFA. Its subtle, yet strong, influence on the RFA found reflection in the
governing structures of the process which were embedded in larger political structures
at the state and federal level and were subject to, or drivers of, the same constraint.
Processes initiated from within those constrained structures therefore carried this
watermark of constrainedness.

It is ironic that the governments, upon which positive change towards deliberative
decision making in the political process depends, are seen to drive and promote today's
neo-liberal growth agenda and orthodox economic credo (Walker, 1989). It is ironic
because the seeming resilience of current political/bureaucratic structures derived from
politico-economic entanglements appears to be one of the key obstacles to be overcome
for the enablement of such processes.

The notion of strength (resilience96) is also

relative as the ideologically driven impenetrability of the political structures is starting to
undermine their own adaptive capacities, as the forces of globalisation increasingly limit
the ability of governments to affect political, social, and economic change (Pusey,
1991b) which not only corrodes their legitimacy but also raises doubt over their
trustworthiness (Macnaghten & Urry, 1998). In other words, long-term political stability
is brought into question as the DP1 structures of governments are coming under threat
from the environmental feedbacks they create.

96

As suggested by Walker et al (2002), resilience is not necessarily desirable, especially in situations where

system configurations lead to a decline in social welfare, loss of social and natural capital, etc.
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What is seemingly needed is an understanding of the implicit existence of economic
constraints and a critical reflection on their effects on, and their long-term implications
for science, society, and nature. However, an understanding of, and reflection on, these
constraints are contingent on an awareness of their existence and the dangers they may
pose.

Despite years of their documentation and their growing visibility one must

question the degree to which an awareness of these constraints exists as their root
causes remain largely unaddressed in discourses on environmental policy-making (e.g.
climate change, salinity, fisheries). Certainly, one explanation lies in the political threat
such awareness would pose within the mindsets of those whose interests are served by
the status quo. The silence of scientists and citizens in that regard is unhelpful and in
itself an expression of an unwitting social endorsement and replication, which in turn
may be indicative of a need for further explication efforts. It is plain that an agenda for
environmental change needs to be concerned primarily with socio-political reform. Yet,
the critical issues may not be whether this reform is needed or what a reformed system
would look like, as much work has already been done in that area, but how system
transformation can be initiated in the face of an implicit, systemic constrainedness as
here may lie the stumbling blocks to a more sustainable future.
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Reflections
In the closing of this thesis, I would like to draw attention to a range of issues in
connection with this work that I believe require further comment and clarification. I
would also like to use this opportunity to reflect on this study's contributions and
limitations and to finish with some personal observations concerning the sustainability
agenda and its future.

To begin with the contributions of this study, I regard this work as contributing to (a)
the area of theory building and (b) qualitative research method. Firstly, an attempt was
made to apply OST and social ecology, conventionally employed at the organisation

(firm) level, to a large and murky socio-political conflict. The theories were used as
means of making sense of the RFA and to develop an understanding of the
relationships

between

political

structures

(systems)

and

their

socio-ecological

environments. The use of the OST-based social ecology perspective provided much
needed conceptual guidance in terms of situating the WA RFA as a natural resource
conflict. In addition, the structure of this thesis was determined by the behavioural
CCPR model adopted for this work, which also helped explain further systemenvironment relations. Overall, the use of OST and social ecology paved the way for a
systems critique of the RFA process, highlighting the closedness of the process and the
political structures governing it. The systems analysis highlighted the need for structural
and procedural openness whilst leading to an argument for negotiating closure within
socio-political proces.ses as a means of establishing a platform for legitimate action.

In other words, this work points to the need for political processes to be open in terms
of process design as well as process outcomes. At the same time, it is recognised that
action (meaning here process initiation, finalisation, etc.) depends on closure and that
boundaries need to be determined. The question addressed in this study is the degree of
inclusiveness of this closing procedure, as the acceptability of the ensuing process depends
on it. Interests excluded from the determination of process parameters are unlikely to
give a positive response to any outcomes achieved by that process. As was shown in the
case of the WA RFA, stakeholders were excluded from the 'scoping' of the RFA
process. The data analysis revealed that, as a consequence, those stakeholders were
fundamentally unhappy with the process and the outcomes it arrived at. In this context,
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the application of OST ena~led the systematic treatment of the nature of this
stakeholder discontent and the resultant, dysfunctional dynamics between RFA
stakeholders and the political apparatuses in charge of the RFA process. This is where I
see this thesis' key contribution to lie. I was able to make sense of a contemporary,
complex political process, shedding light on obstacles to effective public participation,
in a volatile political process. Thus, I am confident that the insights gained from this
study can be instructive for the design of future political initiatives aimed at stakeholder
engagement.

Furthermore, I believe that the application of OST to a meta-system

problematique will conceptually add to the fields of social ecology and systems thinking.

The use of colour-coding in the context of discourse clustering I consider an innovative

!

'

approach for dealing with data confidentiality.

While I was unable to ascribe data

fragments to individual RFA stakeholders, it was possible to present verbatim quotes
attributable to sufficiently precise discourse groups without divulging identifying
information.

I
i1

This approach enabled a form of data presentation, which effectively

minimised author pre-eminence and gave a relatively unfiltered voice to research
participants.

Qualitative researchers facing similar methodological confidentiality

constraints may benefit from this approach. This is because the use of colour coding
protects effectively research participants, yet provides qualified freedom in terms of data
use. This in turn allows the circumnavigation of other methodological safeguards and
the unimpeded portrayal of research information.

The colour-coding method was complemented by the discourse analysis approach
adopted for the purposes of this study. The format employed provided me with the
opportunity to present the discourses of the WA RFA as a whole as large parts of the
interview data could be maintained in their original form. With a focus on the discursive

whole I was able to canvass many, albeit not all, fringe as well as mainstream perceptions
of the WA RFA. This enabled a more holistic treatment of a large number of diverse
discourse communities and helped reveal many silent and hidden views in the rhetorical
landscape of the RFA. Overall, I believe that the format chosen for this study was well
suited for my intention to provide a dialogical overview of the WA RFA and to give
insights into how the process and its outcomes were perceived by RFA stakeholders.
Future research dealing with similar degrees of data complexity may benefit from this
form of data treatment. This method not only helps maintain data integrity it also
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facilitates the management and sense-making of large and unwieldy datasets which are
common in this line of qualitative work.

Following on, comments are warranted on what might have been perceived as a crusade
against the Department of Conservation and Land Management. It was not the aim of
this thesis to discredit the work done by individuals within the department and the
department itself, which in so many regards is held in high esteem locally, nationally,
and internationally. Nor has it been my intention to substantiate scientific claims or
others that run counter to views potentially held by certain staff within the agency.
While much of what this thesis has produced might be seen as a general sort of
smearing of the name CALM, I would like to point out that next to all research
participants were quick to add to their_ respective critiques on aspects of CALM
procedures and operations their se.nse of admiration for the work done by the
department and the individuals working within it (e.g. Most of the CALM staff were
very professional - and - CALM had the best nature conservation - and - CALM ...
was doing a really good job - and -

We worked very closely with CALM - and -

CALM has done some good work - and- . I am not saying that CALM officers are not
good). In other words, none of the aforementioned was meant to be a reflection of the
department as a whole or all of its members of staff.

I have made it clear that this thesis dealt with RFA stakeholder perceptions, and it was a
widely held perception that CALM assumed a very strong role regarding the science and
the management of the RFA process. In light of the department's conflict laden public
relations history, it should not come as a surprise that its centrality to the RFA process
gave rise to perceptions that is was CALM ... that drove that process, that the options
presented in the Public Consultation Paper pretty much covered what CALM was on
about, that it was all done behind closed doors. Many such quotes could be produced at
this point. The following statement, however, may capture the dominant sentiment that
was expressed by research participants:

There was a sense of concern that CALM were going to
take the foreshadowed process and do the same thing to
the process like they had done to a number of other
processes to do with the forests and that was to dominate
the government process in such a way that other
scientists, other people that want to be involved, the
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public at large, and so on, and certainly the conservation
movement, were excluded from participating. So there
was a sense that this would occur.
So, it does not matter whether these concerns were justified or not. The point that I am
making here is that (a) sentiments such as these were certainly wide-spread and (b)
seemingly little was undertaken to counter these perceptions and to alleviate the
underlying concerns.

In fact, it could be argued that the steps that were taken by

process officials only helped fuel existing anxieties and suspicions.

I now wish to address the issue of trans-disciplinarity and what it meant for this thesis;
also with regards to limitations arising. While the need for trans-disciplinary research is
now increasingly recognised and promoted (Somerville & Rapport, 2000), problems
have emerged regarding its assessment, especially. in connection with a project such as
this as questions arise over what can, and ought to, be expected (Hodge, 1995). In other
words, boundaries for trans-disciplinarity have yet to be negotiated. Trans-disciplinary
work is generally burdened by the insurmountable variety it endeavours to embrace,
compounded by problems associated with a disciplinary homelessness; this was certainly
the case in this thesis. The absence of clear disciplinary boundaries is problematic,
especially when in the course of research many traditional boundaries are being crossed,
at times unbeknownst to the researcher.

The danger lies here in the threats of

incompleteness and superficiality as new synthetic understandings can come at the
expense of depth and discipline-bound understanding.

This thesis was affected by the complexity and variety of its subject matter and the fields
of knowledge from which it borrowed.

I thus relied on closure for the sake of

manageability. Below I wish to provide an acknowledgement of my trimmings, in a
sense reflect on my closure, which however should not be understood as the erection of
this project's demarcation lines or barriers. Instead, these may be seen as the offering of
new breaking points or points of departure for future studies.

The breadth of the thesis largely prohibited an in-depth treatment of all relevant aspects
of the RFA or all relevant bodies of literature and schools of thought. On these points,
this thesis does not claim completeness, nor can I give assurances that questions raised
in this thesis have not already received a more advanced treatment within discrete
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disciplinary discourses, despite an ongoing effort on my behalf to be abreast with the
literature. To my understanding, these are the risks faced by trans-disciplinary research,
and therefore, in the interest of learning, I hope that any instances of incompleteness,
naivety, or superficiality can be seen as an invitation to critique and dialogue.

Overall, the limits I set for this thesis I consider justified in light of what this thesis laid
out, and was able to achieve.

Put simply, the aim of this thesis was to gain an

understanding of a political process with great contextual richness with an emphasis on
the treatment of science and process stakeholders.

To this end, in the context of

primary data collection and the inclusion of relevant literature, I sought to embrace a
large variety of viewpoints.

On this score I believe to have been successful. The

resultant complexity meant, however, that I needed to be selective about which aspects
to include and to elaborate. As far as the case study data was concerned, many of these
decisions were made for me, as confronted with confidentiality constraints a large
number of data sets I could not use for it would have jeopardised the anonymity of
research participants. In the end, I was restricted to focus my analysis on data (a) I was
allowed to use, (b) I was able to corroborate with other data sources, and (c) I was able
to address in sufficient depth whilst staying within the usual limitations of space and
time which govern these types of research.

Expounding point (b), weak thematic

groups were included, and data outliers considered where dissonance was at issue. This
restriction applied primarily in a thematic sense where space and time constraints
disallowed the pursuit of vaguely supported themes deemed too broad, too specific or
too tangential for my purposes. Acknowledgement is made of excluded themes below.

As to the treatment of the literature, I recognise to have ventured into very dense
environments of academic work and therefore readily admit to the possibility, indeed
likelihood, of having treated complex issues with a degree of naivety and simplicity.
Especially, I am aware that sections dealing with the public understanding of science,
the nature of science, power, democracy, and public participation could have been
embellished substantially. Although I recognise that these are areas that deserve critical
engagement, personal disciplinary limitations as well as space and time restrictions
influenced my decisions on data inclusion and exclusion and level of engagement.
However, I did not see the purpose of this thesis in the expanding of boundaries within
established modes of thinking but in crossing boundaries and the highlighting of
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complementarities between various schools of thought. What I intended to expand was
a socio-political understanding of the notion of socio-ecological openness as it relates to
science and modes of public participation and to illuminate its applicability to
environmental policy making and political processes in general. In doing so, I hope to
have demonstrated the relevance of OST to the understanding of larger socio-ecological
systems outside the organisational (firm) context from where it emerged.

My choice of discourse analys~s I see justified by the findings of my study, although I am
aware of the obvious dangers of methodologically determined vindication.

The

discourse method I employed proved useful for the unearthing of opinions outside
dominant frames of discourse, which helped increase data variety and thus with the
neutrality of this research. My focus on Dscourse helped give expression to a diverse
range of stakeholder perceptions and allowed me to give some structure to what I
regarded a messy discursive environment. On this point, an added focus on semiotics
could have provided further insights into semantic differences reflective of the disparity
in RFA stakeholders' perceptions of forests and forestry.

For instance, issues of

spiritual connection, identification, instrumentalism, and other issues (dis-)connecting
stakeholders (from) to forests could have been compared and contrasted.

I stood

corrected a number of times concerning vernacular as I learned about the valueladenness of language in the forestry context (e.g., timber crop, timber harvest etc.). A
semiotic approach could have delivered a deeper understanding of stakeholder polarity
and compatibility of interests. and thus would have added a useful dimension to the
analysis of the RFA.

The discourse approach chosen here lent itself to the presentation of rhetorical variety
within a political process. Other and more systematic approaches could have been used,
yet the idea was to minimise author intervention and hence refrain from imposing
analytical layers onto the data and instead offer a, to my mind, transparent interpretation
of the RFA's discursive field.

Admittedly, the length I needed to go to for the

presentation of the interview data could speak against this approach, especially as it
would prove impractical for larger data sets. Also, confidentiality constraints caused
data presentation to be more involved and complicated than was perhaps desirable.
Constraints such as these, however, are not uncommon in this line of research, which is
why other discourse-based approaches (e.g., Q-method (see for instance Steelman &
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Maguire, 1999)) would probably prove more user-friendly. Nonetheless, I hope to have
demonstrated the power of discourse and the importance of its analysis within the
political context.

This thesis attested to the internal and external complexity of the RFA, and without a
doubt a much wider range of issues pertinent to the RFA could have been included.
Again, this was a matter of ability, time, space, and admittedly judgement. At this point,
I wish to acknowledge a number of issues I considered integral to an analysis of the WA
RFA process but for the reasons cited earlier I found myself unable to include.

First and foremost, the interests of Indigenous Australians I regret to have not been
able to include as par_t of my analysis of the WA RFA. WA's N oongar communities did
play a role in the WA RFA, and an analysis of their departure from, and rejection of, the
process and its outcomes would have been a valuable exercise. I am afraid that my
exclusion of their role in the RFA may be seen as another social replication of their
plight in Australian politics, an impression I am merely able to counter with the
arguments of data availability and time. Unfortunately, the perceived marginalisation of
Indigenous interests throughout the WA RFA process was mirrored in the sampling
design employed for the purposes of this thesis. Only few references were made by
interviewees to Indigenous concerns throughout the interview process, and thus only a
limited insight could be gained into Indigenous perceptions of the WA RFA during the
data analysis. The resulting paucity (i)f data did not allow for a more thorough treatment
of the views of WA's Noongar communities.

An analysis into the economics of forestry would have also been a highly informative
enterprise. Many analyses have already been conducted in the past, and some these
findings are mentioned throughout this thesis. However, a WA-specific study is yet to
be undertaken.

In this context, research participants identified a need for the

exploration of workable ratios between timber volumes, employment figures, and social
returns.

Especially, as it is also applicable to other resource sectors, holistic

measurements of social returns from industries working in these sectors and their
measured inculcation in the policy process are sine qua non. Moreover, there is a need
for more comprehensive social studies on regional levels, as those conducted as part of
the RFA represented the first of their kind and attracted criticism for the simplicity with
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which regional needs were perceived to have been assessed. Also, the time is nigh for
greater emphasis to be placed on research into questions of how qualitative findings of
this nature are incorporated in decision making models.

Other issues relevant to an analysis of the WA RFA could include: the role of softwood
and hardwood plantations to which little attention was paid during the RFA; the
scientific pros and cons of woodchipping and their social and environmental
implications as well as a range of other scientific aspects under dispute; a detailed
analysis of the RFA documen! and its amendments and their long-term implications for
forestry. I am convinced this list could be very long, indeed.

Finally, an issue of particular interest to me was that of how the WA RFA compared to
the RFAs signed in other RFA regions. This question formed a part of the initial
research, and a total of six interviews was conducted, transcribed, and analysed for a
comparison between the Western Australian RFA and those signed in Queensland and
Tasmania.

A meaningful analysis, however, would have significantly stretched the

already capacious size of this thesis since the differences between the three states were
vast and would have demanded a significant amount of contextual detail. Consequently,
I hope to present such an analysis at a later stage in the form of publications. An
analysis such as this could then also include research data from similar studies
conducted in other Australian RFA regions (e.g., North East NSW RFA or Southern
NSWRFA).

Personally, I feel that funding-dependent, trans-disciplinary PhDs, such as this, face
constraints in terms of time and space, which demand closure at the most inopportune
time. I speak of poor timing as I feel that one finishes at a stage when an understanding
of the issues at hand is only starting to ripen and the really interesting questions are
beginning to assume shape. Whilst I am relieved to have come to this point of closure,
I note with a sense of sadness not to have been able to address a range of questions,
which I consider worthwhile pursuing and thus perhaps as possible directions for future
research.

For instance, issues relating to power and self-interest demand a more

thorough treatment within the OST framework. On this point, I also perceive a need
for the revisiting of the purposefulness and directionality of systems. Moreover, how do
participatory models incorporate closure and how can they be widened so as to cater for
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socio-ecological complexity? What constitutes negotiated closure, at what point has
closure been negotiated, and what is the permanence of these closure points? In other
words, when do we engage in renegotiations? How does science deal with other modes
of knowing, how are they meant to be weighted, and who decides on their relevance?
What questions can we ask science, and what answers can we expect? Also, what are
the implicits and explicits in sustainability discourse as it relates to engraving and the
l,

I

I

subtlety of implicit constraints? Most of all, how can societal agreement be reached on
the essence and direction of sustainability, or what is it we are looking for?

It is

questions such as these I regard as formidable research topics, not merely for their
theoretical appeal but also their acuteness and real-life applicability.

On the final question of those listed above I wish to comment briefly in the closing of
this thesis.

To me, sustainability is a matter of exploring jointly humanity's

necessities/options for the future. In a microcosm, the RFA process presented such an
opportunity for the exploration of future use and management options in relation to
forestry in Australia. Joint-exploration, however, did not materialise in the face of
multiple constraints which prompted me to explore questions about political processes,
the role of the public, the role of science, and the general rules of engagement within
processes of that kind. I learned to accept that constraints are a fact of life, many of
which are constructed and their existence perceptual.

The notion of ecological

sustainability has emerged against the background of growing perceptions of socioecological constraints facing humanity. The concept's perceptual nature has given rise
to the ecocentric-anthropocentric divide within the current sustainability debate
characterised by a fundamental disagreement over the absolutes in the context of
sustainability. Do limits exist, can we reach them, when do we reach them, are limits
really limiting or do they offer sufficient room for infinite variety and change? These
questions will remain perceptual and therefore a matter of ideological and philosophical
duality as evidenced by the paradigmatic stalemate in the debate.

Socio-ecological change is the only absolute in this debate. Our understanding of the
survival of social and other natural systems points towards a need for requisite variety so
as to ensure system adaptability and resilience in the face of change. Accordingly, a lack
of requisite variety will compromise system survival within a changing world. In various
forms, calls for pluralism within human political systems have been made throughout
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the last century (e.g. James, J 976 [1912]; Haraway, 1988). We have come to understand
the importance of variety/ pluralism in both social and ecological systems as
demonstrated, for instance, by the rise of the democratic state and, of late, in our
understanding of biodiversity protection.

It defies logic, but perhaps bespeaks the

human condition, that current sustainability debates - debates on our future on this
planet - face a doubly-bound closure toward pluralism in terms of input and rationality.

In terms of input, the ESD rhetoric recognises that policies dealing with the natural
environment and its future affect all of humanity, which is why the relevant literature
speaks of a collective, democratic shaping of the future. Yet, the debate has been largely
closed during the 1990s, involving non-representative elites such as politicians, business
leaders, and academics only poorly offset by NGOs.

In terms of rationality, these debates focus on variations of only one set of future
scenarios, based on various models of substitutability and growth with corresponding
levels of depletion and toxicity. These debates are quantitatively driven with little room
for discussions on quality.

It may indeed be possible to have man-made and

technologically underpinned substitutes for old growth forests, wilderness, and other
environmental amenities and systems. However, leaving ethical considerations aside,
the question may not be whether these substitutions are possible but whether they are
desirable. The RFA highlighted that human relationships with nature cannot be reduced
to scientific prescriptions for minimum viability. The debate was shown to have gone
beyond the question of what was needed from a science point of view (even where there
were obvious question marks) to what was wanted by stakeholders. Sustainability is a
construct shaped by social and ecological needs but also by visions on future quality and
desirability.

The last 100 years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the

quantitative standards of living in western world countries. Today, many indicators
suggest that since the 1960s the increases in these countries came at the expense of the
quality of life worldwide.

For its implicitness we do not seem to recognise the

constraints imposed by the very rationality that compels us to carry on with this now
globalised development trajectory. While we understand pluralism as an expression of
sustainability, implicitly we continue to treat it as an impediment.
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Appendix 1
Interview Schedule
General Questions:
When did you get involved in the WA RFA process?
Of what nature was your involvement in the WA RFA process?
What was your motivation for participating in the WA RFA?
Do you think WA needed a RFA?
What were your expectations on the WA RFA in terms of process and what it would
achieve?
What are your views on the RFA process in terms of community involvement?
What are your views on the science of the WA RFA process?
What are your thoughts on the outcomes of the RFA process?
Do you see from your point of view any procedural flaws within the RFA process? If
so, what flaws do you perceive?

Do you view the RFA as an adequate vehicle for what it aimed to achieve?
What, in your view, would an ideal process look like (e.g. if the RFA was to be done
again, what would you like to see done differently?)?
Do you have any further comments or more details to add to any of the preceding
questions? Should you wish to elaborate on any further issues on more neutral territory
I would gladly arrange a new interview time for you.
Do you have any recommendations as to whom I should also be talking to about the
WARFA?

Additional (Specific) Questions:
Who was in charge in scoping the CRA projects?
Do you regard the CRA projects' terms of reference as adequate?
Did the availability of time and resources have an impact on the CRA projects? If yes,
to what extent?

I

Who dealt with the research data after the studies were completed?
Are you satisfied with use of scientific data and the ways it has been dealt with
throughout the RFA process?

In your scientific opinion, does the WA RFA (as signed in May 1999) represent an
agreement that is scientifically sound?
From a science point of view, what are your thoughts on the JANIS criteria?
What are your views on clearfelling and old growth logging?
What, in your view, were the key issues of the forest debate in WA?
How would you describe the situation of the timber industry and the state of the forests
in general prior to the WA RFA?
What did the RFA mean to the forest industry?
Do you view the RFA as a Commonwealth imposition on an issue that is essentially a
State issue?
Who or what determined the composition of the Steering Committee?
How would you describe the nature of the dynamics between the WA State and the
Federal governments during the WA RFA process?

II

Appendix 2
Interview Consent Form
Background:
The aim of this research project is to investigate the Western Australian

CWA)

Regional

Forest Agreement (RFA) in the wider context of environmental policy-making in
Australia. The WA RFA will be treated as a common property resource (CPR) issue as
the forest areas specified in the agreement are held in common by the Western
Australian public and managed by the State Government and its agencies on behalf of
the public. This study acknowledges the fact that these forest areas are subjected to
multiple, overlapping, and potentially conflicting uses by a wide and diverse range of
resource stakeholders.

This research employs interviews with individual members of the scientific community,
government, environmental groups and other RFA stakeholder groups, aiming to (a)
help reconstruct the WA RFA process, (b) gain insights into the individual roles of RFA
stakeholder groups within the process, (c) investigate the behavioural dynamics of
stakeholder groups and (d) understand the perceptions of RFA stakeholders of the RFA
process and its outcomes.

Conditions:
The research participant will be involved in a face-to-face interview. The interviewee
has the right to refuse to answer questions and to terminate the interview at any time.
Supervisory approval (where applicable) has been obtained prior to the commencement
of the interview. For the purpose of data analysis the tape-recording of the interview is
considered essential; however, the recording may be refused by the research participant.
The interviewee will be guaranteed confidentiality and receive the opportunity to read
and edit the interview transcript with confidentiality in mind.

Furthermore, the

participant will be asked to approve the use of the interview data in the data analysis. At
no stage of the research project will the participant's identity be divulged in any written
form emanating from the project, and the participant is assured that all data will be kept
securely and be treated confidentially.

III

Although the researcher will take all necessary precautions to protect the identity of the
research participant, it needs to be acknowledged that individuals participate in this
research exercise at their own risk. This specifically relates to potential breaches of
workplace rules and regulations.

I understand the conditions outlined above and agree to voluntarily participate in this
research exercise:

Name: _________________________Date: _ _ __

Signature:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I agree with the recording of this interview:

D

YES

D

NO

I wish to review/edit the interview transcript:

D

YES

D

NO

If required, I permit viewing of interview

D

YES

D

NO

data by members of the supervisory panel
under the provision of confidentiality.

IV

Appendix 3
Telephone Interview Consent Form
Background:
The aim of this research project is to investigate the Western Australian (WA) Regional
Forest Agreement (RFA) in the wider context of environmental policy-making in
Australia. The WA RFA will be treated as a common property resource (CPR) issue as
the forest areas specified in the agreement are held in common by the Western
Australian public and managed by the State Government and its agencies on behalf of
the public. This study acknowledges the fact that these forest areas are subjected to
multiple, overlapping, and potentially conflicting uses by a wide and diverse range of
resource stakeholders.

This research employs interviews with individual members of the scientific community,
government, environmental groups and other RFA stakeholder groups, aiming to (a)
help reconstruct the WA RFA process, (b) gain insights into the individual roles of RFA
stakeholder groups within the process, (c) investigate the behavioural dynamics of
stakeholder groups and (d) understand the perceptions of RFA stakeholders of the RFA
process and its outcomes.

Interview Conditions:
The research participant will be involved in a telephone interview. Supervisory approval
(where applicable) has been obtained prior to the commencement of the interview. For
the purpose of data analysis the tape-recording and transcribing of the interview is
considered essential; the recording will be done via a listening device connected to a
dictaphone.

During the interview the participant will be informed of the

commencement and termination of the recording. It is the privilege of the research
participant, however, to object to the recording. The interviewee has the right to refuse
to answer questions and to terminate the interview at any time. The interviewee will be
guaranteed confidentiality and receive the opportunity to read and edit the interview
transcript with confidentiality in mind. Furthermore, the participant will be asked to
approve the use of the interview data in the data analysis.

At no stage of the research

project will the participant's identity be divulged in any written form emanating from the

V

project, and the participant is assured that all data will be kept securely and be treated
confidentially.

Although the researcher will take all necessary precautions to protect the identity of the
research participant, it needs to be acknowledged that individuals participate in this
research exercise at their own risk. This specifically relates to potential breaches of
workplace rules and regulations.

I understand the conditions outlined above and agree to voluntarily participate in this
research exercise:

Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Date: _ _ __

Signature:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I agree with the recording of this interview:

D

YES

D

NO

I wish to review/ edit the interview transcript:

D

YES

D

NO

If required, I permit viewing of interview

D

YES

D

NO

data by members of the supervisory panel
under the provision of confidentiality:
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Appendix 4
Review Letter and Data Authorisation Form
Dear [Name of Research Participant].

Please find attached the transcript copy of the interview conducted on [Date of
Interview]. This review copy provides you with the opportunity to revisit the interview,
and I would like to point out a number of issues for you to bear in mind while reading
the transcript.

1. Omissions
Should you wish to remove certain details and information from the transcript, please
cross out the relevant sections on the transcript. Should you be reviewing a digital copy
of the interview transcript, please highlight the sections to be deleted.

2. Additions
In some parts of the interview transcript you may identify areas you wish to add further
information to. In an event such as this simply write any extra information next to or
underneath the relevant section(s).

Alternatively, append the information to the

document with a reference to where you wish for it to be inserted.

3. Corrections and Clarifications
Should you identify any wrongly stated information or parts that require further
clarification please make the necessary adjustments in the manner previously described.

4. Confidentiality
Please examine the transcript with a view to whether any part of it could be
unequivocally attributed to you.

If certain parts of the transcript do not pass this

criterion, please highlight the phrase or section, and indicate (a) changes you wish to
make as above or (b) whether you wish to isolate that phrase or section as "NOT FOR
PUBLICATION."
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After you have reviewed the transcript please complete and sign the checklist form
attached and forward it together with all amendments and additions to the address
shown below or send it via e-mail. If you require a copy for your own purposes, please
indicate this on the checklist.

I would like to thank you for your time and help.

Your support 1s very much

appreciated; indeed it is crucial for the success of this research project.

Sincerely,

---

--~

,_

~-

-. -,.... - -

Martin Brueckner
(PhD candidate at the Centre for Ecosystem Management)

Note: Transcript sections marked with (... ) do not indicate omissions. These marks
merely represent long pauses, interjections or incomplete sentences.
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Appendix 5
RFA-Related National and International Agreements

International Agreements
•

Convention on .Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, 1971, Ramsar

•

Man and the Biosphere Programme, 1971 -

•

Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
1972, Paris

•

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

•

(CITES), 1973, Washington

•

Convention of Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979, Bonn

•

International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), 1983

•

Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992

•

Climate Change Convention, 1992

•

Statement of Forest Principles, 1992

•

Agenda 21, 1992

•

Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992

Regional Agreements
•

Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific, 1976, Apia.

•

Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and the Environment of
the South Pacific Region (SPREP), 1986, Noumea.

Bilateral Agreements
•

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and their
Environment, 1974 GAMBA).
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•

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of China
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and their
Environment, 1986 (CAMBA).

National Strategies and Commonwealth Initiatives
•

The Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (1992)

•

The National Forest Policy Statement (1992)

•

The National Grasslands Strategy

•

The National Rangelands _Strategy (1996)

•

The National Conservation Strategy for Australia (1983)

•

The National Coastal Strategy, and related Commonwealth Coastal Policy

•

The National Strategy for the Conservation of Biological Diversity (1996)

•

The Australian National Strategy for the Conservation of Australian Species and
Ecological Communities Threatened with Extinction (1996)

•

The National Greenhouse Response Strategy (1992)

•

The National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development (1992)

•

The National Decade of Landcare Plan

•

The National Marine Conservation Strategy (1995)

•

The National World Heritage Management System
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Appendix 6
Scoping Agreement Parameters
Scoping agreement will identify the following:

•

The region to be covered by, and the broad objectives of, the regional forest
agreement

•

Potential forest use and resource allocation options

•

The need for any further information collection and assessment

•

Specific information collection and decision making processes to be considered for
accreditation under the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment

•

The estimated cost of the agreement process (including administration, staff, data
and research costs)

•

A broad administrative framework for managing assessments and negotiating the
regional forest agreement

•

Proposed community, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (see Section 4), and
industry consultative opportunities, structures and time frames

•

Firm time frames for accreditation processes, for assessment and for negotiation of
the regional forest agreement

Excerpt taken from Commonwealth of Australia and Government of Western Australia
(1996b).
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Appendix 7
CAR Reserve System Principles
Comprehensiveness - includes the full range of forest communities recognised by an

agreed national scientific classification at appropriate hierarchical levels

Adequacy - the maintenance of ecological viability and integrity of populations, species

and communities.

Representativeness - those sample areas of the forest that are selected for inclusion in

reserves should reasonably reflect the biotic diversity of the communities.

Excerpt taken from Commonwealth of Australia (1992a).

XII

Appendix 8
CAR Reserve System Criteria
Biodiversity
(1)

As a general criterion, 15% of the pre-1750 distribution of each forest ecosystem
should be protected in the CAR reserve system with flexibility considerations
applied according to regional circumstances, and recognising that as far as
possible and practicable, the proportion of Dedicated Reserves should be
maximised.

(2)

Where forest ecosystems are recognised as vulnerable, then at least 60% of their
remaining extent should be reserved. A vulnerable forest ecosystem is one
which is:
i)

approaching a reduction in areal extent of 70% within a bioregional
context and which remains subject to threatening processes; or

ii)

not depleted but subject to continuing and significant threatening
processes which may reduce its extent.

(3)

All remaining occurrences of rare and endangered forest ecosystems should be
reserved or protected by other means as far as is practicable.

(4)

Reserved areas should be replicated across the geographic range of the forest
ecosystem to decrease the likelihood that chance events such as wildfire or
disease will cause the forest ecosystem to decline.

(5)

The reserve system should seek to maximise the area of high quality habitat for
all known elements of biodiversity wherever practicable, but with particular
reference to:
the special needs of rare, vulnerable or endangered species;
special groups of organisms, for example species with complex habitat
requirements, or migratory or mobile species;
areas of high species diversity, natural refugia for flora and fauna, and
centres of endemism; and
those· species whose distributions and habitat requirements are not well
correlated with any particular forest ecosystem.

(6)

Reserves should be large enough to sustain the viability, quality and integrity of
populations.

(7)

To ensure representativeness, the reserve system should, as far as possible,
sample the full range of biological variation within each forest ecosystem, by
sampling the range of environmental variation typical of its geographic range
and sampling its range of successional stages.
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Forest ecosystems are often distributed across a variety of physical
environments, and their species composition can vary along environmental
gradients and between.the micro-environments within the ecosystem.
This approach will maximise the likelihood that the samples included in the
reserve system will protect the full range of genetic variability and successional
stages associated with each species, and particularly those species with restricted
or disjunct distributions.
(8)

In fragmented landscapes, remnants that contribute to sampling the full range of
biodiversity are vital parts of a forest reserve system. The areas should be
identified and protected as part of the development of integrated regional
conservation strategies.

Old Growth Forest
(1)

Where old-growth forest is rare or depleted (generally less than 10% of the
extant distribution) within a forest ecosystem, all viable examples should be
protected, wherever possible. In practice, this would mean that most of the rare
or depleted old-growth forest would be protected. Protection should be
afforded through the range of mechanisms described in section 4.

(2)

For other forest ecosy~tems, 60% of the old-growth forest identified at the time
of assessment would be protected, consistent with a flexible approach where
appropriate, increasing to the levels of protection necessary to achieve the
following objectives:
• the representation of old-growth forest across the geographic range of the
forest ecosystem;
• the protection of high quality habitat for species identified under the
biodiversity criterion;
• appropriate reserve design;
• protection of the largest and least fragmented areas of old-growth;
• specific community needs for recreation and tourism.

Wilderness
(1)

Determiningpotential wilderness areas:

• Potential areas will have a minimum NWI rating of 12.

In addition, minimum

thresholds for each of the wilderness quality indicators will be set within the regional
context. These thresholds will take into account the importance of the indicators,
and in particular the biophysical naturalness component as a primary indicator.
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• The guideline for size which is considered generally appropriate for areas
encompassing forested wilderness is 8000 ha. However, thresholds of less than 8000
ha may apply to areas contiguous with the sea or which adjoin wilderness areas in
adjacent regions. Higher thresholds may apply within a region where wilderness is
extensive.
• The presence in potential areas of "nodal" areas with higher wilderness quality may
provide an indication of their significance and may guide the future management of
identified wilderness areas.
• Other factors which are not considered in determining the NWI rating may need to
be considered, in determining wilderness quality.

These factors may include the

include the impacts of exotic plants and feral animals on biophysical naturalness.

(2)

Determining wilderness boundaries:

• Potential areas identified using the NWI database will be considered in a regional
context to ensure their viability as wilderness, including considerations of shape.
• Both ecological and management features such as topography, water catchment
boundaries, roads and other transport routes, may be useful when delineating
boundaries.

Excerpt taken from Joint ANZECC/MCFFA National Forest Policy Statement
Implementation Sub-Committee (1997)
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Appendix 9
WA RF~ Management Structure
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